Frontline Intelligence in WW2 - (III) Allied T Forces

Frontline Intelligence in WW2 - (III) ALLIED T Forces By Keith Ellison @2013 During WW2 the Allies employed specialist task forces (S Forces) in North Africa and Italy which were used to search newly occupied cities and towns for intelligence - strategic, tactical, technical and economic. The initial aims had been to collect military intelligence and counter-intelligence, but with the occupation of Rome these aims had begun to evolve. When the Allies began to consider operations in NW Europe, they realised that technical economic and industrial intelligence would be important both for the war against Japan and for post-war reparations. They therefore used the S Force model to create a similar type of intelligence collection unit – the T Force, which was given the job of coordinating the collection of a much wider type of intelligence than that collected in most S Force operations in Italy. On 27th July 1944 SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) Intelligence Directive No 17 instructed 6th and 12th Army Groups to establish T Forces. The description of T Force given by the US Military History Institute is: “AngloAmerican organization used for intelligence exploitation of scientific and industrial targets, WWII. Its mission: seize, safeguard, and process documents, archives, and materiel of intelligence/counterintelligence interest. Also, capture designated enemy agents and collaborators. Established by SHAEF, G2, and based in 12th Army Group HQ, G2. Apparently modelled on S-Force of 15th Army Group in Italy, notably in the captures of Rome and Florence.” NDNOTES T Force/S Force – a Bibliography of MHI Sources, USAMHI Ref Branch, Jan 88, Jun 92. This is not a full definition, however, as it concentrates only on the US 12th Army Group (12 AG), while in fact there were T Forces in 6th Army Group (6 AG) and the British 21st Army Group (21 AG) areas as well. The definition given by SHAEF was: “a military unit for planning the seizure of, and thereafter seizing and holding until examined and final disposition has been decided upon, individuals, installations, documents, etc., termed targets, in captured or reoccupied enemy or Allied cities or geographical districts.” War Diary, X-2 Branch, OSS London, England, Vol 1, Book II, Oct-Dec 1944, Commanding Officer, OSS Accessions S91, Microfilm Ref M1623, Roll 10 of 10 rolls, Target 8. Also, “T Forces, Present Position of OSS Relative to,” report by Maj C Brooks Peters, USMCR, Plans and Operations Staff, HQ & HQ Detachment, OSS, ETOUSA (Main), dated 11 January 1945, RG226/Entry 115/Box 52/Folder 3/Item 29. BUILDING BLOCKS The units involved in S Force work in Italy had taken on a technical intelligence collection role as well as combat intelligence and counter-espionage as the campaign in Italy progressed. The reason given for this was to assess the war potential of the German economy. In this role they were guided from 21st August 1944 by the work of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS). This was formed to ensure that the intelligence derived from captured enemy material and personnel would be available to both SHAEF and to the various interested US and UK government departments. CIOS was responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. CIOS’ functions and responsibilities included: “(1) To receive, approve and coordinate all requests of British and US governmental departments for intelligence of military or political significance which became available…exclusive of combat intelligence, normal technical intelligence, and counter intelligence. To assign priorities to such requests. To arrange the preparation of intelligence folders, for the preparation of adequate plans, and for the provision of expert personnel for technical investigations on the spot.” The targets were placed on “Black Lists” if they were of military interest or on “Grey Lists” if they were industrial targets. A CIOS Black List for Buildings would usually consist of 9 columns: Priority Target Number Organization or Firm Place Zone and Map Reference Key Personnel Remarks Reliability of Information Reference of Information Source (Ministry or Department). RG331/Box 138. CIOS had representatives from a number of US and UK intelligence and military departments and civilian agencies and ministries, and was responsible for providing the technical experts to investigate targets in situ. They formed seven Combined Advanced Field Teams (CAFTs), made up of around 70 assessors. The CAFTs were attached to each Army Group, each team specializing in the exploitation of a number of technical items. Their mission was to assess targets rapidly and call for investigation teams when warranted. The investigation teams in turn reported to the “T” Sub-division of G2 in SHAEF, who indexed, filed and disseminated the reports as required. The “T” sub-division (later changed to Intelligence Target (“T”) Sub-Division) was created by SHAEF in July 1944 as the agency responsible for all matters concerning the investigation and exploitation of intelligence objectives or targets. It initially consisted of five US and three British officers, and thirteen enlisted men and women. Also, within the G2’s Operation Intelligence Sub-division there was a Technical Intelligence Section, which acted as the clearing house for all technical information obtained from the field; controlled the allocation of all captured enemy war materials wanted for technical intelligence purposes; and cleared requests for information from the various allied governments. On 17th Feb 1945 “T” Sub-division became part of the SHAEF G2 Special Sections Sub-division, which was principally concerned with the coordination, supervision, and facilitation of the investigation of intelligence targets in Germany by authorised Allied agencies, and served as the SHAEF executive agency for CIOS. Report of the General Board, US Forces, European Theater, on Organisation and Operation of the Theater Intelligence Services in the European Theater of Operations, provided by the US Army Military History Institute. The T Sub-division also acquired a field element, the 6800 T Force, which was about 1,700 strong by April 1945 and, with the later addition of the GOLDCUP ministerial control parties [see below], more than 2,000 strong. During May and June 1945, the force was able to deploy about 1,000 investigators into the field. Planning for T Forces was eventually devolved to Army Groups, while the “T” Sub-Division concentrated on planning T Forces for Berlin and Kiel. T FORCES IN NORTHERN EUROPE Outside of major target cities, the task of locating and searching high-priority objectives, (such as communication nodes, centres of civil administration and headquarters of German occupation forces, and those of organisations sympathetic to the German cause) fell normally to the US Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the British Field Security Sections (FSS). For instance, the CIC were ordered on D Day “to locate, seize, and place under guard all important communications centers and to take charge of civilian traffic control.” The FSS/CIC detachments were often assisted by local French resistance groups, which helped the detachments to advance quickly. 4th Infantry Division CIC entered the first major counter-intelligence target, Cherbourg, on 27th June 1944. ”Documents captured in this city were so voluminous that they were turned over to the VII Corps Order-of-Battle Team for evaluation and dissemination.” Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II, by the Counter Intelligence Corps School, Fort Holabird, Baltimore (undated), 40. Other Special Units There were, however, several other specialist intelligence collecting units operating outside of the larger target cities which later operated in the liberation of Paris under the umbrella of T Force. As the OSS War Diary explains, “T Forces were organized by the Supreme Commander to prevent independent acquisition of documents and other target objectives by uncoordinated American and British government agencies. For this reason, SHAEF policy and the policy of each of the Army Groups dictated that for the duration of the period in which a T Force was operating in a specific target area, no other Allied military or government agency concurrently would be engaged in seizing, holding or examining targets, unless clearance for doing so had been obtained from the T Force Commander in advance.” War Diary, X-2 Branch, OSS London, England, Vol 1, Book II, Jan-Mar 1945, Commanding Officer, OSS Accessions S91, Microfilm Ref M1623, Roll 10 of 10 rolls, Target 8. Also, “T Forces, Present Position of OSS Relative to,” report by Maj C Brooks Peters, USMCR, Plans and Operations Staff, HQ & HQ Detachment, OSS, ETOUSA (Main), dated 11 January 1945, RG226/Entry 115/Box 52/Folder 3/Item 29. The British Naval Intelligence Department (NID) controlled its own collection unit. Originally name the Intelligence Assault Unit, it was soon renamed 30 Commando, and prior to operations in NW Europe renamed again to 30 AU (RN) - Assault Unit or Advance Unit, depending upon the source. 30 AU had been operational since 1943 in commando-type raids on intelligence targets in North Africa and Italy. In December 1944 the unit was tasked with searching out intelligence targets in Germany. In January 1945 the main body of 30 AU was moved to the continent in readiness for operations. Another specialist unit was the Alsos Mission, seeking nuclear scientists, paperwork and raw materials associated with the German nuclear weapons program. Alsos was recalled from Italy to London to form part of an expanded group under Col Boris Pash, preparing for D Day. On 4th August, 8 US Division cleared Rennes as the first Alsos target. Their operation provided useful information on target scientists. Alsos then moved to join T Force elements in Rambouillet on 24th August, preparing to enter Paris. It was normal for such units to work under T Force during the occupation of large city targets, or else obtain permission from the T Force commander to operate separately. Outside of major target cities, they would concentrate on their own missions. The Paris T Force The first deployment of T Force was the liberation of Paris, mainly using 12 AG elements. It was to move into the city within a few hours of the end of fighting, and so needed to be a self-contained mobile force with sufficient combat troops to guard buildings; remove mines, booby traps and explosives; man a detention centre; and provide physical security for intelligence personnel. It consisted of 1,805 men in total, 1,057 of whom were combat troops (including 77 from 30 AU and 80 from the French Special Service Unit). 548 members came from various branches of 10 allied intelligence agencies, including 63 from teams sent by the Combined Intelligence Priorities Committee and 18 from Alsos. They entered Paris at 2200 hrs on 25th August 1944. America’s Secret Army, by I Sayer and D Botting, 146. The organic composition of the T Force staff included eight officers and three enlisted men. Col Francis P Tompkins was commander and Lt Col Harold C Lyon his Executive Officer. The Counter-Intelligence Branch (CIB), 12 AG provided four additional officers as reinforcements, under Col T J Sands, GSC, Deputy Commander. A Document Section was located in the HQ at Petit Palais under Lt Vandemaele of the S2 Section. The original aim had been to handle documents in situ by sealing off target buildings, but insufficient guard forces lead to the documents being transported by the “attacking teams”. When the attacking team was composed of specialists, documents of particular interest were kept in their custody and S2 Section notified other interested agencies. If the attacking team was a regular Target Team, the documents were delivered to the Document Section. When the building targets which had been sealed under the original plan were to be unsealed, the Document Section visited the buildings, examined all documents and removed those of interest and delivered them to the garage at 19 Ave Foch. The documents were handed to CIB, G2, Communications Zone on 6th September and later transported to 72 Ave Foch under the custody of the SHAEF Documents Section. A Civilian Interrogation Centre was initially located at the Petit Palais but later moved to 19 Ave Foch. Between Aug and Sep 1944 the Centre processed 243 people, 62 of whom were target cases. 44 were transferred to French authorities, 20 to the POW cage, eight were evacuated to the UK and seven were released to the T Force Special Counter-Intelligence Unit (SCIU) for further exploitation. HQ T Force 12 AG Draft “T Force Report on Target ‘PARIS’”, dated October 1944, RG331/Box 53. The T Force operation covered 896 targets (382 buildings and 514 persons). Action on all but 54 buildings was achieved before the T Force was withdrawn. About 12% of the personality targets were detained and processed through the T Force interrogation centre. 181 additional arrests were made. According to a subsequent report, “important items of intelligence derived from the operation included a prisoner with information on and key for an exceedingly rare cipher system, a rare set of maps of Indo-China, a German map disclosing the plan of mining, demolitions and booby trapping at Dunkerque” plus other maps and finds of technical intelligence interest. G2 Section (Pts V-VII) 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After Action Report), Vol IV, from US Army Military History Institute. There were 15 numbered Target Teams consisting of a target team commander, an interpreter where necessary, a French representative, CIC personnel, an NCO, and three or four enlisted men from the headquarters company. These were augmented later by people from the special intelligence agencies which organized and operated special field teams or collating agencies. The numbered Target Teams each had their assigned geographical areas. “Representatives of special intelligence agencies with T Force functioned as special teams to investigate targets of particular interest to their agencies.” For example a four-man team from MI6, attached to SHAEF, was on the strength of T Force as at 3rd September, billeted at 18 Rue Petrarque and attached to the T Force SCI Unit. The team leader was Maj Arthur G Trevor-Wilson, and included Maj Malcolm Muggeridge, Lt Col Lord Victor Rothschild and Sgt Tredel. There were also Air Ministry, MIS, APWIU from 9th Air Force, CIC, 30 AU, Alsos, and other special agencies attached to T Force. The S2’s Information Room disseminated the target information, S3 Operations would issue the instructions to the teams, and all teams were required to submit reports on their targets. HQ T Force 12 AG Draft “T Force Report on Target ‘PARIS’”, dated October 1944, RG331/Box 53. On 9th Oct 44 Maj Dana B Durand, commanding SCI Unit 12 AG, wrote a letter to the CO T Force in which he stated: “Through the T Force operation, SCI succeeded in obtaining a large volume of important CE material, documents seized in various headquarters of the German secret services, the Sipo and SD. This material is now being subjected to long range exploitation by the present staff of X2 OSS, now established in Paris. Moreover, through the arrest of numerous agents and informers, carried out by T Force Target teams, SCI has been able to make substantial contribution to short and long range military security. Important members of the Abwehr and SD were picked up, a number of whom have given us valuable information for both French and German clean-up operations. More than one of these individuals is now working for us in penetration or deception capacities.” “Activities of SCI in connection with T Force Paris”, SCI Unit 12 AG letter dated 9 Oct 44, RG331/Box 53. Maj Charles Hostler, a member of 31 SCIU, was placed in command of one of the “specialist teams” covering the 5th and 6th arrondissements. Among his targets were known enemy agents high on the priority list for turning into double agents (the main task of SCI), and the securing and safe-keeping of Madame Curie’s laboratories, where they were researching atomic theory. He located this objective, only to find the Alsos team already there. Operatives, Spies and Saboteurs, by Patrick K O’Donnell, Citadel Press Books 2004, 204-205. After negotiations at a higher level the Alsos team was left in control of that target. The main Alsos target in Paris had been Jean Frédéric Joliot-Curie and the Curie laboratories. They found the man and some of his staff wearing resistance armbands at the College de France, and spent several days debriefing him on the activities of German scientists who had made use of his laboratory. While they went to some pains in trying to hide the reasons for their interest, it was soon clear that Joliot-Curie had realized why they had such an interest. Alsos also used Paris to get information on new targets not available from CIOS, OSS or the US MIS. After Paris, Pash went with an Alsos sub-team to Brussels. Col David Strangeways - commanding R Force, a deception unit similar to A Force in Italy and North Africa - provided support units to enable them to collect information from the factories at Olen, 28kms East of Antwerp. The information concerned uranium ore which had been sent to the Germans from Olen. CIOS teams were also ordered to send representatives to Brussels to participate in the occupation of Eindhoven, while Alsos was charged with securing 70 tons of uranium ore at Olen, supported by Strangeways’ R Force. A Philips plant in the area was already under the protection of a strong detachment from R Force, who refused to even let an officer from one of the CIOS teams to have access! Strangeways also had over 400 men searching Eindhoven for intelligence targets. The Eindhoven operation came under the command of British Lt Col Johnny Cave, who had participated in the liberation of Paris and had been an IO in the Rome S Force, so he was well aware of the potential opportunities in intelligence collection. Brussels itself had been an intelligence target occupied by a British “ad-hoc Intelligence Corps Battle Group, with a strength of 155, and with the task of securing all the Intelligence Targets in the City”. FSS – Field Security Section (reminiscences of W. Sedgwick-Rough), by Bob Steers, 1996, 225. BRITISH ARMY T FORCES (21st Army Group) According to a history of T Force activities in 21st Army Group (21 AG), no special T Force was created in 21 AG during operations in France and Belgium, despite a SHAEF Directive of July 1944 recommending such an organisation This was partly due to a lack of manpower, but also because of “a desire to try out T Force activities with existing resources designed for other purposes”. History of ‘T’ Force Activities in 21 Army Group, undated, FO 1031/49 (UK National Archives). The history goes on: “A T Force role was allotted, first for ROUEN and then BRUSSELS, to certain engineer, signal and intelligence units, whose normal occupation was deception and camouflage.” (A probable reference to R Force mentioned above). While the staff for this force undertook the T Force operations, they were “not entirely successful, mainly due to the extreme meagreness and lateness in arrival of information on the targets.” Strangeways, Commander of the R Force Deception Unit, had been in charge of the first S Force operation in Tunis in 1943. Frontline Intelligence in WW2 - (II) Allies in N Africa and Italy, by Keith Ellison, 2012. The S Force operation in Tunis and the lack of other designated forces lead to his R Force being co-opted for similar operations in NW Europe: “the operation was a success and much later on during the war, Strangeways was asked to do similar jobs in Rouen and Brussels.” Trojan Horses, by Martin Young and Robbie Stamp, 1989, The Bodley Head Ltd, London, 38. The 2 I/C of R Force, Maj Philip Curtis, discussing the activities of this unit after the main deception operations had been completed, reportedly said: “I think the great value of ‘R’ Force then was that we would rush ahead and capture all the maps and bits of intelligence. We were generally searching for German documents to find out whether we’d been doing any good or not. The fighting troops never had a chance to do that, they were too busy chasing the enemy. All the way to Caen and on to Brussels, we were always looking for enemy plans and in particular any reaction to what ‘R’ Force had been doing.” Trojan Horses, by Martin Young and Robbie Stamp, 1989, The Bodley Head Ltd, London, 51-52. These units were unable to continue long-term as T Forces, and staff shortages within 21 AG made the creation of a separate “T” Branch impossible. It was decided instead in October 1944 to add the responsibilities of T Force to those of the Brigadier, Chemical Warfare, within 21 AG. His staff read through the existing material on T Forces and prepared dossiers on potential targets and guides for the sub-units of 21 AG to explain their purpose. In early 1945 it was realised that the T Forces of 21 AG would need to be highly mobile and capable of being split into a number of self-contained units. At this time a number of units were allocated to operate as part of T Force, including two Bomb Disposal companies. Selected NCOs from these companies attended safe-breaking/burglary courses back in the UK and had specialist equipment allocated to assist them in this role. In February 1945 the 5th Battalion, Kings Regiment became the lead unit of the British T Force in Belgium. On 30th March 1945 the T Force was placed under the command of 2nd Army, which was advancing on the Rhine. On 31st March the main T Force moved to occupy Maasbree, while detaching companies to Hengelo in Holland under 43 Division and to 12 Corps for targets in Rheine. Sean Longden’s book “T-Force” describes the activities of the Kings and other military units involved in British T Force operations. The Order of Battle for the British T Forces attached to 2nd British Army and 1st Canadian Army between March and May 1945 were: 2 Br Army: 5 Kings Regt with 2 attached companies 1 Bucks Regt 805, 806, 845, 846 Pioneer Companies 803 Pioneer Company (1 platoon) 19 Bomb Disposal Company RE 1 Can Army: 1 Bucks Regt (minus 2 companies) 30 Royal Berkshire Regt (for ops in West Holland) 803 Pioneer Company (minus 1 platoon) 810 Pioneer Company 5 Bomb Disposal Company RE Both units also had Detachments from 30 AU, 21 AG Documents Teams, and Interpreters from 21 AG Interpreters Pool. A Short History of T Force Operations In North West Europe During the Second World War, produced by the 5th King’s/No 2 T Force Old Comrades Association. The British T Force received its first specialist assessors in the German city of Gescher, near the border with the Netherlands. An impromptu intelligence and briefing organization was immediately set up. There would generally be a floating population of 40-90 British and American officers from all services to be fed, briefed, and housed. The following procedure was evolved for conducting T Force operations. When a target area was about to be taken, the G2 of 21 AG would arrange for the T Force to come under local command. When the targets were important, G2 would provide a dossier and maps to the Corps staff, who would then brief the forward troops to guard the locations until T Force relieved them. Once T Force had control of the target and the area was deemed safe, assessors would be dispatched to investigate the site. The assessors would inform 21 AG if any further investigators were required after they had done a preliminary inspection. This system was similar to that used by the US T Forces. Local Military Government (Mil Gov) units would often provide T Force with additional targets of opportunity, as well as the T Force doing its own reconnaissance. In this way the physics laboratory of Dr Wilhelm Groth (an expert on centrifuges) was located by accident, hidden in a silk factory in Celle. The find was reported to T Force who immediately secured the site. According to the T Force Bulletin for 21 AG, at the Focke-Wulf factory in Celle “many technical documents and much equipment in this large underground plant have been seized and are under guard”. T Force Bulletin No 2 – Period 10-15 Apr 45, 21 Army Group Area, US National Archives ref: MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D, ENV 69, Section 3. The next weekly report recorded that: “An eminent scientist, evacuated from Hamburg University, was discovered to be conducting experiments of a highly secret nature, on behalf of the OKW [sic - German Military High Command], in a laboratory in a silk factory in this town. He has subsequently been flown to UK for detailed interrogation. The laboratory remains under guard pending evacuation of the equipment.” T Force Bulletin No 3 – Period 16-24 Apr 45, 21 Army Group Area, US National Archives ref: MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D, ENV 69, Section 3. When the T Force HQ moved to Osnabrueck two companies were dispatched to Hannover to assist Ninth US Army (9 Army). They secured the HQ of Wehrkreis XI in almost complete working order. This was an important intelligence target as it enabled the occupying forces to quickly take control of the civilian authorities. The T Force company in Celle sent out detachments to secure the Chemical Warfare Station at Raubkammer and the Ordnance Testing Station at Munster Unterluss. Both sites came under attack from SS troops hiding in nearby forests. At Munsterlager they found the central OKW CW research station which had been evacuated from Spandau Citadel in Berlin. Preliminary investigation found few personnel but indicated that much information on the enemy CW offensive policy would be forthcoming. Shortly afterwards, Col Hirsch – a senior officer from the station - surrendered himself and admitted to full knowledge of German CW development and was debriefed. Bremen was taken by assaults from North and South, with separate T Forces attached to both groups. Their most important target was the Deschimag U-boat assembly yard, where sixteen new U-boats and a Narvik-class destroyer were captured. Hamburg surrendered on 2nd May, and three T Force companies were dispatched to cover the 106 listed targets. One company secured the great Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken (DWM) works in Lubeck, which was still being investigated by Ordnance experts over a month later. The T Force Bulletin reported the DWM organisation was “of prime importance from the point of view of ammunition development, ballistics, explosives and propellants”, including work on caseless ammunition for fuel-injection guns and cartridge cases made of propellant. T Force Bulletin No 5 – Period 2-10 May 45, 21 Army Group Area, US National Archives ref: MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D, ENV 69, Section 3. On 4th-5th May the Kiel T Force, consisting of two companies of about 200 men, was confused by instructions given by higher headquarters and advanced to its target – where it was met by a garrison of 12,000 Germans. In spite of a somewhat hostile and sceptical reception from the German staff officers in charge, the force secured the cruiser Hipper and a number of U boats and maintained control of the garrison until relieved on 8th May. They were assisted in the exploitation of several intelligence targets in the area by 30 AU. After this the T Force was directed onto targets in Denmark. As mentioned above, Kiel was also the target for 30 AU. They secured a most valuable objective, Walterwerke, together with the owner, Dr Walter, a leading expert on jet propulsion. Although he had spent four days burning his documents prior to the arrival of the Allies, he was convinced to reveal the location of microfilm of the most important documents, which he had previously hidden away. 30 AU were also able to secure the intact prototype of a jet-propelled submarine capable of 25 knots under water. WO 205/1049, Comments on T Force Activities in Second British Army from 31 Mar to 15 Jun 1945, dated 18 June 1945, by G2 30 Corps, District T Force (UK National Archives). Walter revealed that the design of the Me 163 rocket-propelled plane had been given to the Japanese six months before. The 21 AG T Force Bulletin No 7 for the period 19-30th May 45 notes in its first paragraph: “The short term investigation of targets in North West Europe is drawing to a close and the long term exploitation is now commencing. At the same time’ T’ Forces are retracing their steps in order to unearth installations and research establishments about which no information was available prior to the crossing of the RHINE.” T Force Bulletin No 7 – Period 19-30 May 45, 21 Army Group Area, US National Archives ref: MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D, ENV 69, Section 3. Bulletin No 8 (1-20th Jun 45) explained further that: “there has been a change of emphasis in the subjects under investigation. A new list of subjects which are not concerned solely with GERMAN war potential, but cover rather the secrets of GERMAN industrial and technical processes, is now being covered. It includes among other items metallurgy, plastics, textiles, forestry, building machinery, utilities and railway equipment.” T Force Bulletin No – Period 1-20 Jun 45, 21 Army Group Area, US National Archives ref: MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D, ENV 69, Section 3. By June 1945 it was estimated that nearly 1,000 tons of captured equipment had been evacuated by the T Force. INDEPENDENT T FORCE TEAMS One of the tasks of Intelligence Targets (“T”) Sub-Division was to make arrangements with Army Groups “for further search of combat areas for items of intelligence interest after ‘T’ Forces have ceased to operate in such areas and for similar searches in areas where ‘T’ Forces are not operating”. Activities of Intelligence Target “T” Sub-Division, dated 31 december 1944, SHAEF Office of ACOS, G-2; NARA MR/CRR/331 7W4-11-16-C-D Box 137. The history of one such T Force team is recorded in the online memoirs of Jack Heslop-Harrison, a Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (REME) officer who commanded a T Force team immediately after the war ended in May 1945. About a dozen REME officers were assembled north of Brussels from different locations to take charge of individual teams. They were briefed to - get to their individually allocated targets; collect any information available; collaborate with such RE and other units as were in the vicinity about the earmarking and possible acquisition and transporting of potentially valuable equipment; and then report back from a number of set contact points. Heslop had with him a 2nd Lieutenant, a Royal Artillery sergeant and five other ranks. Their main target was the Kriegsmarine Research Station at Pelzerhaken on the Baltic coast, north of Lübeck , close to the Danish border. The 2nd British Army had advanced to Lübeck, arriving on 2nd May, before proceeding north to liberate Denmark with the Canadian 1st Army. The previously unidentified Pelzerhaken Research Station had been discovered on the coast to the east of the main line of advance and by-passed by the frontline troops.) The team’s instructions were to assess the Pelzerhaken Research Station’s facilities and functions and make a decision as to whether it would require further, more expert, investigation. They found the Station unguarded and were only able to determine its work with the help of the head of research, Dr Östertag, and one or two of his colleagues. A lack of electric power meant that they were unable to test any of the equipment. While mainly intended for naval research, projects in progress covered a considerably wider span. The most active radar research was on anti-reflection measures, including methods for masking U-boat conning-towers and schnorkels. The Allied bombing campaign had meant that people and equipment had been moved to Pelzerhaken as a still-undamaged safe haven. For example, research continued on infrared detection systems under Professor Dr Müller, previously based in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. When his Institute had been largely destroyed he had escaped with his family and files of research results to a house in the Black Forest, and afterwards to Pelzerhaken. Heslop reported him as someone who should be given facilities to recover his material and possibly to be taken to the UK. The team briefly visited the aircraft factory and shipyards of Blohm and Voss, located east of Lubeck, near Travemuende. The site was untouched, with partially and fully constructed hulls standing unguarded. There was nothing the team could do about this site except report what was seen and urge that guards be sent. Heslop’s team left northern Germany in mid-June at the end of their mission for a short debriefing in Holland. J Heslop-Harrison Autobiography: War Service Part 7, “T Force” (online at http://homepage.ntlworld.com/genomes/jhhpdfs/orig11wartf.pdf). It was indicative of the thinness on the ground of Allied technical investigators in the north-western area that Heslop met no other teams with similar assignments. US ARMY T FORCES - 12 AG T FORCE After the completion of 12 AG’s T Force operations in Paris on 6th September, most of the attached units and personnel were withdrawn by their parent organizations. Some of the new personnel assigned for future operations were not made available before the T Force HQ moved to Verdun, from where the operations against Luxembourg, Nancy and Metz were dispatched simultaneously. Col Francis P Tompkins USA was the T Force commander, and he proceeded to Luxembourg with the main HQ element. Capt William E Johns (Assistant S-3 for the Paris T Force under Tompkins) commanded the Nancy T Force, which rejoined the main force in Luxembourg once its mission was concluded. There was prolonged enemy resistance in Metz which prevented the Metz T Force under 2 Lt William E Bell from entering the city, so the unit withdrew to rejoin the main T Force without completing its mission. From Luxembourg, 12 AG T Force moved to Spa in Belgium where the rest of the assigned troops joined the HQ. Between October and December 1944 the unit moved to Remouchamps and was reinforced with an Armoured Infantry Battalion, Signals Communications personnel and various intelligence units and detachments. Col John H F Haskell replaced Tompkins on 28th December. During January and February 1945, Allied forces were recovering from the Battle of the Bulge and T Force was preparing to enter German territory. In March the unit entered Germany and established a Command Post (CP) at Eschweiler. One sub-force was dispatched to search Bonn while the main unit entered Cologne on 6th March. The Bonn T Force had 51 building targets plus 12 targets of opportunity, and 30 personality targets, of which 12 were found and processed. A second sub-force was sent on 9th March to Coblenz, where they were able to search 67 buildings and process 58 persons from the target lists. On completion of their missions both forces rejoined T Force in Cologne. Cologne had 246 building targets, plus 39 targets of opportunity. 201 personality targets were processed between 6-13th March. 215 additional investigators from 24 separate intelligence agencies were processed by the T Force during the stay in Cologne. At this time the T Force was split in two. The main force was to operate with 9th Army in the Ruhr, while the other T Force was to operate with 3rd US Army in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. The units departed Cologne on 26th March. The Commanding Officer of 12 AG T Force, Col Haskell, was subsequently wounded at Neuss and evacuated on 2nd April, being replaced by Col William P Blair on 4th April. T Force Main operated in the Ruhr from 25th March to 1st May, while the junior element, called T Force Lucky, moved into Frankfurt on 28th March and dispatched a smaller element to operate in Wiesbaden. Frankfurt had 171 building and 109 personality targets. All the buildings were searched and about 10% of the personality targets were arrested. In Wiesbaden there were 73 buildings and 40 persons on the target lists. Nine further building “targets of opportunity” were exploited. The personality targets had already been covered by CIC elements with 80th Division. In one of the building targets, the HQ of Wehrkreis Kommando XII, important signals intelligence relating to codes and ciphers was recovered. Operations in both cities were completed by 12th April, and T Force Lucky moved north towards T Force Main, operating in the Wuppertal area from 14th April to 1st May. On 3rd May the two forces were reunited at Herten. Most of the attached elements were reassigned on 6th May, and the T Force HQ and HQ Company moved to Wiesbaden. G2 Section (Pts V-VII) 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After Action Report), Vol IV, from US Army Military History Institute. OPERATION DRAGOON For Operation Dragoon, the invasion of the South of France, a number of US 7th Army personnel with S Force experience joined with personnel from 1st French Army to form a T Force operating in the South of France. On 15 August 1944 the Allies landed in the South of France. A small Allied Combat Propaganda Team (CPT) landed at St Tropez, tasked to gather political intelligence for the Political Warfare Department of SHAEF. One member of this team was Capt Yurka Galitzine, a Russian prince with an English mother. He was drafted for a “T Force” operation consisting of three officers, one French, one American, one British. Their job was to report in detail on what the retreating German Army had left behind. They visited the Gestapo HQ in Nice, where they found 11 bodies in the cellar – one was the daughter of the local mayor, seven month pregnant, The Secret Hunters, by Anthony Kemp, Michael O’Mara Books, 1986, 36-37. a stark reminder that some T Force targets were likely to be dangerous for the hunters. Following SHAEF Intelligence Directive No 17, instructing 6th and 12th Army Groups to establish T Forces, 6 AG established a provisional T Force using staff from its No 2 Intelligence Collection Unit (successor to S Force) on 12th October 1944. The task given to the formation was to identify the intelligence assets of a target city and establish a plan to capture and hold its assets. It was not the T Force mission to analyse the captured assets. Prior to an operation, therefore, the T Force would therefore have an influx of intelligence specialists from various agencies to do this analysis. Strasbourg was the first major city targeted by 6 AG. Most of the Americans of the main T Force in this area were used to form the nucleus of the 6860th Headquarters Detachment, Intelligence Assault Force (T Force). The T Force entered Strasbourg on 23rd November 1944, after having already suffered casualties overnight from delayed action mines and German artillery on and around their Command Post in Saarbourg. A signal from G2 7th Army to G2 SHAEF dated 18th December 44 recommended the deployment of “appropriate intelligence specialists” to Strasbourg to examine and secure documents and records in the “Gauleitung” building. The building contained “party records, official correspondence, Volksturm records, official documents pertaining to the execution of Allied airmen, local civil service and political records, Gestapo records” and more. WO 219/818, G2 7th Army signal to G2 SHAEF MAIN dtd 18 Dec 1944, (UK National Archives). T Force not only captured Gestapo files, they also found the plans for the first jet aircraft engine as well as a prototype engine at the SA Junkers 88 plant at Matford (a fusion of the Ford and French Mathis factories in Strasbourg). The 6860th Headquarters Detachment Intelligence Assault Force (“T” Force), by Les Hughes, 1977. The plant, listed as CIOS Target 19/21, had a dismantled model of the engine in a secret room. WO 219/818, 6 AG G2 signal to SHAEF MAIN for Strong dtd 27 Nov 1944, (UK National Archives). On 7th December 1944 it was arranged for CIOS expert Flt Lt Sproule to travel to Paris, where Air Int SHAEF arranged transport for him to Strasbourg to investigate the engine. WO 219/818, SHAEF REAR signal from Strong from Magnus SHAEF MAIN dtd 7 Dec 1944, (UK National Archives). Alsos were also in Strasbourg. They found working with 6 AG’s T Force so restrictive they withdrew from the T Force and got the US 7th Army to both authorise their independent entry, and provide local T Force support to help guard Alsos targets in Strasbourg. The ALSOS Mission, by Col Boris T Pash, 136. A “truckload” of Sicherheitsdienst (SD) records was taken by Ensign Allan Oakley Hunter USNR, an OSS officer with the 6AG SCIU. He and Lt Lewis Allbee USNR convinced a force of 60 SS troops armed with automatic pistols that the war was over and that they should march towards Freiburg to be taken as PoW by the Americans rather than the French. Recollections of World War II, by Akeley P Quirk, USNR (Ret), Sultana Press 1981, 103. Capt Akeley P Quirk USN, the OC of the SCIU, found an operational German Hellschreiber (“an electronic device like a teletype machine, except that it automatically scrambles outgoing messages and unscrambles incoming messages”). The machine was recovered from the SD HQ, along with a diagram of the Gestapo teleprinter network throughout Germany, with their call-signs. The SCIU spent a further 4 days searching through the HQ building. Recollections of World War II, by Akeley P Quirk, USNR (Ret), Sultana Press 1981, 75-76. Strasbourg was Phase 1 of a four stage operational plan for the T Force. They moved on to operations against Frankenthal-Ludwigshafen, Mannheim, Heidelburg, Karlsruhe and Wurzburg in Phase 2; Stuttgart, Munich and Berchtesgarden in Phase 3; and Augsburg and Ulm were designated as part of the last phase (though this phase may not have been completed). Col Pumpelly and his T Force entered Ludwigshafen around 22nd March. 6 AG SCIU picked up several Gestapo officials and transported them back to a gaol they had commandeered in Frankenthal. They used one of the political prisoners released from this prison as a spotter to identify Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst in Ludwigshafen. The city had been bombed once or twice daily for over four months, and there was “literally not a single building standing in town that was not undamaged, and most of them were knocked flat”. Recollections of World War II, by Akeley P Quirk, USNR (Ret), Sultana Press 1981, 98. The remaining population had been living inside their underground shelters for months. (The Alsos mission beat the T Force to the IG Farben plant in Ludwigshafen, arriving a day earlier, on 23rd March.) On 25th March the T Force entered Mannheim, and took the Daimler-Benz factory on 26th March as their HQ. Capt Quirk of 6 AG SCIU had to divert to Kaiserslautern and then Vittel to deal with three captured German agents. He then moved to Trois-Epee to see several captured men from Otto Skorzeny’s sabotage unit, along with some items of their equipment. This included a cane made from plastic explosive with a time delay detonator, and an overcoat made of soft plastic explosive material resembling rubber. They contained enough explosive to destroy a ten-room house. Recollections of World War II, by Akeley P Quirk, USNR (Ret), Sultana Press 1981, 98-100. This explosive was called “nipolit”. According to the Official History of the British Security Service, written immediately post-war, the Allies had only obtained their first sample of this explosive in September 1944, when a sample disguised as a leather belt was acquired by a Turkish double agent. Samples were later obtained in many other forms, including underwater bombs twenty feet long and six feet in diameter! The Security Service 1908-1945, the Official History, by John Curry, 239. In Heidelburg in April 1945 the T Force was able to locate important documents and personnel of Brown Bovari and Company and IG Farben, both regarded as important intelligence targets. Much of the captured material collected here was transported back to the USA for exploitation, and was microfilmed before being returned to the new German government. Munich had been entered on 30th April and the radio station, which had still been operating, was seized. In May the T Force helped with the liberation of Dachau Concentration Camp and went with 7th Army elements into the Nazi Redoubt region, where they uncovered tons of valuable documents hidden in caves and sunk to the bottom of lakes in special containers. The 6860th Headquarters Detachment Intelligence Assault Force (“T” Force), by Les Hughes, 1977. 1st Lt Raymond F Newkirk and Sgt James Utrecht of X2 OSS were assigned as an SCIU to Y Force, 6 AG. Together with a Major McGettigan of T Force they conducted a number of interrogations at Hermann Goering’s staff HQ, from which they identified the location of Goering’s hidden art treasures in the Berchtesgaden area (Goering himself had surrendered to the US Army in Berchtesgaden). Although very well hidden, the artwork was unprotected from the damp conditions and would have been ruined if they had not been found so promptly. The loot was passed to the care of US 7th Army and the OSS X2 Art Unit was informed. Recollections of World War II, by Akeley P Quirk, USNR (Ret), Sultana Press 1981, 121-122. According to OSS records the OSS SCI units operating with T Forces at 6 AG and 12AG “seized large quantities of counterespionage material”, which was forwarded through Army Documents channels to the Counter intelligence War Room in London. “The head of the War Room estimated that one such T Force operation, concluded in three days, netted identifying information on more than 20,000 German intelligence personnel. This virtually doubled the information on German intelligence personnel which had been made available through all previous Allied counterespionage operations during the war.” History of US CI Vol 2, (Footnotes), RG226, Entry 176, Box 2 of 2. DIVIDING THE SPOILS – FRIENDS AND FOES As the stories of 30 AU and the Alsos Mission have hinted, the Allies were in a race for technical intelligence. The numerous British and American intelligence collecting teams under the umbrella of the T Forces were often working in competition, not only with the French and the Russians, but also with each other. As well as CI units like the SCIUs, CIC and FSS, T Forces were responsible for scientific and technical teams such as: CIOS Alsos Chemical Warfare Services. Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS) - located Axis equipment, such as new aircraft, tanks, ammunition, metalworking equipment, etc. for evaluation and to instruct Allied personnel in its use. Later, the unit was used to evaluate German industrial equipment in general. US Army Ordnance Rocket Branch. Strategic Bombing Survey teams (investigating the effects of the bombing on the German Economy). Technical Industrial Intelligence Branch (TIIB; later the TIIC, Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee) - established as an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but transferred to the Department of Commerce in January 1946. Its task was to investigate German industries and obtain any information that might be of interest to American companies. The Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce for 1946 talks about 3,500,000 pages that TIIB selected for copying. United States Department of Commerce. Report of the Secretary of Commerce, 34th, 1946. Washington, DC: GPO, 1946 TIIB collected more than 300,000 pounds of German equipment and product samples as well as 200 tons of materials captured by the Army and Navy; Navy Technical Mission, Europe - originally a part of the Alsos Mission, assigned to investigate German advances in synthetic fuels and lubricants of interest to the Navy. TOM (Technical Oil Mission) - A non-military group sponsored by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, made up of American and British petroleum experts and charged with investigating the industrial production of synthetic fuels and lubricants from coal using the Fischer-Tropsch method; and other specialists such as 30 AU and MIST (French “Mission d'Information Scientifique et Technique”). Under the auspices of CIOS the French government deployed their “Mission d'Information Scientifique et Technique” (MIST) in occupied Germany during the second half of 1945, tracking down atomic scientists and secret weapons on behalf of the French. 30 AU personnel reported that they had been successful in small teams searching their targets in the Paris area immediately after the occupation, but after several days they found several of their targets already searched and cleaned out by the French “Deuxieme Bureau”. They claimed that the documents seized from these targets were never made available to the British or the Americans. History of 30 AU, by Guy Allan Farrin, (ebook) 2007, 68-69. OTHER TEAMS Besides T Force, there were a number of other specialist teams who had been assigned specific targets of their own, such as: TICOM- a joint US_British mission to collect Sigint. Special Mission V-2 Team – a US Rocket Branch mission to obtain V2 technology and personnel. Watson’s Whizzers (Operation Lusty) – tasked to collect aircraft technology. GOLDCUP teams from the US Group Control Council (to uncover intact parts of the German government and its archives). GOLDCUP teams by the end of May 1945 “collected 750 tons of documents and nearly a thousand German ministerial personnel”. In the summer, GOLDCUP’s collection “increased to 1,420 tons of documents, 46 tons of microfilm, and 1,300 Germans.'' The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946, By Earl Frederick Ziemke, Center of Military History US Army 1975, quoting: (1) Lt Col Joseph S. Piram, Background and History of Field Information Agency, Technical, 8 Jul 44-30 Jun 46, in EUCOM, T 298-1/2. (2) OMGUS, 7771 Document Center, General History, 28 Apr 47, in OMGUS 21-1/5. (3) Memo, SHAEF, AG, for CG, 12th AGp, sub: Ministerial Collecting Center, 13 Jun 45, in SHAEF G-2, GBI/CI/CS/091.1-3. (4) Memo, SHAEF, AG, for CG, 12th AGp, sub: Special Detention Centers, 27 May 45, in SHAEF G-2, 383.6-4 GOLD RUSH/SAFEHAVEN teams (trying to track down Nazi treasures and funds moved abroad which were intended for rebuilding German industry port-war). Library of Congress Foreign Mission - sent to gather books and journals published in Germany (and the rest of Europe) and not available for purchase through normal channels once the war had been declared. The Documents Research Center, A-2, United States Air Forces in Europe - organized for the purpose of collecting and processing all captured German air documents. USAAF’s Air Technical Intelligence (ATI) teams was the active arm in the field. The organization was moved to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, in 1946. Before the move from Europe it was estimated that the total collection of German air documents would be between 1,000 and 1,500 tons. However, the final screened library and collection sent to Wright Field consisted of approximately 220 tons. 'Aeronautical Science. German Documents.' By Richard Eells, Library of Congress Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions 3 (4) Aug. 1946. Large technical libraries held by various German aircraft manufacturers were left virtually untouched – and most of the German aircraft industry was located in the Russian occupied zone. While members of these teams might occasionally have operated under the umbrella of T Force, quite often they worked alone – in part because they had agendas which did not agree with those of T Force, which was organized so that information and equipment might be shared by the Allies equally; and also because they operated in areas outside the main T Force target zones, much like the smaller independent T Force Teams mentioned above. Many of these organisations only became operational after the war in Europe ceased, when they then made use of T Force/ FIAT facilities to aid their investigations. One author states that as of March 1945 “in western Germany alone, the United States had fourteen scientific intelligence teams from the army, navy and air corps” operating independently and often in competition with each other as well as their allies. Secret Waepons of World War II, by William B Breuer, Castle Books NY 2000, 212. Some of these specialist teams have been covered in more detail in books and articles, as well as online. For example, the ATI teams competed with 32 allied technical intelligence groups. Operation “LUSTY”, National Museum of the US Air Force, Posted 2/7/2011,http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets. In April 1945, the USAAF combined technical and post-hostilities intelligence objectives under the Exploitation Division as Operation LUSTY. With the aim of exploiting captured German scientific documents, research facilities, and aircraft, the ATI Teams and Watson’s Whizzers under Operation LUSTY swept up 16,280 items (6,200 tons) for examination, of which 2,398 separate items were chosen for technical analysis. The Wind and Beyond. By Theodore Von Karman, Little, Brown & Co. Boston, MA 1967. Field Intelligence Agency Technical. Post-war the T Force work was continued by an American operation, the Field Information Agency Technical (FIAT), which had been set up by SHAEF as a combined organization. FIAT was conceived as a post-hostilities agency early in 1945 by Secretary of War Stimson. It was to inherit a wartime mission from the Special Sections Subdivision, searching for information to use against Japan; but the longer-term goal was aimed toward civilian interests. Chief among its interests would be "the securing of the major, and perhaps only, material reward of victory, namely, the advancement of science and the improvement of production and standards of living in the United Nations by proper exploitation of German methods in these fields." Memo, SHAEF, ACofS G-2, for CofS, sub: Establishment of a Field Information Agency, Technical, 2 Jun 45, in OPD, 336, sec. V, Class 104. FIAT's scope was extended to take in scientific and industrial processes and patents having civilian as well as military applications. Since the new organization would have to remain a combined operation for as long as SHAEF existed, British Brigadier R. J. Maunsell, who was already chief of the SHAEF Special Sections Subdivision, was designated head of the new organisation. Although envisioned as having exclusive "control and actual handling of operations concerning enemy personnel, documents, and equipment of scientific and industrial interest," in its charter, issued at the end of May, FIAT was authorized to "coordinate, integrate, and direct the activities of the various missions and agencies" interested in scientific and technical intelligence but prohibited from collecting and exploiting such information on its own responsibility. (1) SHAEF, CoS, sub: Establishment of FIAT, 31 May 45, in OPD, 336, sec. V, Class 104-. (2) Memo, Hqs, US Gp CC, for Distribution, sub: Establishment of FIAT, US Gp CC, 14 Jul 45, in USFET SGS 322. The one new T Force operation in the FIAT period was conducted in Berlin in July and August. FIAT investigators scoured Germany looking for anything that might be suitable war compensation. Once SHAEF ceased to exist the organisation came under the joint administration of the US Group Control Council and USFET. Mobile FIAT microfilm teams were sent to major plants and industrial facilities to copy material identified by FIAT experts as valuable. The targets included human resources. About 1,000 Germans – many scientists and technicians from Germany’s rocket and nuclear programmes – were recruited to work in the USA. The 6860th Headquarters Detachment Intelligence Assault Force (“T” Force), by Les Hughes, 1977. German scientists were prime targets of FIAT investigators, whose job included finding suitable candidates for a top-secret program called "Overcast." As Simpson reported in his book "Blowback", the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated that program in July 1945 to, according to a military memo, "exploit chosen rare minds whose continuing intellectual productivity we wish to use." Overcast evolved into Operation Paperclip. It was the responsibility of FIAT investigators to screen German scientists, supposedly to ensure that no war criminals were brought to the United States. Instead, they amended the records of Nazi Party members and war criminals to allow their immigration to America. FIAT provided (from its office in Frankfurt and branches in Paris, London, and Berlin) the accreditation, support, and services to civilian investigators from the Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (Foreign Economic Administration) who were sent to Europe in large numbers to comb German plants and laboratories for information on everything from plastics to shipbuilding and building materials to chemicals. Also, FIAT often became the custodian of the documents and equipment collected by military units being redeployed from gathering technical intelligence. The military intelligence projects were completed and phased out in late 1945 and early 1946, but the civilian investigations increased. By the end of the first year of the occupation, FIAT had processed over 23,000 reports, shipped 108 items of equipment (whole plants sometimes were counted as single items), and collected 53 tons of documents. FIAT continued investigations until 30 June 1947 and continued microfilming until 30 September of that year. The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946, By Earl Frederick Ziemke, Center of Military History US Army 1975, quoting: (1) Background and History of Field Information Agency, Technical, 8 Jul 44-30 Jun 46, by Lt Col Joseph S. Piram in EUCOM, T 298-1 /2. (2) Memo, Actg Ch, CAD, for Sec War, sub: Termination Date for FIAT, 11 Jun 47, in CAD, 014. FIAT separated into its British and US components with the dissolution of SHAEF. EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historian, Organization and Administration of the European Theater and Its Headquarters, 1947, in CMH file 8-3.1, CA 5. FIAT continued operating until the summer of 1947. The French Occupation Forces maintained liaison detachments with FIAT, and an exchange of information was done through joint Allied operations and trading of investigators. The Russians, in asking for German reparations, estimated the cash value of the FIAT efforts alone at ten billion dollars. The Army’s Technical Detectives, by Maj Franklin M Davis Jr, in May 1948 Military Review, Vol XXVIII, Number 2. THE RUSSIAN TEAMS While the British, Americans and French were busy scouring the newly liberated and occupied territories in NW Europe, The Russians appeared slower to grasp the opportunity on offer. Although the Russians entered Berlin first, and were reported to have their own intelligence collection units working in the area, the Americans believed they found their prime intelligence targets untouched when they were finally given permission to enter the city. This was important as many of the targets provided the Allies with intelligence on the Soviet Union. The targeting of such intelligence had become more important to T Force as the British intelligence services saw the potential of places like German map depots, which would be expected to have up-to-date coverage of Soviet territory. Col Andrew J Boyle, the officer in overall command of T Force operations in SHAEF, described the Allied preparations to search Berlin: “We had organized a parachute operation for Berlin purely for intelligence. We had T Forces with targets in Berlin. We had hoped to jump into Berlin as a part of a larger operation. Obviously, of course, with our agreement with the Russians [to permit them to capture Berlin] it never came off. As a consequence, we didn’t get into Berlin for some time after the Russians had gotten in there…It was very interesting that the Russians had not organized any such intelligence effort like this at all. All the prime targets that we wanted were still in Berlin”. Interview between Lt Gen AJ Boyle and Lt Col Frank Walton, Vol 1, The Andrew J Boyle Papers, US Military History Institute. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets were much more effective in gathering up intelligence, technical information and staff than previously believed. Several websites provide details of the Soviet search for aircraft technology, rocketry and atomic technology and raw materials. See HYPERLINK "http://www.russianspaceweb.com" www.russianspaceweb.com for soviet research into German rocketry and space flight; HYPERLINK "http://www.airpages.ru/eng/ru/troph.shtml" www.airpages.ru/eng/ru/troph.shtml for soviet acquisition of aircraft technology; and HYPERLINK "http://www.tutorgig.com/ed/Russian_Alsos" http://www.tutorgig.com/ed/Russian_Alsos for the race for atomic research materials and personnel. The work of the intelligence services on these areas as well as counter-intelligence is covered in several books and the current evidence indicates that Col Boyle grossly underestimated the efforts of the Soviets. See SMERSH, by Vadim J Birstein, Birebeck Publishing CO London 2011; Special Tasks, by Pavel & Anatoli Sudoplatov with J L & L P Schecter, Little, Brown & Co (USA) 1995; Loyal Comrades, Ruthless Killers, by Slava Katamidze, Lewis International Inc 2003; and Ultimate Deception, by Jerry Dan, Rare Books & Berry, Porlock Somerset UK 2003. CONCLUSIONS While the Allies succeeded in sweeping up a large amount of technical information, much of the information on industrial and technological developments was released to the public and to its foreign allies at no more than the cost of copying the CIOS and FIAT reports issued by the various specialist teams. President Truman had established the Publications Board to review all scientific and technical information developed with government funds during the war with a view toward declassifying and publishing it. Post hostilities, the President also ordered "prompt, public and general dissemination" of scientific and industrial information obtained from the enemy. Executive Order 9568, 8 Jun 45, and Executive Order 9604, 28 Aug 45, in Federal Register, vol. 10, pp. 9568 and 10960. The Russian Mission to the US made full use of this opportunity to obtain copies of the information. It might therefore be legitimately claimed that the Soviets obtained much of the information far more cheaply and easily, and in some cases in a more digestible form, through the Americans than if they had obtained the information firsthand. The acquisition of the scientists and technical staff of the Third Reich proved a more precious treasure; their work in the USA and the UK was more closely guarded by their new employers as the Iron Curtain fell over war-torn Europe. PAGE 10- NUMPAGES 19