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CNIT 127: Ch 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)
Chapter 8 of CNIT 127 covers Windows overflow vulnerabilities, focusing on stack protections like security cookies, heap-based buffer overflows, and how to manipulate them. It explains various heap operations, potential exploitation techniques, including overwriting exception handler pointers, and discusses the use of COM objects on the heap. Additionally, it addresses other overflow vulnerabilities in the .data section and TEB/PEB, indicating a lack of public examples for such exploits.
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CNIT 127: Ch 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)
- 1. CNIT 127: ExploitDevelopment Ch 8: Windows Overflows Part 2
- 2. Topics • Stack Protection •Heap-Based Buffer Overflows • Other Overflows
- 3.
- 4. Windows Stack Protections •Microsoft Visual C++ .NET provides – /GS compiler flag is on by default – Tells compiler to place security cookies on the stack to guard the saved return address – Equivalent of a canary – 4-byte value (dword) placed on the stack after a procedure call – Checked before procedure return – Protects saved return address and EBP
- 6. How is theCookie Generated? • When a process starts, Windows combines these values with XOR – DateTime (a 64-bit integer counting time intervals of 100 nanoseconds) – Process ID – Thread ID – TickCount (number of milliseconds since the system started up) – Performance Counter (number of CPU cycles)
- 7. Predicting the Cookie •If an attacker can run a process on the target to get system time values • Some bits of the cookie can be predicted
- 8. Effectively 17 bitsof Randomness
- 9. How Good is17 Bits? • 2^17 = 131,072 • So an attacker would have to run an attack 100,000 times or so to win by guessing the cookie
- 10. Prologue Modification • __security_cookievalue placed in the stack at a carefully calculated position • To protect the EBP and Return value – From link Ch 8m
- 11. Epilogue Modification • Epilogueto a function now includes these instructions – From link Ch 8m
- 12. __security_check_cookie • Current cookievalue is in ecx • Compared to authoritative value stored in the .data section of the image file of the procedure • If the check fails, it calls a security handler, using a pointer stored in the .data section
- 13. Parameter Order • BeforeWindows Server 2003, local variables were placed on the stack in the order of their declaration in the C++ source code • Now all arrays are moved to the bottom of the list, closest to the saved return address • This prevents buffer overflows in the arrays from changing the non-array variables
- 15.
- 16. Overwriting Parameters • We'vechanged the cookie, but if the parameters are used in a write operation before the function returns, we could – Overwrite the authoritative cookie value in the .data section, so the cookie check passes – Overwrite the handler pointer to the security handler, and let the cookie check fail • Handler could point to injected code • Or set handler to zero and overwrite the default exception handler value
- 17.
- 18. Purpose of theHeap • Consider a Web server • HTTP requests vary in length • May vary from 20 to 20,000 bytes or longer (in principle) • Once processed, the request can be discarded, freeing memory for re-use • For efficiency, such data is best stored on the heap
- 19. The Process Heap •Every process running on Win32 has a process heap • The C function GetProcessHeap() returns a handle to the process heap • A pointer to the process heap is also stored in the Process Environment Block
- 20. The Process Heap •This code returns that pointer in eax • Many of the underlying functions of the Windows API use this default process heap
- 21. Dynamic Heaps • Aprocess can create as many dynamic heaps as required • All inside the default process heap • Created with the HeapCreate() function
- 22. • From linkCh 8o
- 23. Working with theHeap • Application uses HeapAllocate() to borrow a chunk of memory on the heap – Legacy functions left from Win16 are LocalAlloc() & GlobalAlloc(), but they do the same thing—there's no difference in Win32 • When the application is done with the memory, if calls HeapFree() – Or LocalFree() or GlobalFree()
- 24. How the HeapWorks • The stack grows downwards, towards address 0x00000000 • The heap grows upwards • Heap starts with 128 LIST_ENTRY structures that keep track of free blocks
- 25. Vulnerable Heap Operations •When a chunk is freed, forward and backward pointers must be updated • This enables us to control a write operation, to write to arbitrary RAM locations – Image from mathyvanhoef.com, link Ch 5b
- 26. Details • There isa lot more to it, involving these structures – Segment list – Virtual Allocation list – Free list – Lookaside list • For details, see link Ch8o
- 27. Exploiting Heap-Based Overflows: ThreeTechniques • Overwrite the pointer to the exception handler • Overwrite the pointer to the Unhandled Exception Filter • Overwrite a pointer in the PEB
- 28. Overwrite a Pointerin the PEB • RtlEnterCriticalSection, called by RtlAcquirePebLock() and RtlReleasePebLock() • Called whenever a process exits with ExitProcess() • PEB location is fixed for all versions of Win NT • Your code should restore this pointer, and you may also need to repair the heap
- 29. Win 2003 Server •Does not use these pointers in the PEB • But there are Ldr* functions that call pointers we can control – Including LdrUnloadDll()
- 30. Vectored Exception Handling •Introduced with Windows XP • Traditional frame-based exception handling stores exception registration records on the stack • Vectored exception handling stores information about handlers on the heap • A heap overflow can change them
- 31. Overwrite a Pointerto the Unhandled Exception Filter • First proposed at Blackhat Amsterdam (2001) • An application can set this value using SetUnhandledExceptionFilter() – Disassemble that function to find the pointer
- 32. Repairing the Heap •The overflow corrupts the heap • Shellcode will probably cause an access violation • Simplest repair process is to just make the heap look like a fresh, empty heap – With the one block we are using on it
- 33. Restore the ExceptionHandler you Abused • Otherwise, you could create an endless loop • If your shellcode causes an exception
- 34. COM Objects andthe Heap • Component Object Model (COM) Objects – An object that can be created when needed by another program – It has methods that can be called to perform a task – It also has attributes (stored data) • COM objects are created on the heap
- 35. Vtable in Heap •All COM classes have one or more interfaces, which are used to connect them to a program – Figure from link Ch 8p
- 36. COM Objects ContainData • If the programmer doesn't check, these data fields could be overflowed, into the next object's vtable – Image from link Ch 8q
- 37. • Vunerable COMobjects are often not fixed • Just added to the "killbit" list • Which can be circumvented • From link Ch 8qq; Image on next slide from link Ch 8r
- 39.
- 40. Overflows in the.data Section • If a buffer is placed before function pointers in the .data section • Overflowing the buffer can change the pointers
- 41. TEB/PEB Overflows • Inprinciple, buffers in the TEB used for converting ASCII to Unicode could be overflowed • Changing pointers • There are no public examples of this type of exploit