AHMR Volume 6 number 3 September-December 2020 online version

African Human Mobility Review
AHMR
VOLUME 6 NUMBER 3
SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 2020
SIHMAScalabrini Institute for
Human Mobility in Africa

AHMR Editorial Board
_______________________________________________________
Editor-in-Chief
Prof Mulugeta F. Dinbabo, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Managing Editor
Sergio Carciotto, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Board members
Prof Vivienne Lawack, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Prof Jonathan Crush, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Canada
Prof Loren Landau, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa
Prof Simon Bekker, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa
Prof Thomas Faist, Bielefeld University, Germany
Prof Raul Delagdo Wise, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico
Prof Laurence Piper, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Prof Shimelis Gulema, Stony Brook University, New York, USA
Prof Wilson Majee, University of Missouri, USA
Dr Delali Margaret Badasu, University of Ghana, Ghana
Dr Edmond Agyeman, University of Education, Winneba, Ghana
Dr Razack Karriem, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Dr Eria Serwajja, Makerere University, Uganda
Dr Ernest Angu Pineteh, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Dr Joseph Yaro, University of Ghana, Ghana
Dr Linda Oucho, African Migration and Development Policy Centre, Kenya
Dr Lothar Smith, Radboud University, Netherlands

1
AHMR is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed journal created to encourage and facili-
tate the study of all aspects of human mobility in Africa, including socio-economic,
political, legal, developmental, educational and cultural aspects.
Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence-based
research papers, AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the
analysis of current migration trends, migration patterns and some of the most im-
portant migration-related issues.
AHMR is jointly owned by the Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa
(SIHMA) and the University of the Western Cape (UWC).
The Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA) a member of the
Network of the Scalabrinian Centers for Migration Studies, with institutions in
New York, Paris, Rome, Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo and Manila.
AHMR is accredited by the Department of Higher Education and Training
(DHET) in South Africa.
Articles and reviews in AHMR reflect the opinions of the contributors.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the writ-
ten permission from the publisher.
ISSN 2410-7972 (online) ISSN 2411-6955 (print).
Copyright © 2020 by the SCALABRINI INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN MOBILITY IN
AFRICA and the UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE
SIHMA Physical address
47, Commercial St, 8001 Cape Town – South Africa
Tel. 0027 021 461 4741
Email: ahmr@sihma.org.za
Webpage: www.sihma.org.za

2
AHMR
___________________________________________________________________________________
AHMR African Human Mobilty Review - Volume 6 No
3, Sep-Dec 2020
Contents
3 Editorial
Mulugeta F. Dinbabo
6 Remittances and Economic Growth: Evidence from Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Uganda
Mulatu F. Zerihun
28 Determinants of Healthy Aging in Internally Displaced Communities in
Nigeria
Adebayo O.M. Makanju and Hafiz T.A. Khan
53 Between the Imagined and the Reality: Threat of African Invasion and
Spain’s Migration Policy in sub-Saharan Africa
Edmond Akwasi Agyeman
74 Differences in Mental Health among Migrants and Non-migrants in South
Africa: Evidence from the National Income Dynamics Study
Hemish Govera and Amiena Bayat
94 Externalization and Securitization as Policy Responses to African
Migration to the European Union
Victor H Mlambo

3
Editorial
___________________________________________________________________________________
Professor Mulugeta F. Dinbabo
Editor-in-Chief, African Human Mobility Review (AHMR)
University of the Western Cape
Email: editor@sihma.org.za
This issue consists of five articles. The first article by Mulatu Zerihun, entitled
“Remittances and Economic Growth: Evidence from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda”,
analyzes the possible effect of international remittances on the economic growth in
three selected countries within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD). The result demonstrates that remittances in the countries included in this
study serve as a ‘big-push’ towards economic development and have an impact on
growth. The findings also suggest the development of close cooperation with host
countries to leverage mutual benefit, as well as the establishment of successful
collaboration with migrants and diasporas. Finally, the research proposes future
studies on the impact of remittances on economic growth.
The second article by Adebayo Makanju and Hafiz Khan is entitled
“Determinants of Healthy Aging in Internally Displaced Communities in Nigeria”.
Different statistical techniques were used in the analysis, including cross-tabulation
and binary logistic regression. The findings of the research indicate a high mean
prevalence of old-age disability within the study area, irrespective of migration status
in North-eastern Nigeria. The research also establishes robust predictors of later-life
health outcomes as socio-economic and environmental determinants. Regression
analysis has also shown that a variety of factors have a negative influence on the well-
being of older adults. Based on the findings of the research, the authors recommend
that the proposed Sahelian ‘Green Belt’ afforestation project of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) targeting, in particular areas around
the Chad basin, be fully implemented. The authors also emphasize the urgent need
to formulate a systematic and evidence-driven integration between migration and
geriatrics.
The third article by Edmond Akwasi Agyeman is entitled “Between the
Imagined and the Reality: Threat of African Invasion and Spain’s Migration Policy in
Sub-SaharanAfrica”.ThestudyexaminesSpain’smigrationpolicyaimedatcontrolling
Sub-Saharan African immigration. A review of policy papers, migration statistics and
secondary literature was used methodologically in the research. The study indicates
that current migration trends and statistics do not support the perception that Spain
is being invaded by Sub-Saharan African migrants. The study also shows that the
restrictive policies of Spain neglect the long-standing interdependent trade and other
economic networks existing between Spain, North Africa and West Africa prior to
the European colonization of Africa.
The fourth article presented by Hemish Govera and Amiena Bayat is entitled

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
“Differences in Mental Health among Migrants and Non-migrants in South Africa:
Evidence from the National Income Dynamics Study”. The goal of this research was
to determine whether the prevalence of depressive symptoms is higher in South
Africa among migrants than among non-migrants. The study also investigates the
association of migration status with a wide set of sociodemographic variables in the
same context. The study applied descriptive analysis and logistic modelling to the
South African National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) panel datasets. The study
found a significant association between low sociodemographic status and the risk
of poor mental health. The report concludes that compared to the Western Cape,
residing in the rest of the South African provinces was associated with a lower risk of
poor mental health after controlling for migration status.
The final article, presented by Victor Mlambo, is entitled “Externalization and
Securitization as Policy Responses to African Migration to the European Union”.
The study explores the externalization and securitization of African migration to the
European Union (EU) and the consequences this has for migration governance and
management for both the EU and Africa. Methodologically, a qualitative research
approach was applied. The study concludes that EU-Africa migration management
needs to be focused on policies that address the main ‘push’ factors driving irregular
migration from Africa.
I believe these articles offer invaluable insights to scholars, practitioners and
students with the skills necessary to provide solutions to many of the major migration
challenges faced by society. They also provide informative advice for policy-makers
to think critically about migration policies, programs and projects by presenting the
continent with reliable empirical research evidence.

5
SIHMA is part of the Scalabrini International Migration Network (SIMN),
and joins an existing Network of Scalabrini Study Centres around the globe:
CSER (Centro Studi Emigrazione Roma), established in 1964 in Rome (Italy)
Journal: Studi Emigrazione
www.cser.it
CIEMI (Centre d’Information et Études sur les Migrations Internationales),
established in 1971 in Paris (France)
Journal: Migrations Société
www.ciemi.org
CMS (Center for Migration Studies of New York,) established in 1969 in New York (USA)
Journal: International Migration Review (IMR)
and Journal on Migration and Human Security (JMHS)
www.cmsny.org
SMC (Scalabrini Migration Center,) established in 1987 in Manila (Philippines)
Journal: Asian and Pacific Migration Journal (APMJ)
www.smc.org.ph
CEM (Centro de Estudios Migratorios), established in 1985 in São Paulo (Brazil)
Journal: Travessia
www.missaonspaz.org
CEMLA (Buenos Centro de Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos),
established in 1985 in Buenos Aires (Argentina)
Journal: Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos (EML)
www.cemla.com
Among our partners: CSEM (Centro Scalabriniano de Estudos Migratórios) in Brasilia
(Brazil); Journal: Revista Interdisciplinar da Mobilidade Humana (REMHU); www.csem.org.br
CEMLA, Buenos Aires
CIEMI, Paris
SMC, Manila
CSER, Rome
CEM, Sao Paolo
CMS, New York
SIHMA, Cape Town
Scalabrini Network
_______________________________________________________

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
Remittances and Economic
Growth: Evidence from Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Uganda
Mulatu F. Zerihun*
* Tshwane University of Technology, South Africa
Email: zerihunmf@tut.ac.za
The purpose of this study is to analyze the possible effect of international remittances
on the economic growth in three selected economies of Intergovernmental Authority
on Development (IGAD) member countries, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.
Remittance inflows have emerged as a key link between human mobility and
development. However, empirical findings on the nexus between remittances and
economic growth are either conflicting or at most mixed. This paper explores the
effects of remittances from international migration inflows on the economic growth of
three IGAD member countries. The study uses quantitative analysis that encompasses
the above-mentioned countries using the World Bank’s annual data from 1990 to 2017.
The novelty of this study is that it uses different approaches to solicit the short-run
and the long-run nexus between economic growth and remittance flow. The pooled
estimation result from fully modified least squares (FMOLS) shows that the logarithm
of remittances impacts the dependent variable, economic growth, positively but not
statistically significant. The Kao panel residual cointegration test shows that the null
hypothesis is not sufficiently supported by the data. There is a statistically significant
long-run relationship between the variables in the series. This implies that international
remittances have a long-run impact on the economic growth of the countries considered
in this study. In addition, remittances Granger cause economic growth, significantly at
a five percent level of significance in the long run. To verify the results from dynamic
panel regression, fixed-effects and random-effects estimation are used as a robustness
check. Both fixed-effects and random-effects estimation results confirm the same
findings as in the panel regression results. The findings from this paper will present
important policy inputs for policymakers on how remittances impact the economic
growth of the countries included in this study.
Keywords: Economic growth, remittances, migration, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda

7
INTRODUCTION
Migration has been an integral part of human dynamics since the very existence of
humans (Faist, 2016). However, in recent years, more than any time in human his-
tory, migration has become one of the topical issues under discussion among policy-
makers, politicians, the media, and citizens of both developed and developing na-
tions. When supported by appropriate policies, migration can contribute to inclusive
and sustainable development in both origin and destination countries, while also
benefiting migrants and their families. International migration is in large part related
to the broader global economic, social, political and technological transformations
that are affecting a wide range of high-priority policy issues (Kotze and Hill, 1997;
Koser, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2018).
Remittance inflows have emerged as a key link between human mobility and
development. There are also diverse theories that have emerged to explain the im-
pact of remittances on economic growth (development) of the countries of origin of
migrants. Among these are the developmental (neo-classical), the structuralist (de-
pendency), the pluralist, and the ‘big push’ theory.1
The big push theory states that a
‘big push’ or comprehensive investment package could jumpstart economic develop-
ment in the developing countries (Pragyandeepa, 2016). According to this theory, if
remittances are managed properly and if smooth inflow is facilitated, remittances can
play a ‘big push’ role for many African countries. These four theories are considered
reliable guides to ascertain how remittances impact economic growth in this study’s
three IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development)2
member countries.
Remittances are classified as current private transfers from migrant workers
resident in the host country for more than a year, irrespective of their immigration
status, to recipients in their country of origin (World Bank, 2019). Many recent em-
pirical studies suggest that remittances may have the potential to positively affect a
country’s economic growth and the development of financial systems in developing
or emerging countries (Yaseen, 2012; Ratha, 2013; Fromentin, 2018; Adeoye et al.,
2020; Azizi, 2020; Donou-Adonsou et al., 2020). Furthermore, remittances from in-
ternational migrants have proven to be a more sustainable source of foreign currency
for developing countries than other capital inflows, such as foreign direct investment,
public debt or official development assistance. However, the nexus between remit-
tances and development remains complex, especially with regards to the movement
of people, which contributes to the spread of global interdependence in social, eco-
nomic and political spheres. Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees
comprise current transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by
non-resident workers.
1
For a detailed discussion of the first three theories, see De Haas (2007) and for details on the ‘Big Push’ theory, see
Rosenstein-Rodan (1957).
2
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in the Horn of Africa, comprises member countries like,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. IGAD is also an AU-recognized Regional
Economic Community (REC) and building-block of the African Economic Community (AEC) under the AEC Treaty,
implying a commitment to establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) and regional infrastructure, including transport devel-
opment.
Remittances and Economic Growth: Evidence from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda

8
3, Sep-Dec 2020
Remittances inflow is one of the major sources of capital flows in the world.
Although developing countries, and especially sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), do not
have a bigger share of this capital flow, remittances are recognized as being very use-
ful in promoting household welfare and health in developing countries. Tah (2019)
found that remittances have a significantly positive impact on financial access in sub-
Saharan Africa. The objective of this study is to analyze and understand the possi-
ble effect of international remittances on the economic growth in the three selected
economies, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. These countries were chosen be-
cause they are among the top recipients of remittance inflows in East Africa. Further-
more, the study tests the causal relationship between international remittances and
economic growth in these countries, in relation to potential policy lessons. This study
analyzes the economic dynamism between international remittance flows and eco-
nomic growth among the three major economies in the East African region. There
are studies that assess the importance of remittance inflows in Africa as a continent,
while there are also specific country-level studies (Tah, 2019).
The motivation for this study is to research other sub-regions within SSA in
relation to their status as dominant migration destinations. Sub-regional analysis fa-
cilitates better corridor-specific policy interventions towards the realization of policy
goals and objectives relating to remittance inflows (Eyden et al., 2011). Given the sig-
nificant increase in migration and remittance flows to the continent, the literature on
international migration and development in sub-Saharan Africa has also increased.
However, the results from many studies are inconclusive or at best, they are mixed.
Therefore, there is still room for further investigation of the topic under discussion.
The next section provides a context on immigration in the three selected countries.
Section three presents the literature review; section four discusses data and method-
ology. Section five presents the result of the data analysis. The last two sections pre-
sent the overall discussion of the findings and conclusion, and policy implications,
respectively.
CONTEXT
Geographically sub-Saharan Africa is the region of the African continent that falls
south of the Sahara Desert. It is composed of all African countries and regions, situ-
ated completely, or partially, south of the Sahara. This study comprises a purposefully
selected group of three IGAD countries in SSA. This section highlights the context of
migration and remittance flows in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia is among the largest remittance receiving countries in sub-Saharan Africa
(Ratha and Mohapatra, 2011). The history of immigration in Ethiopia began with
revolution and an unstable political environment during the 1970s. Most of the
people who migrated at that time formed part of a well-educated urban section of

9
the population, who migrated to western countries in order to seek political asy-
lum (Geda and Irving, 2011). Political migration was followed by more economically
oriented migration, initially driven by the aspirations of the urban population. Cur-
rently, as the Middle East has become an important destination region for Ethiopian
migrants, the migrants are increasingly from rural areas, migrating to find better
(employment) opportunities abroad (Geda and Irving, 2011).
Remittances are an extremely important source of foreign exchange for Ethio-
pia, perhaps larger than the export earning of the country in its foreign exchange
generation capacity. However, the remittance industry in Ethiopia is besieged by
several problems (Reinert, 2007). The size and scale of remittances also create the
possibility for harnessing these flows for productive investment, thus contributing to
the long-term development of Ethiopia. According to studies by Isaacs (2017) and
Adugna (2019), the volume of remittances in Ethiopia could be between US$ 2 to 4
billion per year (an average of about US$ 3 billion). This is about the size of Ethio-
pia’s total export and development aid combined. However, a non-conducive policy
environment, as well as the lack of the deepening of liberalization of the financial
sector, remain key challenges in the sector. However, there are disparities between
the report released by the National Bank of Ethiopia and the World Bank reports on
the amount of remittance flows to the country (NBE, 2017; World Bank, 2018a)
Remittances play a large role in financial household dynamics in Ethiopia, no-
tably as risk-reducing instruments and as insurance against external shocks (Aredo,
2005). The diaspora has had an influential voice in Ethiopian politics and develop-
ment over the past decades. The role of the diaspora in the current socio-economic
transformation3
led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is significant. A few years before
the transformation in the country, the Ethiopian diasporas, especially those living
and working in the United States of America, declined the volume of remittances
and avoided the formal channels of sending remittances home as a way of bringing
about change. The Ethiopian government increasingly recognizes the importance of
remittances from its migrants, for the development of the country and has taken
several initiatives to optimize the effects of these financial flows. One of their goals
was to stimulate its diaspora members to send money through the official channels.
However, most financial transfers are still made through informal channels (ICMPD,
2008). This situation is directly related to the immigration status of the diasporas in
host countries. Most Ethiopian diasporas in Europe and North America have legal
documented immigration status that allows them to send remittances through of-
ficial channels. However, those in countries in the Middle East and the rest of Africa,
especially those in South Africa, are in a dire situation because of their unfavorable
immigration status in those countries.
3
Since taking over as head of the Ethiopian government in April 2018, Abiy Ahmed has increased his openness, by
lifting the state of emergency, releasing political prisoners, announcing economic openness, and privatizing national
enterprises. Regarding foreign policy, Abiy Ahmed surprisingly initiated an historic rapprochement with Eritrea. Abiy
Ahmed is applying his manifest skills to the vital purpose of transforming Ethiopia into a prosperous society (Collier,
2019; Financial Times, 2020).

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All Ethiopian migrants in South Africa, with exception of few professionals,
are unable to send money through formal channels and remit informally, as they do
not have the required official identification and thus lack access to formal financial
services. Complicated formal banking procedures and their cumbersome require-
ments make the lives of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa very difficult (Dinbabo,
2020). To ease the flow of remittances, countries like Mexico issue official identifi-
cation to their nationals living abroad, irrespective of their migratory status in the
destination country. The Ethiopian government may need to explore such options as
well. Likewise, the European Investment Bank and Mediterranean developing coun-
tries have signed an agreement to allow migrants in European Union (EU) coun-
tries access to simplified banking facilities upon presentation of consular registration
cards (UNCTAD, 2013). The South African government should also consider the
introduction of simplified banking facilities, in order to facilitate remittance outflows
through formal channels and make the process much easier and less costly, for the
benefit of both the host nation and the African diaspora.
Another discouraging factor with respect to remittance flows to Ethiopia
for the last two-and-a-half decades, was that the former government of Ethiopia had
introduced indirect (implicit and hidden) remittances tax, requiring recipients to
convert remittances to the local currency at uncompetitive officially-fixed exchange
rates (Adugna, 2019). In addition, the former Ethiopian government adopted a more
opportunistic approach, damaging the trust of migrants and diasporas, by issuing
diaspora bonds, which were embezzled by government officials due to poor govern-
ance, lack of economic and political stability, and unfavorable investment regulation.
However, in recent years, the current Ethiopian government has put in place several
positive measures to improve the operations and flow of formal remittances, as well
as to reduce the costs of transfers and to increase access to international remittance
services (Isaacs, 2017). However, the Ethiopian government should make continued
efforts in ensuring that the Ethiopian diaspora community is recognized by host na-
tions, through its diplomatic channels.
Kenya
After Kenya gained its independence from Britain in 1963, the inflow of remittances
to Kenya from the diaspora grew substantially and ranks among the top-four leading
sources of Kenya’s foreign exchange (Makori et al., 2015). This has been attributed
to the surge in the numbers of Kenyans living in the diaspora (Ngugi, 2015). From
the mid-1980s when Kenya began to experience an economic downturn and politi-
cal instability, a significant number of Kenyans left the country to join the diaspora
(Makori et al., 2015). They moved to countries where political and economic climates
were favorable and promising and became the initial remitters of funds to Kenya
from their destination countries. In fact, as far back as the post-independence pe-
riod, Kenya started experiencing a gradual increase in remittances (Ngugi, 2015).
Kenya has experienced a steady growth in the annual volume of diaspora re-

11
mittances recorded over the post-independence period. Remittances have become
a major source of foreign exchange and a key driver of economic growth, as under-
scored in the “Kenya Vision 2030”, Kenya’s national development policy blueprint
(Aboulezz, 2015). Ratha et al. (2011) found that remittances received in Kenya from
within Africa were used primarily for the construction of houses, while inflows from
outside Africa were devoted to long-term investments. The volume of emigrants
from Kenya and the volume of remittances have been increasing over time. The
Kenyan government has been very keen to encourage the diaspora to participate in
national development (World Bank, 2012). The importance of the diaspora has also
been recognized in the “Kenya Vision 2030”. Although remittances have the potential
to contribute to national development, there has been a lack of administrative
structures and mechanisms to enable the government to tap directly into these for-
eign inflows from the diaspora as an asset for investment and national development
(Government of Kenya, 2011).
Studies comparing poverty levels between Kenyan households that have no
remittances and those that receive remittances have recorded higher poverty levels
in the former than in the latter (Makori et al., 2015; Ocharo, 2015). It is well under-
stood that remittances do facilitate household incomes and are efficient anti-poverty
forces in poor or developing countries such as Kenya (Kamuleta, 2014; Nyamwange
and Paterson, 2015). Indeed, recipients of remittances are able to identify and uti-
lize the remittances to meet their most pressing poverty needs. Studies conducted
around Kenya on the well-being of households receiving remittances and those that
do not receive remittances reveal that the households that receive the remittances
are better off financially than those that do not receive the funds (Kamuleta, 2014;
Nyamwange and Paterson, 2015). The reason for this is that the recipient households
can invest the remittances in income-generating activities, which result in the reduc-
tion of their poverty standing and improvement of their living standards while the
non-remittance receiving households have no funds to invest. Furthermore, studies
carried out across Kenya indicate that remittance-receiving households experience
higher income levels and have a higher purchasing power than the non-remittance-
receiving households (Ngugi, 2015).
Uganda
Remittance inflows in Uganda have been increasing steadily while outflows have
remained relatively stable. Mobile money is increasingly successful in Uganda
and has driven a lot of the growth in remittance volume and value. The regulatory
requirements for cross-border remittances are relatively clearly outlined, compared
to many other SSA markets (Macmillan et al., 2016). There are no caps on outward
remittances and no foreign exchange controls exist. According to interviewees, the
regulator comes across as mostly open-minded and eager to advance the sector.
However, regulation around mobile money is unclear and lags the rapid technological
advances in the market, preventing inclusive development (Macmillan et al., 2016).

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
Uganda’s remittance market is thriving, yet costs are high (World Bank, 2018b).
Informal inflows and the costs of sending remittances are high, despite the significant
developments in the market structure, regulation and access which have taken place
in recent decades.
Remittances to Uganda have surpassed traditional foreign currency earners
with positive impacts on the economy. The positive role played by remittances
include that the aggregate flows into the economy have a direct effect on the national
reserves, foreign exchanges and GDP of the economy as well as improvement on
savings and credit ratios as a result of improved investment. Ugandan migrants are
sending remittances to improve conditions in their households and communities.
There is evidence that remittances in Uganda have the potential to significantly
contribute to development compared to the official aid (Bank of Uganda, 2016). In
Uganda, remittances tend to be more stable than other sources of foreign exchange,
and they are often countercyclical, helping sustain consumption and investment
during downturns and performing the role of a shock absorber (Ratha et al., 2011;
UNHCR and UNCDF, 2018).
Remittances play a key role for Ugandans and refugees alike, providing vital
funds from friends and families abroad. Uganda is a net recipient of remittances, given
the large flows that the Ugandan diaspora remits home as well as the inflows that are
supporting the enormous refugee population. Uganda’s open border policy towards
refugees from crisis-ridden neighboring countries is particularly commendable,
given the current global rise in anti-immigration sentiments and policies. The
remittance sector in the country is further advanced than in most countries in
Africa, yet challenges remain. While formal remittance flows into Uganda are the
sixth highest in Africa, it is estimated that both domestically and regionally a large
proportion of personal transfers are still made informally (Cooper et al., 2018).
LITERATURE REVIEW
Migrants remit money home from host countries for two main reasons, namely
altruism and self-interest motives. Altruism refers to the migrant’s assistance to the
family back home to meet basic family needs, while self-interest motives refer to
returns seeking purposes for remitting back home (Docquier and Rapoport, 2006).
Remittance inflows sometimes involve a complex arrangement that incorporate
features of both self-interest and altruism, such as risk diversification, consumption
smoothing and intergenerational financing of investments (Docquier and Rapoport,
2006). Migrants also remit home, aimed at maintaining good family ties to improve
their standing for inheritance purposes or to ensure that their assets back home are
properly taken care of. This is referred to as “enlightened self-interest”(Lucas and
Stark, 1985: 906).
This section presents empirical studies that have analyzed the relation between
remittances and economic growth. There are positive and negative externalities as-
sociated with international migration. One of the positive outcomes of migration is

13
remittance inflows, which have emerged as a key link between human mobility and
development. A great deal of literature is available on remittances both in developed
and developing countries. These include research in the area of development eco-
nomics (Corden and Neary, 1982; Barajas et al., 2011; Koyame-Marsh, 2012; Siddique
et al., 2012; Ahmed, 2013; Alvarez-Tinajero, 2013; Marwan et al., 2013; Richard and
Alfredo,2013; Kemegue et al., 2014; World Bank, 2014; Adarkwa, 2015; Asongu and
Nwachukwu, 2016; Hien et al., 2019; Tchamyou, 2020).
The empirical studies show that remittances can stimulate economic activity
and motivate entrepreneurial communities (Ahmed, 2013; Asongu and Nwachukwu,
2016; Tchamyou, 2020). Remittances help households move out of poverty and in-
crease educational and housing spending. Siddique et al. (2012) investigated the
relationship between remittances and economic growth in Bangladesh, India and Sri
Lanka and found that there is no causal relationship between economic growth and
remittances in India, that there was a two-way relationship between remittances and
economic growth in Sri Lanka, and that remittances did not lead to economic growth
in Bangladesh.
Studies from sub-Saharan African countries show mixed results. For example,
a study undertaken by Koyame-Marsh (2012) found that remittances do not lead
to economic growth in all ten ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African
States) countries studied. Marwan et al.’s (2013) study on Sudan found a long-run
positive relationship between growth, export and remittance. Richard and Alfredo
(2013) also found evidence of the strong role of remittances in promoting social wel-
fare in Ghana. Adarkwa (2015) examined the impact of remittances on economic
growth in four selected West African countries and found mixed results.
From another angle, Barajas et al. (2011) show that the growing consump-
tion of recipients may increase the local market price and appreciate the exchange
rate. As a result, the macroeconomic mechanism known as ‘Dutch Disease’4
may
yield the failing of the tradable sector of the domestic economy, the rising of the cur-
rent account deficit, and inflation with weaker monetary control (Hien et al., 2019).
Meanwhile, the growing pressure on wages may lead to job losses in the tradable
sector, while the sudden rise of prices would increase the labor costs in the non-
tradable sector, thus leading to the loss of national competitiveness. In addition, the
assessment of the impact of remittances on national growth suggests a wide range of
multifaceted causal links and presents both positive and negative aspects, which may
vary depending on the socioeconomic factors pertaining to each country at national
and local levels (Yaseen, 2012). Table 1 presents a summary of positive and negative
effects of remittances.
In general, sub-Saharan Africa lags woefully behind other regions in efforts at
effectively harnessing the benefits of remittance inflows while minimizing negative
externalities associated therewith. This has been attributed to several factors, such as
4
An economic model developed by Corden and Neary (1983), when a country experiences a resource boom due to a
tradable resource discovery and/or to an increase in a resource price.

14
3, Sep-Dec 2020
inadequate awareness of the drivers and constraints to these inflows through formal
channels, overregulation, underdeveloped financial systems and markets, lack of the
requisite structures and enabling environment (Kemegue et al., 2014). In 2013, in-
flows of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa increased by 3.5% (World Bank, 2014).
However, the increase was not distributed evenly across the continent. East African
countries experienced significant gains in remittance inflows while those in the West
African sub-region experienced only a marginal increase (World Bank, 2014).
Table 1: Summary of positive and negative effects of remittances
Source: Adapted from Alvarez-Tinajero (2013).
Positive effects Negative effects
National level • Increase national income if
remittances are transferred
through formal channels.
• Recipient countries
gain creditworthiness in
international credit markets.
• Recipient countries may
stabilize national balance of
payments accounts.
• Large remittance flows
could lead to currency
appreciation, with negative
consequences on exports.
Local/household/
individual level
• Boost local economies by
stimulating consumption,
demand for local goods
or services, fostering job
creation.
• Potentially increase local
capital to be reinvested in
businesses.
• Afford basic needs (food,
healthcare, education,
housing).
• Face risks (unemployment,
disability, accidents, illness).
• Afford social/family events
(town festivities, weddings,
funerals); strengthen social
networks; gain prestige,
power and resources (social
or material advantages);
Redress relative deprivation
(access to what others in
the immediate environment
have).
• Partly redress social (class,
gender) disadvantages.
• Generate a demand for
imported (rather than
locally produced) goods.
• Increase the price of land,
property, construction
materials.
• Exacerbate structural
inequalities between
recipients and non-
recipients.
• Foster dependency links
between senders and
recipients.
• Put pressure on
senders, leading to the
deterioration of their living
conditions.

15
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
This study uses data from the World Bank for the period from 1995 to 2017 to
evaluate the nexus between inflow remittance and economic growth among three
IGAD member countries, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. The descriptive
statistics for the data used in this study are presented in Table 2. The variable name
GR stands for the real GDP growth rate. Most studies use GDP as a proxy variable
for economic growth. However, using GDP growth rate better mimics the growth
trend in respective countries. GRi,t-1
is the lag of the logarithm of GDP growth rate,
INF is inflation, measured as the annual percentage change in the consumption
price index, INV is investment, lnGEXP is the logarithm of government expenditure,
lnPOP is the logarithm of population size as a measure of human capital, lnREM is
the logarithm of remittances over time, and OPN is openness to international trade,
defined as the ratio of the sum of exports plus imports of goods to total output. In
the analysis, many variables in this study are transformed to logarithm (log) forms.
In time series analysis, logarithmic transformation is often considered to stabilize
the variance of a series and mimics normal distribution (Luetkepohl and Xu, 2009).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Source: Author’s estimation from World Bank. 2017. Migration and Remittances
Data, Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Dec. 2018).
The larger values of skewness and kurtosis show asymmetric distribution around the
mean. This fact is also evidenced in the Jarque-Bera test that rejected the null hypoth-
esis of normality at 1 percent level of significance for most of the variables.
Methodology
Since the main objective of the study is to analyze the impact of international
G INF INV lnGEXP lnPOP lnREM OPN
Mean 6.339514 8.245000 22.86067 19.88665 17.52654 19.55574 17.22065
Median 6.081430 7.114000 21.47600 19.80179 17.41449 19.86758 14.15700
Maximum 13.57260 39.24500 39.41700 23.61567 18.34440 21.40123 125.9680
Minimum -3.458139 -8.999000 12.35200 15.94040 16.73840 16.03824 -22.65600
Std. Dev. 3.585341 7.624076 6.616714 2.154349 0.476774 1.307967 22.08911
Skewness -0.213900 1.538381 0.760696 -0.141375 0.299412 -0.837405 1.794977
Kurtosis 2.883122 7.925549 3.055465 2.052124 1.839402 2.799826 9.949993
Jarque-Bera 0.565438 96.96656 6.663418 2.812946 4.903541 8.179549 175.9217
Probability 0.753732 0.000000 0.035732 0.245006 0.086141 0.016743 0.000000
Sum 437.4264 568.9050 1577.386 1372.179 1209.331 1349.346 1188.225
Sum Sq. Dev. 874.1174 3952.604 2977.101 315.6030 15.45734 116.3329 33179.17
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 69

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
remittances on economic growth in the three east African countries, the effect of
international remittances on economic growth can be modelled as follows:
Methodology on panel unit root tests
As a common accord in the literature, panel unit root tests are superior to time series
unit root tests. Therefore, this paper uses panel unit root tests, as outlined in Im,
Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (2003) and Levin Lin and Chu (LLC) (2002). Following IPS
(2003) and LLC (2002) we have the following panel unit root regression:
Δyi,t
= αi
+ βi
yi,t-1
+ ∑j=1
δi,j
Δxi,t-j
+ εi,t
, i = 1, …, N, and t = 1 (1)
where:
Using equation (1), LLC (2002) test and IPS (2003) test are carried out,
respectively. The LLC test examines:
H0
: β1
=β2
=...=βN
=0 (no cointegration) against
H1
: βi<0, for some i (there is cointegration)
H0
and H1
are the null and the alternative hypotheses respectively, where the
appropriate lag order wij
from equation (1) must be determined. The conventional
t-statistics for testing βi
=0 is:
tβi
= (2)
The IPS adjusted t-statistics is expressed as:
tβi
= (3)
Note that the IPS test also examines similar null and alternative hypotheses as
specified in the LLC test.
Dynamic Panel Model Specification
Following from Giuliano and Arranz (2009) and Barguellil et al. (2013), the dynamic
panel model used in this study is specified as follows:
GRi,t
=β0
+ β1
GRi,t-1
+ β2
Infi,t
+ β3
lnInvi,t
+ β4
lnGEXPi,t
+ β5
lnPOPi,t
+ β6
lnREMi,t
+ β7
OPNi,t
+ εi,t
(4)
where:
GR - is the real GDP growth rate
GRi,t-1
- is the lag of GDP growth rate
INF - is inflation, measured as the annual percentage change in the consump-
tion price index
INV - is investment
lnGEXP - is the logarithm of government expenditure
lnPOP - is the logarithm of population size as a measure of human capital
wij

17
lnREM - is the logarithm of remittances over time
OPN - is openness to international trade, defined as the ratio of the sum of
exports plus imports of goods to total output
ε - is the error term
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Panel Co-integration Test
Given the nature of the data used in this study, the unbalanced panel data analysis is
employed. For the analysis of the long-run relationship among variables in this study,
an array of panel cointegration tests are employed to ensure the veracity of the find-
ings. Table 3 presents a summary of the panel unit root test.
Table 3: Panel Unit Root Test: Summary
Data, Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Dec. 2018). Note: *, **, and *** indi-
cate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Most of the variables are stationary at level, since the null hypothesis of unit root
is rejected. That makes our estimation reliable. Table 4 presents a summary of the
pooled estimation result from the panel fully modified least squares.
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit
root process)
Null: Unit root (assumes individual
unit root process)
Variable Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) W-stat
Level First differ-
ence
Level First difference
G -3.6445*** -2.71078***
INF -3.1507*** -2.84007
lnREM -1.68116** -0.31627
INV 0.04313 -2.04313** 0.32596
lnGEXP 2.43817 -1.80750** 4.48814 -2.28552***
OPN -4.4806*** -5.18781***
lnGDPP -2.96322***
D(lnPOP,2) -6.31624*** -6.05418***

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
Table 4: Pooled Estimation Result from Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS)
The logarithm of remittances impacts the dependent variable, economic growth,
positively but is not statistically significant. However, the first lag of economic growth,
inflation, and openness has affected economic growth during the study period
positively and significantly at five percent and one percent levels of significance
respectively. Table 5 presents the results from the Kao panel residual cointegration.
Dependent Variable: G (Growth rate)
Sample (adjusted): 1996- 2016
Periods included: 21 Cross-sections included: 3
Total panel (balanced) observations: 63 Cointegrating equation deterministic: C
Coefficient covariance computed using default method
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Probability
GT_1 0.198874 0.097510 2.039522 0.0464**
INF 0.138120 0.039452 3.500981 0.0009 ***
INV 0.031040 0.082528 0.376110 0.7083
lnGEXP 0.060569 1.354254 0.044725 0.9645
lnPOP -2.554559 5.488141 -0.465469 0.6435
lnREM 0.635389 0.540616 1.175305 0.2451
OPN 0.064385 0.014339 4.490131 0.0000***
R-squared 0.419647 Mean dependent var 6.269976
Adjusted R-squared 0.321097 S.D. dependent var 3.672979
S.E. of regression 3.026373 Sum squared residual 485.4234
Long-run variance 3.462648

19
Table 5: Kao Panel Residual Cointegration Test for long-run
relation between remittance and economic growth
The Kao panel residual cointegration shows that the null hypothesis is not sufficiently
supported by the data. There is a statistically significant long-run relationship between
the variables in the series. This implies that international remittance, our variable
interest, has long-run impact on the economic growth in the countries considered in
this study. Table 6 presents a summary of the Granger causality test.
Table 6: Granger Causality Test
There is not enough evidence to accept the null hypothesis. Therefore, remittances
Granger causes economic growth – significantly at 5 percent level of significance in
the long run.
Robustness Check
To verify the above dynamic panel regression result, fixed-effects and random-effects
estimation are used as a robustness check. As shown in Tables 7 and 8, both fixed-
effects and random-effects estimation results confirm the same findings, as shown
in other panel regression results. That is, the logarithm of remittances impacts
Series: G, GT_1, INF, INV, LNGEXP, LNPOP, LNREM, OPN
Sample: 1995 2017
Included observations: 69
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 5
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
t-Statistic Prob.
ADF -3.447484 0.0003***
Residual variance 11.10221
HAC variance 1.559893
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1995 2017 Lags: 2
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
lnREM does not Granger Cause G 63 4.29316 0.0182**
G does not Granger Cause LNREM 0.24848 0.7808

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
economic growth in the panel of countries included in this study positively, affects
economic growth, but is not statistically significant. However, in the random-effects
analysis, the estimation result is negative but not statistically significant. The other
variables like inflation and openness have affected economic growth during the study
period positive and statistically significant in both models (see Tables 7 and 8). These
findings are in line with economic theories on growth.
Table 7: Fixed-effects Estimation Results
Fixed-effects(within)regression Number of obs. = 66
Group variable: i Number of groups = 3
R-sq: Obs. per group:
Within = 0.3450 min = 22
Between = 0.2236 avg. = 22.0
overall = 0.0011 max = 22
F (7,56) = 4.21
corr(u_i,χb) = -0.9435 Prob> F = 0.0009
G Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Gt_1 0.13875 0.1273 1.09 0.280 -0.1161 0.3937
lnREM 0.7595 0.7387 1.03 0.308 -0.7204 2.2394
INV -0.0132 -0.1086 -0.12 0.904 -0.2307 0.2043
lnGEXP 1.5202 1.6533 0.92 0.362 -1.7917 4.8322
OPN 0.0633 0.0184 3.44 0.001*** 0.0264 0.1001
INF 0.1108 0.0529 2.09 0.041** 0.0048 0.2168
lnPOP -8.9945 6.5789 -1.37 0.177 -22.1737 4.1846
_cons 116.3416 89.7058 1.30 1.30 -63.3503 296.0334
Sigma_u 9.0418
Sigma_e 2.9079
rho 0.9063
F_test that u_i=0: F(2,56) = 2.47 Prob> F= 0.0942

21
Table 8: Random-effects Estimation Results
Data, Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Dec. 2018). Note: ** and *** indicate
significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
CONCLUSION
Human migration is one of the topical issues under discussion among policy-makers,
politicians, the media, and individual citizens of both developed and developing
nations. When supported by appropriate policies, migration can contribute to
inclusive and sustainable development in both origin and destination countries,
while also benefiting migrants and their families. However, sub-Saharan Africa
lags woefully behind other regions in efforts at effectively harnessing the benefits
of remittance inflows while minimizing negative externalities associated therewith.
This study investigated the effect of remittances on economic growth in three IGAD
member countries, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, for the period ranging from
1995 to 2017. The pooled estimation result from panel fully modified least squares
(FMOLS) shows that the logarithm of remittances impacts the dependent variable,
economic growth, positively but not statistically significant. The Kao panel residual
cointegration test shows that the null hypothesis is not sufficiently supported by the
data. There is a statistically significant long-run relationship between the variables
Fixed-effects(within)regression Number of obs. = 66
Group variable: i Number of groups = 3
R-sq: Obs. per group:
Within =0.3033 min = 22
Between =0.9807 avg. = 22.0
overall = 0.4073 max = 22
Wald chi2(7) = 39.85
corr(u_i,χ) = 0 (assume) Prob> chi2 = 0.0009
G Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Gt_1 0.2144 0.1192 1.80 0.072 -0.0192 0.4481
lnREM 0.0291 0.0571 0.06 0.955 -0.0419 1.0426
INV 0.1320 0.0887 1.49 0.137 -0.9376 0.3059
lnGEXP -0.0268 0.4648 -0.06 0.954 -1.7917 0.8839
OPN 0.0564 0.0185 3.04 0.002*** 0.0200 0.0927
INF 0.1198 0.0527 2.27 0.021** 0.0165 0.2230
lnPOP -0.0225 1.6846 -0.01 0.989 -3.3243 3.2793
_cons 0.3749 31.7787 0.01 10.991 -61.9103 62.6602
Sigma_u 0
Sigma_e 2.9079
rho 0 (fraction of variance due to u_i)

22
3, Sep-Dec 2020
in the series. This implies that international remittances, our variable interest, has
a long-run impact on the economic growth in the countries considered in this
study. In addition, remittances Granger cause economic growth – significantly at
5 percent level of significance in the long run. In this study, the impact of human
capital is captured using the population size of the respective countries. However,
the result comes with a negative effect. Such result is not surprising, given that the
countries included in this study have relatively higher population growth rates that
may hamper capital formation because of high levels of consumption. Education and
training could better capture the effect of human capital on economic growth.
The countries included in this study are known for poor governance, lack of
economic and political stability, and unfavorable investment regulation that deters
the inflow of remittances. The trust deficit between the diaspora and governments
should also be addressed to promote diaspora investment appetite in local financial
instruments, like bonds and other financial assets. Policymakers in Ethiopia, Kenya
and Uganda should formulate policies that can stimulate additional remittances
from their diaspora. Governments, institutions, and civil society are interested in
mobilizing remittances, as illustrated by the growth initiatives targeting the financial
and human capital of migrants and diasporas. Remittances can serve as a ‘big-push’
towards economic growth in the countries included in this study; countries need to
design appropriate policies suitable for money transfer. In addition, there should be
strong collaboration with host countries to harness mutual benefit in both ends. The
migrant-sending countries should also create a strong collaboration with migrants
and diasporas, with respect to their rights, and improve their quality of life in host
countries. Future studies in this area may focus on the channels through which
remittances impact economic growth.

23
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3, Sep-Dec 2020
Determinants of Healthy
Aging in Internally Displaced
Communities in Nigeria
Adebayo O.M. Makanju* and Hafiz T.A. Khan**
* Department of Economic Planning and Budget, Lagos State Government, Nigeria
Email: adebayomakanju@gmail.com
** University of West London, UK
Email: hafiz.khan@uwl.ac.uk
The main objective of this research article, is to assess the effect of socio-economic
and environmental determinants on the healthy aging status amongst internally dis-
placed migrants and non-migrants nestled within the environmentally stressed regions
of Northeastern Nigeria. Methodologically the study utilized secondary data from the
Nigerian IDP Survey 2018 (Location-Northeastern States; n-1293 adults aged ≥50;
male n-63.1%, female n-36.9%) using a multi-stage stratified random sample. Varied
statistical techniques such as cross-tabulation and binary logistic regression were used
to analyze the dataset. The study results show a high mean prevalence of old-age dis-
ability within the study area, irrespective of migration status in Northeastern Nigeria.
Secondly, socio-economic and environmental determinants were robust predictors of
later-life health outcomes. In addition, the regression revealed that concomitant fac-
tors such as age, gender and sanitation have a negative effect on older adult wellness
and well-being. Meanwhile, the migration status of internally displaced persons (IDPs),
although in most cases forced, significantly improves the odds of aging healthily. Con-
clusively, the quality of life of the older adults, irrespective of migration status, is poorly
impacted by diminishing familial supports, social exclusion, non-existent social secu-
rity program and non-existence of healthcare infrastructure. Based on the study results,
we recommend that the proposed Economic Community of West African States (ECO-
WAS) Sahelian “Green belt” afforestation project targeted, especially to areas around
the Chad basin be fully implemented, as this project will help mediate the perennial
conflicts between the herdsmen and farming communities. Furthermore, there is an
urgent need to formulate an integration between migration and geriatrics which would
be comprehensive, and evidence-driven. Study recommend that budgetary allocation
for health should have a flooring capped at 20% of the national budget..
Keywords: environmental stress, forced migration, population aging, Nigeria,
Sullivan method

29
INTRODUCTION
The combined impacts of conflicts, environmental and climatic changes on socio-
economic development as witnessed in the 21st century are complex (IOM, 2018;
IDMC, 2019a; IDMC-GRID, 2020). This trident portends short- and long-term
challenges to policy audiences and nations worldwide, in most cases precariously
alteringthedemographicstructureswhilealsohinderingthesustainabledevelopment
drive of most countries. Increasingly more regions around the globe are experiencing
unprecedented levels of habitat loss due to factors such as climate change, change in
land use/land cover, desertification, and water pollution. This has devastating effects
on the most vulnerable communities, particularly in least developed countries
(LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small island developing
states (SIDS) (Hartter et al., 2015; IPCC, 2018; Strandberg and Kjellström, 2019).
In order to better comprehend the scale of this phenomenon, according
to the IDMC-GRID (2020), 33.4 million people were recently internally displaced,
making 2019 the year with the highest annual increase since 2012. A staggering
8.5 million of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) were driven by conflict and
violence, while 24.9 million IDPs were triggered by around 1,900 recorded disaster
events across 145 countries and territories. The status of 23.9 million of these IDPs
was directly attributable to weather-related disasters (See in Figure 1). During 2019,
a total of 75.5% of IDPs, which accounted for an estimated 34.5 million IDPs, were
resident in just 10 countries. Of these IDPs, 18.3 million are children under the age of
15 years, while 3.7 million are persons aged 60 years and above (IOM, 2018; IDMC-
GRID, 2020).
Climate-induced displacement is fluid and widespread, constantly
reshaping migration patterns across different regions and most especially in the
LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS nations. According to the UNHCR (2018) an estimated
79.5 million people are currently displaced worldwide, which constitutes about 1%
of the human population derived from 28 million new humanitarian crises across
148 countries and territories. It is evident that the humanitarian crises abound and
persist unabated (IDMC-GRID, 2020). The global migration picture must, therefore,
be seen as a sum of many parts and it is important to put recent developments in
specific regions into global and historical contexts.
Determinants of Healthy Aging in Internally Displaced Communities in Nigeria

30
3, Sep-Dec 2020
Figure 1: Annual distribution of internal displacement by causation (2008-2019)
Source: Authors' compilation (2020)
Sub-Saharan Africa
In Africa, inter-tribal conflicts are the leading source of internal displacement1
alongside the effects of environmental change. The continent at present houses
over one-third of the global internally displaced population. This is in spite of the
unanimous adoption by the different African states of the African Union Convention
for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons plan in 2012
(AU, 2012). The sub-Saharan region which comprises 47 nations is still home to
an estimated 16.8 million IDPs. Conflicts and violence within the sub-region
contributed 4,590,000 new IDPs and 3,448,000 IDPs were displaced as a result of
environmental stress. This is evidenced in the temporal escalation of violence and an
overall deterioration of security, mostly within the Sahelian sub-regions, that are still
ongoing in nations like Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (World Bank, 2017a).
Causes of internal displacement in Nigeria (stylized fact)
The problem of forced migration and internal displacement in Nigeria persisted
post-independence, and this has often been triggered by ethno-religious communal
1
In this study the terms internal displacement and forced migration are used interchangeably.

31
disputes, electoral violence, a civil war in 1967 and natural disasters such as flooding
and desertification. Nigeria is currently ranked as one of the highest IDP-dense
countries with one of the highest numbers of conflict-induced IDPs (IOM, 2018;
GTI, 2019). Since 2013, the country has experienced an unprecedented spike in
internal displacement due to the insurgency in the northern part of the country
caused by Boko-Haram2
(north-east) and Fulani herdsmen3
(north-west). Together,
they account for 78% of terror-related incidents and 86% of deaths from terrorism
(Mohammed, 2017; GTI, 2019). The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Round
13 Report estimated 1,770, 444 IDPs in the northeastern parts alone. Displacement in
this area is principally caused by conflict (1,770,444) attributed to the Boko-Haram
Islamist group, coupled with the intensification of the conflict between pastoralists
and the nomadic Fulani terrorist-facilitated further displacements leading to a total
of 2,706,152 IDPs across 13 states in Nigeria (IOM, 2018).
Environment-induced migration is occurring at an increasing rate in North-
ern Nigeria, considering that 613,000 persons were recently displaced as a direct
impact of environmental stressors (IDMC, 2019b). Studies have shown that the
Sudano-Sahelian Ecological Zone (SSEZ) suffered from seasonal and inter-annual
climatic variability as measured in most parts of the country (See in Figure 2). This
led to increased droughts and the inevitable onset of the desertification processes,
particularly since the 1960s decrease in rainfall in the range of about 3-4% per decade
since the beginning of the 19th century (FRN, 2003; Abaje et al., 2011). The Sahelian
droughts of the 1970s and the 1980s ravaged this zone and left farmers impoverished
(Ati et al., 2007). This zone falls within the “Arc of Tension”, a region burdened by
successive disasters in the form of flash flooding, coupled with the slow onset of ex-
treme drought and desertification (Abaje et al., 2011; Abaje et al., 2012).
2 Boko-Haram is known as the Islamic State in West Africa, and was formerly known as Jama’at Ahl as-Sunnah
Lid-Da’wahwa’l-Jihad (Founded in 2002).
3 Fulani extremists are from the Fulani tribe in Northern Nigeria and from other neighboring countries in the Sahel, a
tribe known for cattle herding.

32
3, Sep-Dec 2020
Figure 2: Climatic Transition in Nigeria (1901-2016)
Northeastern Nigeria is being structurally transformed and overburdened by
forced migration, triggered by conflicts and disasters resulting in clashes between host
communities and the displaced population over scarce socio-economic resources.
This humanitarian situation in the Northeast is deteriorating, with almost 8 million
people heavily dependent on humanitarian aid. An estimated 823,000 people are
out of the reach of aid organizations, and little is known about their health needs.
According to the UN, 5.4 million people are in dire need of healthcare (UN OCHA,
2018).
There is a growing need to view the resultant problems associated with
migration and non-migration within this region through new lenses, as they are far
too complex to be characterized in just a binary perspective. In compositional terms,
most people and households that face climate risks do not migrate, particularly
in LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS. On the other hand, forced migration is increasingly
recognized as a leading source of global health crises. Evidence shows that conflict-
driven displacement has profound impacts on both the physical and mental health
of those displaced persons, among which consist of older adults (Burns et al., 2018).
Older adults, irrespective of legal status, are more susceptible to social and
healthcare exclusion, especially with the decline of the traditional familial support
system. Despite their increased health risks, a large number of older persons within

33
this conflict-stricken region lack access to adequate levels and quality of health care.
Older adults within host communities have to compete with older IDPs for the limited
healthcare services and aid provided by often over-stretched local governments. This
“double stress” puts additional strain on the scarce resources, further reducing their
coping ability and weakening their resilience (Le Van et al., 2018; UNHCR, 2018; UN
OCHA, 2018).
Figure 3: Conceptualizing the research problem
Source: Authors' construct (2020)
The adverse impacts of conflict-driven displacement on health outcomes are well-
documented (see for example, Julca and Paddison, 2010; Heudtlass et al., 2016). This
paper argues that inasmuch as some people migrate willingly and voluntarily, there
are other forms of migration that occur under forced or coerced conditions as far as
Nigeria is concerned. Some scholars refer to the voluntary–forced migration nexus as
continuum (Oucho, 2009; Koppenberg, 2012). This work does not delve into the vol-
untary and involuntary migration nexus; rather, it focuses on internal displacement
as a form of forced migration (Mooney, 2005; Terminski, 2013). In addition, less is
known about the nexus between migration status and determinants of healthy aging
in Nigeria. The main objective of this article is to assess the effect of socio-economic

34
3, Sep-Dec 2020
and environmental determinants on healthy aging status among displaced migrants
and non-migrants nested within the environmentally stressed region of Northeast-
ern Nigeria. The study also seeks to contribute to the emerging body of literature on
global population aging studies as impacted by migration, while also contributing to
the discussion on the dynamics of internal displacement in Nigeria.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the past few decades, the literature on migration has paid less attention to the sub-
ject of forced migration, although this sub-field in migration has its roots in the early
writings of contemporary migration studies. Ernst Georg Ravenstein (1834–1913)
propounded in the Laws of Migration that “bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation
and unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, and even compulsion
(slave trade, transportation) produce flows of migrants, but none of these flows can
be compared in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in the most
men to ‘better’ themselves in material aspects” (Ravenstein, 1885:167-227; 1889:224-
310.).
The voluntary form of migration enthused by economic causes propagated
by Ravenstein has dominated and influenced major migration theories (see: mobil-
ity transition by Zelinsky, 1971; dual economy model, 1950/1960) throughout the
twentieth century up to the present. The reduction of human mobility due to eco-
nomic pull factors alone overlooks certain important immeasurable social factors in
contemporary times such as environmental and climatic stressors (Terminski, 2013).
Healthy aging
Currently, more than 11.6% of global populations are persons aged 60+ years (about
901 million persons) and this number is projected to rise to about 1.4 billion people
by 2050 (UN, 2015). Similarly, the eastern and south-eastern Asian sub-regions are
anticipated to experience the largest demographic transition (312 million people),
while sub-Saharan Africa is projected to experience the largest increase in life expec-
tancy gain (11.4 years), rising from 49.1 years (1990-1995) to 60.5 years (2015-2020),
and a further gain of 7.6 years is anticipated between 2015-2050 (UNDP, 2018; UN-
DESA, 2020).
The global advancement in healthcare and living standard has translated into
prolonging life expectancy of people worldwide. Thus, a person who turns 60 years
old could expect to live an additional 17 years in 2015-2020, and this number could
rise to 19 years in 2045-2050. Those living in sub-Saharan Africa are projected to live
only an additional 14.2 years in 2045-2050 (Higo and Khan, 2014; UN DESA, 2020).
However, more emphasis should be placed on the quality of life, rather than longev-
ity alone, optimizing opportunities for health, participation and security in order to
enhance the quality of life of older adults in society. The World Health Organization
(WHO) defines healthy aging as, “the process of developing and maintaining the

35
functional ability that enables well-being in older age” (WHO, 2015).
The Nigerian government confronts a major problem, optimizing health op-
portunities, social inclusion and security for older adult IDPs in order to promote
healthy aging. Elder et al. (1994) showed the adverse effects of conflicts and war on
the physical health of persons older than 30 years. In addition, Kuh et al. (2002),
Shaw and Krause (2002), Krause et al. (2004) all revealed that early-life events are
adversely related to health outcomes in middle- and older age. The WHO (2015b)
report, points out that healthy aging status is significantly influenced by social de-
terminants of health, for instance persons classified as socio-economically disadvan-
taged, such as in the case of most IDPs, who experience markedly poorer health in
older age.
Furthermore, the review of some studies revealed problems of inequality in
health status and well-being among older people, highlighting different factors,
such as socio-economic status (Lindström et al., 2017), age (Aboderin, 2010; 2011),
nationality (Axén and Lindström, 2002), educational status (Ibáñez and Moya,
2006), marital status and economic status (Kirchhoff and Ibáñez, 2002), emotional
support (Ahs et al., 2006), the transformation of familial support (Higo and Khan,
2014; Khan et al., 2017; Khan, 2019), and not having a partner present. These factors
are associated with poorer health and well-being, and in general lower quality of life
(Gómez-Olivé et al., 2010; Phaswana-Mafuya et al., 2013).
METHODS AND DATA
The study utilized the Nigerian IDP Survey (FRN, 2018), a household survey with a
multi-stage stratified random sample. Six Northeastern states were surveyed namely:
Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe (See in Figure 4). This region is
characterized by harsh climatic conditions, poor infrastructure, poor service delivery
and frequent epidemic outbreaks. The sampling frame consisted of a list of wards with
IDP household counts in the six states, provided by the International Organization
for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of 2017. The survey is
representative for IDPs and host communities, defining host communities as the
non-displaced population living in the Enumeration Areas (EAs) with displaced
populations. All the households in the selected EAs were first listed and 12 IDP
households and 12 (or multiples of it) host community households were randomly
selected and surveyed per EA, to reach the designated sample size.

36
3, Sep-Dec 2020
Figure 4: Nigeria showing its Northeastern geo-political zones
Variable measurement
The WHO (2015b) notes that healthy aging is significantly influenced by the
social determinants of health. This implies that people from socio-economically
disadvantaged groups experience markedly poorer health in older age and have a
shorter life expectancy. Social determinants of health (SDOH) encompass the social,
economic and environmental factors that can affect an individual’s health and quality
of life. For older adults in particular, SDOH-related factors can have significant
implications for their ability to live independently in advanced age.
We selected physical disability (B_3_3_disal_3) as a proxy of healthy aging
status for the outcome. The study justification for this decision of selecting sensory
impairment as a health status metric is based on the fact that it is a prevalent
cause of unhealthy aging in low- and lower-middle-income countries like Nigeria.
Environmental factors include the household’s type of toilet (C_1_21_toilet), source
of household drinking water (C_1_11_water_home), and type of waste disposal
(C_2_21_waste_disposal). Economic factors consist of consumption quintile
(Quintile_tc), labor participation status (Status), and household density (HH_sleep).
Social factors include age (Age_cat_g), migration status (Migr_idp), educational
status (edu_level_g_c), and household dependency status (Depend_share).
For the purpose of this study, we selected persons aged 50 and above, rather

37
than the generally utilized age of 65 years, for two reasons. Firstly, the life expectancy
age of the average Nigerian is marginally greater than 50 years (Ex=54.49year;
Male=53.79/Female=55.62). Secondly, the Northeastern region is considered the
poorest in Nigeria, with socio-economically disadvantaged groups experiencing
markedly poorer health in older age and shorter life expectancy.
In Nigeria ethnicity and religious identities are often intertwined, forming part
of a complex pattern of social exclusion. Religious minorities experience social, po-
litical and economic exclusion, as a result of these differences (UNECA, 1991; World
Bank, 2017b; Idris, 2018; Le Van et al., 2018). Interestingly, the majority of IDPs in
Northeastern Nigeria relocate to places where they connect with host communities
with shared ethnicity and religious beliefs.
Data analysis
We utilized descriptive statistics, alongside the disability-free life expectancy
(DFLE) calculation, a health concept centered on the health expectancies proposed
by Sullivan (1971). The Sullivan health expectancy reflects the current health of a real
population adjusted for mortality levels and independent of age structure (Bone et
al.,1995). The Sullivan health expectancy provides a means of comparing the health
states of an entire population at two time-points or of two different populations at
the same time-point. This stated merit helps advance scholarship in migrant studies,
as in the case of this study, because it affords us the opportunity to determine health
disparities between persons in internally displaced communities and persons in their
host communities.
The binary logistic regression technique was also utilized in order to actualize
the aim of the study. This technique is one of the often-used machine-learning
algorithms for binary classification that utilizes a performance baseline (Hosmer et
al., 2013). This technique was used to determine the binary healthy aging outcome
between the host and migrant communities, predicted by an assemblage of varied
factors. Furthermore, this technique has significant importance in the measuring of
migrant’s health outcomes. The binary logistic regression model is given below,
Y=β0
+β1
X1
+β2
X2
+ βqXq (1)
Logit (π) = β0
+ β1
X1
+β2
X2
+ ... + βpXp (2)
Logit(p(π))=log(1-p(x)
)=α+βx
(3)
(Then for x=0 (Healthy aging), x=1(Unhealthy aging))
Where; β1
→βq
=coefficient for q
β1
→βq
are regression parameters; X1
, X2
…. Xq are explanatory variables, and π is the
probability of success. β = Regression coefficient; α = Constant.
In[1-p
]= β0
+β1
X1
+β2
X2
+βq
Xq
(4)
Since the study was assessed at an individual level, the probability of an individual
p(x)
p

38
3, Sep-Dec 2020
aging in a healthy manner is needed, the binary logistic regression:
P= (5)

Overview characteristics of the sample and to identify factors associated with healthy
aging status p. The binary logistic regression analysis can be used to determine the
relationship between a binary response and continuous or categorical explanatory
variables (Vittinghoff et al., 2011; Long and Freese, 2014). In addition, logistic
regression gives a discrete outcome, unlike other analytical techniques such as linear
regression, that gives a continuous outcome.
Yi
=
Logit (Health Status) = β0
+ Social factor + Economic factors + Environmental
factors+ Xn
(6)
Predictor variables utilized: X1
-Age, X2
-migration status (non-migrants =1,
migrants =2), X3
-educational status, X4
-gender (male=1, female=2), X5
-labor
market participation, X6
-household dependency status, X7
-consumption quintile,
X8
=communal participation, X9
- type of waste disposal, X10
-type of toilet, X11
-source
of drinking water and X12
-household density.
exp(β0
+β1
X1
+...βq
Xq
)
1+exp(β0
+β1
X1
+β2
X2
+...βqXq)
0 = Do not have Sensory Impairment
Outcome Variable
(Healthy Aging Status)
1 = Have Sensory Impairment

39
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Table 1: Basic demographic background of the aging
Note: Mean age= 56±9, Standard deviation= 1.737
Source: Authors' computation (2020)
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the socio-economic status of the
respondents. Based on the study age distribution, the majority of the respondents
were aged 50-59 (53.2%), followed those aged 60-69 (27.1%), those aged 70-79
(14.3%) and persons aged 80 and above (5.3%) had the lowest representation. The
Variable Host(N=692) IDP(N=601) Combined(N=1293)
Age
50-54years 242(18.7%) 214(16.6%) 456(35.3%)
55-59years 120(9.3%) 112(8.7%) 232(17.9%)
60-64years 171(13.2%) 145(11.2%) 316(24.4%)
65-69years 15(1.2%) 20(1.5%) 35(2.7%)
70-74years 72(5.6%) 51(3.9%) 123(9.5%)
75-79years 33(2.6%) 29(2.2%) 62(4.8%)
>80years 39(2.6%) 30(2.3%) 69(5.3%)
Gender
Male 420(32.5%) 396(30.6%) 816(63.1%)
Female 272(21.0%) 205(15.9%) 477(36.9%)
Gender of household head
Men 449(34.7%) 384(29.7%) 833(64.4%)
Women 243(18.8%) 217(16.8%) 460(35.6%)
Religious Affiliations
Christianity 58(6.4%) 23(2.5%) 81(8.9%)
Islam 414(45.5%) 413(45.4%) 827(91.0%)
Traditional 1(0.1%) 0(0%) 1(0.1%)
Literacy
Yes 358(27.8%) 262(20.3%) 620(48.1%)
No 331(25.7%) 337(26.2%) 668(51.9%)
Highest Educational
Attainment
No education 299(23.3%) 306(23.9%) 605(47.2%)
Primary andIntermediate 36(2.8%) 30(2.3%) 66(5.1%)
Secondary 90(7.0% 47(3.7%) 137(10.7%)
University 33(2.6%) 12(0.9%) 45(3.5%)
Technical and Vocational 7(0.5%) 6(0.5%) 13(1.0%)
Religious 174(13.6%) 170(13.3%) 344(26.8%)
Others 47(3.7%) 25(2.0%) 72(5.6%)

40
3, Sep-Dec 2020
adult mortality rate is 3.18 deaths per 1,000 of the populations among women and
3.25 deaths per 1,000 of the populations among men (NDHS, 2019).
Delineationbygenderrevealedthatthepopulationofmale(63.1%)respondents
was nearly double that of their female (36.9%) counterparts. This gender disparity
could be a direct effect of cultural and religious norms, particularly where women
are barred by their husbands/guidance to attend to male visitors. Similarly, 63.1%
of households were headed by men, compared to 36.9% of households headed by
women. Observers of the Islamic faith constituted 91.0% of the respondents, followed
by Christians (8.9%) and African traditionalists (0.1%). Furthermore, based on the
ability to read in any language, 48.1% of the respondents were literate compared to
51.9% who were non-literate. Additionally, 47.2% of respondents had no form of
formal education, 26.8% had Islamic education (known as Karatu Islamiyah) and
26% had some form of western education (see Table 2).
Table 2: Disability-free life expectancy (DFLE) using an abridged life table
Source: Authors' computation (2020)
Life expectancy at a specific age is the number of additional years that a person of that
age can expect to live, if current mortality levels observed for higher ages continue
for the rest of that person’s life. Thus, based on the result of the study’s abridged
life table (Sullivan method), aged persons in the host communities are expected to
live 4±9 years more than IDPs. Along cohort delineation, a host person aged 50-59
has a mean life expectancy of 17±9 years compared to IDPs (mean 16.4± years; a
host person aged 60-69 (mean 11±2 years) > IDPs (mean 10 years); a host person
aged 70-79 (mean 6 years)>IDPs (mean 4±8 years); and host persons aged 80 and
above (mean 2±9 years) > IDPs (mean 2 years) respectively (see Table 2). Longer
lives are an incredibly valuable resource, both for individuals and for society more
Host N=(692) IDP N=(601) North-West (Combined) N=(1293)
Age
(x-x+n)
Life
expec-
tancy
(ex
)
Deaths
(Dx
)
Sur-
vival
(ιx
)
Life
expec-
tancy
(ex
)
Deaths
(Dx
)
Sur-
vival
(ιx
)
Life
expec-
tancy
(ex
)
Deaths
(Dx
)
Sur-
vival
(ιx
)
Propor-
tion
disabil-
ity (Nx
)
50-54 19.8 242 0.6503 18.1 214 0.6042 20.5 456 0.6473 46.4%
55-59 16.1 120 0.4769 14.6 112 0.4576 17 232 0.4679 56.5%
60-64 12.7 171 0.2298 11.3 145 0.2163 13.7 316 0.2235 69.9%
65-69 9.7 15 0.2081 8.6 20 0.1830 10.7 35 0.1964 80.0%
70-74 7.1 72 0.1040 5.9 51 0.0982 8 123 0.1013 73.7%
75-79 4.9 33 0.0564 3.7 29 0.0499 5.8 62 0.0534 85.3%
>80 2.9 39 0.0000 2.0 30 0.0000 4.1 69 0.0000 89.9%

41
broadly. Older people participate in, and contribute to society in varied ways. This
social engagement may in turn reinforce the health and well-being of older people
themselves.
Figure 5: Nigeria's LIfe expectancy (ex) Transition (1960-2019)
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2020)
The results show that Nigeria has experienced a progressive trend, growing at an
average annual life expectancy growth rate of 0.60%. Interestingly, during the onset
of the economic recession in the early 1980s, the country experienced a decline
(1980(45.3)-1990(45.9)-1998(45.9)) in its life expectancy status, and this remained
so until the re-adoption of democratic governance in 1999 (46.1-2010(50.9)-
2019(54.5)). Coincidentally, the 21st century has also ushered in an increase in global
life expectancy due to concomitant factors (see Figure 5).

42
3, Sep-Dec 2020
Figure 6: Disability-free life expectancy (DFLEx) of the study area
Source: Computed by authors from NGA-IDP data (2018)
The Sullivan health expectancy was utilized to determine the current health status
of persons aged 50 years and above, adjusted for mortality levels and independent
of age structure. The study calculated the number of remaining years, at a particular
age, that an individual can expect to live in a healthy state, void of sensory disabilities
(see Figure 6), considering that almost one-third (32.8%) of people aged 60 or older
in Nigeria are reported to have at least one form of disability (NDHS, 2019). The
study’s results showed healthy aging disparities, considering that IDPs were more
susceptible to sensory disabilities. This means that this cohort was projected to have
a far less disability-free life compared to their peers in the host communities across
the entire age cohort (aged 50-80 and above).

43
Table 3: Result of the Binary Logistic Regression Model (IDP and host population)
VARIABLES
Model 1
IDP population
Model 2
Host population
β Wald Sig. Exp(β) β Wald Sig. Exp(β)
Age
50-59
60-69
70-79
>80
-.604
-.545
-.451
Ref
43.691
43.334
41.223
Ref
<.002
<.010
.052
Ref
.547
.661
1.232
Ref
-.792
.439
-671
Ref
5.296
5.122
4.992
Ref
<.001
<.001
<.002
Ref
.453
.527
.531
Ref
Educational Status
No Education
Pry Education
Sec education
vocation
University
Religious
Others
.017
-0.29
.071
.098
.373
Ref
.122
.164
2.177
.434
2.115
Ref
.001
<.002
<.001
.510
.075
Ref
1.017
1.040
.575
.767
.918
Ref
-.168
-.271
-.283
-.099
-.282
Ref
.738
2.124
1.341
1.291
3.418
Ref
<.002
<.001
<.001
<.006
<.001
Ref
.845
.743
.447
.751
.847
Ref
Gender
Male
Female
-.404
Ref
3.177
Ref
.<.001
Ref
.668
Ref
-.980
Ref
.784
Ref
<.001
Ref
.375
Ref
Labour Force
Participation
Active
Non-active
.488
Ref
10.879
Ref
.001
Ref
1.629
Ref
1.055
Ref
2.988
Ref
<.001
Ref
2.871
Ref
Household
Dependency Status
High
Low
.832
Ref
1.139
Ref
<.001
Ref
.856
Ref
.
.226
Ref
.362
Ref
<.004
Ref
1.253
Ref
Household
Consumption
Quintile
Poorest Q1
SecondQ2
Middle Q3
FourthQ4
Highest Q5
.668
.831
.631
.383
Ref
2.566
3.288
1.654
.648
Ref
<.001
.003
<.001
<.001
Ref
1.950
2.296
1.880
1.467
Ref
-.655
-.301
-2.936
-1.741
Ref
.192
.039
2.889
1.321
Ref
<.001
<.002
<.004
<.001
Ref
.520
.740
.053
.009
Ref
Level of Communal
Engagement
High
Low
.241
Ref
3.651
Ref
0.56
Ref
1.272
Ref
.019
Ref
.003
Ref
<.003
Ref
1.019
Ref
Type of Waste
Disposal
Discrete
Indiscrete
-0.13
Ref
.438
Ref
.508
Ref
.987
Ref
.217
Ref
4.81
Ref
<.000
Ref
1.242
Ref
Type of household
Toilet
Unimproved
Improved
.081
Ref
.100
Ref
<.001
Ref
.922
Ref
-.905
Ref
1.303
Ref
<.002
Ref
.404
Ref

44
3, Sep-Dec 2020
In Model 1, all the explanatory data was found to be statistical predictors of the
healthy aging status among older IDPs. Based on demographic predictors, age was
negatively correlated to the healthy aging status of IDPs (p-value.000<0.05). There
is a 0.55 odds of unhealthy aging with advanced age; more educated persons were
1.017 times more age-healthy in comparison with their less-educated peers. Males
were .668 times more likely to age healthily, compared to females with 1.497 greater
odds of aging healthily (see Table 3). Economic variables were all statistically sig-
nificant and made unique contributions to the prediction of the healthy aging status
in the full model. People actively involved in the labor force were 0.614 times more
likely to experience unhealthy aging while those outside the labor force were 1.629
times more likely to experience less wellness as they age. Consumption patterns ap-
pear to be quite skewed among the IDP population – persons grouped in the lowest
consumption were 1.950 times more likely to experience prolonged health complica-
tions, as they age. In addition, environmental predictors were all statistically signifi-
cant. Older adults who were more socially engaged, were 0.78 times less likely to age
in poor health, compared to the less-engaged ones who had a 1.272 higher likelihood
of aging in poor health. Improved waste disposal: host persons were .987 times more
likely to experience healthy aging, compared to those residing in households with
unimproved waste disposal methods, with 1.085 greater odds to age poorly. Unim-
proved toilets: elderly IDPs were .922 times more likely to experience unhealthy ag-
ing, compared to persons resident in households with improved toilets, who were
also 1.085 times more likely to age in good health. Likewise, older persons in house-
holds with an unimproved source of drinking water, were .857 times more likely to
age in poor health (see Table 3).
In model 2, the p-value for each regression effect is smaller than .05; thus, all
the predictors in the model were statistically relevant. The results show that there is
a .453 times increase in the odds of aging in poor health among persons in the host
community. Males were .375 times more likely to age in poor health compared to
females (2.667 better odds of healthy aging); older persons in the labor force were
VARIABLES
Model 1
IDP population
Model 2
Host population
β Wald Sig. Exp(β) β Wald Sig. Exp(β)
Household Density
High
Low
-.154
Ref
1.085
Ref
.005
Ref
.857
Ref
.760
Ref
2.114
Ref
<.001
Ref
2.138
Ref
Constant 8.602 48.133 .000 5439.928 10.243 4.258 .000 28073.768
Model Summary -2 Log likelihood 554.219a
Cox and Snell R2
.116
Nagelkerke R2
.368
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test .802
2 Log likelihood 68.196a
Cox and Snell R2
.237
Nagelkerke R2
.368
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test .815

45
2.871 times more likely to age in poor health compared to their peers who are still
active (0.348 better odds of healthy aging). Older adults resident in households with
the lowest consumption profile, were expected to age in poorer health, by .520 times.
The environmental factors were also found to be unique predictors of healthy aging
status. The findings in Table 3 show that persons residing within households with
unimproved waste disposal methods (odd ratio=1.242), using unimproved toilet
types (odd ratio=.404), drinking water from non-sanitary sources (odd ratio=2.072),
and sleeping in densely populated housing (odd ratio=2.138), are highly likely to
experience unhealthy aging (see Table 3).
Figure 7: Logistic regression graph showing propensity to healthy aging
NB: X1
-age, X2
-education, X3
-gender, X4
-labor participation, X5
-dependency ratio,
X6
-consumption quintile, X7
=communal participation, X8
- waste disposal, X9
-toilet
type, X10
-drinking water source, X12
-household density.
Figure 7 presents the projected odds ratio of older adults aging in an unhealthy way, in
both the host and IDP households, by determinants. The demographic determinants
appear to be uni-directional across both groups, which might be a result of the
normalized distribution of respondents by age. Unlike the demographic factors, the
effects of the economic factors exhibit more variance. Out-of-labor older adults in
the host communities, be it due to retirement or unemployment, were projected to
be less active while aging, accompanied with predicted higher morbidity in later life.
IDPs without employment or any work would also experience the same fate, but
with much lower odds. In terms of consumption rate, more IDPs were projected to

46
3, Sep-Dec 2020
experience more health crises in later life in comparison to their host community
peers.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Nigeria has benefited immeasurably from the socio-economic and technological
evolution of the 20th century, resulting in improved standard of living and life ex-
pectancy. This success can be attributed to migratory processes, be it human resource
migration, technological transfer and data/information transfer. Interestingly, older
adults, often referred to as the “invisible population”, have also been development
actors. However, recent estimates indicate that the aging population in Nigeria now
constitutes more than 10% of its national population, with a doubling time of a few
decades. Interestingly, the failure to ensure that extra years of life gained are enjoyed
in the best possible health, is avoidable. However, this mega-demographic change
has become a macro-level concern, mainly due to the accompanying economic and
social costs, culminating in the absence of a geriatric healthcare policy to cater for
the healthy aging needs.
Contemporary Nigeria is being battered by phenomena such as environmental
stressors – such as floods and drought – and widespread conflict, notably in its most
disadvantaged region, the Northeastern part of the country. Therefore, households’
decisions on whether to migrate or not, now has later life health implications on the
older adult cohort within this region. Our study makes a valuable contribution to
the literature on population aging in Nigeria. In particular, the goal of this study is
to better understand the impact of socio-economic and environmental determinants
on the healthy aging status among later-life migrants and non-migrants within
both IDp and host communities in Northern Nigeria. The study’s findings revealed
a much higher prevalence of sensory impairment among IDPs than for residents
in the host communities. In general, the mean prevalence was significantly higher
in the Northeastern region. Secondly, the socio-economic and environmental
determinants were significantly associated with the healthy aging status outcomes in
Northeastern Nigeria. In addition, combinations of this factor, or the lack of it, were
also associated with healthy aging. Inclusion of the decisions on the part of the IDPs
to migrate to neighboring towns and cities in Northeastern Nigeria, has significantly
improved their odds of aging in an active and healthy manner. This is probably due
to competing with residents in these communities for limited resources and services,
such as healthcare, employment and farming space. Alternatively, these residents had
slightly greater odds of aging healthily. However, factors such as the increased inflow
of more migrants, increased desertification, poor governance, the trade-off for non-
migration, may impact on their healthy aging trajectory in the long run, which may
fall lower than that of the IDPs.
Basedonourfindings,weconcludethattheolderpeople’slivesarecharacterized
by growing inadequacies in customary family supports, social exclusion and non-
existent social security programs targeted at them, thus rendering them vulnerable to

47
poverty and diseases. We recommend that the proposed ECOWAS Sahelian “Green
belt” afforestation project, especially areas around the Chad basin, be expedited, as
this project will help reduce perennial conflicts between herdsmen and farmers.
In addition, the government needs to improve security by defeating Boko-Haram
and other Islamist militias. Furthermore, there is an urgent need to formulate an
integrated migration–adult health policy or plan that is both comprehensive and
evidence-driven. Finally, the budgetary allocation for health should have a flooring
capped at 20% of the national budget.

48
3, Sep-Dec 2020
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53
Between the Imagined and
the Reality: Threat of African
Invasion and Spain’s Migration
Policy in sub-Saharan Africa
Edmond Akwasi Agyeman
University of Winneba, Ghana
Email: kwasikyei2004@hotmail.com
The paper examines Spain’s migration policy aimed at controlling sub-Saharan Afri-
can immigration. It is based on analysis of policy documents, migration statistics and
secondary literature. The paper shows that current migratory trends and statistics do
not support the perception that sub-Saharan African migrants are invading Spain. The
paper shows that Spain’s policy of walling itself off the African continent is borne out
of an imaginary threat and Spain’s role as a gatekeeper for Western Europe’s southern
borders. It further argues that Spain’s restrictive policies ignore the long-standing inter-
dependent trade and other economic networks that exist between Spain, North Africa
and West Africa, which predate the European colonization of Africa.
Keywords: sub-Saharan migration, Spain, immigration control, policy
Threat of African Invasion and Spain’s Migration Policy in sub-Saharan Africa

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I trace the strategies adopted by the Spanish government since the
1990s to control ‘unwanted’ migration from sub-Saharan Africa. I show that, these
policies are based on a false premise that African migrants are invading Spain and, by
extension, Europe. In 2019, the government of Spain launched its third Plan África,
a strategic document for the governance of Spanish relations in sub-Saharan Africa.
As is the case with the previous Plans, immigration from sub-Saharan Africa proved
to be a crucial concern for the Spanish government. The first Plan África which was
launched in 2006 had specified that Spain’s geographical proximity to the African
continent and the use of some African nations as transit points for drug traffick-
ing or for the establishment of terrorist networks and refuge points in the continent
coupled with the issue of immigration constituted a reality that preoccupied public
opinion in Spain. For that matter, the document spelled out the strategies to inten-
sify Spain’s border control mechanisms and to plant and extend Spanish influence in
Africa through aid, trade and cooperation. The ultimate goal of the first Plan África
and subsequent ones was to keep Africans at home and focused pre-eminently on
building fortress Spain by barricading borders used by sub-Saharan African youth to
enter Spain ‘illegally’ through diplomacy and border controls.
I argue that the volume of African migration to Spain in the last thirty years
represents an insignificant fraction of the total immigrant population in Spain and
that the policies themselves have rather led to creating unwanted migrants out of
the African migrant population in Spain. I indicate that Spain’s policy of walling it-
self off the African continent is borne out of an imaginary threat and Spain’s role as
a gatekeeper for Western Europe’s southern borders. I further argue that there is a
long-standing interdependent trade and other economic networks that exist between
Spain, North Africa and West Africa predating the European colonization of Africa,
which have also contributed to shaping the migration trends.
LITERATURE AND METHODS
Spain’s southern border control strategies have received a lot of scholarly attention
in the past three decades. Broadly, these studies can be grouped into two: (i) those
that focus on border control methods and strategies, including border externaliza-
tion and excessive pressure on Morocco and Senegal to crack down on sub-Saharan
migration and the human rights implication of these policies; and (ii) those that fo-
cus on Spain’s foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa.
Studies that focus on border control mechanisms by Spanish authorities
against sub-Saharan African migration have sustained that the surveillance meth-
ods used at Spain’s southern sea borders breach international human rights treaties,
because by intercepting immigrants at sea before they reach Spanish waters, they
prevent potential asylum seekers from receiving protection (Ceriani et al., 2009; Wil-
liams, 2018). Some other researches, however, try to examine the effectiveness of the

55
control methods used at the Spanish southern borders. They include the works of
Alscher (2005) Carling (2007) and Carrera (2007) which analyze the impact of the
Integrated System of Exterior Surveillance (Sistema Integral de Vigilancia Exterior–
SIVE) and the activities of Frontex, the European border and coast guard agency. In
a recent work, Williams (2018: 157) argues that this approach “was not effective at
stopping current or future migration”.
The literature that examines Spain’s foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa fo-
cuses on the legal, political and economic implications of relying on economic aid
and diplomacy as means of controlling unwanted migration from sub-Saharan Af-
rica to Spain. They generally fall into two categories: those that have economic, so-
ciological, political and moral character, and those that have legal character. The first
group includes the work of Eduardo Romero, which questions the moral base of
Spain’s migration policies in sub-Saharan Africa (Romero, 2006); and the study by
Arango and Martin (2005), which has both economic and political character, and
focuses on the migration control methods and bilateral agreements reached between
Spain and Morocco. Pérez Graciela (2008) examines the possible conflict of interest
between migration control and Spain’s development aid programs in sub-Saharan
Africa. Wolff and Schout’s (2013) work focuses on the identity of Frontex, the le-
gitimacy of its operations and their implications for interstate relations and human
rights. The other group of works that are more juridical in nature include the publica-
tions by Asunción Asín Cabrera (2008) and Del Castillo Fajardo (2006) that analyze
the bilateral agreements signed between Spain and the sub-Saharan African coun-
tries and their implication for cooperation. Much of this literature is very critical of
the approach adopted and some of them have questioned their implication in regards
to race relations, human rights, state autonomy of African countries and the need to
respect the interest of African states and migrants (Casas et al., 2011; Jones, 2017;
Adam et al., 2020).
The approach of this paper is analytical, focusing on Spain’s policy documents
and secondary literature relating to sub-Saharan African migration control. I also
draw on official statistical data sources of Spain—Instituto Nacional de Estadística
data bank—to obtain figures of sub-Saharan African migrant stock in Spain, World
Bank data on migrants’ remittance flows, as well as the 2020 official report by the
Frontex agency and other official sources on migration flows and interception data.
Based on this information, I develop tables and figures to enable me to do a com-
parative analysis of actual migrant flows and stocks, and Spain’s migration control
policies. The goal is to tease out how the principle of fear of invasion based on the
imagined rather than the actual migrant stock and flows, has influenced Spain’s mi-
gration policy in sub-Saharan Africa.
THEORY AND CONCEPTS
The concept of imagined threat of invasion as used in this paper draws on sociologi-
cal theories of inter-group relations by Blumer (1958), Blalock (1956, 1957) and Quil-

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
lian (1995). I also draw on the invasion anxiety concept advanced by Burke (2008)
to explain the feeling of imminent threat of invasion on the part of states and state
actors, which informs their attitudes, actions and policies towards certain migrant
groups. I also rely on more recent works by Herda (2010, 2013, 2018) and Semyonov
et al. (2008) to show how in many instances this feeling of threat is borne out of the
imagined rather than the actual threat by the migrant population.
Blumer was one of the key proponents of the Chicago sociological school. In
his seminal 1958 paper entitled “Race prejudice as a sense of group position”, he ar-
gues that during inter-group or race relations, each group develops a position relative
to the other in hierarchical terms that influences power relations between them. He
indicates that group prejudice develops when the dominant group feels that its posi-
tion is threatened by a subordinate group. Blumer (1958: 588) identifies four types of
feelings that he believed could lead to this situation: “(1) a feeling of superiority, (2)
a feeling that the subordinate race is intrinsically different and alien, (3) a feeling of
proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage, and (4) a fear and sus-
picion that the subordinate race harbors designs on the prerogatives of the dominant
race”. For Blumer, group prejudice is a function of perceived rather than actual threat.
Arguing along the same line, Blalock (1956; 1957) shows that perceptions of threat by
the dominant group towards the subordinate group are influenced by demographic
and economic factors. Blalock posits that the size of the subordinate group relative
to that of the dominant group as well as precarious economic conditions constitute
major sources of threat perceptions by the majority group towards the subordinate
group. More recent studies have further showed that the feeling of perceived threat
by majority groups with respect to minority groups worsens when the former have
to protect their economic interest (Quillian,1995) or where there are economic and
cultural threats at stake (Fietkau and Hansen, 2018).
In some instances, however, the perceived threat posed by migrant groups
hinges on national identity issues. This is the position taken by Burke (2008) to ex-
plain Australian authorities’ attitudes towards migrants and national migration poli-
cies. He argues that the idea of white racial supremacy and the fear of a non-white
invasion have had great impact on Australian migration policy and attitudes toward
other Asian immigrants over a long period.
In several studies based on national surveys, Herda (2010; 2013, 2018) and Se-
myonov et al. (2008) have also argued that misconceptions and ignorance about the
actual threat posed by immigrants inform a great deal of host nations’ policies and at-
titudes towards certain migrant groups. They show that migrant exclusion is associ-
ated with these misconceptions. In particular, Herda (2013, 2018) found that citizens’
misconception about migrants’ legal status (i.e. conceiving migrants to be undocu-
mented or illegal settlers) or having an inflated perception of their actual population
size, is associated with citizens’ tendencies and desires to exclude migrants, halt im-
migration, restrict migrants’ rights, or support anti-im migrant policies. Hsia (2007)
observes that the imagined threat may be the result of media construction and fram-

57
ing, which in many instances could be far from reality. Other studies have shown that
immigrant threat feelings among host populations are sometimes the result of politi-
cal framing by radical right-wing political parties to improve their popular appeal
and electoral fortunes (Doerschler and Jackson, 2018). In the case of Spain, Toasije
(2009) maintains that African migration is manipulated by the Spanish political elite
as a strategy to please European Union law makers and to Europeanize Spain with
the ulterior agenda of weaning the country from its African and complex multi-eth-
nic identity. In this paper therefore, I examine how the perceived or imagined rather
than the actual threat of invasion is manipulated and used by Spain’s political actors
to manage the socio-political challenges posed by African migration to Spain.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN MIGRATION TO SPAIN
Spain, unlike France, United Kingdom or Portugal, had minimal colonial ties with
Africa. Equatorial Guinea, which passed into the hands of Spain in 1827 after seven-
teen years of British administration, is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that
has a direct colonial link with Spain. Resultantly, migration from sub-Saharan Africa
to Spain started relatively late and has remained on a very low key.
The early group of sub-Saharan labor migrants in Spain originated from Cape
Verde. In 1975 a group of Cape Verdean men from Lisbon settled in the mining
towns of Bembire in the area of El Bierzo and Villablino in the Laciana valley in León
after their failed trip to the Netherlands (Moldes and Gonzàlez, 2008). Between 1977
and 1978 another community of Cape Verdeans settled in Galizia to work on the
construction of the Alúmína-Alumíno metallurgical plant. After the construction of
the plant some of the migrant workers were integrated into the local fishing industry
while the rest dispersed in the area to find jobs. The men were later joined by Cape
Verdean women from Lisbon and the rate of family reunification increased from
the second half of the 1980s. In the early 1980s migrants from Gambia, Mali, Mau-
ritania and Senegal settled in the Catalonia region following the restriction imposed
by France after the 1973 oil crisis (Sow, 2006). The first group of Senegalese mi-
grants, consisting mainly of people from Pulaar and Soninké ethnic groups, settled
in Maresme in Barcelona and from there they moved on to Zaragoza and Valencia.
They are currently dispersed all over the country due to their itinerant commercial
activity.
By the end of 1992 there were only 12,776 sub-Saharan immigrants in Spain
out of which four communities represented three-quarters of the total population.
The Senegalese (3,190) represented the largest group at the time and they were uni-
formly distributed across the country. They were followed by the Gambians (2,952)
concentrated in the Catalonian provinces of Barcelona and Gerona where they were
largely employed in the agricultural sector. Cape Verdean citizens made up the third
largest group (1,939). They lived between León and Madrid. Migrants from Equato-
rial Guinea (1,569), found mainly in Madrid, were the fourth largest group (Pumares,
1997).

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From the late 1990s, the sub-Saharan African population in Spain began to
experience a sharp increase. However, despite negative media reportage and crimi-
nalization of these movements the rate of growth remained very slow and was much
contained over the years. Sub-Saharan Africans in Spain originate principally from
West Africa and account for close to 80% of the total sub-Saharan migrants.
STEMMING AFRICAN MIGRATION TO SPAIN
In the past two decades, Spain and the European Union have spent millions of eu-
ros to prevent Africans and other nationals entering their territory. Williams (2018)
shows that between 2006 and 2015, close to €127 million was budgeted for joint
migrant interdiction operations in the central Mediterranean Sea. These operations
include: Nautilus, Hermes, Aenas and Triton. Spain’s immigration control policy
in relation to sub-Saharan immigration is influenced strongly by domestic politics
(negative public opinion, interest group politics and political party politics) and is
strictly linked to national security matters and foreign aid (Pinyol-Jiménez, 2008;
2012). For that matter, the main political strategy that Spain has adopted to control
migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa could be synthesized into two strategies.
The first strategy consists of a set of policy measures directed towards intensive bor-
der control. These measures are designed and coordinated principally by the Spanish
Interior Ministry in collaboration with the EU and the affected African countries.
Their main objective is to obstruct and dissuade illegal entry or illegal stay of sub-Sa-
haran immigrants in Spanish territory. The second set of policy measures focuses on
development aid, trade and investment to reduce migration pressure in the migrant
sending and transit countries. This policy measure is preventative and it is driven
mainly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Its objective is to mitigate
the root causes of emigration. The roadmap for this approach is contemplated in the
Plan Africa (Romero, 2006; Casas et al., 2011).
Even though the two strategies are different, their ultimate goals, however, are
to reduce the propensity to migrate from sub-Saharan Africa to Spain and to the
European Union, ensure that unwanted African migrants do not arrive in their terri-
tory, remove those who enter or stay in Spanish territory without authorization, and
encourage voluntary return of those who have legally settled in Spain (Agyeman,
2011; Agyeman and Fernandez Garcia, 2016).
MARITIME BORDER CONTROL SYSTEMS
Alscher (2005) observed that during the period between 2000 and 2004 when Spain’s
conservative Popular Party (PP) won an absolute majority in parliament, the fight
against illegal migration became the central issue of immigration policy. However, it
was the socialist government, led by Felipe González and the Socialist Workers’ Party
(PSOE) that introduced visa requirements for Moroccan immigrants and began the
early construction of a border fence around the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla

59
(Alscher, 2005). The accession of Spain to the Schengen Treaty required that Spain
controlled its southern border, which until the late 1990s was considered the transit
route for African migrants heading towards various European destinations.
The first set of measures that Spain adopted to control migration pressure
from sub-Saharan Africa included intensifying its maritime border control system
through dissuasion, obstruction, apprehension and repatriation of migrants found
entering Spain illegally through its southern borders (Carling, 2007). Dissuasion and
obstruction are strategies involving putting pressure on Spain’s immediate southern
neighbors, particularly, Moroccan, Senegalese and Mauritanian authorities to intro-
duce stricter border control and visa regulation in order to crack down on illegal
smuggling of Moroccans and sub-Saharans into Spain (González-Enríquez et al.,
2018). Other efforts to dissuade ‘unwanted immigration’ included information cam-
paigns and joint police patrols in Morocco and sub-Saharan countries, particularly
Senegal and Mauritania to dissuade prospective immigrants from departing. These
efforts are facilitated by opening Migration Information Centres (MICs) in sending
countries. For example, as part of the EU-funded Ghana Integrated Migration Man-
agement Approach (GIMMA) program, Spain funded the establishment of MICs in
Tamale and Sunyani, considered transit and origin zones of Ghanaian youth destined
to Spain across the Sahara.
Border surveillance is perhaps the area where Spain has devoted greater re-
sources to the effort to fight ‘unwanted’ immigration from sub-Saharan Africa. The
first step to a stricter border control started in the early 1990s with the construction
of an 8.4km fence around Ceuta in 1993 and another around Melilla in 1996. These
fences were later fortified and equipped with video and infrared cameras, control
towers and motion detectors (Alscher, 2005). In January 1998, the PP government
introduced the Plan Sur (Alscher, 2005) to strengthen the border control system. The
project introduced more intensive surveillance systems in Spain’s air and sea ports, it
tightened the deportation procedures and strengthened cooperation with Moroccan
and Algerian authorities. Additionally, a special unit of motorized police force was
created to search for undocumented immigrants along Spain’s coastal cities. Half a
year later, the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), introduced another project named Fron-
tera Sur (southern border/frontier) equipped with new vehicles and helicopters from
the Spanish Army (Alscher, 2005). In May 1999, the PP government introduced a
more intensive border control system labelled Integrated System of Exterior Sur-
veillance (Sistema Integral de Vigilancia Exterior–SIVE). Initial work on the project
was financed at a cost of €150 million. It was operated by the Civil Guard (Guardia
Civil) and its objectives were to detect and intercept small vessels and pateras (boats)
and cayucos (kayaks/canoes) arriving at Spain’s southern sea border. The system was
equipped with fixed and mobile detection devices including radars, infrared and vid-
eo cameras that are able to detect a small vessel 10km away and estimate the number
of people in the vessel when it is 5km away. When a vessel is detected, information
about its course and position is transmitted to a central command, from where in-

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terception units including boats, helicopters and cars are dispatched (Carling, 2007).
The SIVE was first developed on the coast of Gibraltar and in 2002, was extended
to the Canary Islands in the towns of Fuerteventura, Gran Canaria and Lanzarote.
It was also extended to cover the entire coast of the Cádiz province in 2004 and the
entire coast of the province of Andalucía in 2005. It is noteworthy that the PSOE
government continued to develop the SIVE project after it won the 2004 election,
although it initially opposed the project when it was in opposition.
In addition to SIVE, in 2005 Spain impressed upon the EU, the need for a
European border and coast guard agency, hence the creation of Frontex. This agency
was created in 2006 with a Spanish official, Gil Arias, appointed its Executive Direc-
tor (González-Enríquez et al., 2018). In addition, the General Directorate of Interna-
tional Relations and Alien Affairs and its two sub-directorates were also created in
2006 to enable Spanish authorities to reach agreements for institutional cooperation
with officials in the migrant origin or transit countries. This enabled Spanish police
officials to collaborate with officials of the Frontex agency and officials of origin or
transit countries to organize joint border operations. The European Union’s spon-
sored projects undertaken by Frontex at the Spanish coasts include, Agios (joint op-
eration to identify forged documents in Spain’s Mediterranean ports); Hera I (iden-
tification and return of unauthorized immigrants); Hera II (patrol of Spanish seas
near Senegal and Mauritania) (Commission of the European Community, 2006); and
Hera III (surveillance mission by Frontex deployed on the territorial waters of Mau-
ritania and Senegal) (Ceriani et al., 2009).
Greater effort has also been made to improve information exchange between
Spain and the African countries. The Spanish police have provided technical and ma-
terial support and exchanged information with the police and immigration officials
in the transit and origin countries to strengthen their internal patrol system (Min-
isterio de Interior, 2007). Examples include the Seahorse and the Atlantis projects
funded by the European Union which formed a network of information exchange
among the border police between Spain, Portugal, Mauritania, Senegal, Cape Verde
and three other countries which were incorporated in 2009 which also include Mo-
rocco, Gambia and Guinea Bissau (González-Enríquez et al., 2018). The joint bor-
der surveillance operations have three objectives: to dissuade the immigrants in the
origin or transit country before they set out to reach Spanish borders; to intercept
and return the immigrants who succeed to depart before they reach Spanish coasts;
and, to ensure that those who reach Spanish borders are repatriated within the terms
established by law (Ministerio de Interior, 2007). While Spanish officials and some
scholars tout this initiative as contributing to stemming unwanted immigration to
Spain, Williams (2018) argues that the operations of Frontex are nothing more than
search and rescue.

61
IMMIGRATION CONTROL THROUGH ‘MIGRATORY DIPLOMACY’
Since 2000, Spain’s development aid to sub-Saharan countries has become a tool to
control immigration from these countries to Spain. Their declared goal is to fight
poverty and promote economic development and democracy in Africa – factors be-
lieved to be the main cause of migration. The main architecture of Spain’s foreign
diplomacy to control migration pressure from sub-Saharan Africa is the master plan
called Plan of Action for sub-Saharan Africa (El Plan de Acción para África Subsa-
hariana) or Plan África in short. The first plan was developed in 2006 to cover the
period between 2006 and 2008. Since then, two other master plans have followed: the
2009-2012 plan and the more recent 2019-2024 plan.
Plan África I set in motion what Pinyol- Jiménez (2008: 61) described as
Spain’s “migratory diplomacy”. The document laid greater emphasis on migration
management, commercial links and development cooperation (Casas et al. 2011).
The document placed the sub-Saharan countries into three main geographical divi-
sions based on the type of actions that the Spanish government intended to perform
in the regions. The first group consists of countries that are considered to respond
to the majority of the objectives set out by the plan. The second division is made up
of countries considered as strategic for the fight against illegal immigration or for
Spain’s economic and cultural activities in Africa. The last group consists of countries
considered as strategic in the medium term—due to their political situation of be-
ing unstable and in conflict-prone areas. However, a critical look at this geographi-
cal division shows that two main principles guided the choice of countries, namely,
economic interest and the fight against immigration. The document exposed a clear
distinction between African countries that are senders, potential senders or transit
points of migrants destined to Spain and countries that are strategic for Spanish trade
relations with Africa because they host large quantities of raw materials and natural
resources essential for Spain’s economy.
In anticipation of the master plan, Spain’s Foreign Minister visited Ghana, An-
gola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger and Mali in 2005 (Moratinos, 2005). After Plan
África I was launched, it paved the way for the signing of bilateral and readmission
agreements between Spain and sub-Saharan African countries including Gambia
(2006), Guinea (2006), Cape Verde (2007), Mali (2008) and Niger (2008) (Cabrera,
2008). Spain’s objective for these agreements was to enable it to establish and expand
its institutional base and influence in sub-Saharan Africa through the establishment
of diplomatic missions, new embassies and consulates, offices for economic coopera-
tion and trade as well as offices for the technical operations of the Spanish Interior
and Defense Ministries’ missions in sub-Saharan Africa so that its fight against un-
wanted migration from sub-Saharan Africa could be effective. To this end, Spain
established a permanent diplomatic mission in Cape Verde in 2006 and an office for
the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation in 2007; in 2006 Spain created
a permanent diplomatic mission in Mali; in 2007 Spain created a general consular
office in Dakar, Senegal; and in the same year it established offices for the Span-

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ish Agency for International Cooperation in both Senegal and Mauritania (Cabrera,
2008: 86).
All the bilateral agreements that were signed, with the partial exception of the
one signed with Mali, have almost identical structure and content (Cabrera, 2008).
They all have eighteen articles expressed in eight chapters. They begin with an iden-
tical preamble and end with an annexure indicating the procedures and guarantees
for readmission of persons. Six lines of action are also delineated in the agreements,
which include: admission of workers; voluntary return; integration of immigrants;
migration and development; cooperation in the fight against illegal immigration and
trafficking of persons; and readmission of persons. However, the most controversial
aspect of the agreement lay in sections dealing with the readmission of persons, or
obliging African nations to prevent the emigration of their own nationals. Contract-
ing African countries were obliged to readmit their citizens apprehended or found
living illegally in Spain. This section took inspiration from Article 13 of the Cotonou
Accord of 2000, rectified by Spain in 2003 in which the African, Caribbean and Pacif-
ic (ACP) and EU countries committed themselves to accept their nationals deported
from another country party to the contract.
Another issue which the Spanish government pursued was to seek the coop-
eration of the contracting African countries to fight what Spain termed as the illegal
migration or trafficking of African nationals to Spain. Chapter six of the agreement
obliged the contracting parties to cooperate in the following areas: (i) exchange of in-
formation between the competent authorities on human trafficking; (ii) provision of
technical assistance to the sub-Saharan African countries affected in the fight against
illegal migration to Spain; (iii) organization of formation courses for consular and
immigration personnel; (iv) cooperation for border control enforcement; (v) mu-
tual support to guarantee the security of national identity cards; (vi) strengthened
capacities of the fight against illegal migration and human trafficking; (vii) running
of campaign programs on the dangers of illegal migration and human trafficking
(Cabrera, 2008). In return, Spain promised to open a window for the legal recruit-
ment of African migrant workers and put measures in place to promote temporal
migration through the admission of seasonal workers and through the quota system
as well as facilitating the travel of highly qualified professionals such as professors,
scientists, researchers, managers, as well as artists, sportsmen and women (Cabrera,
2008). However, a more recent study has revealed that these kinds of schemes have
not yielded positive results. For example, González-Enríquez et al. (2018), note that
a recruitment scheme meant to enable Senegalese women to work in the strawber-
ry sector in the Province of Huelva in Andalusia was not successful and had to be
discontinued. This was because there were deficiencies in the selection process and
many recruits ended up becoming illegal immigrants in Spain. In spite of the limited
legal channels, remittances from sub-Saharan African migrants in Spain far outpace
Spain’s official development aid to these countries and thus contribute immensely to
the wellbeing of families left at home, as shown in the Table 1.

63
Table 1: Remittance Flow from Spain to Sub-
Saharan African Countries per $ million
Source: Author’s elaboration from World Bank data
Cassarino (2007) observes that the reciprocity of obligations expressed in the agree-
ments does not mean that both parties benefit equally due to the “significant level of
development asymmetry” between the contracting parties and that,
while the interest of the destination country sounds obvious (“unwanted mi-
grants have to be effectively removed”), the interest of the origin country may
be less evident, above all when considering that its economy remains depend-
ent on the revenues of its (legal and illegal) expatriates living abroad, or when
migration continues to be viewed as a safety valve to relieve pressure on do-
mestic unemployment (Cassarino, 2007: 182).
Therefore, Spain’s migration policy, while seeking partnership of African countries to
execute, regrettably, focuses on the likely benefits which will accrue to Spain, and not
that of the sub-Saharan migrants involved or their nations which Spain has made its
(control) partners.
THE IMAGINED THREAT OF AFRICAN INVASION VS REALITY: REVISITING
THE STATISTICS
As asserted earlier, Semyonov et al. (2008) comment that the inflated perception of
the size of the immigrant population in a country is one of the main causes of anti-
immigrant feeling, discrimination and support for exclusionary policies towards mi-
grant groups. We have also discussed studies by Herda (2013, 2018), who observes
that misconceptions about the actual population size and the legal status of migrants
are more likely to generate exclusionary sentiments towards immigrants. He notes
that in most European countries, citizens perceive immigrant numbers to be more
than twice the actual size of the immigrant population in their country. He describes
this as immigrant population innumeracy (Herda, 2013). The imagined rather than
an actual threat of sub-Saharan African migrants invading Spain is the main motiva-
tion behind Spain’s anti-African immigration policy.
Country/Year 2015 2016 2017
Nigeria 690 706 771
Senegal 211 272 302
Mali 40 64 71
Gambia 50 58 60
Ghana 48 51 53
Cape Verde 5 6 6

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At the end of 2019, there were 235,951 sub-Saharan African immigrants from
over forty countries, resident in Spain. This was fewer than the British immigrants in
Spain and a little above the Italian nationals resident in Spain. Sub-Saharan African
migrants represent 4.75% of the total immigrant population in Spain and only 21%
of Africans, as shown in Table 2
Table 2: Sub-Saharan Africa Immigrants in Spain
Source: Author’s elaboration from INE data (www.ine.es)
Senegal has the largest sub-Saharan community in Spain (71,020), followed by
Nigeria (39,306), Mali (25,011), Gambia (20,387), Ghana (17,669), Equatorial
Guinea (13,221), Guinea (10,811), and Mauritania (8,184). It is significant to know
that the population of Nigerian immigrants in Spain has seen a substantial decrease
consistently since 2012. Several other countries, including Spain’s former colony,
Equatorial Guinea, have also seen a marginal decrease in their population. In fact,
since the economic crisis and particularly from 2013, the entry of African migrants in
Spain has seen a substantial decrease, with the exception of 2017, when the number
of irregular entries went up sharply (Consejo Económico Y Social España, 2019).
Figure 1: Growth Rate of Foreign Population in Spain by Continent
Source: Author's elaboration from INE (www.ine.es)
Region/Year 1999 % 2004 % 2009 % 2014 % 2019 %
Sub-Saharan
Africa
32,302 4.31 115,999 5.14 230,044 4.07 231,373 4.6 235,951 4.68
Africa 174,402 23.28 579,372 19.09 1,009,169 17.86 1,076,164 21.42 1,122,409 22.28
Spain 748,954 100 3,034,326 100 5,648,671 100 5,023,487 100 5,036,878 100

65
Over the past twenty years, the sub-Saharan Africans have recorded the slowest
growth rate in Spain compared to Europeans, South Americans and Asians, as shown
in Figure 1. This supports the argument that there is no threat of invasion, as por-
trayed by Spain’s right-wing political parties and the media (Toasije, 2009). This sup-
ports Hsia’s (2007) findings that the threat of invasion is sometimes the product of
media construction and political manipulation.
Moreover, public opinion toward sub-Saharan African migrants in Spain is
increasingly positive compared to that of other immigrant groups. In a recent survey,
only 2% of Spanish claimed they felt uncomfortable working with a black person,
compared to 3% for Asians and Jews and 7% for Roma and Muslims (González-
Enríquez, 2017). In the same study, González-Enríquez (2017: 20) notes that, “there
is also a significant increase in responses expressing closeness, especially noticea-
ble towards US citizens and sub-Saharan Africans”. About 25% of the Spanish who
participated in the survey said they felt “quite or very close” towards sub-Saharan
Africans whereas only 18% and 15% said they felt the same toward Moroccan and
Chinese migrants respectively. This form of public opinion does not support Spain’s
aggressive control of sub-Saharan immigration.
GENERATING ILLEGALITY THROUGH RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION
POLICY
From the time Spain became an immigration country, its coastal cities became
regular scenes of sub-Saharan, North African and Asian boat-people entering
Europe without going through the strict immigration regulations, by using small
wooden boats known in Spain as pateras. These scenes raised media interest and
almost every week there was news of new entrances and reports of deaths on the
boats. The excessive media attention and coverage of African migrants entering the
European southern border by boat, dominated policy discourse on illegal migration
and increasingly conveyed the image that massive numbers of desperate Africans are
fleeing poverty and war and are attempting to enter Europe irregularly. This raised
fears of possible invasion and security threats (De Haas, 2007). Since then, a great
deal of literature has fueled the perception that economic and demographic pressure
persisting in Africa today is driving Africans to invade Europe and the rest of the
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries in
the same way as the European states migrated to America in the half-century before
World War I. This perception has strongly influenced public opinion on immigration
matters and electoral politics in Spain (Hatton and Williamson, 2003). For example,
in July 2018, the leader of Spain’s Popular Party claimed that there were over fifty
million prospective African migrants ready to invade Spanish territory, a claim
which was discredited by Spain’s popular newspaper, El Pais (2018). Even though
such claims lack an empirical base, these forms of perceptions have greatly influenced
Spain’s relations with its black African neighbors at their southern borders and have

66
3, Sep-Dec 2020
informed the increasing apprehension, detention and repatriation of sub-Saharan
migrants who are legally or illegally resident in Spain. As Burke (2008) observes, the
emphasis on security threats posed by immigrants, although based on false pretense,
gives legitimacy to restrictive immigration control measures by state authorities.
However, empirical data does not support the media hype of sub-Saharan Af-
rican invasion of Spain through illegal migration. Since 2000, the annual number of
migrants who arrive in Spain or Italy by sea, represents a small fraction of the total
number of migrants who enter Spain illegally. Data from the Frontex agency shows
that out of 141,846 persons intercepted at border crossing points (BCPs) attempting
to enter Europe illegally in 2018, those who originated from the West African route
were a meagre 2,718 persons, representing 1.9% of the total. Of these, Moroccan
nationals constituted one-third. In 2017, for example, only 25,251 individuals out of
532,482 immigrants who entered Spain that year without following the regular im-
migration procedures, were Africans (El Pais, 2018). This reduction in numbers is,
however, attributed to the aggressive control measures that have been put in place by
Spain with European Union backing to stem immigration from sub-Saharan Africa
(González-Enríquez et al., 2018).
The asymmetry between the actual figures of sub-Saharan migration flows to
Spain and the restrictive state control policies can be properly understood within the
sphere of race relations where the perceptions of threat rather than the actual threat,
govern policy decisions, attitudes and actions. Following from studies by Blumer
(1958), Blalock (1956; 1957), Quillian (1995) and Burke (2008), one can argue that
the perceptions of threat to Spain’s racial identity and economic position rather than
the actual migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa to Spain, have greatly informed
Spain’s migration control policies in Africa.
LONG-STANDING RELATIONS VS SPAIN’S ROLE AS EUROPEAN UNION’S
SOUTHERN BORDER GATEKEEPER
Touching on issues pertaining to identity and economic relations, this paper argues
that Spain, by its actions of excessive migration control of sub-Saharan African
migration, is ignoring the long-standing relations that have existed between Spain,
North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, which span across several centuries (Toasije,
2009). These relations have generated several forms of interdependence within the
spheres of economics, politics, culture, family ties and social relations, spanning
several centuries. Toasije (2009: 343) notes that “until the defeat of Grenada in 1492,
the western end of the European subcontinent had been the core of European and
African struggles, and this has created an ethnically-mixed population” in Spain.
Moreover, there is also a long history of migration and trade relations between
Spain and the rest of the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan countries. During his
visit to Timbuktu in 1352, Ibn Battuta reported that, “In this town is the grave of
the illustrious poet Abu Ishaq al-Sahill of Granada, known in his own country as
al-Tuwaijin (‘the little cooking pan’), and also of Siraj al-Din b. al-Kuwaik, one

67
of the great merchants among the people of Alexandria” (Gibb and Beckingham,
1994: 969). These interconnections were the subject of the 2019 special edition of
the Journal of North African Studies, which depicts not only a history of conflict
between Spain and Morocco but also a construction of economic, social and cultural
relations and interdependence through “ideas, people, texts, and material goods that
have circulated across the sea and continue to do so until today” (Stenner, 2019: 8).
In his introduction, Stenner (2019: 8), notes that this “focus on connections between
Europe and Africa indirectly challenged the notion of the Mediterranean as a frontier
separating two worlds, and instead highlighted its role as a shared cultural space”.
González-Enríquez (2017) asserts that the right-wing anti-immigration
politics which has a lot of force elsewhere in Europe, has struggled to gain influence
in Spain to push the anti-black immigration agenda. This may be due largely to the
long-standing relations that Spain has had with Africa over the centuries. However,
Spain bears the brunt of anti-black African sentiments held elsewhere in Europe.
Spain is therefore forced to implement policies which in many situations are not
in its interest and to a large extent run counter to the long-standing relations that
it has with the African continent. Toasije (2009) considers this as part of efforts to
Europeanize Spain and to deny it of its African and complex multi-ethnic identity.
Many European governments assume that uncontrolled sub-Saharan immigration
can generate social alarm among the citizenry, challenge the sovereignty of the state
and jeopardize the welfare system and the idea of ethnic homogeneity underlying
the formation of European states (Toasije, 2009; Ambrosini, 2013). Consequently,
there is a subtle criminalization of African migration through the complicity of the
European Union, Spain’s political elite and the media (Toasije, 2009).
Politics, more than actual migration trends, is the main factor underlying the
illegalization and aggressive combatting of sub-Saharan African migration to Spain.
This is because, given the trends of African migration to Spain over the past three
decades, it is very difficult to imagine that African migrants would flock to Spain and
stay there permanently if the borders were open. In fact, open borders would have
generated fluidity of human movements across the borders, as it existed before. This
is because, for centuries, movements across the Mediterranean Sea has been bidirec-
tional, and as Therrien (2019) observes, there is a growing trend of Spanish migrants
moving in the opposite direction to Morocco, to settle there. The sendentation of
African migrants in Spain and elsewhere in Europe is borne largely out of restric-
tive immigration policies and border controls against African migrants (Agyeman,
2011). According to Cachón (2002), immigrants from southern European nations
who migrated to northern Europe for reconstruction during the post-World War
II period, sought permanent settlement and family reunification when restrictions
were imposed after the oil crisis in the 1970s. The increasing proportion of ‘illegal’
or ‘unwanted’ African migration to Spain is borne out of the policies being imple-
mented by the Spanish government.

68
3, Sep-Dec 2020
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have shown that Spain’s migration policy in sub-Saharan Africa
involving intensive border policing, and strategies to dissuade African migrants from
entering Spain, is borne out of an imaginary threat of possible African invasion of the
Spanish peninsula and Europe. The paper argues that statistics showing the migration
trends from sub-Saharan African to Spain, both through legal and illegal means over
the last three decades, does not support this perception of invasion. Compared with
migration movements originating from other parts of Europe, South America and
Asia to Spain, sub-Saharan migration trends are the slowest. However, the African
migration figures, although low, are magnified and manipulated to give legitimacy to
restrictive control policies.
Based on the above observations, the paper argues that Spain’s control of sub-
Saharan African migration is an over-reaction and ignores all forms of historical,
economic and social relations that exist between Spain and sub-Saharan Africa. It
further maintains that there are long-standing cultural, economic and social relations
between the two regions that have generated aspects of interdependence which
predate European colonization of Africa. However, Spain’s role as the European
Union’s gatekeeper at its southern borders appears to be the main motivation behind
Spain’s aggressive border control mechanisms.
This paper concludes that Spain, in pursuing its migration policies aimed at
restricting African immigration, focuses mainly on its own interests or those of the
European Union, and does not factor into the equation the interests of the migrants
or the African states that are supposed to be Spain’s partners or accomplices in
combating African migration. This is because, remittances that families and African
states receive from migrants in Spain, whether legal or illegal residents, have a very
positive impact on African economies and far outpace Spain’s development aid to
these countries.

69
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Differences in Mental
Health among Migrants and
Non-migrants in South Africa:
Evidence from the National
Income Dynamics Study
Hemish Govera* and Amiena Bayat**
* University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Email: hgovera@gmail.com
** University of the Western Cape, South Africa
The literature associates migration with poor mental health outcomes. Despite exten-
sive empirical research in other countries, there is a paucity of research examining the
mental health consequences of migration in South Africa, and the factors that com-
pound the relationship between the two variables. The study objective was to evaluate
the differences in the mental health status of internal migrants and that of non-mi-
grants in South Africa with a special focus on depressive symptoms. The study con-
sidered the influence of various vulnerability and sociodemographic factors such as
gender, age, educational attainment, race, income group, marital status and province
of residence. Mental health disorders are already considered the largest contributor to
the global disease burden. Hence, understanding the nature of the relationship between
migration and mental health is critical for public health prevention efforts. To make
the determination, the study applied descriptive analysis and logistic modelling based
on the South African National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) panel datasets of 2008,
2010, 2014/15 and 2017. Descriptive statistics were employed to derive the frequency
distribution of sociodemographic characteristics and migration factors. Logistic re-
gression analysis was used to assess the associations between depression, migration
and sociodemographic factors.
Keywords: Migration, acculturation, gender, depression, sociodemographic
factors

75
INTRODUCTION
The process of migration is complex and stress-inducing, regardless of whether mi-
gration is internal or international (Bhugra, 2004; Carroll et al., 2020). This is due to
the association of migration with stressful experiences of change, inadequacy, per-
ceptions of discrimination and social marginalization (Bhugra, 2004; Gkiouleka et
al., 2018; Bauer et al., 2020). The migration process entails social change of cultural
settings for the migrants and this change has implications for mental health (Ajaero
et al., 2017). Therefore, migration has the potential to negatively influence mental
health and has been identified as one of the social determinants of negative mental
health outcomes (Satcher, 2000). The association between mental health issues and
migration bears a considerable influence on health disparities (Ai et al., 2015). Em-
pirical evidence has established sociodemographic inequalities in migrants’ health
(Giannoni et al., 2016). As such, migration and health inequalities continue to be a
key concern of public and policy debates (Bircan et al., 2020).
The concept of migration is not new in South Africa. The country is one of
the main destinations of immigration in Africa (Fauvelle-Aymar, 2014). Within the
country, the Western Cape and Gauteng account for most of the inter-provincial mi-
gration (Kleinhans and Yu, 2020). Evidence suggests that the population of internal
migrants has increased in the post-apartheid era (Ajaero et al., 2017). A significant
proportion of internal migration within the country is intra-district and economi-
cally motivated (Rogan et al., 2009). Despite extensive empirical research in other
countries, there is a paucity of research examining the mental health consequences of
internal migration in South Africa. In this context, it therefore becomes pertinent to
examine if migrants actually have better mental health than non-migrants in South
Africa. Understanding the nature of the relationship between migration and mental
health is critical for public health prevention efforts.
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXTUALIZATION
In South Africa, internal migration is historically associated with the social engineer-
ing and enforced fragmentation of families that took place under apartheid (Hall,
2016). This was part of the apartheid strategy to entrench minority rule through spa-
tial arrangements that strategically divided families and split generations and sepa-
rated breadwinners from dependants (Hall, 2016). Such social conditions have been
conceptualized as a challenge to the emotional resilience of individuals who may
experience psychological distress, personal crisis and could precipitate poor mental
health (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006). In this context, it becomes relevant to examine
if internal migrants have worse mental health than non-migrants in South Africa.
LITERATURE REVIEW/THEORETICAL/CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
There are various theoretical frameworks in the literature that provide concepts that
may be useful in analyzing the association between migration and mental health
Differences in Mental Health among Migrants and Non-migrants in South Africa

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
outcomes. Theories of acculturative stress posit that tensions due to living in a for-
eign culture contribute to mental disorders (Gutierrez-Vazquez et al., 2018). Bhugra
(2004) developed a contingency model which hypothesizes vulnerability (risk fac-
tors) or resiliency (protective factors) for psychological disorders based on the per-
son’s situation and migration stage.
In physical health literature, the selection hypothesis predicts that more pre-
pared and healthier individuals are more likely to migrate compared to their coun-
terparts in worse conditions (Akresh and Frank, 2008). Migrant selectivity could be
evident in both observable and unobservable characteristics such as preparedness to
migrate. As a result, migrants could be positively selected on the sociodemographic
characteristics that are protective against poor mental health outcomes such as gen-
der and family background. This implies that migrants could be better positioned to
handle uncertainty and stress compared to those who select not to migrate. However,
given the high prevalence of poor mental health among migrants, it could be that
selection can negatively impact on mental health. According to Gutierrez-Vazquez
et al. (2018), if migrants are negatively selected with respect to sociodemographic
background, or have underlying traits that make them more prone to dissatisfaction,
then selection could be an important contributor to adverse mental health outcomes.
The literature provides evidence of the significant prevalence of depressive
symptoms within migrant population groups compared to non-migrants. Mulcahy
and Kollamparambil (2016) investigated the impact of rural-urban migration on
subjective well-being in South Africa between 2008 and 2012. The study adopted the
use of instrumental variables to control for endogeneity caused by shock-induced
self-selection, and propensity score matching to control for migration self-selection
bias. The results indicated that rural-urban migration leads to decreased subjective
well-being which could be due to unrealized expectations and changing reference
groups used to peg aspirations, as well as the emotional cost of being away from fam-
ily and a home environment.
Gkiouleka et al. (2018) researched the prevalence of depressive symptoms
among migrant and non-migrant communities in 21 European countries. The re-
search looked into the impact of gender, childhood experiences, sociodemograph-
ic factors and social support on depressive symptoms using data from the seventh
round of the European Social Survey and the Greek Migheal survey. The study found
that migrants reported significantly higher levels of depressive symptoms in seven of
the examined countries, while in Greece and in the UK, they reported significantly
lower levels compared with non-immigrant populations. The findings suggest that
the impact of migration status on depressive symptoms is subject to additional deter-
minants of mental health as well as on contextual factors.
Gutierrez-Vazquez et al. (2018) sought to explore the link between migration
and depressive symptoms among Mexicans residing in the United States of America
(USA) and those residing in the sending communities in Mexico. The study reviewed
the standard explanations for the links between migration and depression, such as ac-

77
culturative stress, lack of social support, and powerlessness and isolation. The study
also tested the migration selection hypothesis using propensity matching scores. The
study results indicated a higher prevalence of depressive symptoms among migrant
communities compared to non-migrant community groups. The study also found
little support for selection as an important source of migrant depression. Instead,
the study found strong evidence that migration itself was primarily responsible for
depressive symptoms mainly due to the disruption of social networks that it entails.
Family separation was found to be the strongest predictor of depressive symptoms
and could account for a significant proportion of the poor mental health among mi-
grants.
Akresh and Frank (2008) sought to quantify the extent of health selection
among contemporary US immigrant groups. This entails checking the degree to
which potential immigrants migrate, or fail to migrate, on the basis of their health
status. Data for the study came from the New Immigrant Survey 2003 cohort which
included unique series of questions to evaluate the health of immigrants in the Unit-
ed States to that of citizens in their country of origin. The study found that the extent
of positive health selection differed significantly across immigrant groups and was
related to compositional differences in the sociodemographic profiles of immigrant
streams.
Past studies on migration highlight four key sociodemographic risk factors
for depression among the general population: (i) low sociodemographic status; (ii)
female gender; (iii) being unmarried; and (iv) undesired life events (Alegria et al.,
2007). Mental health outcomes were found to be worse for immigrants who are un-
employed, young, and female (Ai et al., 2015). However, in a completely different
finding, Bauer et al. (2020) found that a high sociodemographic status does not nec-
essarily protect refugees from the negative influences during migration and the first
months or years in the new country.
There are several theoretical models and perspectives mainly focusing on ru-
ral-urban and international migration. However, migration research lacks theoreti-
cal advancement with empirical research disconnected from the theories (Kureková,
2010; Bircan et al., 2020). The existing migration theories do not adequately capture
the dynamics of internal migration and depression. In the presence of these theoreti-
cal gaps, this study looks at confirming the hypothesis that migrants report greater
rates of depressive symptoms than non-migrants after controlling for sociodemo-
graphic factors. Also, while there is extensive empirical literature on the impact of
mental health on international migration, relatively little is known about internal mi-
gration and mental health outcomes, especially in the South African context. There
is a paucity of research examining the mental health consequences of migration in
South Africa, and the factors that compound the relationship between the two vari-
ables. Therefore, the key objective of this empirical research is to examine whether
internal migrants are more likely to report poor mental health outcomes compared
to non-migrants in South Africa, and if they do, to also determine the sociodemo-

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
graphic predictors of migrant status and mental health outcomes.
METHODOLOGY
Data
The study used data from the five waves of the National Income Dynamics Study
(NIDS) survey: wave 1 (2008), wave 2 (2010–2011), wave 3 (2012), wave 4 (2014–
2015) and wave 5 (2017) (SALDRU, 2020). The NIDS is a face-to-face, longitudinal,
nationally representative panel survey of individuals and households focusing pri-
marily on sociodemographics, labor market participation, grants received, education
and health in South Africa. The NIDS adopted a stratified, two-stage cluster sample
design in sampling the households and individuals identified in the 2008 base wave.
In waves 2 to 5, the survey included the original sample members as well as new
members who had joined the original households. Response rates in the NIDS sur-
vey were high, with over 81% of households being successfully interviewed in wave
5. This study considered only respondents who were 18 years of age or older at the
time of the interview. For the data analysis, the dataset was weighted to account for
attrition and under- or over-sampling errors.
Measures/Instruments
Depression variable
The depression variable was derived from responses to the emotional health ques-
tions in the survey questionnaires. Across all the waves, respondents were asked 10
questions relating to their mental well-being. The responses were scored on a 4-point
Likert scale indicating the frequency of experiencing the depressive symptom. To
calculate a total score for depressive symptoms, the survey responses were summed
up using the 10-item version of the Centre for Epidemiological Studies-Depression
(CES-D) scale (Radloff, 1977). This study used the threshold of 10 and above to de-
fine the presence of significant depressive symptoms (SDS). The threshold was also
recommended by Radloff (1977). The same scale was adopted by other studies as-
sessing depression using the NIDS such as Mungai and Bayat (2018) and Dowdall
et al. (2017). The CES-D scale is a common psychiatric measurement tool for as-
sessing depressive symptoms and has good psychometric properties (Dowdall et al.,
2017; Mungai and Bayat, 2018). The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale in the sample was
0.75. Following from Schuckit et al. (1993: 5), who asserted that “symptoms are not
diagnoses”, and the methodology employed by Mungai and Bayat (2018), the study
did not attempt to diagnose depression but rather assessed the symptomatology that
suggests significant vulnerability to being depressed.
Migration variable
This research followed Hall’s (2016) methodology in defining migrants as those who

79
moved across municipal boundaries. It is a single variable that captures movements
between waves 1 and 5, or any of the intervening waves. For instance, persons who
moved between waves 1 and 2, but not between waves 3 and 4 are defined as mi-
grants, on the basis that they had moved place at some time between waves 1 and 5.
Empirical model
The study uses logit models to analyze the likelihood of migration status to impact
on mental health status. The adoption of logit models is appropriate, given that the
dependent variables can be structured as binary outcomes. Logistic regression allows
the research to predict the probability of the outcomes falling between the unit in-
tervals. The technique can be used to model a response variable as a function of one
or more explanatory variables. The study follows the approach of Chear (2015) and
formulates the logistic model in the general form below:
log 1-P
= α + βi
Xi
+ ε
The regression equation considers depression status as the dependent variable. In the
equation, P is the probability that the participant exhibits depressive symptoms and
1-P is the probability that the participant does not exhibit depressive symptoms. P/
(1-P) is the odds that the participant exibits significant depressive symptoms. X is
the vector of independent variables hypothesized to impact the probability of dem-
onstrating significant depressive symptoms. The model included several sociodemo-
graphic characteristic indicators such as age, race, gender, educational attainment,
and marital status. β are the coefficients of the independent variables and ε is the
error term. After fitting the logistic regression model to the survey data, the study
conducted model diagnostic tests for goodness of fit of the fitted model. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow (HL) test was used to check the goodness of fit of the specified models.
The independent variables were tested for symptoms of multi-collinearity through
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. All the statistical tests were based on a p-
value of a less than 5% level of significance.
Data analysis
The data analysis included the use of descriptive analysis and regression analysis to
assess the association between depressive symptoms and migration status. The study
applied multivariate logistic regression analysis to assess the likelihood of sample
members to experience significant depressive symptoms taking into account their
migration status and controlling for sociodemographic characteristics. The study
used race, gender, educational attainment, age, marital and occupational status as
indicator variables for sociodemographic status based on prior literature such as
studies by Moussavi et al. (2007), Atwoli et al. (2013), and Mungai and Bayat (2018).
P

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Ethical considerations
Ethical approval was not needed for the study due to the use of secondary data that
was anonymous.
RESULT
Table 1 provides an overview of the sociodemographic characteristics of the study
population. The sample consisted of more females compared to males in both the
migrant and non-migrant population groups. The sample majority is also predomi-
nantly African, with 76% of the study sample being of the African race. Over 60% of
both the migrant and non-migrant population groups have secondary school educa-
tion. The unemployed comprised a bigger proportion of the study sample across both
migrant statuses. More than half of the sample were aged between 18 and 44 years.
Within provinces, the majority of the sample members were from KwaZulu-Natal.

81
Table 1: Characteristics of the study sample
Source: Authors’ own calculations, based on NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014/15
(SALDRU, 2020)
Migrants Non-migrants Overall
n Proportion
%
n Proportion
%
n Proportion
%
Gender
Male 743 46% 3,983 39% 4,726 40%
Female 884 54% 6,146 61% 7,030 60%
Race
African 1395 86% 7500 74% 8895 76%
Coloured 138 8% 1771 17% 1909 16%
Asian/Indian 24 1% 195 2% 219 2%
White 70 4% 663 7% 733 6%
Educational attainment
No schooling 98 7% 1220 14% 1318 13%
Some primary 171 12% 2198 26% 2369 24%
Some secondary 555 40% 2813 33% 3368 34%
Completed secondary 341 25% 1205 14% 1546 16%
Tertiary or more 211 15% 1107 13% 1318 13%
Employment status
Employed 537 39% 4,007 47% 4,544 46%
Unemployed 839 61% 4,536 53% 5,375 54%
Age group
18-24 695 43% 1748 17% 2443 21%
25-34 458 28% 2320 23% 2778 24%
35-44 221 14% 2211 22% 2432 21%
45-54 143 9% 1855 18% 1998 17%
55-64 64 4% 1158 11% 1222 10%
65+ 46 3% 837 8% 883 8%
Province
Western Cape 130 8% 1653 16% 1783 15%
Eastern Cape 186 11% 1134 11% 1320 11%
Northern Cape 72 4% 772 8% 844 7%
Free State 85 5% 644 6% 729 6%
KwaZulu-Natal 487 30% 2528 25% 3015 26%
North West 149 9% 852 8% 1001 9%
Gauteng 211 13% 1007 10% 1218 10%
Mpumalanga 90 6% 689 7% 779 7%
Limpopo 217 13% 850 8% 1067 9%

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Figure 1 displays the overall distribution of depressive symptoms by migration status
and gender. Based on the information in the figure, the pattern is similar for females
with roughly the same distribution within both the migrant and non-migrant groups.
For females, roughly 25% reported depression scores between 10 and 20 across both
the migrant and non-migrant categories. It is also evident that there are more female
outliers reporting higher depression scores for migrants compared to non-migrants.
Figure 1: Distribution of symptoms in CES-D depression
screening by migration status and gender
Source: Authors’ own construction, based on NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014/5 and 2017
(SALDRU, 2020)
However, there is a marked difference between the distribution of depressive symp-
toms in the migrant and non-migrant groups of males. More migrant males dis-
played higher depressive scores compared to non-migrant males. Over 25% of mi-
grant males reported depressive scores greater than 10 compared to about 15% for
non-migrant males.
In Figure 2, we report the distribution of symptoms by migration status and
race. The migrant sub-population group reported higher depressive scores across
all the races. A total of 25% of migrant Asian/Indians had depressive scores above
the cut-off of 10, followed by African migrants at slightly below 25%. Close to 20%
of migrant Coloureds also reported depressive scores higher than 10. Despite a high
number of outliers, the proportion of non-migrants reporting depressive scores of 10
or higher was less than that of migrants.

83
screening by migration status and race
(SALDRU, 2020)
Figure 3 provides an overview of the distribution of symptoms in CES-D depres-
sion screening by migration status, race and gender. Based on information in the
figure, there is no significant variation in the distribution scores of both migrants
and non-migrants across both genders within the African racial group. About 25%
of female migrants, male migrants and male non-migrants exceeded the threshold
of 10 to qualify as displaying significant depressive symptoms. The only exception
is the category of African non-migrant females who have more than 25% displaying
significant depressive symptoms. The African race constituted the group with the
highest depression scores compared to the other racial groups followed by Coloureds
and lastly, the White racial group.

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
screening by migration status, race and gender
(SALDRU, 2020)
The figure shows that overall, the African population group exhibits the highest in-
tensity and prevalence of depressive symptoms followed by the Coloured group and
the White group. The female non-migrant African group accounted for the highest
depression scores. The same group also constituted the group with the highest pro-
portion of members with depression scores greater than 10. Within the Coloured ra-
cial group, females reported higher depression scores compared to males across both
the migrant and non-migrant categories. White non-migrants across both genders
reported similar patterns of depression in both intensity and distribution. However,
female White migrants reported higher depression scores compared to male White
migrants.
The study employed logistic regression analysis to ascertain the association
between the depression status, migrant status and their sociodemographic character-
istics. Table 3 displays the results of the logistic regression analysis, using data from
the NIDS waves 1 to 5, pooled into cross-section. Model 1 is specified to control
for migrant status only. Model 2 is a specification that controls for gender as well,
while Model 3 controls for educational attainment, age, income groups, employment
status, marital status and province of domicile. The majority of the predictors were
statistically significant. An exception was race and migration status (White non-mi-
grants) across all three models, race and migration status (Coloured non-migrant),

85
educational attainment (some primary education) and province (Free State and
North West) in Model 3.
Table 2: Logistic regression on depression status by migration
status and sociodemographic characteristics
Source: Authors’ own calculations, based on NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014/15 (SALDRU,
2020) *** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level
Variables (1)
Model 1: Simple
specification
(2)
Model 2: Some
controls
(3)
Model 3:
Full specification:
Race and migration status (Base: White migrant)
African migrant 1.1135*** (0.2149) 1.1177*** (0.2151) 0.9459*** (0.2327)
Coloured migrant 0.7303*** (0.2423) 0.7401*** (0.2425) 0.5825*** (0.2632)
African non-migrant 1.2246*** (0.2132) 1.2054*** (0.2134) 0.8826*** (0.2309)
Coloured non-migrant 0.586*** (0.215) 0.5737*** (0.2152) 0.2679 (0.233)
White non-migrant 0.1736 (0.2243) 0.1702 (0.2245) 0.0631 (0.2418)
Gender (Base: Female)
Male -0.2688*** (0.022) -0.157*** (0.0257)
Educational attainment (Base: No education)
Some primary education -0.0614 (0.0388)
Some secondary education -0.2407*** (0.0425)
Completed secondary education -0.3777*** (0.0529)
Tertiary or more -0.4269*** (0.0533)
Income quartiles (Base: Lowest income group)
Second quartile -0.1057*** (0.032)
Third quartile -0.1555*** (0.0342)
Fourth quartile -0.2864*** (0.0416)
Age 0.0038*** (0.0011)
Marital status (Base: Married)
Widowed 0.2541*** (0.0414)
Separated 0.3512*** (0.0679)
Never married 0.1914*** (0.0288)
Employment Status (Base: Unemployed)
Employed -0.1466*** (0.0265)
Province (Base: Western Cape)
Eastern Cape -0.1835*** (0.0582)
Northern Cape -0.3437*** (0.0608)
Free State -0.0628 (0.0655)
KwaZulu-Natal -0.164*** (0.055)
North West -0.1188* (0.0624)
Gauteng -0.1502*** (0.0601)
Mpumalanga -0.627*** (0.0693)
Limpopo -0.5398*** (0.0636)
Constant -2.0228*** (0.2128) -1.9128*** (0.2132) -1.3231*** (0.2439)

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
The regression results in Table 2 reveal that all other racial groups in both migrant
and non-migrant groups were more likely to be depressed compared to White mi-
grants in models 1 and 2. The results were statistically significant except for White
non-migrants across all 3 models. However, there were no statistically significant dif-
ferences between White migrants and Coloured non-migrants, as reflected in Model
3.
On gender, being male compared to being female, reduces the likelihood of
being depressed and this is apparent in both Model 2 and Model 3 results. Using ‘no
education’ as the base category, moving into a higher educational attainment catego-
ry reduces the odds of being depressed. With age, each year-increase in age, increases
the chances of being depressed. The same patterns extend to income brackets. Taking
the lowest income quartile as the base category, being in a higher income category re-
duces the chances of being depressed. Compared to being married, all other marital
statuses are associated with higher odds of being depressed. Being employed rather
than unemployed reduces the chances of being depressed. On province of residence,
if we take the Western Cape province as the reference point, residing in any of the
other 8 provinces is associated with lower odds of being depressed.
The study then appraises the determinants of mental health status in South
Africa by gender and sociodemographic variables. Table 3 summarizes the logistic
regression models to give a clearer picture of how gender influences the risk of de-
pressive symptoms. Model 1 evaluates the effects of migrant status and sociodemo-
graphic variables on depression status for males. Model 2 undertakes a similar analy-
sis for females, with Model 3 reporting the combined effect.

87
Table 3: Logistic regression on depression status by migration
status, gender and sociodemographic characteristics
Sources: Authors’ own calculations, based on NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014/15 (SALD-
RU, 2020) *** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level
of significance
Based on the regression output, the overall finding was that compared to White
migrants, male Africans across both migrant and non-migrant categories had
Variables (1)
Model 1: Male
(2)
Model 1: Female
(3)
Model 1: Combined
Race and migration status (Base: White migrant)
African migrant 1.767*** (0.52) 0.6128*** (0.2667) 0.9344*** (0.2326)
Coloured migrant 1.4524*** (0.5522) 0.2241 (0.3128) 0.5762*** (0.2631)
African non-migrant 1.6585*** (0.5182) 0.5735*** (0.2639) 0.8791*** (0.2309)
Coloured non-migrant 1.0548*** (0.5208) -0.046 (0.2669) 0.2717 (0.233)
White non-migrant 0.9152* (0.5305) -0.3063 (0.2796) 0.0629 (0.2418)
Educational attainment (Base: No education)
Some primary education -0.085 (0.0718) -0.059 (0.0463) -0.0616 (0.0388)
Some secondary education -0.2784*** (0.0755) -0.2274*** (0.0518) -0.2367*** (0.0424)
Completed secondary
education
-0.4106*** (0.0893) -0.3667*** (0.0664) -0.3741*** (0.0528)
Tertiary or more -0.4642*** (0.0905) -0.4146*** (0.0668) -0.4145*** (0.0532)
Income quartiles (Base: Lowest income group)
Second quartile -0.1183*** (0.0601) -0.1055*** (0.0379) -0.1098*** (0.032)
Third quartile -0.1497*** (0.061) -0.1704*** (0.0418) -0.1686*** (0.0342)
Fourth quartile -0.2617*** (0.0696) -0.3058*** (0.0533) -0.3097*** (0.0414)
Age 0.0044*** (0.002) 0.0039*** (0.0013) 0.0039*** (0.0011)
Marital status (Base: Married)
Widowed 0.5763*** (0.1145) 0.2014*** (0.0462) 0.2967*** (0.0408)
Separated 0.5291*** (0.1238) 0.2539*** (0.0815) 0.371*** (0.0678)
Never-married 0.2686*** (0.0543) 0.1419*** (0.035) 0.1929*** (0.0289)
Employment status (Base: Unemployed)
Employed -0.2408*** (0.0461) -0.0817*** (0.0327) -0.1658*** (0.0263)
Province (Base: Western Cape)
Eastern Cape -0.2079*** (0.0994) -0.1764*** (0.0719) -0.1858*** (0.0582)
Northern Cape -0.3788*** (0.1007) -0.3214*** (0.0765) -0.3511*** (0.0608)
Free State -0.041 (0.1106) -0.0776 (0.0816) -0.0643 (0.0655)
KwaZulu-Natal -0.1021 (0.0943) -0.1952*** (0.0679) -0.1591*** (0.055)
North West -0.1269 (0.1038) -0.1172 (0.0785) -0.1258*** (0.0624)
Gauteng -0.2097*** (0.1003) -0.1063 (0.0755) -0.1502*** (0.0601)
Mpumalanga -0.6952*** (0.1183) -0.5913*** (0.0859) -0.6271*** (0.0693)
Limpopo -0.4139*** (0.1093) -0.5976*** (0.0783) -0.5367*** (0.0636)
Constant -2.2792*** (0.5375) -0.9999*** (0.2807) -1.3709*** (0.2438)

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significantly higher chances of being depressed. This finding is evident from the
significant results of all the 3 models. The impact is more pronounced for the male
group compared to the female group with significant association for Coloured
and White males and insignificant effect for their female counterparts. Poor
sociodemographic status was significantly associated with reduced probability
of good mental health across all 3 models. The factors include poor educational
attainment, lower income, higher age, being widowed, separated or never married
(using married as the base category), being unemployed and residing in any province
other than the Western Cape ceteris paribus (except for Free State and North West
across both genders and Gauteng province for females).
DISCUSSION
Theaimofthisstudywastodeterminewhethertheprevalenceofdepressivesymptoms
is higher among migrants than non-migrants in South Africa. The study also sought
to examine the association of migration status with a wide set of sociodemographic
factors in the same context. The a priori expectation was that migrants would report
higher depressive symptoms compared to non-migrants. In supporting findings,
the study found that both migrant and non-migrant African groups were more
vulnerable to depressive symptoms than Coloured and White migrants and non-
migrants. The result had greater effect for males compared to females. The findings
were consistent with the existing literature that suggests migration as a risk factor
for depressive symptoms in South Africa with sociodemographic status having a
modifying effect. This finding is consistent with the research by Ajaero et al. (2017)
who found a similar association between migrant status and depressive symptoms
in South Africa, using the 2012 NIDS data (SALDRU, 2020). These results were
also consistent with findings by Bhugra (2004), Hwang et al. (2010), Gkiouleka et
al. (2018), Gutierrez-Vazquez et al. (2018) and Carroll et al. (2020), who identified
migration as a risk factor for depressive symptoms in various contexts.
Thestudyalsohypothesizedthatdepressivesymptomswouldbemoreprevalent
among those with low sociodemographic status after controlling for the migrant
status. The research found significant associations between low sociodemographic
status and the risk of poor mental health. Poor mental health was associated with
lower educational status, unemployment and being part of a lower income group, in
findings consistent with Alegria et al. (2007) and Gkiouleka et al. (2018).
The current study found significant gender disparities in mental health status
with females, especially African migrant women, who displayed poorer mental
health status compared to males across both migrant and non-migrant communities.
The result is consistent with findings by Dalgard and Thapa (2007). A possible
explanation for this, is that in South Africa, women have less economic and social
power than males, yet they carry heavy family responsibilities (Mungai and Bayat,
2018). This factor can have a modifying effect on the risk of depressive symptoms
when combined with the challenges of social integration for migrants.

89
Furthermore, age appears to be a significantly strong predictor of depressive
symptoms with an increase in age being associated with increased risk of depressive
symptoms. This finding is consistent with the study by Ardington and Case (2010),
who also found that the likelihood of depression increases with age. This result can
be explained in part, by older adults being more troubled by poverty compared to the
relatively young members of the society.
This study found that marital status was significantly associated with depres-
sive symptoms. It is apparent from the study results that all marital status categories
have poorer mental health relative to the married category. This is consistent with the
findings of Das et al. (2007) who also found that respondents who were separated,
divorced or widowed, reported worse mental health compared to those who were
married. This could be linked to the lack of social support, which adds to stress and
lowers mental health.
The place of residence was also identified as a significant determinant of men-
tal health status in the study. Compared to the Western Cape, residing in the rest of
the South African provinces was associated with a lower risk of poor mental health
after controlling for migration status.
LIMITATIONS
Notwithstanding the robust findings, the study has some limitations. First, the num-
bers in some of the racial sub-categories such as Whites and Indians/Asians con-
stitute very few respondents, which makes it difficult to draw inferences from the
results for these groups. Second, the available data makes it difficult to determine if
a move represents a ‘return’ rather than ‘migration’. Future research should consider
employing more representative data for inferences regarding under-represented ra-
cial groups such as Whites and Indians/Asians.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The aim of the study was to evaluate whether there are differences in the mental
health status of migrants and non-migrants in the South African context, consid-
ering sociodemographic factors. The results highlighted significant associations
between migrants and non-migrants with the relationship being compounded by
sociodemographic characteristics. The study found empirical evidence that African
migrants are at heightened risk of depressive symptoms, compared to other races.
Both migrant and non-migrant African groups were more vulnerable to depressive
symptoms than Coloured and White migrants and non-migrants. There were also
significant differences in the way sociodemographic characteristics were associated
with mental health status. Migrants with lower sociodemographic status were more
susceptible to poor mental health, highlighting the unique challenges and threats that
are faced by economically-deprived migrants. The gender analysis revealed signifi-
cant differences in the mental health status of males and females, with male migrants

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3, Sep-Dec 2020
being impacted more than females. Being married was significantly associated with
better mental health status. These findings provide insights into the racial, gender
and sociodemographic dimensions of poor mental health in the migrant community
in South Africa, which policy-makers can incorporate into intervention strategies.
A key insight of the results is that strategies that impact on migration, such as local
employment, housing and urban planning are likely to have important mental health
outcomes at the population level. Therefore, there is a need to address neighborhood-
level material deprivation and unemployment to reduce migration, which ought to
impact positively on mental health.

91
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Externalization and
Securitization as Policy
Responses to African Migration
to the European Union
Victor H Mlambo
University of Zululand
Email: halavico@yahoo.com
This paper examines how African migration to the European Union (EU) has become
externalized and securitized and the implications this has for migration management
for both the EU and Africa. To accomplish this, the paper employed a qualitative re-
search approach which reviewed current literature on the topic under study. It found
that the externalization and securitization of African migration to the EU have failed
to prioritize and address the different socio-economic and political conditions that are
driving irregular migration. Additionally, externalization and securitization as policy
responses do not stop irregular African migration; rather, they prolong the misery of
migrants who are at the mercy of smugglers who prey on their desperation. The paper
concludes that migration management between the EU and Africa needs to be an-
chored on policies that address the core ‘push’ factors driving irregular migration from
Africa, rather than policies which do not stop migration (even though they have slowed
it down) but rather indirectly empower smugglers and leave considerable room for the
abuse of migrants.
Keywords: Africa, development, management, migrants

95
INTRODUCTION
There have been growing debates not only on African irregular migration to the
European Union (EU) as a phenomenon but also on how it could be reduced. Since
the 1970s, more than 2.5 million migrants have crossed the Mediterranean Sea to
enter Europe without visas (IOM, 2018). However, the attacks in March 2004 in
Madrid and on 7 July 2005 in London became a defining moment as to how the EU
responded to migration. Even though the number of Africans arriving irregularly
at EU shores has been on the decline, this has not coincided with the decline in
anti-immigrant attitudes in some EU states. For Ivanova (2016), the Visegrád Group
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) has at times, incorporating the
concept of state sovereignty, vehemently disagreed with the European Commission’s
directive how migration ought to be handled collectively. The EU does not operate
in a vacuum, and thus the European Commission has to take into consideration the
interests of member states. Despite a decline in those arriving (over a million in 2015
and 140 000 by June 2019) (Mbiyozo, 2019), EU member states have been torn apart
by bitter disagreements over how to collectively manage irregular migration without
infringing on the territorial sovereignty of member states while also adhering to
international human rights practices (Farrell, 2015).
The EU (through the European Commission) has attempted to pressure Africa
(majority sending countries of migrants) to cooperate on migration management.
For example, the EU introduced a new visa code which will continue to regulate
the short-stay entry of third-country nationals. The new visa code introduced
restrictive processes for countries that fail to cooperate on readmissions. However,
the African Union (AU) and most African states say that returns must be voluntary
and people cannot be forced to go to countries against their will (Mbiyozo, 2019).
The above reflects that the current migration and refugee crisis in Europe requires an
understanding of the different drivers of migration and how they can be addressed
collectively. It is not a question of opening or closing borders, but rather, there is a
need to understand the complex and overlapping relationship between forced and
economic drivers of migration to Europe as this can better shape an appropriate
policy response to the phenomenon.
This paper discusses the extent to which EU initiatives (securitization and
externalization) have been successful in reducing this irregular flow which has been
deemed an influx by EU media. The common narrative has been that socio-economic
and political factors are drivers of irregular migration; however, such narratives have
missed the point by not focusing on the often-ignored factors driving migration. This
paper is based on a review of the literature on irregular African migration to the EU.
The paper aims to provide a sound basis for a more evidence-based discussion of this
highly debated and politicized issue, i.e., what drives African migration to the EU,
how has the EU responded and how effective have these responses been. Irregular
African migration to the EU as a process flows into Europe along land and sea routes
under the control of human smugglers, and migrants in the process face further
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marginalization and exploitation. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: after
this introduction, the paper reviews EU migration management policies such as the
EU charter, the EU trust fund and the new pact relating to migration. Subsequently,
it discusses securitization and externalization as policy reactions to irregular African
migration, their effectiveness, shortcomings and finally, how the African Union
needs to play a more important role in the quest to reduce irregular migration to the
EU. This is followed by the policy implications and conclusion of the paper.
Many African migrants who try to reach Europe (using the North African
route which cuts through Libya) by boat are often intercepted by the Libyan coast
guard and handed over to criminal gangs that traffic them. Nearly 20,000 people
have been detained in Libya according to Amnesty International. Therefore, it be-
comes imperative for this paper to examine whether EU policies with regards to mi-
gration management have contributed to the abuse and deaths of migrants.
EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is a legally binding treaty for member states
which outlines fundamental rights for everyone within the borders of the EU, regard-
less of their migration status. However, the EU does not exist in a vacuum or operate
detachedly from the member states or the people. The European Commission is a
politically independent institution that proposes legislation, policies and programs of
action. It represents the collective interests of member states (Laine, 2020). It is also
responsible for implementing the decisions of the European Parliament, the voice
of the people, and the Council (of Ministers), the voice of the member states. There
is also the European Council, comprising of the heads of state or government of all
the EU member states. It is the highest-level policy-making body in the EU, which
defines the overall political direction and priorities of the Union, but it does not
exercise any legislative functions. While it is the European Commission that initi-
ates procedures and proposes new laws, it is the European Parliament and Council
that adopt them. Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by EU
citizens to represent their interests and the Council consists of government minis-
ters, i.e., elected officials, from all the EU member states (Laine, 2020). However, the
issues of irregular migration have divided opinion in the EU, with disagreements
blocking agreements on reforms of EU asylum laws and fair distribution of respon-
sibility for processing migrants and asylum seekers entering and already present in
EU territory. The focus remains on keeping migrants and asylum seekers away from
the EU, including through problematic proposals for offshore processing and migra-
tion cooperation with non-EU countries with fewer resources, human rights abuses
and less capacity to process asylum claims. While European attempts to ‘secure’ or
‘protect’ its borders have reduced irregular migration from Africa, considerable ef-
forts are needed to address the factors facilitating irregular African migration. These
revolve around understanding the drivers of migration, enacting policy (jointly by
EU and Africa) to address these drivers. Apart from policy development concerning

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addressing the drivers of migration, from an African perspective, good governance
and economic development are key necessities in the continent’s drive to reduce ir-
regular migration.
Framing migration as a problem in the EU was a result of the upsurge in anti-
migrant and right-wing political parties, and thus migration was observed as a bor-
der security issue that needed to be addressed (Laine, 2020). Seeking to debunk the
common misconceptions about migration and suggest an alternative narrative that
is based on mutual interests, this paper observes that from the onset, the EU and
the AU acknowledged that cooperation is greatly needed to address the problem.
However, contentions have arisen about how this cooperation ought to take place.
For the EU, securitization and externalization initiatives have received their share of
criticisms, for either not doing enough to help those in need or doing too much in
trying to protect its borders.
THE EU TRUST FUND FOR AFRICA
The European Union Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF for Africa) was established as a
mechanism to address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregu-
lar migration and to contribute to better migration management in Africa (Castillejo,
2016). The EU Trust Fund was born out of the implementation of the Action Plan
adopted at the Valletta Summit. The EU committed 1.8 billion euros from the EU
budget and the European Development Fund (EDF), to be complemented by con-
tributions from the EU member states and other donors (Hunt, 2015). For the EU,
irregular migration from African and the Middle East, coupled with the rise in right-
wing populism, warranted an intervention to stem the inflow of migrants. The EU
Trust Fund was anchored on soliciting cooperation from third parties through finan-
cial support. Programs under the EU Trust Fund are spread across three regions in
Africa (involving twenty-six partner countries) mainly the Sahel and Lake Chad, the
Horn of Africa and North Africa (Cangas and Knoll, 2016). The EU Trust Fund un-
dertakes a number of activities related to strengthening the rule of law, creating eco-
nomic and educational opportunities, building better governance, and ensuring the
effective and sustainable return, readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants
not qualifying for protection. The support of the EU Trust Fund in Africa requires a
firm commitment to supporting capacity-building of third countries in the field of
migration and border management, as well as to the stabilization and development
of these regions of Africa. The EU with its financial support solicits cooperation from
African states who are most fragile and those most affected by migration. Cangas
and Knoll (2016) explain that the EU Trust Fund is anchored on four types of inter-
ventions. Firstly, economic programs, which are focused on creating employment
and also to integrate returnees. Secondly, resilience projects, which are meant to im-
prove food security and provide services for local communities and refugees. Thirdly,
migration management, which is geared towards fighting irregular migration and
smuggling, focusing on return, readmission, international protection and legal mi-

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gration. Fourthly, governance and security, which is premised on the need for good
governance, through strengthening the rule of law, security and development, border
management and conflict-prevention systems. However, pouring billions of euros
into countries which are characterized by political instability, human rights abuses
and disregard for civil liberties, raises questions about the EU’s commitment to the
respect and support for international human rights. Therefore, this means that the
lack of clarity over funding could mean that EU aid money is repackaged as border
security with no development goals. Moreover, tackling ‘the root causes of irregular
migration’ is a lengthy, non-linear, unpredictable process, depending on many more
contextual factors than support from financial and technical development partners.
However, the narrative around the EU Trust Fund for Africa suggests that aid can
buy partner countries’ cooperation (in readmission and strict border management),
and hence curb migration flows to the EU (Cangas and Knoll 2016). While the EU
Trust Fund envisions a cooperative framework with regards to migration manage-
ment, the EU however, with its financial muscle, has the upper hand with regards to
policy development and soliciting cooperation through financial means.
THE EU MIGRATION PACT
On 23 September 2020, the European Commission announced it’s New Pact on Mi-
gration and Asylum, which is underpinned by strengthening border security (Kirisci
et al., 2020). The new pact (European Commission, 2020) consists of three layers.
Firstly, the pact advocates for the development of policies to keep people in their
countries. However, such policies ignore the positive benefits of migration, in both
Europe and countries of origin. In addition, the investments in addressing the ‘root
causes’ of migration within these partnership agreements have, to date, done little to
prevent onward movement (Kirisci et al., 2020). From an African perspective, Abebe
and Mbiyozo (2020) explain that the increased emphasis in the New Pact on mi-
grant returns is contrary to Africa’s position and could affect negotiations around the
Post-Cotonou Partnership Agreement (ACP) and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Even
though the number of those arriving in the EU from Africa has decreased, the EU
has turned its attention to returning migrants who do not have legal rights to remain.
Thirteen of the 16 priority countries under the European Commission’s 2016 New
Partnership Framework are in Africa (Abebe and Mbiyozo, 2020). The new pact aims
to increase returns through strengthening border control, signing returns agree-
ments with third countries and allowing EU member states to choose between reset-
tling refugees and sponsoring returns. However, African states have resisted intensi-
fied returns policies, maintaining that returns must be voluntary. The second layer
of the new pact involves the investment in increased border security and deterrence.
From an African perspective, incorporating the EU’s Global Approach to Migration
and Mobility, processes such as the Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment
(MME) Partnership, the Rabat Process, The Rome Declaration and Programme for
2015-2017, The Khartoum Process, and the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020

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are all processes that are geared towards strengthening border security (European
Commission, 2015). The third layer of the pact proposes rules to resolve the long-
standing challenge within the EU to achieve a more balanced distribution of respon-
sibilities and promote solidarity among EU members in dealing with asylum seekers
and refugees. This has however, been met with considerable rebellion from within
the EU (Abebe and Mbiyozo, 2020).
Critics of the pact argue that it is so inward-oriented that it fails to recognize
the policy implications of the dire state of forced migration globally. Secondly, the
pact makes little allowance for how the COVID-19 pandemic is going to impact the
EU’s migration and asylum policies, since the pandemic has profoundly affected the
capacity of host countries to manage the presence of refugees and ensure their pro-
tection (Kirisci et al., 2020). From an African perceptive, the call by the EU’s New
Pact on Migration and Asylum for revamping partnerships with third countries is
reminiscent of the EU’s long-standing policy of externalizing the cost and responsi-
bility of managing its external borders. Critiquing this approach, Abebe and Mbiyozo
(2020) contend that cooperating with third countries with regards to migration by
tying policy issues such as development assistance, trade concessions, security, edu-
cation, and visa facilitation has long been criticized as asymmetrical. The pact takes
this relationship to a new coercive level by suggesting the possibility of “apply[ing]
restrictive visa measures” to third countries unwilling to be cooperative (European
Commission, 2020).
SECURITIZATION AND EXTERNALIZATION OF AFRICAN MIGRATION
Migration control is typically seen as a natural part of legitimate nation-states’ exer-
cise of sovereign power. External border surveillance is, according to the European
Commission, a necessity because of the relaxed internal borders within the Schengen
region (Palm, 2020: 10-14). Contrary to EU media reporting, labeling the arrival of
African migrants as an invasion, such reports fail to take into consideration that most
African migrants move within the continent – they are not overwhelming Europe or
the rest of the world. African migration to the EU is complex and characterized by
complex factors which present numerous dangers to migrants. A study by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2019) explains that irregular migrants
who made the fraught journey from Africa to Europe would do so again despite
knowing the dangers of the trip. The report further reveals that getting a job was not
the only motivation to move, not all irregular migrants were ‘poor’ in Africa, nor had
lower education levels. Additionally, 58 per cent were either employed or in school at
the time of their departure, with the majority of those working earning competitive
wages. Even though the UNDP study shows that economic need was not the main
driver of migration, other studies (Dinbabo and Nyasulu, 2015; Marie-Laurence,
2016; Mlambo, 2017; Giménez-Gómez et al., 2019) argue that key to migration is the
need to maximize economic opportunities that do not exist in countries of origin.
Nevertheless, this paper argues that tackling irregular migration requires a consider-

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able understanding of the other drivers of migration (political factors, family ties,
socio-cultural determinations, etc.) beyond economic consideration.
Irregular immigration from sub-Saharan Africa has created considerable ten-
sions between the EU, North African countries and sub-Saharan states. From general
observation, North African governments seem to have undoubtedly bowed to EU
pressure and were swift in adopting dominant European public discourses on ‘com-
bating illegal migration’ (Dagot, 2020). However, some North African states openly
opposed several elements of these policies, partly because they were seen as reinforc-
ing their position as transit countries, e.g., being reluctant to readmit large numbers
of irregular migrants from third (sub-Saharan) countries and establishing offshore
‘processing centers’ for immigrants and asylum seekers. Nevertheless, the paper con-
siders what informs these securitization and externalization initiatives. The question
may seem inconsequential, but the migration to Europe has not always been a prob-
lem. In fact, in the 1950s and 1960s, migration was seen mainly as an extra workforce
in most western European countries. However, today, migrants are viewed as the
‘other’ and incompatible with EU culture. Sensationalist media reporting gave rise to
right-wing populism and sadly, political campaigning in the EU on anti-immigrant
slogans have succeeded in sowing more discord across the continent, with many cen-
trist and liberal politicians having difficulty formulating a response (Hameleers et al,
2017). The rise and popularity of the far-right in the EU and ways in which they use
the securitization of migration and the alleged threat migrants pose to ‘their’ state,
economic and ontological security and identity, as a conduit to justify and legitimize
their anti-immigration, racist and xenophobic rhetoric and praxis are not based on
current migration patterns from Africa to the EU (Lazaridis and Wadia, 2015). Re-
inforcing the notion that Africa–EU migration is misunderstood, Jobson (2017) rea-
sons that Europe’s panic over migration alienated many of its African partners, this
driven by media-fueled perceptions of European countries being ‘swarmed’ by Af-
ricans, arouse deep-rooted insecurity about national identity, mistrust of the ‘other’,
racism, and xenophobic attacks, thus giving way to securitization and externalization
of African migration.
It is imperative to acknowledge that the externalization and securitization
policies are not a new phenomenon; rather they are a response to the increasing rates
of migration worldwide which have evoked nationalist politics. Examples have been
observed in the USA/Mexico border area, with regards to irregular migration. They
have also been observed in the EU’s cooperation with the Middle East, failing to
stem the outflow of migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. In Africa, West and
North Africa have been central to the EU’s securitization and externalization poli-
cies and these policies have become entrenched, largely due to the financial support
that comes with them. Border agencies and police officers in cooperating countries
(Libya, Mali, Niger, and Chad) have received training in border operation and migra-
tion management and hence this has allowed for the consolidation of securitization
and externalization policies. Although the EU and many of its member states, have

101
committed themselves to protecting the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, such
commitment has been overshadowed by the EU’s prioritization of restrictions rather
than addressing the drivers of migration. Populism reinforced the securitization and
externalization as key to curbing migration and even though these approaches have
reduced irregular African migration to the EU, they have also contradicted the EU’s
commitment to protecting refugees and asylum seekers (Laine 2018: 290).
This contradiction has been driven by the ever-changing public and politi-
cal opinions with regards to migrants in the EU. For example, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel’s open-door policy, which allowed approximately a million refugees
and migrants, faced backlash and forced the German government to backtrack on
the policy. This suggests that irregular migration has been seen as being negative
within the EU, which has caused a lot of anxieties. Sadly, these anxieties have become
intertwined with deep insecurities, triggered by originally unrelated societal changes,
such as the precarization of the labor market and dissolving social security (Laine
2018: 292). Consequently, Laine (2018) argues that the debate and public opinions
concerning immigration have not been discussed in isolation; rather they have been
in tandem with the above issues. Walls, whether on paper or on the ground, may
seem effective, but seldom are. Once a wall is erected, people will soon try to cross
it and this creates a fencing self-referential – a vicious cycle – which feeds itself, and
sadly, enforcement pressures on third countries can increase the difficulty of crossing
borders for asylum seekers and refugees as well as the ability to seek or access proce-
dures for determining refugee status (Laine, 2018).
Arguably, the rise of populism has fed into the nationalistic ambitions of right-
wing parties. To an extent, this has side-lined the EU’s commitment to freedom, de-
mocracy, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.
This is evident in the humanitarian and moral appeals that have been consumed by
debates and outright fear-mongering about economic security and national iden-
tity (Kupe, 2019). Moreover, nations that have been at the forefront of developing
rights‐sensitive standards and procedures for assisting and processing asylum seek-
ers within their jurisdictions, have suddenly created barriers that prevent asylum
seekers from setting foot on their territories (Palm, 2020: 12). As a result, migrants
have effectively been prevented from even attempting to undertake the journey to the
EU, let alone reaching EU shores, seemingly freeing the EU member states from the
human rights obligations that they have accepted.
The media reporting on the inflow of irregular African migrants has been
overstated, partly because populists, anti-migrant parties and the EU media have
been able to frame African migration as a threat to the values and traditions of the
EU, discounting the fact that most African migrants migrate continentally. This pa-
per therefore argues that the media can also provoke controversy, for strategic edito-
rial and economic reasons, even without any particular social need for it. Contro-
versy which generally forces political parties and those in charge to take a stance
on certain issues, notably immigration and the threat of invasion by the ‘other’ in

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Europe, has imposed itself into the media and political sphere. Laine (2020), Palm
(2020), Moreno‐Lax (2018), and McAuliffe and Ruhs (2018) observe that there is a
strong causal connection between the EU’s exercise of power and the many lives lost
in the Mediterranean Sea. Firstly, the EU closed legal avenues of entry, which com-
pelled migrants to undertake risky irregular journeys and rely on human traffickers
and smugglers to relocate. Secondly, extreme measures were undertaken to block the
remaining irregular exit paths and detain those who did not utilize heavily surveil-
led borders. As a result, both casualties at sea and atrocities in detention camps were
foreseeable harms that, with proper measures, could have been avoided.
While the EU is within its sovereign right to protect itself from what it deems
security-related threats, which are driven by Africa’s failure to reduce irregular mi-
gration, it is also duty-bound to protect migrants. Palm (2020: 9-18, citing Altman
and Wellman, 2011) asserts that sovereign states have, according to them, foremost
obligations towards themselves and their citizens and immigration control as a mat-
ter of self‐determination, and while the deaths and abuse of migrants in detention
centers are condemnable, Africa has left the EU no choice but to unilaterally prior-
itize the protection of its integrity. This paper however, refutes such assertions and
contends that while protecting one’s integrity is important, securitization and exter-
nalization are not the right way to go about it, as they do not stop migration, and, in
many cases, they have a reverse effect.
De Haas (2008) observes that there are two problems associated with securiti-
zation and externalization. Firstly, increasing border controls has led to a diversifi-
cation of trans-Saharan migration routes and trans-Mediterranean crossing points
and in turn, has led to an unintended increase in the area that EU countries have to
monitor to ‘combat’ irregular migration. Secondly, increasing surveillance has led to
the professionalization of smuggling methods. Smugglers now use larger and faster
custom-made boats and zodiacs. Additionally, the huge length of land and mari-
time borders, coupled with the widespread corruption among border guards and
other officials, make it virtually impossible to prevent people from crossing. As more
and more restrictions are introduced, this benefits smugglers because it increases
the need (and the cost) for their services. Every time a fence goes up, access to the
European dream gets a little more expensive (Abebe, 2019). Securitization and ex-
ternalization have failed to take into cognizance the plethora of drivers of migration
and do not address structural inequality, which means that marginalized individu-
als and communities will continue to migrate (Herbert, 2019). Furthermore, the EU
with its securitization and externalization of African migration has not only failed
to dissuade migrants from taking the strenuous journey, but it has also resulted in
unintended consequences, with migrants being abused and held in inhumane deten-
tion centers Libya; centers which are ironically funded by the EU (Andersson, 2016;
Abebe 2019).
Disputably, externalization and securitization, coupled with populism, have al-
lowed for the migration policy to become an increasingly politicized issue. Benedicto

103
and Brunet (2018: 17-18) argue that the far-right have manipulated public opinion
to create irrational fears of refugees. This xenophobia sets up mental walls in people,
who then demand physical walls. This is because externalization is often deceptively
framed as either a security imperative or a life-saving humanitarian endeavor (or
both) even though such responses to migration pose serious human rights concerns
and threaten the integrity of the international refugee protection system (Frelick et
al., 2016: 193). Even though initiatives of externalization and securitization involve
investing funds in technology-related equipment and ensuring the training of local
law enforcement are welcomed, their association with human right abuses has cast
doubt over their effectiveness. However, externalization and securitization do not
take into consideration the drivers of migration from Africa, hence, the focus should
be on addressing the root causes of migration first rather than narrowing the focus
on border capabilities.
Theo Francken, Belgium’s Secretary of State for asylum and migration, re-
vealed that the EU should stimulate economic growth and employment, to boost
the buying power of the African population (Politico, 2018). Michael Clemens, co-
director of migration at the Center for Global Development, posits that no amount
of financial assistance can stop migration. He maintains that the EU should rather
invest in creating skills among potential migrants in Africa — specific skills that the
EU needs. Paul Collier, an economics professor at the School of Government at Ox-
ford University, argues that Europe should indeed spend €6 billion to bring jobs to
Africa through investment by the European Investment Bank which would support
European firms in Africa, thus helping reduce irregular African migration (Politico,
2018).
This paper agrees that while European investments would contribute positively
towards the development of the continent, they would, however, find it cumbersome
to address the drivers of migration (political instability, porous borders, corruption,
smuggling and trafficking syndicates), hence irregular migration will likely persist,
although in far fewer numbers. Furthermore, rather than promoting the externaliza-
tion of migration controls, the EU and other donors could also increase support to
regional and international organizations that provide or promote the protection of
migrants’ rights, including the rights of asylum seekers, in third countries and coun-
tries of origin, especially considering that borders in Africa have many entry and exit
points (Frelick et al., 2016: 195); hence the question of how to strengthen the capabil-
ity of one entry point without neglecting the other.
The AU, and by extension African states, are important role players. The AU
argues that migration is inevitable, and needs to be better governed in an integrated
manner through comprehensive, human-rights based and gender-responsive nation-
al migration strategies and policies (AU, 2018). However, the deaths of African mi-
grants in the Mediterranean Sea coupled with their abuse in Libyan detention camps
(funded by the EU) have become a thorny issue for the continental body, giving rise
to the need to address irregular migration through policy cooperation with the EU.

104
3, Sep-Dec 2020
Moreover, criticisms against the AU have dwelt on the notion that expecting the AU
to take the lead in curbing irregular migration is quite unrealistic, since within the
AU many decisions are made, but very few are implemented. This lack of consen-
sus, therefore, allows the EU to enforce its externalization and securitization policies,
even though such initiatives may not be largely welcomed.
Palm (2020: 20) contends that today privileged nations are, due to their af-
fluence, capable of almost hermetically sealing their external borders using mas-
sive investments in sophisticated surveillance systems and financial means to reach
agreements with transit countries that secure their interests in keeping ‘aliens’ out.
However, rather than keeping ‘aliens’ out and hoping that poor countries can help
in stemming irregular migration if rich countries want fewer immigrants, their best
shot might be to help poor countries become rich so that fewer people feel the urge
to leave. This is not to say, however, that Africa has not done anything to reduce ir-
regular migration. The European Commission (2015) notes that the continent has
cooperated with the EU on a number of policies such as the Migration EU Expertise
(MIEUX), EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue, the Dakar Strategy, European-wide
African diaspora platform for development, and Addressing Mixed Migration Flows
in Eastern Africa. Nevertheless, criticism against Africa has been premised on the
notion that it is the EU which takes the lead on these initiatives. It is the EU which
comes up with policies to stem migration (rightly so, because Africa does not con-
sider migration to be a threat, but rather as a way to boost continental integration
development), often pouring money into the continent to solicit the cooperation of
African countries. African countries have little interest in putting in place barriers to
stop migration; hence, it makes sense for the EU to intervene as it observes irregular
migration as a threat to its sovereignty.
This paper also argues that irregular migration to the EU is not an isolated
incident. Since independence, the role of external actors has, of course, destabilized
Africa. Unwarranted interventions from a socio-political perspective have further
complicated the political and economic challenges African governments face today.
Interventions constantly overlap, with one crisis influencing another, marking the
never-ending nature of foreign intervention, especially militarily, which gives way to
conflict, forced displacement and migration. While both the EU and AU are eager for
a practical and jointly-undertaken solution, it is not going to be that simple. As a point
of departure, African and European leaders must now lay the foundations for such a
relationship by agreeing on a forward-looking strategy that addresses structural im-
balances, harnesses the benefits of migration, and delivers tangible benefits to their
citizens. The first step to address such structural imbalances is to ensure adequate
opportunities for young people who are at the core of migration. Altogether, the EU
should help Africa strengthen democratic and transparent processes and institutions
in Africa which will improve the socio-economic and political environment.

105
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper was not an empirical study but rather it relied extensively on the available
literature to draw its conclusions. The policy implications and concluding remarks
are therefore based on literary works that the paper has summarized. Externalization
and securitization have focused on the need to reduce irregular migration to the EU
but have not addressed the issues driving these migratory patterns. This signals that
externalization and securitization do not speak to the current realities on the ground
in an African context. Political instability across the continent has given way to the
consolidation of smugglers, who fuel irregular migration. The discourse on irregular
African migration to the EU has ignored the observation that most African migrants
migrate within the continent. While Marie-Laurence (2016) asserts that Europe re-
mains the main destination for African-born migrants who seek to maximize the
economic opportunities that may be available, the European media has failed to take
note of vast and increased migration within the continent. The media has instead
focused on framing migration from Africa as a threat, even though most Africans
migrate within the continent. These migration patterns are informed and driven by
an array of factors which include economics, family, networks and individual choic-
es. In its quest to reduce these irregular inflows, the EU has opted to externalize and
securitize migration.
This paper maintains that for the EU to reduce migration, there is a need for
it to understand the different drivers of migration rather than believing externaliza-
tion and securitization are a one-size-fits-all solution. The rise of populism linked
to migration has changed how liberal parties view migration. Under pressure from
right-wing populists, they have sought to externalize and securitize migration even
in the face of human rights violations. The EU media also contributes to the observa-
tions of migrants as thugs and incompatible with EU culture, leading to the consoli-
dation of racism and the ‘othering’ of migrants (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2017).
Even though African countries have committed to working with the EU to reduce
migration, the financial imbalance favors the EU to be the major player, which often
side-lines African states.
Finally, the external intervention in the affairs of Africa has also indirectly con-
tributed to population displacement and citizens becoming refugees. Migration is an
ever-evolving phenomenon and putting a complete stop to it is virtually impossible.
While there is no quick fix to this situation, this paper contends that from an EU
perspective, there is a need to think beyond the funding of securitization and exter-
nalization. The EU needs long-term, sustainable alliances with key partners — and
with those in Africa in particular. For these to be meaningful, cooperation should go
beyond migration, as it is a consequence of much broader shared challenges, includ-
ing geopolitical instability, demographic developments, climate change, and socio-
economic issues. Secondly, while EU developmental aid to Africa is needed, another
form of action would be to prepare migrants for work in Europe. The reality is that
there is no amount of financial assistance that can stop migration; hence, the EU

106
3, Sep-Dec 2020
should invest in creating skills among potential migrants in Africa — specific skills
that the EU needs. From an African perspective, stopping illegal migration seems
cumbersome, especially from a socio-economic point of view. However, stable gov-
ernance is the crucial issue that needs to be addressed and this requires that, coopera-
tion between Africa and the EU is prioritized, if this matter is to be resolved, in the
interest of all parties.

107
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The African Human Mobility Review (AHMR) is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed
journal created to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects of human mobility
in Africa, including socio-economic, political, legal, developmental, educational and
cultural aspects.
Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence-based
research papers, AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to
the analysis of current migration trends, migration patterns and some of the most
important migration-related issues.
The journal is also accessible on-line at no charge at sihma.org.za.
AHMR is jointly owned by the Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA)
and University of the Western Cape (UWC) and accredited by the Department of Higher
Education and Training (DHET) in South Africa.
ISSN 2410-7972 (online) ISSN 2411-6955 (print).

AHMR Volume 6 number 3 September-December 2020 online version

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AHMR Volume 6 number 3 September-December 2020 online version