social

structure
survey
2006

K NDA
ARAŞTI RMA VE DANIŞMANLIK
Copy of this report is based on the series of articles published in Milliyet daily on 19-26 March, 2007.
The internet version in Turkish is available at the following URLs:

http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/19/guncel/agun.html
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/20/guncel/agun.html
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/21/guncel/agun.html
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/22/guncel/agun.html
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/23/guncel/agun.html
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/24/guncel/agun.html
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/25/guncel/agun.html
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/26/guncel/agun.html

The original survey report in Turkish is available at the following URL:

http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf
CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 5
2. SAMPLE AND FIELD ORGANISATION ......................................................................... 8
3. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ................................................................................11

3.1. Half of the poorest live in Southeast Turkey.......................................................11

3.2. The Latest Situation of the Population and Education in Numbers .......................11
3.3. Half the Population Have Primary Education or Less ...........................................12
3.4. Huge Regional Difference in Level of Education .................................................13
3.5. 3 to 5 Person Household for 61 % of the Population ..........................................14
3.6. Huge Income Gulf ............................................................................................15
3.7. Unemployment at 16.3 %.................................................................................16
3.8. Lowest Income Levels in Southeastern Anatolia .................................................16

4. ETHNIC IDENTITY...................................................................................................18

4.1. 55 MILLION PEOPLE ARE “ETHNICALLY” TURKISH ............................................ 18

4.2. How do Adults Define Themselves Ethnically? ....................................................20
4.3. 15.6 % of the population in Kurdish ..................................................................20
4.4. No Hiding of Ethnic Identity ..............................................................................22
4.5. 85 % OF TURKEY SAYS “TURKISH IS MY MOTHER TONGUE” ............................. 22
4.6. Education Among Kurds Below Average.............................................................24
4.7. The Laz, Circassians and Immigrants ................................................................25
4.8. In the Poorest Segment, Kurdish-Zaza is the Largest Group ................................ 25
4.9. Kurds and Arabs are Poorer and Live in More Crowded Households..................... 26
4.10. Comparing the Findings with Censuses From 1927 to 1965: The Figures Match
the Historical Development ..........................................................................................26
4.11. 3 Million Turks and Kurds Relatives Through Marriage ....................................27

5. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY .............................................................................................28

5.1. 4.5 million say “I am Alevi” ...............................................................................28

5.2. In Distress About Exercising Their Beliefs ..........................................................30
5.3. The Poorest Religious Group is the Shafii...........................................................32
5.4. Cause of Poverty Not Their Sect........................................................................32
5.5. Out of Every 10 Alevis, 6 are Turkish and 2 Kurdish-Zaza ...................................33
5.6. The Majority is Devout but not Conservative ......................................................35

6. MIGRATION ............................................................................................................36

6.1. Highest Number of Kurds live in Istanbul ...........................................................36

6.2. A Third of the Population Has Moved with Migration........................................... 36
6.3. Istanbulites Make up 28 % of Istanbul ..............................................................36
6.4. 62 % Live in Their Homeland............................................................................37
6.5. People Feel They Belong Where They Were Born ...............................................38
6.6. 21 % of the Society Would Like to Move ...........................................................39
6.7. Out of every thousand people, 373 have migrated .............................................41
7. DEFINING CITIZENSHIP ..........................................................................................42

7.1. The Primary Prerequisite of Citizenship: LOVING TURKEY ................................... 42

7.2. The Primary Prerequisite is Loving Turkey .........................................................42
7.3. Bond of Citizenship According to Background .....................................................43

8. ETHNIC IDENTITY AND THE STATE .........................................................................44

8.1. Support to Ethnic Groups by Region ..................................................................44

8.2. Percentage of Acceptance of State Support .......................................................45

9. EXPRESSION OF IDENTITIES ...................................................................................46

9.1. The Majority Says “I am from Turkey First and Foremost” ..................................46
9.2. Ethnic Background Stands Out in Two Regions ..................................................47
9.3. An Unostentacious Patriotism............................................................................48

10. LOYALTY TO IDENTITIES AND VIEW ON OTHERS .................................................49

10.1. Eastern Black Sea Strictest in Loyalty to Identity ............................................49

10.2. Most Tolerant Regions ..................................................................................50
10.3. The Situation Among Kurds and Zaza ............................................................50

11. LIVING ONE’S IDENTITY ......................................................................................52

11.1. Living One's Identity is Controversial .............................................................52

11.2. Alevis in Distress ..........................................................................................53

12. THE SOUTHEAST AND KURDISH ISSUE ................................................................54

12.1. The Majority of Society says: “Kurdish problem is Provoked by Foreign

Countries” ..................................................................................................................54
12.2. The Problem by Ethnic Identities ...................................................................56
12.3. Approval of Suggestions Change by Background ............................................56
12.4. Kurds see the Problem and the Solution Differently ........................................57
12.5. Women are closer to AKP .............................................................................59
12.6. PROFILE OF PARTISANS ...............................................................................61

13. ANNEX 1 – EVALUATION OF SURVEY BY METU SOCIOLOGISTS ............................. 62

1. INTRODUCTION

Taking a scientific, unbiased and objective x-ray of Turkey's social fabric

instead of depending on estimations carries a vital value for surmounting
the country's problems. A KONDA-Milliyet collaboration, the survey
conducted in 2721 locations constitutes a significant step in this area.
The survey lays out all aspects of the society in Turkey, with all its
colors.
1.1.1. Introduction

Starting today and going on for a week in the Milliyet daily newspaper, this survey is
an important first for Turkey given its subject and scope. What opinionated people
will state in their own way and more importantly, with their own sums and figures
about what they think about Turkey's social structure, this survey lays out in front of
the public in its vast scope. We believe that the survey we are publishing will be
helpful in finding solutions to many of Turkey's problems. As such, this survey will
serve as a 'cipher box.'

It is known that Turkey is going through serious problems and facing obstacles on its
journey of development and modernization. And almost everybody in the country
voice their opinions on what can provide a momentum, a rejuvination. Taking a
snapshot of Turkey's social sturcture, most notably of ethnic and religious affiliations,
and fleshing out all aspects of identity weigh significantly in formulating solutions.

1.1.2. A Striking Picture

Historically a transit point for peoples spanning three continents, Anatolia did not
change in ethnic composition merely as a result of conquests and wars. A thousand
years of cultural reconciliation and blending has left a distinctive mark on this
composition. Claiming similarly that there exists a single notion of Islam would do
injustice to Anatolia which has been a melting and boiling pot for centuries. In fact,
countless sects and ethnic groups, small or large, have been in constant interaction,
pushing and pulling one another. The existence of each different element has deeply
influenced another's way of being. Regardless of their size, each and every group
was important for the other. Therefore, every group, no matter how few individuals
it comprises of deserves to be in this survey.

1.1.3. A Very Mobile Population

It would be impossible to fully understand today's society without grasping how very
mobile it is geographically-speaking. For example, internal migration which began in
the 1950's with a movement from villages to cities and continued in the 1970's with
exchange between cities has been transforming the structure of the village, the city
and their inhabitants. International emigration and immigration, illegal workers,
illegal immigrants and many other popluation movements can completely overthrow
local and societal order, just as shantytowns have. The survey aims to bring such
buoyant population movements under its scope.

1.1.4. An Observation Towards Solution

It would not be too ambitious to make the following claim: “Without any exception, it
is everybody's desire to live in peace and comfort in this land.” We can also easily
state that societal peace is the primary condition for surmounting the bottleneck that
our society is experiencing today.

Within this framework, taking a crystal-clear and bare snapshot such as the one you
will be following in Milliyet is crucial.

Thanks to the survey, all decision-makers can put aside estimated figures suiting
their interest and start thinking instead with a frame of reference based on unbiased,
scientifically-prepared fundamental information.

1.1.5. Self-claimed “Kurds”

This survey entitled “Who Are We?” was conducted to be able to make a complete
and objective definition of Turkey's social fabric. The findings expose in an unbiased
manner all aspects of the identity structure of Turkey, most notably in terms of
ethnicity and religion.

For example, a question often asked but left unanswered is: How many people in
Turkey consider themselves to be a “Kurd”? The European Commission's 2004
Progress Report on Turkey states that there are “15 to 20 million Kurds” in Turkey
and DTP (Democratic Society Party) co-president Ahmet Türk has claimed that there
are 25 million but are these figures accurate? Just as important as the figures is
another question: “What do the Kurds want and what do they think about issues of
identity?”
Or what do other ethnic groups deem fit for the Kurds? Such questions have been
answered up until now to suit personal or political interests but the most truthful
answers will be exposed thanks to this survey.

1.1.6. Turkish, Laz, Alewite

It is also unknown how many people consider themselves to be “Turkish” or

“Muslim.” What is the true figure for those who define themselves as “Laz” or “Arab”
or “Circassian”? How many define themselves as “Sunnite”, “Alewite” or “Turkish
Muslim” and what it is they want?”
Or how do they feel about each other? Politicians love the phrase “In our country
where 99 % of the population is muslim...” but does that figure reflect the reality?
This survey will define ethnic and religious affiliations, determine their geographic
distribution, their mobility and the social dynamics that they create. All these
definitions are also examined from different angles: social security, education and
income.

Obtaining the peoples' opinions on domestic peace and reconciliation in such a

complicated social structure is another objective of the survey. Because no matter
how small, any difference is part and parcel of the more general identity of Turkey.
2. SAMPLE AND FIELD ORGANISATION

Over 1500 people were employed for the most comprehensive non-
government survey ever conducted in Turkey and 47,958 randomly chosen
people were interviewed face to face.

The sample distribution based on interviews

Province 79
District 488
Number of niegborhood and villages 2.685
Urban 2.286
Rural 399
Number of interviews 47.958

The sample distribution based on interviews

The number of subjects reaching 50,000 means that this survey has 10 to 20 times
as much volume as other public opinion surveys and therefore provides that much
more “detailed” information. The one factor that deserves most care and influences
all results in such surveys is the sample, which is the process of determining where
and with whom the interviews will be conducted. In fact, despite the high numbers
of subjects, it is still difficult to represent such a large society.

The initial stages of the survey were sample preparation, literature scan and field
organisation. Then, three separate samples were prepared, with one representing
Turkey, one representing the 12 regions of Turkey and the third one representing
the 13 cities where the population will reach 1 million by the year 2010, according
Turkish Statistics Institute projections. For the sample to be statistically reliable, it
was crucial that it represent the society accurately. Therefore intersection points of
the samples were selected as locations for the interviews. The samples were also
stratified by rural and urban population, size of settlements, level of education, 2002
election results, women's participation in worklife and land prices. With all the above
mentioned parameters in mind, a large sample was prepared and a target of 49
thousand interviews in 2721 locations was set. In every village or neighborhood, 18
people were interviewed. Age and gender quotas were adhered to. The result is a
huge piece of work that both represents the society and allows for detailed
deductions to be made.
Classification of the Statistical Regions of Turkey
(Supplement to Law No 5449)
İstanbul Central Anatolia
1- İstanbul 1- Aksaray, Kırıkkale, Kırşehir, Niğde,
Nevşehir
West Marmara 2- Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat
1- Edirne, Kırklareli, Tekirdağ
2- Balıkesir, Çanakkale West Black Sea
3- 1- Bartın, Karabük, Zonguldak
Aegean 2- Çankırı, Kastamonu, Sinop
1- İzmir 3- Amasya, Çorum, Samsun, Tokat
2- Aydın, Denizli, Muğla
3- Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, East Black Sea
Manisa, Uşak 1- Artvin, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Ordu,
Rize, Trabzon
East Marmara
1- Bilecik, Bursa, Eskişehir Northeast Anatolia
2- Bolu, Düzce, Kocaeli, Sakarya, 1- Bayburt, Erzincan, Erzurum
Yalova 2- Ağrı, Ardahan, Iğdır, Kars

West Anatolia Central East Anatolia

1- Ankara 1- Bingöl, Elazığ, Malatya, Tunceli
2- Karaman, Konya 2- Bitlis, Hakkari, Muş, Van

Mediterranean Southeast Anatolia

1- Antalya, Burdur, Isparta 1- Adıyaman, Gaziantep, Kilis
2- Adana, Mersin 2- Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa
3- Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, 3- Batman, Mardin, Şırnak, Siirt
Osmaniye

2.1.1. The Survey Reached Everyone

While generally no more that 3000 subjects are used for polls seeking the country's
inclination, why were 50.000 people interviewed? The first and foremost reply is
obviously “sensibility.” But as our survey has demonstrated, it is simply impossible to
generalize on people's situation, on their attitudes and behaviours, on their values
and preferences. Through its modernization process, Turkey is experiencing many
changes simultaneously. Therefore individuals' attitudes and behaviors depend
largely on where they are in the change process, how much they are part of the
economic development. Another fact the survey has revealed is that the social
structure and people's preferences are shaped by their region and their ethnic and
religious identities as much as their gender and education. For example, ethnic
affiliation may play a much stronger role in a certain preference than level of
education. The survey aims to determine the perception and tendencies of all
segments of the society. Such detailed information was only possible with such a
large number of subjects.
The sample size of the survey also allowed us to reach groups which constitute one
in ten thousand of the total population.

2.1.2. 1500 Researchers

The part of the survey where 50 thousand people were interviewed face to face in
their homes, namely the “field work,” required 1500 people to work all over Turkey.
Of these, 22 were regional leaders, 150 were team leaders and 1400 worked as
interviewers or controllers. 47,958 interviews were conducted in almost 3000
locations in all four corners of Turkey over a span of one month and the survey was
completed in October 2006.
3. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

3.1. Half of the poorest live in Southeast Turkey

According to the survey, going from the west of Turkey to the east,
going from the cities to the villages, both education levels and income
decrease. Paralel to this, the size of the household increases.

3.2. The Latest Situation of the Population and Education in

Numbers
Demographic information (structure of the population) are normally the control
elements of such a study. In other words, the demographic information obtained
from the survey is compared to information from other institutions. But since the
survey is highly representative, it provides up-to-date information by itself. Therefore
the data and figures provided here should be viewed as fresh information.

Looking at the graphs about the level of education in Turkey, the most delightful
result is how much the situation of girls' education has improved. While 41.28 % of
women over 44 have primary school education, this rate is 13.71 % among women
between the ages 29 to 43 and goes down to 6.37 % for women aged 18 to 28. The
gap between men and women for secondary school and higher education seems to
closing fast (10.76 % of younger women having higher education versus 15.59 % of
younger men). With recent campaigns such as “Haydi Kızlar Okula” (Come On Girls,
to School) or “Baba Beni Okula Gönder” (Dad, Send Me to School), it can be
predicted that problems in girls' education will be solved in the near future.

Age and Gender Distribution of Adults

Women Aged 18 - 28
Women Aged 29 - 43
Women Aged 44 or More
Men Aged 18 - 28
Men Aged 29 – 43
Men Aged 44 or More
Educational Level of Adults

Higher
Education; 8,93 Illiterate; 8,52
No Diploma;
5,15
High School;
20,77

Vocational
School; 2,86 Primary School;
38,79
Secondary;
14,98

3.3. Half the Population Have Primary Education or Less

The second most significant finding among the demographic data was that 12.48 %
of the population still have no diploma, meaning they have not completed even 5-
year primary school. Or from another viewpoint, more than half of the population
(52.31 %) either have primary education or no diploma. The third important finding
shows that vocational training is far below Turkey's need (2.85 % of total
population). These figures are low all over the country showing no regional
differences.

Educational Attainment by Age and

Gender
Illiterate Literate- Primar Secondar Vocation HighScho Higher
No y y School al School ol Educatio
Diploma School n
Women Aged 18 -
3,54 2,83 29,79 17,16 2,67 33,24 10,76
28
Women Aged 29 -
8,33 5,38 50,21 13,28 1,24 14,44 7,12
43
Women Aged 44
29,37 11,91 42,1 6,29 0,79 6,79 2,75
or More
Men Aged 18 - 28 1,05 1,14 16,55 18,41 6,66 40,6 15,59
Men Aged 29 –
1,52 1,72 36,63 21,11 3,89 23,47 11,66
43
Men Aged 44 or
7,28 7,21 52,84 13,27 2,06 10,86 6,47
More
Turkey 8,39 5,09 38,83 14,94 2,85 20,94 8,96
3.4. Huge Regional Difference in Level of Education
The survey provides striking data about the regional differences in education.
Beginning with Central Anatolia, all eastern regions fare much lower that the country
averages of education levels. Those who have 8-year primary education or less
constitute 79.45 % of the Southeast Anatolian region, 75.45 % of the Northeast
Anatolian region and 73.17 % of Eastern Black Sea region. The two regions with the
highest levels are Western Marmara and Istanbul.

Southeast Anatolia is the Region with the Lowest

Level of Education
Illiterat Literat Prima Second Vocatio HighSch Higher Tota
e e-No ry ary nal ool Educati l
Diplo Schoo School School on
ma l
Turkey 8,52 5,15 38,79 14,98 2,86 20,77 8,93 100,
00
Southeast Anatolia 22,81 8,63 35,34 12,67 1,03 14,93 4,59 100,
00
Central East 14,53 6,92 37,30 13,99 1,86 19,74 5,67 100,
Anatolia 00
Northest Anatolia 13,61 8,90 34,70 18,24 2,14 17,26 5,16 100,
00
Eastern Black Sea 10,07 6,68 41,80 14,62 1,96 18,89 5,97 100,
00
Western Black Sea 10,28 5,01 40,27 15,68 2,73 19,26 6,77 100,
00
Central Anatolia 10,99 5,42 39,09 13,62 1,78 20,20 8,90 100,
00
Mediterranean 8,45 4,43 40,53 14,22 2,76 20,58 9,03 100,
00
Western Anatolia 6,77 3,85 36,89 15,34 2,87 22,68 11,60 100,
00
Eastern Marmara 3,62 3,95 39,04 17,02 3,68 22,08 10,60 100,
00
Aegean 5,45 5,18 41,61 14,45 4,08 20,67 8,56 100,
00
Western Marmara 3,26 4,50 44,00 15,87 4,32 20,55 7,50 100,
00
Istanbul 5,04 3,60 36,42 15,01 3,07 24,14 12,73 100,
00
Istanbul

Western Marmara

Aegean

Eastern Marmara
Illiterate
Western Anatolia Literate-No Diploma
Mediterranean Primary School
Central Anatolia Secondary School
Western Black Sea Vocational School
Eastern Black Sea HighSchool
Northest Anatolia Higher Education
Central East Anatolia

Southeast Anatolia

Turkey

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

3.5. 3 to 5 Person Household for 61 % of the Population

The number of people per household is crucial for understanding the changing
population structure and related parameters. 61 % of the population live in
household with 3 to 5 people. The further east one goes, the bigger the household.
The survey shows that 16.47 % of the households in the Southeast Anatolian region
have 9 people or more. The figure is 15.97 % for Central Eastern Anatolia and 14.16
% for Northeastern Anatolia.

The Number of Crowded Households Increase in the East and

Southeast

1-2 3-5 6-8 9+

Persons Persons Persons Persons
Turkey 15,95 60,94 18,56 4,55
Southeast Anatolia 9,00 40,21 34,33 16,47
Central East Anatolia 8,49 45,64 29,91 15,97
Northest Anatolia 11,20 43,91 30,73 14,16
Eastern Black Sea 15,97 59,89 21,12 3,02
Western Black Sea 17,11 55,58 20,79 6,52
Central Anatolia 14,31 59,24 23,28 3,17
Mediterranean 17,78 65,74 14,63 1,84
Western Anatolia 17,45 64,78 16,07 1,69
Eastern Marmara 15,96 65,33 16,79 1,93
Aegean 19,18 66,68 12,94 1,21
Western Marmara 24,96 65,40 9,20 0,44
Istanbul 15,49 68,51 14,04 1,96
Istanbul

Western Marmara

Aegean

Eastern Marmara

Western Anatolia

Mediterranean
1-2 Persons
3-5 Persons
Central Anatolia
6-8 Persons
Western Black Sea
9+ Persons
Eastern Black Sea

Northest Anatolia

Central East Anatolia

Southeast Anatolia

Turkey

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

3.6. Huge Income Gulf

The survey once again verifies the well-known imbalance of income distribution. The
income ranges used in the survey where grouped as monthly household income
below 300 YTL, 300 to 700 YTL, 700 to 1200 YTL, 1200 to 3000 YTL and above 3000
YTL. From this perspective, our graph lays open the difference and imbalance of the
various income levels.

The lowest income group with less than 300 YTL per month represent 16.40 % of
the population, while the second lowest with 300-700 YTL per month constitute 44
%. Overall, 87 % of the total population earn a below average income, with 1200
YTL or less monthly for the household. Only 2 % of the population have a monthly
household income of 3000 YTL or more.

How the National Income is Divided

Highest income segment

4th income segment 2% Poorest segment
11% 16%

Middle income segment

27%

2nd income segment

44%
3.7. Unemployment at 16.3 %
While 41.63 % of the subject interviewed were working, 48.12 % stated that they
were housewives, retirees, students or unable to work and 8.11 % that they were
unemployed. Calculating those who could be part of worklife but are not (i.e. putting
housewives, retirees and students aside), the unemployment rate comes up to 16.3
%.

Civil Servant 9,83

Unemployed + Not
Working 16,30
Private Sector 6,65

Employed; Other 7,08

Worker 20,94

Agriculture 18,85

3.8. Lowest Income Levels in Southeastern Anatolia

Examining household income differences by regions, we can see that the Southeast
Marginal 1,07 Tradesman 12,62

Anatolia region accounts for 45 Self-employed

% of the lowest
4,66 income group.
Businessman 1,97 36.38 % of this
groups is accounted for by the Northeast Anatolian region and 32.90 % by the
Central East Anatolia region. Istanbul, East and West Marmara stand out among
regions with the highest level of incomes. Slicing the data in terms of rural and urban
setting, it is shocking to see that the percentage of the poorest group in rural areas
is always at least twice as much as that in urban areas. More strikingly, this
difference in percentage can go up to 7-fold in the Aegean region ( 6.37 % of the
cities are the poorest while 39.33 % in villages are the poorest) and 5-fold in the
West Marmara region (7.05 % in cities versus 37.65 % in villages).

3.8.1. All Villages Equally Poor

Looking at income data form the urban-rural perspective, the most significant result
is that even in regions where poverty in diminishing, increase in income is limited to
urban areas. In other words, poverty increases as we go east but also as we go from
urban areas to rural areas even if these areas are in the Western regions. Resultantly
all villages are in a similar situation.

Income Distribution by Regions

Poorest 2nd Middle 4th Highest
Segment Income Income Income Income
Segment Segment Segment Segment
Dilimi
Turkey 16,4 44 26,65 11,06 1,9
Istanbul 3,32 35,89 35,66 21,02 4,1
Western Marmara 15,63 48,2 25,45 10,12 0,6
Aegean 14,66 44,04 30,72 9,57 1,01
Eastern Marmara 7,74 49,57 30,75 10,52 1,42
Western Anatolia 8,74 44,06 28,67 16,03 2,51
Mediterranean 20,53 48,08 21,22 9,25 0,92
Central Anatolia 21,2 47,5 21,8 7,12 2,37
Western Black Sea 11,49 54,25 22,91 7,78 3,57
Eastern Black Sea 18,33 48,56 25,05 7,29 0,77
Northest Anatolia 36,38 35,02 22,61 5,05 0,95
Central East Anatolia 32,9 44,3 18,91 3,63 0,26
Southeast Anatolia 44,73 39,1 12,39 3,38 0,4
4. ETHNIC IDENTITY

4.1. 55 MILLION PEOPLE ARE “ETHNICALLY” TURKISH

The survey shows that people have no restraints in expressing their

ethnic identity. Of the total population of 73 million, 55 million 484
thousand are ethnically Turkish. There are 11 million 445 thousand
Kurds living in Turkey.

The survey that KONDA conducted for Milliyet under the direction of Tarhan Erdem
brings to light critical findings regarding the ethnic identity distribution of Turkish
citizens, a topic much discussed with a variety of figures.

In the survey which approximately 50.000 people were interviewed face-to-face,

instead of commonly used labels, people's own terms and definitions of themselves
were emphasized.
Therefore, no choices were offered on questions on identity and they were in no way
guided.

4.1.1. Over 100 Responses

Interviewers were asked to write down the subject's first response. Subjects gave
over 100 different responses to this question. Later on, the frequency and similarity
of responses were studied and grouped together in statistically meaningful groups.
The question for the most sought-after findings of the survey was formulated as
follows:
“We are all Turkish citizens, but we may be from different territories and origins.
What do you know or feel yourself to be?”
The table below shows the identity groups according to subjects' responses and the
percentage with which these identities were uttered by subjects.
Identity Groups Used in the Survey Total Identity Categories Said by Subjects Total
% %
Turkish 81,33 Turk 81,33
Local Identity 1,54 Manav 0,59
Laz 0,28
Turkmen 0,24
Region name in Turkey 0,22
Yörük 0,18
Anatolian Turkish Tribes 0,03
Asian Turk 0,08 Tatar 0,04
Azeri 0,03
Central Asian Turkish Tribes 0,01
Of Caucasian Origin 0,27 Circassian 0,19
Georgian 0,08
Chechnian 0,004
Of Balkan Origin 0,22 From Balkan countries 0,12
Bosnian 0,06
Bulgarian Turk 0,04
Immigrants 0,4 Migrant (Muhacir) 0,22
Balkan immigrant 0,16
Region name abroad 0,02
Muslim Turkish 1,02 Muslim 0,58
Muslim Turkish 0,44
Alevi 0,35 Alevi 0,35
General Definitions 0,36 From Turkey (Türkiyeli) 0,23
World citizen 0,12
Ottoman 0,01
Kurdish-Zaza 9,02 Kurdish 8,61
Zaza 0,41
Arab 0,75 Arab 0,75
Non-muslim 0,1 Armenian 0,08
Greek (Rum) and Christian 0,01
Jewish 0,004
Assyrian (Süryani) 0,004
Roma 0,03 Roma 0,03
From Other Countries 0,05 European 0,02
Other Asian 0,01
Russian 0,01
Iranian 0,004
American-African 0,004
Citizen of the Republic of Turkey 4,45 Citizen of the Republic of Turkey 4,45
Total 100
4.2. How do Adults Define Themselves Ethnically?
Having included the information provided by mother tongue data as a control, the
resulting figures show that adults in Turkey defined themselves as follows: 78,1 %
Turkish, 13,4 % Kurdish, 1,5 % local identities such as “Laz” and “Turkmen”, 0,1 %
Asian Turkish, 0,3 % of Caucasian origin, 0,2 % of Balkan origin, 0,4 % immigrants,
0,9 % Muslim Turkish, 0,2 % Alevi, 0,3 % with general terms such as “I am from
Turkey; I am a world citizen” etc., 0,7 % Arab, 0.1 % non-muslim, 0,03 % Roma,
0,05 % from other countries and 3,8 % as citizen of the Republic of Turkey.
As the survey was conducted only with people above the age of 18, the above
percentages are for that population. The Turkish Statistics Institute (TSI) estimates
the adult population for 2006 to be 48 million and 709 thousand, which means that
among them 38 million 43 thousand are Turkish and 6 million 524 thousand define
themselves are Kurdish. The table below summarizes the raw data, the rectified data
as explained above and the corresponding adult population of ethnic groups.
However, it must be noted that for all groups less than 1 % the margin of error is
rather high.

Identities % By Identities % By Data as Adult Population

Said by Subjects Rectified by by Data as
KONDA Rectified by
Turkish 81,33 78,1 38.043
Local Identities 1,54 1,5 743
Asian Turkish 0,08 0,1 45
Of Caucasian Origin 0,27 0,3 133
Of Balkan Origin 0,22 0,2 111
Immigrants 0,4 0,4 193
Muslim Turkish 1,02 0,9 437
Alevi 0,35 0,2 77
Self-Defined in General Terms 0,36 0,3 126
Kurdish - Zaza 9,02 13,4 6.524
Arab 0,75 0,7 358
Non-muslim 0,1 0,1 51
Roma 0,03 0 17
From Other Countries 0,05 0 21
Citizen of the Republic of 4,45 1.829
Turkey 3,8
Total 100 100 48.709

4.3. 15.6 % of the population in Kurdish

The percentage among the adult population who call themselves Kurdish
or Zaza amounts to 13,4 %. However when the population below 18 is
added to the figures, this percentage comes up to 15,6 % equaling 11
million 445 thousand.
In order to see the ethnic identity distribution of the 72 million 975 thousand, i.e. the
total population of Turkey, the population below 18 must be included in the
calculations with the correct proportions.
While there are “33 children for every 66 adults” in Turkey overall, this ratio is
different for the Kurds whose fertility rates are known to be higher. Based on the
household size data in the survey, the population growth of provinces and the age
cohorts of the Kurds, it would be safe to assume this ratio to be “47 children for
every 53 adults” among Kurds. The following calculations which take this approach
into account show that Turks make up 55 million 484 thousand with 76 %, Kurds
make up 11 million 445 thousand with 15.6 % and all other ethnic groups make up 6
million 46 thousand with 8,3 %.
The 13,4 % Kurdish-Zaza population among the adult population reaches 15,68 % in
all of Turkey when the population below 18 was added.
Estimates on the Kurdish and Zaza population in Turkey have ranged between 7 and
25 million. In view of these estimates, KONDA maintains that based on its latest
survey and on TSI data, the figure of 11 million 445 thousand is more realistic for the
total population (children, teenagers and adults) for the Kurdish and Zaza population
living in Turkey as of late 2006.

KONDA conducted a similar survey in Istanbul in 1993. In response to the question

“We are all Turkish citizens, but we may be from different origins. What do you feel
yourself to be?”, 25,15 % had said “Muslim” or “Muslim Turkish.” In this current
survey, this percent is a mere 1,02 %. Even though the sample universe was
Istanbul for one survey and Turkey for the other, the main reason for the sizeable
difference is that in the 1993 survey, there were no questions on religious affiliation.
In this current survey however, right before the identity question, the subjects were
asked about their religion and sect. In other words, the subjects first provided
information about their religion and sect and then for the identity question,
understood that it was about an affiliation other than religion and responsed
knowingly. The question being understood this way has been beneficial for
evaluating the ethnic structure. The Alevi group has been included in the ethnic
groups as well as the religious groups as this might shed light on the debates on the
definition of Alevism.

Ethnic Identity
Distribution in Turkey %
Turkish 76
Kurdish-Zaza 15,7
Turkish Origin 2,8
Arab 0,7
Self-Defined in General Terms 3,9
Others 0,8
Total 100
4.4. No Hiding of Ethnic Identity
The “No Response” rate for the ethnic identity question was the same as other
questions – 2 to 3 %. This rate demonstrates that the people basically have no
problem revealing their identities.
However, in an environment where the Southeastern and Kurdish problem continues
some people may be heedy of revealing their identity and it was thus necessary to
derive indirect information about their identity. To this end, subjects' mother tongues
were taken as an indication of their ethnic identities and ethnic identity percentages
were rectified accordingly. For example if a person's mother tongue is Arabic and
defines himself as “Turkish,” this person was considered to be “Arab” and
percentages were changed according to such considerations. This also provided the
chance to determine more correctly the ethnic identity of people who defined
themselves as “Muslim” or “citizen of the Turkish Republic.” Even though this
rectification seems to be disadvantageous for the dominant identity and the
dominant language, it may be said that it brings us closer to the truth about ethnic
identities.

4.5. 85 % OF TURKEY SAYS “TURKISH IS MY MOTHER

TONGUE”

Mother Tongue
Distribution %
Turkish 84,54
Kurdish – Zazaki 12,98
Arabic 1,38
Other 1,11

Comparing mother tongue and ethnic identity data bears importance for
determining ethnic identity accurately and consistently. The mother
tongue for 85 % of people living in Turkey is Turkish... Second is Kurdish
and Zazaki with 13 % of the population.

Two separate questions were asked to the subjects in order to determine the mother
tongue and the spoken language. These questions were: “What is your mother
tongue, that is the language that you learned from you mother?” and “What
language is spoken in daily life, in your family?” According to the responses to these
questions, Turkish is the mother tongue for 85 % of the inhabitants of Turkey. The
second most common mother tongue is Kurdish and Zazaki with 13 % and the third
is Arabic, with 1,38 %. Comparing mother tongue and ethnic identity data bears
importance for determining ethnic identity accurately and consistently. In our survey,
some of those who stated their identity to be Turkish said their mother tongue was
Kurdish (4.08 %). Also, among those whose identities were “Kurdish” or “Zaza”, 8,82
% said that their mother tongue was Turkish.
Among those who identified themselves as “citizen of the Turkish Republic,” the
mother tongue of 14 % of them is Kurdish or Zazaki. It is a fact that some of the
Kurdish define themselves as “Turkish”, that, in other words, they have assimilated.
Yet, it is obvious that ethnic identity should be determined after having resolved such
discrepancies. In the part on identity, this approach has been applied with certain
assumptions.
In the following tables, we can see how identities are intermingled and blended and
how mother tongues have been caught up and dissolved between identities.

% as Mother
Language Tongue
Turkish 84,54
Kurdish 11,97
Zazaki 1,01
Arabic 1,38
Armenian 0,07
Greek 0,06
Jewish Languages 0,01
Balkan Languages 0,23
Caucasian Languages 0,07
Laz 0,12
Circassian 0,11
Turkic Languages 0,28
Romani language 0,01
West European Languages 0,03
Other 0,12
Total 100
Distribution of Ethnic Identities by Mother Tongue

Caucasian
Kurdish-
Turkish

Muslim

Balkan
Zazaki

Arabic

-Asian

Other
Lang.

Total
Identity
Turkish 94,41 4,08 0,66 0,04 0,18 0,49 0,12 100
Kurdish-Zaza 8,82 90,65 0,49 0,05 100
Ciziten of Republic of Turkey 83,28 14 2,11 0,3 0,2 0,1 100
Local Identities 94,33 1,98 0,28 0 2,83 0,57 100
Muslim Turkish 86,96 11,3 0,87 0,43 0,43 100
Arab 18,24 2,35 78,82 0,59 100
Immigrants 98,89 0 0 0 1,11 0 100
Self-Defined in General Terms 67,09 25,32 3,8 2,53 1,27 100
Alevi 37,18 53,85 7,69 1,28 100
Of Caucasian Origin 66,13 33,87 100
Of Balkan Origin 73,08 23,08 3,85 100
Non-Muslim 45,83 50 4,17 100
Asian Turkish 80,95 4,76 14,29 100
From Other Countries 27,27 18,18 0 54,55 100
Roma 75 0 12,5 12,5 100
Total 85,05 12,57 1,32 0,13 0,22 0,56 0,16 100

4.6. Education Among Kurds Below Average

The survey intended to find out the different economic and social situations, the
attitudes and viewpoints of people with different identities. Looking at the
educational level, while in the general population, 67,4 % have less than high-school
level education, this rate goes up to 78 % among the Kurds. Also the overall 9 %
rate of higher-educated people, falls to 5,5 % among the Kurds. The educational
level of those who define themselves with general terms and those from “other”
ethnic identity groups seems to be a little better than average.

Size of Household (person)

1-2 3-5 6-8 9+ Toplam
Turkish 17,1 64 16,5 2,5 100
Of Turkish Origin 17,8 63,6 16,3 2,2 100
Kurdish 8,6 40,8 32,9 17,6 100
Arab 10,2 51,4 26,2 12,1 100
Self-Defined in General Terms 16,7 67,1 14,2 1,9 100
Other Ethnic Identities 16,2 64,9 16,2 2,7 100
Turkey 15,7 60,3 19,1 4,9 100
4.7. The Laz, Circassians and Immigrants
When the population below the age of 18 is added to the findings of ethnic identity
distribution among adults in Turkey by subjects' responses, the population of Arabs is
calculated as 550.000. The same calculation reveals that the numbers of immigrants
may be 310.000, Laz 220.000, those of Caucassian origin (Circassian, Chechnian and
Georgian) 210.000 and Roma people 30.000. The number of non-muslims were
estimated to be 80.000. But these figures depend on very low percentages and the
high margin for error in these calculations must be kept in mind.

4.7.1. The Situation of The Younger Generation

It must be taken into account that the younger generation among these groups is
less keen on expressing their ethnic identity.

4.8. In the Poorest Segment, Kurdish-Zaza is the Largest Group

Regarding the income situation of ethnic identities, the Kurdish and Zaza seem to be
most crowded group in the lowest income segment. Following them are the Arabs.
The “other” ethnic groups seem to be in the higher income level less than average
and most of them take their place in the 2nd lowest income level.

4.8.1. Kurds and Zazas

It must be noted that in the findings of the survey, the term Kurdish includes those
whose have identified themselves as Zaza. While some believe that the Zaza are
Kurdish, others maintain that they should be considered as completely different
ethnic groups. The results show that the Zaza population is much lower than the
Kurdish population and that they are different in some respects. Among the adult
population in Turkey, those who feel themselves to be Kurdish make up 8,61 % of
the population, those identifying themselves as Zaza make up 0,41 %. Examining the
Kurdish and Zaza population together, the Zaza make up 4,5 % of this group. The
table below summarizes, with approximate percentages, their differing situation and
viewpoints.

KURDS ZAZAS
Their Religious Sects 4/10 Hanafi, 4/10 2/10 Hanafi, 6/10
Shafii, 1/10 Alevi Shafii, 2/10 Alevi
Social Security Status 3/10 have no 2/10 have no
security security
“Southeastern or Kurdish
problem is due to Provocation
of Foreign Countries” % 45 agree % 57 agree
Would vote for CHP if elections
were tomorrow 5% 11%
Would vote for DTP if elections
were tomorrow 23% 12%
4.9. Kurds and Arabs are Poorer and Live in More Crowded
Households
Looking at the household size among various ethnic groups, one can see that the
Kurds and Arabs live in more crowded housholds. 17,6 % of Kurds and 12,1 % of
Arabs seem to be living in households with 9 or more people.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME (YTL)

Poorest 2nd income Mid-level 4th income Highest Total
segment segment income segment income
segment segment
Turkish 15,7 43,8 27,1 11,5 1,9 100
Turkish Origin 15,2 41,1 28,8 12,5 2,5 100
Kurdish 23,8 44,1 22,7 8,2 1,2 100
Arab 21,9 49,4 20,2 6,9 1,7 100
Self-Defined in 17,3 43,5 25,8 10 3,4 100
General Terms
Other Ethnic 16,7 53,1 24,9 4,8 0,5 100
Identities
Turkey 17,1 43,9 26,2 10,9 1,9 100

4.10. Comparing the Findings with Censuses From 1927 to

1965: The Figures Match the Historical Development
In the 7 censuses that the State Statistics Institute (former name of Turkish Statistics
Institute) conducted from 1927 to 1965, the “mother tongue” and “second language
spoken” were questions asked to citizens. Those saying “My mother tongue is
Kurdish” or “My second language is Kurdish” during these 7 censuses made up 8,07
% at the lowest and 9,88 % at the highest – and Zaza speakers are not included in
these figures. Doubtlessly, as these censuses were conducted by the state's civil
servants, some people have again not responsed to the question and hidden their
identities.

In KONDA's survey for Milliyet, those whose “mother tongue” or “second language
known” is Kurdish make up 11,97 % of the adult population. And in the ethnic
identity question, 8,61 % of the population have defined themselves as Kurdish. As
can be seen, the findings of our survey are consistent with the historical
development.
Kurdish Speakers According to 7 Censuses
Kurdish Population Percent
(1000) (1000) (%)
1927 SSI 1184 13629 8,69
1935 SSI 1595 16157 9,87
1945 SSI 1594 18790 8,48
1950 SSI 2070 20947 9,88
1955 SSI 1942 24065 8,07
1960 SSI 2317 27755 8,35
1965 SSI 2817 31391 8,98
2007 KONDA 8735 72975 11,97

4.11. 3 Million Turks and Kurds Relatives Through Marriage

The social fabric of Turkey is not mere percentages of religious and ethnic identities.
A focus on marriages between ethnic identities demonstrates that marriages between
the Turks and the Kurdish-Zaza makes up for 3,7 % of the population. In other
words, 2 million 708 thousand Kurdish people have Turkish relatives (meaning also
that that many Turkish people have Kurdish relatives). So 2 million 708 people have
kinship in their family due to a Turkish-Kurdish marriage. Also between Turks and
“other” ethnic groups, 3,6 % or 2 million 611 thousand people seem to have kinship
through marriage. As for kinship through marriage between Kurdish-Zaza and “other”
ethnic groups, it makes up 0,5 % of the population or 353 thousand people. These
kinship relations denote that the social fabric of Turkey is formed by intermingling
relationships between different group living together, marrying one another and
creating a common culture.
5. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

5.1. 4.5 million say “I am Alevi”

According to the survey data, the Alevi population corresponds to 2

million 895 thousand people among adults. When the population under
18 is included in the calculation, the number of Alevis in all of Turkey
comes to 4.5 million.

Conducted for Milliyet under the direction of Tarhan Erdem, KONDA's survey aimed
to reveal with scientific data the distribution of religious and sect affiliations in
Turkey.
Examining people's responses to the question of which religion and sect they felt
affiliated with, one can see that 99 % of the population is Muslim and by sect, 82 %
are Sunnite Hanafi and 5,73 % are Alevi-Shiite.
Accordingly the commonly guessed Alevi population equals 2 million and 895
thousand people among adults. If the population below the age of 18 is added to the
adults, one reaches the conclusion that the total Alevi population in Turkey nears 5
million (4 million and 587 thousand). Another remarkable finding is that 9.06 of the
population are Sunnite Shafii.

Region %
Istanbul 34,1
Western Marmara 23,2
Aegean 14,2
Eastern Marmara 6,8
Western Anatolia 6,3
Mediterranean 5,1
Central Anatolia 3,6
Western Black Sea 2
Eastern Black Sea 1,7
Northest Anatolia 1,6
Central East Anatolia
1,3
Southeast Anatolia
Total 100
A Third of Alevis in Istanbul

5.1.1. Geographical Distribution

The geographical distribution of Alevis is quite different than what is commonly
known by conviction / what we have learn to recite. A third of them living in
Istanbul, Alevis also densely populate Central Eastern Anatolia (Bingöl, Elazığ,
Malatya, Tunceli, Bitlis, Hakkari, Muşi, Van) and the Mediterranean region. When
asked how long they have been living where they currently live, it is revealed that
the Alevi population is much more mobile than the rest of Turkey. Out of 10 people
in Turkey, six live where they were born. For Alevis, this is figure is 4 out of 10. In
other words, six out of every 10 Alevis do not live in their hometown.
Although the economic and social situation of Alevis is not very different than the
rest of society, their opinions on some matters are. They have been living in the
same place for shorter time periods and they feel less settled than others. While they
own less property where they live, they have more property in their hometowns.

View of Sect on Marriage with Someone from Another Religioun, Ethnic Background or Country
Your Future Daughter-In-Law, Son-In-Law or Spouse
From Another Religion From Another Ethnicity From Another Country
Can Maybe Cannot Can Maybe Cannot Can Maybe Cannot
Be Be Be Be Be Be
Sunni 28,6 10,9 60,5 40 13,7 46,3 30,2 10,7 59,1
Hanafi
Suni 36,8 8 55,3 60,7 11 28,2 38 9 53
Shafii
Alevi 63,4 10,1 26,5 66,3 12,3 21,4 61 9,9 29,1

Other People
Can Live Their Have Some Have Legal Have Social
Identity Freely Yes Problems Obstacles Obstacle Total
Sunni Hanafi 57,7 30,7 7,0 4,6 100
Suni Shafii 36,7 36,8 21,4 5,1 100
Alevi 20,9 43,6 25,7 9,7 100

5.1.2. Open to Other Groups

Compared both to other religious and ethnic identities, Alevi prove to be the most
open-minded group about their prospective daughter-in-law, son-in-law or spouse
being from another religion, sect, background or country. Among Alevis, 63,4 % say
that “their prospective daughter-in-law, son-in-law or spouse” can be “from another
religion”; 66,3 % say they can be “from another ethnic background”; and 61 % say
they can be “from another country.”
Southeast Anatolia
Western Black Sea
Western Marmara

Eastern Black Sea

Northest Anatolia
Western Anatolia
Eastern Marmara

Central Anatolia
Mediterranean

Central East
Istanbul

Anatolia
Aegean

Total

Regional
Distribution of
Religious Faith
Groups
Sunni Hanafi 15 4,2 14 9,5 11 14 7 7 6 3,6 2,8 7,5 100
Sunni Shafii 11 0,3 4 2 2,6 6,9 1 0 12 21,5 38,9 100
Sunni other 32 8,8 8,8 12 12 12 2 2 6,6 3,3 100
Alevi 34 1,3 6,8 2 5,1 14 2 4 1,7 23,2 6,3 100
Nusayri 4,2 4,2 4,2 8,3 71 8,3 100
Shiite 9,8 1,2 4,3 1,2 2 79 0,6 2,4 100
Other Muslim 16 21 23 8,9 6,6 4,6 5 9 5 0,8 0,6 0,4 100

Size of
Household 1-2 3-5 6-8 9+ Total
Sunni
Hanafi 16,7 62,7 17,3 3,3 100

Sunni Shafii 5,7 39,1 32,9 22,3 100

Sunni other 16,3 64,0 16,3 3,5 100
Alevi 13,3 65,0 19,5 2,2 100
Nusayri 14,3 57,1 28,6 0,0 100
Shiite 13,0 50,8 32,2 4,0 100
Other
Muslim 18,8 61,3 18,0 1,9 100
Christian
and Jewish 46,7 46,7 6,7 0,0 100
Other 36,2 55,2 3,8 4,8 100

5.2. In Distress About Exercising Their Beliefs

On the other hand, while 53 % of Alevis state that they can freely live their identity,
it is noteworthy that only 20,9 % agree that others can live their identity freely.
Holding such differing views about themselves and about others demonstrates that
they prefer to express their own distress through others. Alevis seems to be the
group facing the most difficulty in living their own identity.
Moreover, 89,6 % of Alevis approve of state support to ethnic groups and 90,5 % to
religious groups. While being a muslim is viewed as a prerequisite for citizenship in
most groups, Alevis disagree, with only 27,1 % saying it is a prerequisite.
EXPERT VIEW

Mustafa Şen, Ph.D. Middle East Technical University Department of Sociology

Why are data on Alevis so different?

One of the interesting findings of the survey is that the percentage saying they are Alevi-
Shiite is rather low (5,7 %). In order to better evaluate this finding, It will be beneficial to
examine other research. Two previous surveys conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz
Toprak for TESEV in 1999 and 2006 are available. When religious identity and sect
affiliation are asked directly, 3,9 % of the subjects in 1999 and 6,1 % of the subjects in
2006 state that the are Alevi. Moreover, the 2006 survey with a few additional question
reaches the conclusion that in fact 11,4 % of subjects might be Alevis. Obviously, various
studies present different figures about Alevis. We may explain this situation as follows:

z First of all, the method, the sample and the way the questions are posed are critical
in such surveys on sensitive subjects. Each of these effect the validity and
reliability of the findings.

z Secondly, an important part of Alevis are heedy about exposing their identity
publicly. As the survey has also demonstrated, the dominant religious identity in
Turkey is the Sunnite Hanafism. Also, Hanafism is eheavily supported by the state
on an institutional basis. This situation causes Alevis to be subjected to pressure,
discrimination and exclusion in numerous ways and thus prevents them from
comfortably voicing their identity. As a matter of fact, the survey itself has
revealed that those living their identity freely is lowest among Alevis.

z Thirdly, the survey shows that Alevis are highly mobile, that a third of them live
in Istanbul, that their households are quite small and that the educational level has
risen. These findings point to urbanisation of Alevis. The indifferent and relatively
freer environment of larger cities cause religious and denominational identities to
become de-emphasized from time to time.

z Fourthly, in public spaces where the cizitenship-based values of the republic are
deeply-rooted, Alevis fell no need to stress their own identities. In other words,
Alevis and Sunnites have created a common culture of existence in which the
fundamental values of the republic are upheld. Alevis believe that any strong
emphasis on their own identity may harm this common culture of existence . For
this reason, they are especially reluctant to emphasize their identity.
5.3. The Poorest Religious Group is the Shafii

Shafiis make up the largest sect after the Hanafis. Not only are their
educational and income levels below average, but a third of them are also
in the lowest income group.
The economic and social situation of the Shafiis is quite noticeable as their level of
education, the size of their hoseuholds and their household income are behind the
society's average.
The percentage of those with higher education is merely 4.5 % among the Shafiis.
40 % of the Shafiis are in the lowest income group. Shafiis with no social security or
having a Green Card are 62.4 %. Households with 9 or more people make up 22.3 %
of the Shafii population. Among the Kurdish Shafiis, this percentage goes up to 27.57
%. However, quite interestingly, the size of household decreases, not as income
increases but as level of education increases.
Owning less property that the rest of society, Shafiis also more willing to move than
the nation's average. Shafiis are quite open to the idea of daughter- or son-kin-law
having a different identity. Only half (54.5 %) of the Shafiis think that they can live
their identity freely. They strongly believe in state support for ethnic and religious
groups with 91 % and 92.8 % rate of approval respectively.

Income Less
Distribution Than 300 301-700 701- 1201- 3000+
By Sect YTL YTL 1200 YTL 3000 YTL YTL

Sunni Hanafi 15,3 45,1 26,6 11,0 1,9

Sunni Shafii 31,0 39,1 21,5 7,3 1,1

Sunni other 5,6 35,2 29,6 29,6 0,0
Alevi 16,8 38,5 31,2 11,8 1,7
Nusayri 0,0 42,9 57,1 0,0 0,0
Shiite 41,6 28,0 24,2 5,0 1,2

Other Muslim 8,7 47,6 29,7 12,7 1,2

Christian and
Jewish 0,0 40,0 40,0 12,0 8,0
Other 2,1 25,5 25,5 41,5 5,3

5.4. Cause of Poverty Not Their Sect

In debates on sects, it is often claimed that not only Alevis but also non-Hanafite
Sunnites are also subject to exclusion. The data on Shafiis, the largest sect after
Hanafis, might be interpreted by some people as findings which imply that
truthfulness of this claim. However, in the three eastern regions where 72 % of the
Shafiis live, lack of education, low income, regional underdevelopment are so very
intermingled that it is impossible to base differences on sects. Even though the
survey did not aim to figure out whether differing viewpoints within the Sunni sect
existed, it showed that both the Hanafis and the Shafiis are quite devout and that
Sunnism plays a unifying role.

Vocational
Education School or University
Attainment Less than High or
by Sect HighSchool School College

Sunni Hanafi 67,5 23,7 8,8

Sunni Shafii 79,1 16,4 4,5

Sunni other 57,0 24,4 18,6
Alevi 63,3 27,1 9,6
Nusayri 42,9 28,6 28,6
Shiite 73,7 21,1 5,1
Other
Muslim 63,4 26,3 10,3
Christian
and Jewish 43,3 46,7 10,0
Other 13,5 34,6 51,9

What are the two Sunnite sects of Hanafism and Shafiism?

Two of the four “Ahl ul-Sunna” schools of Islam, Hanafi and Shafii sects differ in daily life practices,
such as matter on what annuls ablution. The information provided by te Meydan Larousse
encyclopedia is summarized as follows:

Hanafism: Founded by Al-Imam al Azam Abu Hanifah. His followers Abu Yusuf Yakub Muhammed İbn-
ül-Hasan-üş-Şeybani (died 805) ve İmam Abu Yusuf, have been more influential its becoming a
school. Developing mostly in Iraq, it became the principle fiqh school of the state during the Abbasi
rule. It spread east and improved in Khorasan and Mawara'un Nahr. Although it became less
influential when the Abbasi state collapsed, with the Ottomans it regained . Today Turks in Turkey
and the Balkan countries, muslims of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Acara, Greece, Poland, Bulgaria
and Rumenia, Circassians and Georgians of the Caucaus, Daghistani Turks and Turk os Northern
Caucasia are almost all Hanafi.

Shafiism: Founded y Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Idris Shafii (767-820). It has spread predominantly
among the muslims of Eygpt, Iran, Iraq, Endonesian islands, Sri Lanka, Indochina and Australia. There
are also followers of this sect in the east of Anatolia, in Daghistan and some regions of Central Asia.
The predominance of the Shafii sect in the Eygptian region began following the collapse of the Fatimis
with the Ayyubid rule. During the Mamluk period Sultan Zahir Baibars appointed qadi's from all four
schools but Shafii dominance lasted. In the Ottoman period, Mehmed Ali Pasha's rule accepted
Hanafism as the official state sect but Shafiism continued among the people.

5.5. Out of Every 10 Alevis, 6 are Turkish and 2 Kurdish-Zaza

Interesting data on the relationship between faith groups and ethnic

background were also obtained. 72 % of society consists of Hanefi Turks.
Among the Alevis, 61,2 % are Turkish, 22 % are Kurdish or Zaza, 7,8 %
are of Turkish origin.
So what about the relationship between other sects and etnic groups? Although sects
and ethnic identities seems to be closely related, any sect seems to be comprised of
people from various ethnic background and similarly any ethnic groups has members
from different religious sects. For example,, 61,2 % the Alevis are Turkish, 22 % are
Kurdish or Zaza, 7,8 % are of Turkish origin and the rest from other ethnic origins.

Distribution of Religious Faith Groups by Ethnic Identity

Religious Those of Kurdish –
faiths Turkish Turkish Origin Zaza Arab Other
Sunni Hanafi 87,8 3,32 3,16 0,22 0,56
Sunni Shafii 32,68 0,9 58,43 4,17 0,25
Sunni other 76,74 4,65 8,14 3,49 3,49
Alevi 61,19 7,85 22,1 2,74 0,18
Nusayri 33,33 16,67 0 45,83 0
Shiite 91,19 1,89 3,14 0 1,89
Other Muslim 88,14 5,72 0,64 0 2,54
Christian and
Jewish 26,67 0 10 0 63,33
Other 65,42 3,74 18,69 0 5,61

Distribution of Ethnic Groups by Religious Faiths

Religious Those of Kurdish –
faiths Turkish Turkish Origin Zaza Arab Other
Sunni Hanafi 88,78 80,66 28,66 24,4 67,11
Sunni Shafii 3,59 2,38 57,51 49,4 3,29
Sunni other 0,36 0,53 0,35 1,79 1,97
Alevi 3,69 11,39 11,96 17,86 1,32
Nusayri 0,04 0,53 0 6,55 0
Shiite 0,8 0,4 0,25 0 1,97
Other Muslim 2,29 3,58 0,15 0 7,89
Christian and
Jewish 0,04 0 0,15 0 12,5
Other 0,39 0,53 0,99 0 3,95
Total 100 100 100 100 100

5.5.1. 58,43 % of Shafiis are Kurdish-Zaza

The Shafii population is 58,43 % Kurdish or Zaza, 32,68 % Turkish, 4,17 % Arabic
and the remaining percentage from other ethnic backgrounds. These figures
demonstrate a close tie
between being Shafii and being Kurdish.

Sunni Hanafis who represent 82 % of society appear to be the most comfortable

group about living their own identity. 87,2 % of them have replied this question
positively. This group seems to be a bit stricter regarding other issues. Sunni Hanafis
are more opposed than average to the idea of their daughter- or son-in-law being
from a different religion, sect, ethnic background or country. Sunn Hanafis also less
approving of the state supporting ethnic and religious groups.

5.5.2. 72 % of Society Hanafi Turkish

Examining religious identities collectively, one remarkable observation is that
viewpoints seems to differ not only on religioun but on feeling settled, on the
prerequisites of citizenship and on the Southeast and Kurdish question.
In any case, we may say that people seems to be devote to their religion, to uphold
religious values but without manifesting conservatism in a negative sense. For
example the fact that people are more open to a daughter- or son-in-law from a
different ethnic background than to one from a different religion implies that religion
is sincerely valued.
72,2 % of the society is Hanafi Turkish. With the remaining 27,8 % belonging to a
myriad of different religious and ethnic background, it is rather difficult to argue that
the social fabric of the population is not a colorful one.

5.6. The Majority is Devout but not Conservative

Considering the relationship between identity, religion and the state, one can see the
emphasis of religious faith in social life. For example, 54 % of the population says
“Being a Muslim is a prerequisite of being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey.”
Similarly, the majority of society (76 %) are in favor of the state supporting religious
groups.
In defining themselves, religiona and/or sect once again comes up, as one of the two
most prominent aspects of identity. Here, religion is more valued as a marker of
identity that place of birth, ethnic background or profession. However, this emphasis
on religion should be interpreted “devotion to religion” and not as “conservatism” or
“reclusion.” Because even if only one in a hundred marriages is between sects (this
data based on question on mother and father's religious and sect), one in three
people say that their future daughter-, son-in-law or spouse “can be from a different
religion or sect.”
6. MIGRATION

6.1. Highest Number of Kurds live in Istanbul

According to the Turkish Statistics Institute, 11,622,000 people live in Istanbul.
Based on KONDA's calculations on the survey data, Kurds and Zazas in Istanbul
number 1,571,000. Considering Diyarbakır's population (677,000 according to TSI,
KONDA's calculation shows the number of Kurds and Zazas in this city to be 618,00.
The level of the Kurdish population in Istanbul is a striking data demonstrating the
high percentage of ethnic mixing among society and how inseparable ethnic groups
are.

6.2. A Third of the Population Has Moved with Migration

Only 62 % of the subjects still live in their place of birth. This means that
38 % of the population has migrated at least once. 13 % have moved
within the last 10 years.
Population mobility as a result of migration highly influences the social structure. The
society can not only move about easily but also shape its identity by this ability to
move. As with the following statements, it is possible to view an incredible circulation
of the population that is not unique to Turks. Migration which itself can be based on
a myriad or reasons becomes an influential factor the notions of homeland and
compatriotism (hemşehrilik) as well as perceptions of identity and citizenship.

6.3. Istanbulites Make up 28 % of Istanbul

One piece of information we were looking forward to extract from the survey was
how many people still lived where they were born or from another perspective which
regions received the least migration. Looking at those who state the same region for
their place of residence and place of birth, Eastern Black Sea (96,54 %) and
Southeastern Anatolia (95,35 %) seem to have the highest rates. It can be said that
these two regions do not seem to have received any migration, not at least in the
last 50 years. It is also not difficult to guess that Istanbul is the most cosmopolitan
region, with the highest immigration rates. A mere 28,45 % of Istanbul inhabitants
were born in Istanbul.

Distribution of Istanbul
Residents by Place of Birth %
Istanbul 28,45
Western Marmara 3,47
Aegean 2,14
Eastern Marmara 3,63
Western Anatolia 2,37
Mediterranean 3,20
Central Anatolia 7,45
Western Black Sea 14,25
Eastern Black Sea 10,99
Northest Anatolia 8,03
Central East Anatolia 7,21
Southeast Anatolia 6,06
Abroad 2,73

30,00

25,00

20,00

15,00 %

10,00

5,00

0,00
Marmara

Marmara

Central East
Istanbul

Eastern Black
Mediterranean

Northest
Western Black
Western

Western

Southeast
Central
Eastern

Anatolia

Abroad
Anatolia

Anatolia
Aegean

Anatolia
Anatolia
Sea
Sea

6.4. 62 % Live in Their Homeland

Among the subjects representing the whole of Turkey 62.03 % have been living in
the same place since birth. About 25 % have been living where they live for the past
10 years or longer. 6.10 % came to their current residence in the past 5 to 10 years
and for 6.97 % this time period is less than 5 years. According to this data, 13 % of
the population in Turkey have moved within the last ten years. Another important
finding is that 45.03 % of society have some sort of property in their homeland. This
implies that people in Turkey still have strong ties with their place of birth.

5 Years or Less
6,97

6 to 10 Years 6,10

Since Birth 62,03

More Than 10
Years 24,87
Own property in place of residence? Own property in
place of birth?
Yes No Yes No
62,09 37,91 45,03 54,97

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Yes No Yes No

Own property in place of residence? Own property in place of birth?

6.5. People Feel They Belong Where They Were Born

The mobility of the population leads to surprising findings about where people feel
like they belong. 59.47 % of people define themselves as belonging to, as coming
from their place of birth and not their place of residence. When Istanbul inhabitants
are asked “Where are you from?”, 68 % of them will say they are from outside of
Istanbul, from their hometown. The majority of people in West Marmara (64.10%)
and Western Black Sea (66.08 %) regions will identify themselves with their place of
birth. In a similar survey conducted by KONDA in 1993 only 17 % defined
themselves as Istanbulites. Thirteen years later, the self-claimed Istanbulites in this
survey have risen to 24.15 % (even though 28.45 % are born in Istanbul).
Responses to "Where Are Place of Place of 3rd place
You Fgrom Originally?" Residence Birth
Turkey 36,71 59,47 2,81
Southeast Anatolia 43,11 53,69 1,35
Central East Anatolia 45,53 51,52 1,44
Northest Anatolia 53,88 42,82 0,85
Eastern Black Sea 44,21 55,51 0,19
Western Black Sea 31,62 66,08 1,49
Central Anatolia 41,40 56,01 1,96
Mediterranean 35,58 62,44 1,51
Western Anatolia 38,21 55,91 3,92
Eastern Marmara 41,80 54,85 2,31
Aegean 36,77 60,37 2,17
Western Marmara 33,73 64,10 1,72
Istanbul 24,15 68,08 6,90

Istanbul
Aegean
Western Anatolia
Place of Residence
Central Anatolia
Place of Birth
Eastern Black Sea
3rd place
Central East Anatolia
Turkey
0% 50% 100%

6.6. 21 % of the Society Would Like to Move

Although it seems that in some regions only people who were born there are living
there, there seems to be a social problem of “not being able to settle” due to several
reasons.
10.47 % do not consider themselves to be settled; 28.37 % clearly do not wish their
children to settle in the same place; and 21.2 % openly declare that they would be
willing to migrate. These data demonstrate that the society has serious problems of
settling, or in other words of “habitat.”

Young people with university education stand out as the most mobile segment. Of
these, 24.78 % of young women and 21.33 % of young men have been in the same
place for 5 years or less. Those with secondary education or less seem to be more
settled. The more settled, the more people want their children to stay. But still, all
groups envision the future of children elsewhere, not where they live. The replies of
“Do Not Want Children to Settle Here” and “Can Settle Depending on Conditions” are
lowest among people aged 44 or older. This percentage is highest however among
well-educated people less than 29. In this group, women saying “Do Not Want
Children to Settle Here” and “Can Settle Depending on Conditions” is 64 % and men
saying the same is 61 %.

The desire to move decreases as age increases and decreases as education

increases. In response to the question “Would you like to move away from here from
this city?”, 35.38 % of young well-educated women and 36.27 % of young well-
educated men answer “yes”.
No regional difference seems evident for “feeling settled.” Those who least consider
themselves to be settled live in Central East Anatolia (15.88 %) and Istanbul (%
13.60).
Central East Anatolia (36.18 %) and West Marmara (32.70 %) are the two regions
which have the highest percentage of people who clearly do not wish their children
to settle in the same place. Those who would like to migrate in the future are highest
in Northeastern Anatolian (34.86 %) and Central Anatolia (28.58 %) regions.

Outlook on and Depends

Acceptance of Place of on
Residence Yes No Conditions
Wants to Move in the
Future 21,2 29,37 46,69
Wants Children to Settle 47,26 28,37 24,37
in Same Place
Feels Settled 87,17 10,74 0

Feels Settled

Yes
Wants Children to Settle
No
in Same Place
Depends on Conditions

Wants to Move in the

Future

0% 20 40 60 80 100
% % % % %
6.7. Out of every thousand people, 373 have migrated
Most striking findings of the survey are on migration:
The first finding is that out of every 1000 adult, 627 of them still live where they
were born but 373 have migrated elsewhere. In other words, a third of the
population do not live in their place of birth. The second important finding is that out
the 373 people who have moved at some point, 243 came to their current place of
residence 10 years before or even earlier, 60 came 5 to 10 years ago and 69 of them
came in the past 5 years or later. The third crucial finding is that 254 of the 373
people still identify themselves as belonging to their place of birth. In other words,
when asked “Where are you from?” they still quote their hometown's name. Most
notably, among the 243 who have moved 10 years ago or earlier, 160 of them still
do not feel they belong where they live; their hearts still lie in their hometown.

1000 persons Where They Feel They Are From

Place
How Long They Have Place of of 3rd
Lived There Residence Birth Place Total
5 - Years 15 50 3 69
6-10 Years 15 43 2 60
10+ Years 76 160 7 243
Total of Thosed Moved 106 254 13 373
Since Birth 0 613 14 627
Grand Total 106 867 27 1000
7. DEFINING CITIZENSHIP

7.1. The Primary Prerequisite of Citizenship: LOVING TURKEY

A most remarkable finding of the survey was the view on bond of
citizenship. 82 % of the subjects said that loving Turkey is a prerequisite
for being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Ethnic background was the
prerequisite stated the least.
In the “social fabric” survey conducted for Milliyet's “Who Are We?” series,
astonishing data was obtained regarding which factors would count as a bond of
citizenship to the Republic of Turkey. A majority of the subjects place “Loving
Turkey” above all other proposed prerequisites for citizenship. Regarding bond of
citizenship, a heavily argued subject these days, the following question was posed:

Some people say that the following are prerequisites to truly be a citizen of the
Republic of Turkey. Some people say that they are not. In your opinion, are each of
the following a must or not?
z Is it a prerequisite to be ethnically Turkish?
z Is it a prerequisite to claim one is from Turkey, regardless of ethnic
background?
z Is it a prerequisite to be a Muslim?
z Is it a prerequisite to love Turkey?

Which of the following are prerequisites for being a

citizen of the Republic of Turkey?
Being Ethnically Turkish Saying "I am from Turkey" Being muslim Loving Turkey
Is a Neither Not a Is a Neither Not a Is a Neit Not a Is a Neit Not a
Prerequi Prerequisit Prerequisit Prereq Prereq her Prereq Prereq her Prereq
site e e uisite uisite uisite uisite uisite
45,64 9,85 44,51 63,80 11,49 24,71 54,31 10, 35,66 82,00 6,5 11,49
03 2

7.2. The Primary Prerequisite is Loving Turkey

As seen in the graph, 82 % of the public believes that loving Turkey is a prerequisite
for being a Turkish citizen. 63.88 % think that claiming one is from Turkey,
regardless of ethnic background, is a must; 54.31 % believe that one must be a
Muslim; and 45.64 % believe that one must be being ethnically Turkish. Revealed
here is the fact that this country's people prefer to emphasize feelings and beliefs
rather than background. Of those who view ethnic background and religious belief as
prerequisites for citizenship, most of them have an educational level below secondary
school. All our people love their country without stressing ethnic identity and this
love seems to be the prerequisite of bond of citizenship.
View on Being Ethnically Saying "I am from Being muslim Loving Turkey
bond of Turkish Turkey"
citizenship Is a Not a Is a Not a Is a Not a Is a Not a
by gender Prerequisite Prerequisite Prerequisite Prerequisite Prerequisite Prerequisite Prerequisite Prerequisite

Female 47,72 42,26 62,90 25,14 57,13 33,05 80,93 12,01

Male 43,88 46,43 64,54 24,40 51,85 37,95 82,98 10,98

7.3. Bond of Citizenship According to Background

Breaking down the responses by ethnic background reveals different results. While
people of Turkish origin largely disagree that being ethnically Turkish is a must for
citizenship (only 29 % agree), they agree with others on the other proposed
prerequisites.

Arabs think like the rest of society in other issues, but when it comes to the
prerequisite of being ethnically Turkish they mostly disagree. 29,8 % of Arabs who
view ethnic Turkishness as a condition for citizenship. Kurds agree with the society at
large regarding muslimness as a prerequisite for citizenship but they think differently
about ethnic background. 76,3 % of Kurds think that being ethnically Turkish is not a
prerequisite of citizenship and 40,3 % of them think of saying “I am from Turkey”
regardless of ethnic background as a prerequisite. As for loving Turkey, 52,5 % of
Kurds view it as a must. Those who least view muslimness as a condition are the
remaining ethnic groups. Only 38,5 % identifying themselves in these groups say
that it is a must.

Which of the following are prerequisites for being a citizen of the Republic of
Turkey? (Distribution by ethnic background)
Being Ethnically Saying "I am from Being muslim Loving Turkey
Turkish is a Turkey" is a is a is a
Prerequisite Prerequisite Prerequisite Prerequisite
Turkish 48,6 66,6 54,6 84,9
Turkish
background* 46,8 63,7 58,9 82,8
Kurdish / Zaza 14,6 39,2 51,3 52,5
Arab 29,8 63,1 55,7 80,0
Self-defined in
general terms 50,5 63,2 53,8 82,3
Others 29,5 57,9 38,5 69,4
All of Turkey 45,8 64,2 54,4 82,2
* Balkan, Caucasian migrants etc. ** World citizen etc. *** Greek, Armenian etc.

Definition of Citizenship According to the Constitution

The 66th article of the “Political Rights and Duties” chapter of the constitution of Turkey
defines Turkish citizenship as follows: “Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond
of citizenship is a Turk.”
8. ETHNIC IDENTITY AND THE STATE
One of the significant findings of the survey focused on peoples views on whether
the state should or should not provide support so that ethnic groups are protected
and citizens are allowed to exercise the religious beliefs as they wish. The following
questions were posed:

Should the state support ethnic groups so that they can protect their customs and
traditions?
Should the state provide support so that citizens can freely exercise their religious
beliefs according to their own rules and manner of worship?

Our people have approached the question of state support for other groups quite
tolerantly (Once this question is asked for a specific group, this approach changes).
State support to ethnic groups is approved by 66,58 % and to religious groups by
76,45 %. Women have been more approving than the general public. As education
increases and age decreases, state support is further promoted. Support to religious
groups is more acceptable than to ethnic groups.

Should the State Support the Protection of Different Identities?

Support to Ethnic Groups Support to Religious Groups
In Favor Against In Favor Against
Turkey 66,58 33,42 76,45 23,55
Female 69,96 30,04 78,75 21,25
Male 63,84 36,16 74,63 25,37

8.1. Support to Ethnic Groups by Region

Studied by region, support to religious groups is more acceptable than support to
ethnic groups. State support to ethnic groups is accepted by 90,72 % in the Central
East Anatolian region (Bingöl, Elazığ, Malatya, Tunceli, Bitlis, Hakkari, Muş and Van
provinces) and by 86,30 % in the Southeast Anatolian region, but only 46,02 % in
the Eastern Black Sea region and 50,22 % in the Aegean region.

View on State-Citizen Relationship by Ethnic Background

Should Not Should Not
Should Support Support Ethnic Should Support Support Religious
Ethnic Groups Groups Religious Groups Groups
All of Turkey 66,4 33,6 76,4 23,6
Others 82,8 17,2 83,3 16,7
Self-defined in general terms 69,9 30,1 76,3 23,7
Arab 81,2 18,8 84 16

Kurdish and Zaza 96,3 3,7 95,7 4,3

Turkish background 66,6 33,4 77,1 22,9

Turkish 62,9 37,1 74,4 25,6
8.2. Percentage of Acceptance of State Support
Views on state support also change according to people's ethnic identities. While
Kurds almost unanimously endorse state support for ethnic and religious groups,
Turks are least in favor of this. Support to ethnic groups is accepted mostly by Kurds
(96.3 %), then other ethnic groups (82,8 %), then Arabs (81,2 %), then those who
use general terms instead of any ethnic affiliation (69,9 %), then those of Turkish
origins such as migrants from the Balkans and Caucasian regions (66,6 %) and least
by Turkish people (62,9 %).
9. EXPRESSION OF IDENTITIES

9.1. The Majority Says “I am from Turkey First and Foremost”

The subjects were offered seven choices for expressing their identity.
59.14 % of them stated that they would rather be identified as “from
Turkey.” Religion and set was the second choice after this with 42.11 %.
Ethnic backgroung was fourth however, with 13.96 %.

In the survey that was conducted in 3000 locations all over Turkey with a staff of
over 1500 people, 47,958 people were interviewed face-to-face. The aspects people
prefer or stress more when defining their own identities for this “social fabric” survey
bears a lot of significance.
In order to extract this data, the subjects were presented the following options and
asked which ones they would prefer to use when expressing their own identity:

z City or village of birth

z Being from Turkey (Türkiyelilik)
z Gender
z Ethnic background
z Religion/sect
z Age group (young/old)
z Attire
z Profession

We presented these options to the subjects one by one and asked how important
they thought they were.

9.1.1. Religion Ranks Second

A most significant finding in this section is that in all demographic segments,
“religion” receives more emphasis than “ethnic background.” Thus in Turkey
expressing one's religion is more important than expressing one's ethnicity.
However, in all groups, “being from Turkey” stood out as the most important identity
element. It must be noted that this finding fits perfectly with the finding that “loving
Turkey” came up as the most important prerequisite for “being a citizen of the
Turkish Republic.”
Following “being from Turkey” were the responses “religioun”, “city or village of
birth”, “ethnic background” and “gender.” “One's age group” and “one's attire” were
the least important identity elements.
When this data is sliced into educational segments, “being from Turkey” still seems
to be an important element for those with less than high school education. However,
for this group “religion-sect” is the most important identity element.
9.1.2. Place of Birth Important
The subjects were also asked for a second most important identity element among
the choices. This method allowed to extract not only their preferences but also their
tendencies. According to this question, “being from Turkey” (59,14 %) and “religion-
sect” (42,11 %) were the two most important identity elements. “One's city or village
of birth” fell slightly behind “religion-sect” with 40.78 %.

Who defines his/her identity

with what? Turkey Women Men
Being from Turkey 59,14 54,20 59,56
Religion-Sect 42,11 42,12 39,45
City or Village of Birth 40,78 39,77 38,95
Ethnic Background 13,96 12,82 14,02
Profession 11,46 9,44 12,50
Gender 7,74 8,10 6,89
Attire 2,52 2,95 2,02
Age Group 2,15 2,29 1,89

9.1.3. Ethnic Background Not in First Three

Another remarkable finding was that “ethnic background” was not among the first
three identity elements and preferred only by one thirds of the first three (13,96 %).
For this country's people, “ethnic background” is only as important as an identity
element as “one's profession.” Women quoted “being from Turkey” (54,20 %) and
“religion-sect” (42,12 %) as the first two important elements. Women identify
themselves by their place of birth by 39,77 % and the significance they place on
“ethnic background” seems to be the same as for the general public (12,82 %). As
for men, the identity elements rank as follows: “being from Turkey” (59,56 %),
“religion-sect” (39,45 %), “city or village of birth” (38,95 %) and “ethnic
background” (14,02 %).

9.2. Ethnic Background Stands Out in Two Regions

In Southeast Anatolia and Central East Anatolia, it was “ethnic
background” and not “being from Turkey” that stood out as the most
important identity element.
In Istanbul, West Marmara, Aegean, West Anatolian, Central Anatolian and Western
Black Sea regions, “being from Turkey” and “religious-sect” were the two most
important elements.
However in the Eastern Marmara, Mediterranean, East Black Sea and Northeast
Anatolian regions, the second most important identity was “one's place of birth” after
“being from Turkey.”
9.2.1. Regions Saying “Religion”
The regions where “religion-sect” surpasses “being from Turkey”--that is, where the
percentage for religion is the highest-- are Central Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern
Anatolia. Regions where “ethnic background” was cited as the most important
identity element were Central Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia.

9.2.2. Kurds and “being from Turkey”

Dividing the data by ethnic identity, there are significant differences in ranking.
“Being from Turkey” which ranks first overall falls to third place among the Kurds.
For this group, the most important identity element is “ethnic background” with 81,4
%. “Religion-sect” is just as important as ethnic background for Kurds at 81 %. As
with the general population, “religion-sect” is the second ranking identity element
among ethnic groups following “being from Turkey.” “Religion” comes before “being
from Turkey” for Arabs and ranks first. Ethnic background is most important for
Kurds (81,4 %) and Arabs (78,8 %).

9.3. An Unostentacious Patriotism

People's emphasis on being from Turkey and on religion-sect was one of the most
interesting findings. As ethnic background is relatively low in preference and in
percentage and as “being from Turkey” ranks first, this can be evaluated as an
indication that people have patriotic feelings in which pretention and showing off are
down-played.
Noticeable and worthy of an explanation here is the emphasis on “being from
Turkey.” The survey contained no detailed question about what subjects understood
of the term “being from Turkey.” While this survey had to suffice with subjects'
responses, new research into and more detailed information about this issue is
necessary. Yet it is our opinion that, with an emphasis on “being from Turkey”,
people were describing a society not based on ethnic identity and expressing a
heartfelt love of nation and country through this choice. However the extent to which
this emphasis translates to an emphasis on being fro Turkey as in the political
terminology needs to be examined and measured.
10. LOYALTY TO IDENTITIES AND VIEW ON OTHERS

10.1. Eastern Black Sea Strictest in Loyalty to Identity

In response to the question “Can your future daughter-in-law, son-in-law
or spouse be from a different religion, ethnicity or country?”, the most
negative answers came from the Eastern Black Sea region and from
uneducated men over 44.

Another tendency that the survey set out to measure was people's attachment to
their identities. In order to determine the feelings of loyalty to one's identity, a
personal question was directed to the subjects: “Can your future daughter-in-law,
son-in-law or spouse be from a different religion, ethnicity or country?” The first
point to be noticed is that people are rather strict in their attitudes regarding this
subject. Those who emphasize “being from Turkey” and “religion-sect” rather than
“ethnic background” in defining their identity are the same people who are less
compromising about becoming family with people from another country or religion.
Generally speaking, people are more accepting of marriage with someone from
another ethnic background but refuse such proximity when it's someone from
another country.

10.1.1. Women are More Tolerant

Examining this group of questions by gender, women seem to be more lenient than
men in all age groups. Dividing them into demographic groups, the results are quite
striking. For example, people with university degrees approve more highly of such
marriages. The group with the highest percentage of “can be” responses is middle-
aged or older women with university degrees at a rate of 65 %.
The highest rate of “no” to “daughter-in-law from another religion” comes from
uneducated men aged 44 or older at 69,93 % and from uneducated women aged 44
or older at 66,96 %.
The most positive groups are university-educated men (69,66 %) and women (66,06
%) between the ages 29 and 44. The least tolerant groups were again uneducated
men (55,22 %) and women (54,47 %) aged 44 and over.

Your Daughter- From Another Religion From Another From Another

in-Law, Son-in- Ethnicity Country
Law or Future Can be Maybe Cannot Can Maybe Cannot Can Maybe Cannot
Spouse be be be be be
Turkish 30,2 11,1 58,7 40,8 14 45,3 31,3 10,9 57,7
Of Turkish 29 8,5 62,5 48,1 10,7 41,2 30,5 9,5 60
Origin
Kurdish or Zaza 47,4 8,9 43,7 66,3 11,3 22,4 48,6 9,4 42
Arab 37,7 7 55,3 60,5 11,4 28,1 35,2 5,6 59,3
Self-Defined in 39,7 7,9 52,4 50 10 40 38,8 8,5 52,8
General Terms
Other 39,9 13,7 46,4 58,6 12,4 29 43,8 10,7 45,6
Total 31 10,3 55,1 42,2 12,9 41,3 31,8 10,2 53,9
10.2. Most Tolerant Regions
Splitting the responses by region, Central East Anatolia (46,22 %) and Istanbul
(42,70 %) seem to be the two regions with the highest rate saying “daughter- or
son-in-law can be from another religion” while Eastern Black Sea (15,96 %) and
Central Anatolia (23,98 %) have the lowest rates.
As for the idea of “daughter- or son-in-law from another ethnic background,” Central
East Anatolia (60,74 %) and Istanbul (53,09 %) are again the most favorable
regions but Eastern Black Sea (25,64 %) and Aegean (33,70 %) people are not in
favor of this idea. Central East Anatolia (48,78 %) and Istanbul (42,59 %) have high
rate of people saying they are open to a daughter- or son-in-law from another
country and Eastern Black Sea (20,11 %) and Central Anatolian (24,45 %) people
are generally against the idea of setting up a family with citizens of other countries.

10.2.1. Turks are More Closed

When citizens' loyalty towards their identities are examined according to the ethnic
structure, interesting findings are revealed. “Turks” give more conservative replies to
these questions. Even though the territory they come from ranges from Central Asia
to the Balkans and they have, despite being ethnically Turkish, expressed their own
identity with a range of terms (Turkmen, immigrant (muhacir), Muslim Turkish,
Manav etc.), “those of Turkish origin” were the group most against (62,5 %) the idea
of daughter- or son-in-law from another religion. This group does not seem to
approve of marriage with someone from another country either (60 % against).
Arabs and other ethnic group members seem to be somewhat more inclined toward
the idea of the future daughter- or son-in-law or spouse being from another religion,
ethnicity or country.

More Closed to Other Religion Can Be Maybe Cannot be

or Other Country than Other
Ethnicity in Choice of Spouse, or
In-Law
From Another Religion 32,15 10,71 57,13
From Another Ethnicity 43,76 13,40 42,84
From Another Country 33,18 10,67 56,15

10.3. The Situation Among Kurds and Zaza

The Kurdish-Zaza are more open to other groups than the rest of society and they
gave higher rates of positive responses to these questions. The suggestion of a
daughter- or son-in-law or spouse from another religion gathers 47,4 % approval
(overall rate is 31 %); if it's from another ethnic background, the rate is 66,3 %
versus the overall rate of 42,2 % and if it's from another country, the rate is 48,8 %
versus 31,8 % overall. Regardless of how important ethnicity is for the Kurds, they
still do not see it as an identity issue preventing marriage and blending with other
groups.
10.3.1. Alevis are More Open
Looking at the same questions by religious affiliation, it seems evident that Alevis are
much more tolerant in marriages than all other religious and ethnic groups. While
Alevis support inter-religious, inter-ethnic and inter-country marriages by 60 to 65 %,
the Hanafis' support rate are between 28 to 40 %.

Examining all responses to this question group together reveals that people are most
tolerant to marriage with someone from a different ethnic identity. Being from
another religion is the least acceptable difference. People seem to see ethnic identity
and differences in ethnicity as less important than their religious identity and
religious differences.
11. LIVING ONE’S IDENTITY

11.1. Living One's Identity is Controversial

While 82,55 % of the survey subjects stated that they can comfortably live
their identity, the rate of positive responses to the question “Can others
live their identity?” falls to 53,57 %.

After having brought to light the different identity definitions, it was also necessary
to mete out the social circumstance about how free people are to live out these
identities. The correct method for this requires two phases. First the subjects were
asked whether they could freely and peacefully live the identities that they saw
“descriptive of themselves.” Then they were asked whether “other people could live
their own identities.” A vast majority, namely 82,55 %, of the subjects said that they
could live their own identities. Only 3,91 % who thought they had legal problems.
11,93 % stated that they face some problems but they could live their identities and
1,61 % said they faced social obstacles.

However, the question “Can others live their identity?” revealed a rather different
picture. This time 53,57 % said “Yes.” In other words, the rate of people thinking
that others have problems living their identities is higher. Similarly, 31,91 % of the
subjects thought that other people had some problems, 9,38 % that they faced legal
obstacles and 5,14 % that they faced societal obstacles.

11.1.1. Identity Problem for Women

When sliced by age and gender, the findings draw attention to the viewpoint of
educated young women. Among the university-level educated women between the
ages of 18 and 29, 25,74 % state that they cannot live their identities but regarding
others' identities, this rate reaches 68 %. The higher the level of education,
especially in the younger cohorts, the more people admit to having problems. Yet
they see others as having problems about three times as much as themselves. Based
on the same table of findings, women seem to stress societal obstacles more than
men.

The view of different ethnic groups on living their own identity lies, as can be
expected, on a wide range of approaches. Those who define themselves as ethnically
Turkish are a bit more comfortable living their identities (86,8 % say “Yes”) and their
view on others having problems is a bit more optimistic. The view of those of Turkish
origin is not very different than the average of Turkey.

However, none of the ethnic identity groups have a stance as clear and as different
as that of the Kurds. Whereas people in Turkey believe that they can live their own
identity (82,5 %) and other can live it (at 53,57 %), only 39,2 % of Kurds say that
they can live their identity and only 24,9 % say that other can live their identities
freely.

Can You Freely and Peacefully Live Your Identity?

Yes Have Some Legal Social Total
Problems Obstacles Obstacles
Turkish 86,8 9,7 2,2 1,3 100
Of Turkish Origin 81,1 12,2 3,8 2,9 100
Kurdish or Zaza 39,2 33,4 22,7 4,7 100
Arab 77,6 17,2 2,6 2,6 100
Self-Defined in General 83,5 11,5 3,7 1,3 100
Terms
Other 74,6 20,7 3,6 1,2 100
Total 82,5 11,9 3,9 1,6 100

Can You Live Your Identity?

Yes Have Some Problems Legal Obstacles Social Obstacles
82,55 11,93 3,91 1,61

Can Others Live Their Identity?

Yes Have Some Legal Obstacles Social Obstacles
Problems
53,57 31,91 9,38 5,14

11.2. Alevis in Distress

One very striking finding is that Alevis stand out as the religious group who feel most
distressed about living their own identity freely. While only 53 % of Alevis express
that they can live their own identities, 47 % state that they face problems.
Compared to other groups, Alevis have a much higher percentage of members who
believe that “others cannot live their own identities” (79,1 %). As for the Sunni
Hanafis, 87,2 % can live their identity freely and 57,2 % say others can.
When the two questions can taken into consideration together, the most important
finding is that people are aware that “others” have problems regarding identity
issues. Data demonstrates that the public is well aware of the identity debates and
identity-related problems.
12. THE SOUTHEAST AND KURDISH ISSUE

12.1. The Majority of Society says: “Kurdish problem is

Provoked by Foreign Countries”

An 87 % of society see the cause of the Southeast and Kurdish problem

as “a provocation of foreign countries.” Also 80 % says that for a
solution, “the only way is to end terrorism.”

The survey conducted for Milliyet under the direction of Tarhan Erdem with 47,958
people face to face, aimed to attain reliable figures about Turkey's social fabric.
Understanding how the social fabric affects public opinion and how people think were
other objectives.

As part of this context, survey subjects were asked for their opinions on the
Southeast and Kurdish issue. To be able to obtain the real opinions of people on such
a sensitive issue, two carefully selected questions were phrased in the following
manner:

1- Do you believe the following views on the Southeastern or Kurdish issue are
true or false?

z It is the Kurds' identity problem, their problem of getting their identity

accepted.
z It is caused by the state treating them differently.
z It is caused by Kurds’ desire to establish a separate state.
z It is due to provocation from foreign countries.
z General problems are presented as if they are only Kurds' problem.

2- For the solution of the Southeastern or Kurdish issue, do you find the following
policies to be correct or wrong?

z Kurds must be granted their right to education in their own language.

z Kurds must be granted their right to broadcasting in their own language.
z Councils of municipalities and special provincial administrations must be
elected by plebiscitary vote and granted extensive authority.
z The state must provide support so that the Kurdish customs and traditions
can develop and live on.
z The parliamentary election threshold must be removed.
z The only way is to end terror.

The responses show the primary reason of the Southeastern and Kurdish issue to be
provocation of foreign countries (87,03 %) and the secondary reason to be Kurds'
desire to establish a separate state (74,53 %). The regions with the highest
percentage of people saying that the cause is “Kurds' identity issue” are Central
Eastern Anatolia at 60,99 % (Hakkari, Bitlis, Bingöl, Elazığ, Malatya, Muş, Tunceli,
Van) and Southeastern Anatolia at 56,61 % (Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır,
Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak). Believing that is it caused by “the
state treating Kurds differently” are Central Eastern Anatolian (49,66 %) and
Southeastern Anatolian regions (44,99 %).

12.1.1. Rate Rises in Black Sea

For the causes of the problem, Eastern Black Sea (92,60 %) and Western Marmara
(84,65 %) regions say it is due to “Kurds' desire to establish a separate state and
Eastern Black Sea (97,02 %) and Western Black Sea (93,45 %) regions say it is due
to “provocation of foreign countries.” As with other issues, serious and noteworthy
differences of opinion exist between Istanbul and the eastern regions.

Causes of the Southeastern Correct Wrong

and Kurdish Problem
Identity Problem of Kurds 53,76 46,24
State Treating Kurds Differently 33,45 66,55
Kurds’ Desire to Establish a
Separate State 74,53 25,47
Provocation of Foreign Countries 87,03 12,97
General Problems Being Presented
as if Kurds’ Problems 57,69 42,31

For education in own language,

the majority says “it would be wrong”
Correct Wrong
Turkish 27,5 72,5
Kurdish and Zaza 85 15
Other Languages 47,7 52,3
Turkey 35 65,1
Suggestions for Solution by Ethnic Identity

Kurds’ Right Kurds’ Right Extensive State Removing The Only

to Education to Authority Support Threshold at Way is
in Own Broadcasting to to Parliamentary To End
Language in Own Elected Kurdish Elections Terror
Language Councils Customs
and
Traditions
Correct

Correct

Correct

Correct

Correct

Correct
Wrong

Wrong

Wrong

Wrong

Wrong

Wrong
Turkish 28 72 29,3 70,7 44,6 55,4 36,2 63,8 34,2 65,8 83 17
Of Turkish 35 65 32,8 67,2 51,5 48,5 43 57 40,5 59,5 77,2 22,8
Origin
Kurdish 93,2 6,8 94,7 5,3 84,1 15,9 94,9 5,1 81,6 18,4 52,1 47,9
Arab 66,3 33,8 66,7 33,3 64,1 35,9 64,3 35,7 57,1 42,9 80 20
Self-Defined 42,7 57,3 44,1 55,9 50,9 49,1 47,7 52,3 38,9 61,1 80,9 19,1
in General
Terms
Other 45,3 54,7 38,4 61,6 59,1 40,9 52,1 47,9 48,1 51,9 79,4 20,6
Turkey 35 65,1 36,3 63,8 48,3 51,7 42,4 57,6 38,8 61,2 80,3 19,7

12.2. The Problem by Ethnic Identities

When views on the Southeastern and Kurdish issue are examined on the ethnic
identity axis, important differences become apparent. When the views of ethnic
groups are roughly compared to the views of the whole of society, one can see that
they are more likely to see the issue as an identity issue and due to “different
treatment of the state” and less likely to see its cause as “Kurds' desire for a
separate state” or as “provocation of foreign countries.” Turks give less support to all
suggestions for solution except for “ending terror.”
The thinking of “those of Turkish origin”, namely people whose place of origin extend
from Central Asia to the Balkans and who despite their Turkish ethnicity define
themselves with various terms such as Turkmen, muhacir, Muslim Turk, Manav,
seems to be parallel with the rest of society. Yet when it comes to the Southeastern
or Kurdish issue, they think it is caused by “their need for identity acceptance” (79,7
%) and “the state treating them differently (78,1 %) and support by only half the
ideas that causes are “provocation by foreign countries” and “general problems being
shown as if only Kurds' problems.”

12.3. Approval of Suggestions Change by Background

For the solution of the Southeastern and Kurdish issue, the most common response
all over Turkey is “ending terror” at 80,30 %. Following that, “extended authority to
local administrations” (48,33 %) and “state support to Kurdish customs and
traditions” (42,37) are mentioned.
It is quite interesting to note that people are in favour of state support to ethnic
groups as a general suggestion (by 66,58 %), but this rate drops to 42,37 % when
the same question about state support is asked specifically about the Kurds. In other
words, among the people who approve of the general idea of state support to ethnic
groups, only 47 % of them also believe that the state should support the Kurds.

What to Do Towards a Solution? Correct Wrong

Kurds must be granted their right to education in their own language. 34,95 65,05
Kurds must be granted their right to publication in their own language. 36,25 63,75
Councils of municipalities and special provincial administrations must be
elected by plebiscitary vote and granted extensive authority. 48,33 51,67
The state must provide support so that the Kurdish customs and traditions
can develop and live on. 42,37 57,63
The parliamentary election threshold must be removed. 38,84 61,16
The only way is to end terror. 80,3 19,7

12.3.1. The Situation by Regions

Viewpoints on the solution to the problem vary dramatically by regions. While Central
Eastern Anatolia (64,41 %) and Southeastern Anatolia (62,17 %) say “Yes” to the
suggestion “Kurds must be granted their right to education in their own language”,
Eastern Black Sea supports this suggestion by 8,45 %. Support to broadcast in their
own language is at 67,82 % in Central Eastern Anatolia and 67,38 % in Southeastern
Anatolia but 9,75 % in the Eastern Black Sea. The suggestion of “extended authority
to local administrations” is thought to be correct by 78,72 % in the Central East
Anatolian region and 73,45 % in the Southeast Anatolian region but in the Eastern
Black Sea region, this rate falls to 17,75 %. “State support for Kurdish customs and
traditions to develop” is highly approved in Central Eastern Anatolia and
Southeastern Anatolia but this support goes down to 15,56 % in the Eastern Black
Sea region.

Regional differences are not so great about the suggestion of “ending terror.” In all
regions, more than half of the population believe that “ending terror” is correct as a
solution.

12.4. Kurds see the Problem and the Solution Differently

Among the Kurds, the percentage of people thinking that the problem is “caused by
Kurds' desire to establish a separate state” is 34,4 %. For the general public this
figure is 74,5 %. Kurds' approach to the solutions are again different. Kurds are 80
to 95 % in favor of the suggested solutions. “The only way is to end terrorism” finds
support all over Turkey at 80,30 % but among the Kurds this percentage is 52,1 %.
Objections to this suggestion should not be evaluated as “adovocacy of terrorism”
but as a view that “ending terror will not be sufficient as a solution.”
To see whether having a mother tongue other than Turkish affected people's view on
granting Kurds the right to education in their own language, the relationship between
subjects' mother tongue and their response to this suggestion was examined. Having
a mother tongue other than Turkish does in fact increase the likelihood of support for
this suggestion. When asked, “people whose mother tongue is Turkish” support the
suggestion by 27,5 %, those whose mother tongue is Kurdish or Zaza by 85 % and
those whose mother tongue is other than these by 47,7 %.

As for the suggestion “Kurds must be granted their right to broadcasting in their own
language,” those with Turkish mother tongue support it by 28.3 %, those whose
mother tongue is Kurdish or Zaza support it by 89,5 % and those with other mother
tongues support it by 47,6 %.

12.4.1. A Great Change is Evident

In order to better understand and evaluate what the views on the Kurdish issue
really mean, the findings were compared to a previous survey conducted by KONDA.
The Kurdish issue was taken up in this earlier survey which was conducted in
Istanbul in 1993, and the public's opinion on the causes and solutions of the problem
was obtained.

Some of the questions were posed in the exact same way in the two surveys. To
compare the data, the initial step was to compare the current Istanbul sample with
the current Turkey sample. Seeing that there were no significant differences, we
decided that it was possible to compare the findings of the 1993 Istanbul survey with
the 2006 Turkey survey and that meaningful results could be extracted.
Comparing the two surveys, most remarkable was a shift from 1993 to 2006 in
Kurds' views on the matter. Among the Kurds, the replies of “Correct” to “The
Southeastern or Kurdish problem is caused by Kurds' desire to establish a separate
state” has fallen from 41 % to 34,4 % and negative responses have risen from 33 %
to 65,6 %.

As for the suggestion “It is caused by provocation of foreign countries”, those saying
“Correct” increased from 23 % to 51,8 % and those saying “Wrong” increased from
41 % to 48,2 %. Most remarkable is the shift on the view “Local administrations
should be granted more extensive authority.” This suggestion had 32 % support
among Kurds in 1993 and now it has risen to 84,1 % and those who were against
this suggestion fell from 23 % to 15,9 %.
What is the Cause of the Problem Correct Wrong
According to Kurds; Is Increasing
1993 2006 1993 2006
Local Authority a Solution?
Kurds’ Desire to Form a Separate State 41 34,4 33 65,5
Provocation of Foreign Countries 23 51,8 41 48,2
Extended Authority to Local Administrations 32 84,1 23 15,9
Undecided Will Not Other DTP DYP MHP CHP AKP
Vote + Parties
None
Women Aged 18-28 16,26 20,77 12,43 21,60 8,28 9,20 14,76 14,17
Women Aged 29-43 18,22 15,43 13,13 12,11 13,80 10,63 14,76 17,80
Women Aged 44 + 17,54 13,69 12,40 12,60 13,58 8,08 15,30 16,46
Men Aged 18-28 12,81 17,53 18,81 21,28 15,12 25,37 15,39 13,87
Men Aged 29-43 15,26 17,34 20,37 21,44 19,54 27,74 18,15 17,38
Men Aged 44+ 19,91 15,23 22,87 10,97 29,69 18,97 21,64 20,32

12.5. Women are closer to AKP

Question aiming to determine the political tendencies of people with
different ethnic and religious identities revealed that support for AKP is
stronger among women and support for CHP, MHP and DTP is stronger
among men.

The two following were posed to the subjects:

z Which party or leader would you vote for if there was a general election
tomorrow?
z Which party did you vote for at the 2002 general elections?

These questions did not aim to forecast the election results. Rather, the aim was to
obtain clues about political tendencies of people with different ethnic and religious
identities and from different demographic segments. Therefore, the frequencies (the
raw response rates) of these questions, especially of the “hypothetic election
tomorrow” question have not been included in the evaluations. The results were
used in outlining the political tendencies of different identities and demographic
segments and in drawing profiles of voters and partisans.

12.5.1. Women's Choices

Women are either more supportive of AKP or more undecided or more likely to say
“none of the parties” than men. Men seem to support CHP, MHP and DTP more than
women. While 26,46 % of women say “Undecided,” among men this rate is 20,76 %.
Women below the age of 29 have a tendency to say they will not vote for any party
(14,68 %) or they are undecided (25,76 %). Education attainment does not change
women's decisiveness on whether to vote or to vote for a certain party, but as
education increases the likelihood of voting for CHP increases and that for AKP
decreases. The 29 to 43 age group women seem to have the same political
tendencies as the younger cohort but their AKP support is a little higher (34,63 %).
Fewer women in this group say they support none of the parties (10,28 %). CHP
receives the highest support from university level educated women between 29 and
43 whereas AKP receives the highest support from women between 29 and 43 with
only primary education. While women over 44 have the same general tendencies,
CHP support reaches its peak with university-level educated ones among them
(35,89 %). In this group, AKP support is parallel with the general trends (35,89 %).
12.5.2. Men's Choices
Men below 29 cite their political preferences to be for AKP at 27,77 %, for MHP at
13,84 % and for CHP at 10,78 %. While education does seem to matter, in this
group of men it does not for MHP.
Support of men between 29 and 43 go to AKP (27,77 %), MHP (12,89 %) and CHP
(10,84 %). As for men over 44, the distribution is 31,58 % for AKP, 11.76 % for CHP
and 8,03 % for MHP.
Among men over 44 with university degrees, AKP support falls three-folds and CHP
support doubles.

12.5.3. Partisanship by Region

Support for AKP is higher than average in the following regions: West Anatolia (34,02
%), Central Anatolia (38,88 %), Northeastern Anatolia (52,17 %), Central Eastern
Anatolia (34,71 %) and Southeastern Anatolia (38,78 %). AKP support is lowest in
West Marmara (22,48 %) and the Mediterranean (25,91 %) regions. While West
Marmara (14,05 %) and Aegean (14 %) regions stand out with the highest level of
support for CHP, the lowest level of support for this party comes from Northeastern
Anatolia (6,80 %) and Southeastern Anatolia (7,08 %). MHP support comes from
Central Anatolian (15 %) and West Anatolia (12,51 %) but not so much from
Southeastern Anatolia (3,54 %).

Is AKP the alternative for DTP? (Distribution of

Kurds’ Votes by Party) AKP CHP MHP DYP DTP Other Undecided Total
Kurdish and Zaza 30,3 6,3 0,3 1,7 38,3 7,1 16,0 100

Distribution of Party Support by Background

AKP CHP MHP DYP DTP
Turkish 83,8 84,9 92,3 85,6 11,9
Of Turkish Origin 3,4 4,5 3,9 5 1,7
Kurdish and Zaza 6,8 4 0,2 2,4 84,3
Arab 0,7 0,7 0,2 0,1 0,2
Self-Defined in
General Terms 4,8 5,1 2,9 6,3 1,8
Other 0,6 0,7 0,5 0,5 0,2
Total 100 100 100 100 100
12.6. PROFILE OF PARTISANS
12.6.1. AKP Partisans
# 48,34 % are women, 51,66 % are men.
# 27,99 % are aged less than 29, 35,18 % are between 29 and 43, 36,83 % are 44
or older.
# 18,12 % are the poorest, 45,88 % have lower middle income, 25,84 % have mid-
level income, 8,81 % have upper middle income and 1,35 % are from the richest.
# 75,92 % have primary education or less, 18,58 % have graduated from high
school, 5,49 % have university degrees.
# 36,12 % housewife, 10,91 % worker, 10,89 % retired, 9,55 % agricultural worker,
9,11 % unemployed.
# 83,8 % Turkish, 6,8 % Kurdish or Zaza, 3,4 % of Turkish origin.
# 86,9 % Sunni Hanafi, 9,4 % Sunni Shafii.
# 78,24 % voted for AKP in the 2002 elections, 9,38 % did not vote by choice or
could not vote due to age in 2002.

12.6.2. CHP Partisans

# 44,75 % women, 55,25 % men.
# 30,10 % are aged less than 29, 32,85 % are between 29 and 43, 37,05 % are 44
or older.
# 13,07 % are the poorest, 38,20 % have lower middle income, 30,49 % have mid-
level income, 15,07 % have upper middle income and 3,17 % are from the richest.
# 56,27 % have primary education or less, 29,52 % have graduated from high
school, 14,21 % have university degrees.
# 26,60 % housewife, 15,84 % retired, 9,65 % unemployed, 8,75 % worker.
# 84,9 % Turkish, 5.10 % defining themselves with “general terms” such as "world
citizen," 4,5 % of Turkish origin, 4 % Kurdish or Zaza.
# 74,4 % Sunni Hanafi, 19,20 % Alevi.
# 72,04 % voted for CHP in the 2002 elections, 11,45 % did not vote by choice or
could not vote due to age in 2002.

12.6.3. MHP Partisans

# 27,69 % women, 72,31 % men.
# 34,55 % are aged less than 29, 38,40 % are between 29 and 43, 27,05 % are 44
or older.
# 13,84 % are the poorest, 41,64 % have lower middle income, 30,68 % have mid-
level income, 10,90 % have upper middle income and 2,94 % are from the richest.
# 58,81 % have primary education or less, 31,80 % have graduated from high
school, 9,39 % have university degrees.
# 18,27 % housewife, 14,72 % worker, 14,34 % agricultural worker, 7,87 %
student.
# 92,3 % Turkish, 3,9 % of Turkish origin, 0,2 % Kurdish or Zaza.
# 95 % Sunni Hanafi, 1,6 % Sunni Shafii.
# 61 % have voted for MHP in the 2002 elections, 19,06 % have voted for AKP in
2002.
13. ANNEX 1 – EVALUATION OF SURVEY BY METU
SOCIOLOGISTS

March 25, 2007, Milliyet

METU Professors Evaluated the Survey Data: Alevi-

Sunni Borders Soften in the Cities
Providing important data on social change, the survey reveals that bond
of citizenship (sense of being from Turkey - “Türkiyelilik”) stand out as a
result of urbanisation. The data point to another important change:
Urban life is softening the traditional borders between Alevis and Sunnis,
creating spaces for a common life.

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata – METU (Middle East Technical University) Social
Sciences Institute Director
Dr. Mustafa Şen – METU Department of Sociology
Dr. Aykan Erdemir – METU Department of Sociology

Basing our analysis on the KONDA survey data, we have strived to outline the main
trends relating to national, ethnic, religious and local identities rather than focusing
on exact numeric values.
In Turkey and throughout the world, as a general trend, the emphasis on ethnic and
religious trends is increasing especially after the Cold War era. In the last few years,
not only in Turkey but in many countries, from Russia to France, from Iran to Bolivia,
nationalism is rising.
Before discussing the issue, we would like to point out that ethnic and religious
identities are only two factors of the social structure and political culture. Identities
are not stagnant, their borders shrink and expand depending on conditions. They are
not stagnant because their content can be re-interpreted and can change.
The answers to the questions on identity in the survey point toward four main
trends. The first and most fundamental trend is the bond of cizitenship (Türkiyelilik)
becoming an important identity element. Expressed in daily language, most of the
subjects define themselves as “people of this country.”

The City Blends

We may view the strengthening of the bond of citizenship as a result of
transformation from a rural society to a more urban one. Groups which previously
lived more separately are now, along with migration and urbanisation, in intensive,
constant and multi-faceted interaction. Contrary to popular belief, urbanisation
actually contributes to social integration and to the creation of a common culture of
life because new common spaces and relationships are formed in cities. Individuals
from different backgrounds come together at school, at the workplace, during
worship, at markets or at recreational spaces and form relationships as neighbors,
friends and buddies. Also, institutions such as education and media play a
fundamental role in the creation and spread of common values.

Those Highlighting Religion

Even though it falls a good twenty points behind country and citizenship identities,
the second strongest trend is religious and sect identity. This segment accepts Sunni
Islam as its base. The data does not provide us the chance of understanding whether
national and religious identities are competing with or complementing each other.
Nonetheless, several researches conducted previously imply that approximately 10
percent of the total population of Turkey is in favor or the rule of Sharia, i.e. a state
based on Islamic law. Taking this view into account, we may posit that only a quarter
of those highlighting religion have Islamist tendencies.

Alevi-Sunni Softening
In the survey, three points stand out regarding the Alevis. Firstly, Alevis are
geographically the most mobile group. The majority of Alevis now live in urban areas.
The educational level, the household size and the income level suggest that Alevis
are quickly urbanising. Secondly, quite differently from other groups, most of Alevis
state that they cannot freely live their identities. This viewpoint seems to be the
result of facing multi-faceted pressure, discrimination and exclusion.
Thirdly, Alevis stand out as the group most open to marriages with other groups.
Urban life softens the traditional borders between Alevis and Sunnis and creates
common living spaces. On the other hand, the borders between Alevis and certain
fundamentalist groups of Islam are becoming even more acute.

Support of “Fellow Townsman” in the City

Localism and fellow townsmanship is another important dimension of identity. There
exists, on the one hand, a population who still live in the village or town they were
born and identify themselves first and foremost with this locality. On the other hand,
there are people who have moved. This migrant population strives to preserve their
local identity in the city. Sometimes this situation is perceived as “an inability to
urbanise” as in the phrase “villagers in the city.” Townsman associations' efforts to
maintain relations with the village and conserve traditions give the impression that
such a perception is in fact correct. Yet, fellow townsmanship is not merely about
missing the village and complaining about the city but also about a very pragmatic
calculations because townsmanship is about material support as much as it is a
morale support. Many circumstances ranging from finding a room in a hospital to
getting paperwork done at the mayor's office, from borrowing money to finding
employment require fellow townsmen's support.

Fellow townsmanship is not as binding and exclusive at one may think. On the
contrary, it is easy to enter and leave these groups and group members have
freedom of movement. As townsmanship does not compete with national, religious,
ethnic or political identities, it can go hand-in-hand with these. Emphasis on local
identities whether in the village or town environment or in the city reflects the
significance they have in the subject's daily life.
Kurds Votes Divided in the West
Religious identity is in the foreplan for Kurds in the east and AKP and DTP
are competing. Yet in the west, Kurds’ votes are divided.

People emphasizing their ethnic identity are only 14 % of the subjects. The survey
does not provide data that would pinpoint a Turkish nationalism which upholds blood
or shows an exclusivist attitude towards people from different backgrounds. As
people from ethnic backgrounds such as Laz, Circassian, Bosnian, Georgian or Arab
represent very small percentages in the survey results, it is impossible to make any
evaluation. An important part of those who have identified themselves as “Kurdish”
are clearly separate from other ethnic groups in terms of their approach to political
issues.

East and Religious Identity

This group expresses its distress about living their identities. Three main trends can
be underlined about this group.
z First of all, one in every four persons whose mother tongue is Kurdish has
stated that his/her identity is “Turkish,” not “Kurdish”.
z Secondly, especially among the Kurds living in Southeastern Anatolia and
Central Eastern Anatolia, religious identity is much stronger that it is in all
other ethnic groups. As for voting behaviour, AKP is the only party that can
compete with DTP. However, in the western regions votes of Kurds go to
other parties as well as these two.
z Thirdly, at least a third of those who consider themselves to be “Kurdish” have
opinions in parallel with the rest of society and thus fall apart from other
Kurds.

Three Main Trends

Taking these data into account, we may point to three trends which seem to carry
equal weight, numerically-speaking:
z Firstly, a certain trend exists among people of Kurdish origin which can be
defined as “Kurdish nationalism.”
z Secondly, some of people of Kurdish origin prefer to emphasize the country
and cizitenship bond rather than the Kurdish identity.
z Lastly, we may mention those who emphasize the ethnic and cultural basis of
the Kurdish identity without a nationalist starting point.

New research is required to study these three trends in more detail.

East Black Sea Draws Attention

Some findings of the survey about the East Black Sea region are quite noteworthy.
People have migrated heavily from this region. But it has also not pulled any
migration because of its slow economic growth. In short, this region is relatively
secluded to the outside and somewhat underdeveloped socioeconomically. Despite a
population of various ethnic backgrounds, a pronounced emphasis on being Turkish
and Muslim is noticeable.
Multiple Identities and Tolerance is Widespread
Among ethnic and religious groups, there are segments which define these identities
in a very strict and excluding manner. Nonetheless, for many people, other identities
are also important. We may state that multiple identities and tolerance is in fact
more prevalent. In conclusion, intermixed identities deserve as much attention as
separate identities. Values shared with other identities are as important as values of
background identities. Numerous groups and individuals strive to bring together and
reconcile different identities, to develop new common definitions without renouncing
the other. There are wide areas of negotiation within and between different
identities. This lively interaction takes place in daily life as much as it does in the
media and maybe even more so.