Nuclear Power in Germany

Responsibility for licensing the construction and operation of all nuclear facilities is shared between the federal and Länder governments, which confers something close to a power of veto to both.

When Germany was reunited in 1990, all the Soviet-designed reactors in the east were shut down for safety reasons and are being decommissioned. These comprised four operating VVER-440s, a fifth one under construction and a small older VVER reactor.

In 2000 the European Commission approved the merger of two of Germany's biggest utilities, Veba and Viag, to form E.ON, which owned or had a stake in 12 of the country's 19 nuclear reactors which were operating then.

Germany has about one third of Europe's installed wind generating capacity, amounting in 2008 to about 17% of its total capacity. This provided 6.4% of the electricity then.

German nuclear power units 

 NB. The 8 shut-down reactors are not yet defueled, nor decommissioned and written off by their owners. 

E.ON has equity in the following nuclear plants:
Grafenrheinfeld 100%, Isar 1 100%, Isar 2 75%, Unterweser 100%, Grohnde 83.3%, Brokdorf 80%, Kruemmel 50%, Brunsbuettel 33.3%, Gundremmingen 25%, Emsland 12.5%.

RWE has equity in the following nuclear plants:
Gundremmingen 75%, Biblis 100%, Emsland 87.5%.

Vattenfall has equity in the following German nuclear plants:
Brunsbuettel 66.7%, Kruemmel 50%, Brokdorf 20%.
Also in Sweden: Ringhals 70%, Forsmark 66%.

EnBW has equity in the following nuclear plants:
Neckarwestheim 100%, Phillipsburg 100%. 

Nuclear power policy

German support for nuclear energy was very strong in the 1970s following the oil price shock of 1974, and there was a perception of vulnerability regarding energy supplies. However, this policy faltered after the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and the last new nuclear power plant was commissioned in 1989. Whereas the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had affirmed nuclear power in 1979, in August 1986 it passed a resolution to abandon nuclear power within ten years.

The most immediate effect of this change of policy was to terminate R&D on both the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor and the fast breeder reactors after some 30 years of promising work, since much of the work was in North Rhine-Westphalia, which was governed by the SPD. A Christian Democrat (CDU) federal government then maintained support for existing nuclear power generation nationally until defeated in 1998.

In October 1998 a coalition government was formed between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party, the latter having polled only 6.7% of the vote. As a result, these two parties agreed to change the law to establish the eventual phasing out of nuclear power.

Long drawn-out "consensus talks" with the electric utilities were intended to establish a timetable for phase out, with the Greens threatening unilateral curtailment of licenses without compensation if agreement was not reached. All operating nuclear plants have unlimited licences with strong legal guarantees.

In June 2000 a compromise was announced which saved face for the government and secured the uninterrupted operation of the nuclear plants for many years ahead. The agreement, while limiting plant lifetime to some degree, averted the risk of any enforced plant closures during the term of that government.

In particular, the agreement put a cap of 2623 billion kWh on lifetime production by all 19 operating reactors, equivalent to an average lifetime of 32 years (less than the 35 years sought by industry). Two key elements were a government commitment to respect the rights of utilities to operate existing plants, and a guarantee that this operation and related waste disposal will be protected from any "politically-motivated interference".

Other elements included: a government commitment not to introduce any "one-sided" economic or taxation measures, a recognition by the government of the high safety standards of German nuclear plants and a guarantee not to erode those standards, the resumption of spent fuel transports for reprocessing in France and UK for five years or until contracts expire, and maintenance of two waste repository projects (at Konrad and Gorleben).

In June 2001 the leaders of the Red-Green coalition government and the four main energy companies signed an agreement to give effect to this 2000 compromise. The companies' undertaking to limit the operational lives of the reactors to an average of 32 years meant that two of the least economic ones - Stade and Obrigheim - were shut down in 2003 and 2005 respectively, and the one non-operational reactor (Muelheim-Kaerlich, 1219 MWe) commenced decommissioning in 2003. It also prohibited the construction of new nuclear power plants for the time being and introduced the principle of on-site storage for spent fuel.

The agreement was a pragmatic compromise which limited political interference while providing a basis and plenty of time for formulation of a national energy policy. An industry leader reminded his government that "Reliable and cost-effective energy supply must remain an important component of German economic policy". Some speculation centred on the future of the agreement and the revised Atomic Energy Act which followed it under any new government. Parliamentary opposition party leaders said that they would reverse the decision when they could*.

* A major element in the federal government's war of attrition through 1999-2000 against the nuclear utilities was a law retrospectively to tax funds amounting to DM 50 billion which have been contributed by electricity users and set aside in trust as provision for waste management, decommissioning nuclear power plants and rehabilitating lignite mines. Early in 1999 industry promptly served notice that this would be vigorously contested as "a blatant breach of German constitutional rights and legal principles", as depletion of these funds by some DM 25 billion through the tax will leave future generations liable for much of the future costs. However, despite a scathing attack on it by the Chancellor, Mr Schroeder, in cabinet, the tax measure was approved by the upper house on the last day that the new coalition enjoyed a majority there. 

The Federal Ministry of Economics & Technology (BMWi) implements national energy policy.

Utilities wanted to extend the lifetimes of all 17 reactors initially to 40 years (from average 32 years) and then individually seeking extensions to 60 years as in the USA. 

The new Christian Democrat (CDU) and Liberal Democrat (FDP) coalition government elected in September 2009 was committed to rescinding the phase-out policy, but the financial terms took a year to negotiate. If reactor lifetimes were extended from average 32 years to 60 years, the four operating companies would have reaped additional gross profit of EUR 100 billion or more, and the government was keen to secure more than half of this - much more than its extra tax revenue.

In September 2010 a new agreement was reached, to give 8-year licence extensions (from 2001-agreed dates) for reactors built before 1980, and 14-year extensions for later ones. The price exacted for this was several new measures: a tax of EUR 145 per gram of fissile uranium or plutonium fuel for six years, yielding EUR 2.3 billion per year (about 1.6 c/kWh), payment of EUR 300 million per year in 2011 and 2012, and EUR 200 million 2013-16, to subsidise renewables, and a tax of 0.9 c/kWh for the same purpose after 2016.  However, utilities may reduce their contribution to renewables if safety upgrades to particular individual nuclear plants cost more than EUR 500 million.  At the end of October these measures were confirmed by parliamentary vote on two amendments to Germany's Atomic Energy Act, and this was confirmed in the upper house in November. 

All these arrangements were thrown into doubt when in March 2011 the government declared a three-month moratorium on nuclear power plans, in which checks would take place and nuclear policy would be reconsidered. Chancellor Angela Merkel decreed that the country's nuclear power reactors which began operation in 1980 or earlier should be immediately shut down. Those units then closed and were joined by another unit already in long-term shutdown, making a total of 8336 MWe offline under her direction, about 6.4% of the country's generating capacity.  This decision was not based on any safety assessment.

The reactors affected are Biblis-A, Neckarwestheim 1, Brunsbuettel, Biblis-B, Isar 1, Unterweser, Phillipsburg 1. Already in a long-term shutdown was Kruemmel and this was included despite having started up in 1984. Over the three months the impact on the German government from loss of income via its unique nuclear fuel tax could be around €235 million. 

In May 2011 the Reaktorsicherheitkommission or Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) reported that all German reactors were basically sound, and safe. It had reviewed all 17 reactors and evaluated their robustness with respect to natural events affecting the plants, station blackouts and failure of the cooling system, precautionary and emergency measures as well as man-made events effecting the plant, e.g. plane crashes. However, despite this, on 30 May, after increasing pressure from anti-nuclear federal states, the government decided to revive the previous government's phase-out plan and close all reactors by 2022 but without abolishing the fuel tax, thus reneging on the new fuel tax trade-off.  The Bundestag passed the measures by 513 to 79 votes at the end of June, and the Bundesrat vote on 8 July confirmed this.  Both houses of parliament approved construction of new coal and gas-fired plants despite retaining its CO2 emission reduction targets, as well as expanding wind energy. 

 This leaves the eight oldest reactors closed, and will result in the remaining nine closing by the end of 2022. France, Poland and Russia (Kaliningrad) are expecting to increase electricity exports to Germany, mostly from nuclear sources, and Russia is expected to export significantly more gas. 

The country's four nuclear power utilities are pressing claims for compensation and in particular are suing the government over continuing with the nuclear tax introduced in relation to the 8- and 14-year licence extensions agreed in September 2010. Claims for compensation are also on the basis of write-down of plants, cancelled upgrades which were in train following the September 2010 policy change, and decommissioning costs brought forward. While RWE and E.On are public companies, Vattenfall is owned by the Swedish government and EnBW 46.55% by the Baden-Wuerttemberg government, currently a Social Democrat-Green coalition. Another 46.55% is owned by the state’s municipalities.

 In September 2011 the government's continuing tax on nuclear fuel was rejected by the Hamburg Tax Court. The Court expressed "serious doubt" that the nuclear fuel tax was compatible with the German constitution. It granted a request from E.On to refund some €96 million, and nuclear fuel tax collections were to be suspended. The first lawsuit was from EnBW, which paid the tax when it refuelled a reactor in July and quickly launched legal action, claiming the tax was unconstitutional and contrary to EU law. The court's judgement said that the tax does not qualify under the constitution as a consumption tax, and anyway those should not be applied to single-purpose supplies like nuclear fuel. The court took its decision based on these constitutional points and did not consider other areas the utility had contested: whether the tax violated equality laws or EU directives on taxation.  In October RWE and E.ON were refunded €74 and €96 million respectively.  However the government then challenged the ruling and resumed collections of the tax. In January 2013 the Hamburg Tax Court ruled more definitely that the German tax on nuclear fuel is simply “to siphon off the profits of the nuclear plant operators” and therefore unconstitutional. It referred the question to the Constitutional Court. Since January 2011 nuclear power plants had paid around €1.5 billion through the tax over two years as well as bearing much greater costs with reduced revenue from the government’s policy U-turn in March 2011.

Apart from contesting the fuel tax, all the nuclear generators are seeking compensation for the effective confiscation of generating rights from the eight reactors ordered shut after Fukushima, despite safety assurances from the regulator.

RWE has filed a lawsuit against the government regarding closure of its Biblis-B and said that the phase-out cost the company over EUR 1 billion in 2011 alone. E.On is also seeking EUR 8 billion in compensation. Vattenfall in June 2012 contested the confiscation of generation rights for the Brunsbuttel and Krummel nuclear power plants, and filed the case with the autonomous International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which was designed in 1965 by the World Bank and established by a convention now signed by 143 countries. It had previously said simply that it expects full compensation for its costs, which it noted as SEK10 billion ($1.5 billion) for the first half of 2011 alone. EnBW supports the legal actions brought by the other utilities, saying that the government’s actions infringe its property rights, but being almost completely publicly-owned it is unable to file a legal complaint. The four utilities have made provisions of over EUR 30 billion on account of the government decisions, and the German government appears to be facing claims of this magnitude.
 

Economic and CO2 implications of nuclear policy changes   

Fuelling the earlier dispute within the grand coalition government then in power, a January 2007 report by Deutsche Bank warned that Germany will miss its carbon dioxide emission targets by a wide margin, face higher electricity prices, suffer more blackouts and dramatically increase its dependence on gas imports from Russia as a result of its nuclear phase-out policy, if it is followed through. Unless adjustments are made to the shutdown timetable which was passed into law, four large reactors (which started up 1975-77) totaling almost 4 GWe will be shut down by the end of 2009. The Economy Minister and utility owners called for urgent review of the policy. The Bank estimated that 42 GWe of new generating capacity would need to be constructed by 2022 if shutdowns proceeded. 

If Germany were to proceed with its nuclear phase-out policy and maintains carbon emission reductions, by about 2020 it would need to import some 25,000 MWe of electricity as base-load.  The country already has significant interconnection with France, Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic and Switzerland.  Connection with Russia's Kaliningrad Baltic exclave, where a 2400 MWe Russian nuclear plant is being built, is envisaged and Russia expects to export half the output of that plant to Germany.  So increased nuclear capacity in several of those neighbouring countries - and pre-eminently France - could easily, by 2020, supply 25,000 MWe through much-expanded interconnection.  This would put Germany in 2020 in much the same position as Italy today, being dependent on neighbours for electricity (which would be mostly nuclear) and a price-taker.   

In September 2011, a study from KfW Bankengruppe, which supports domestic developments, said that about €25 billion per year will be required to meet the government's nuclear phase-out goals. It puts the total investment at €239-262 billion by 2020. This includes up to €10 billion on fossil fuel plant, €144 billion on renewables plant and up to €29 billion on 3600 km of high-voltage transmission lines. The bank noted that large capital-intensive projects have a tendency to go over budget.

Germany's decision to shut its nuclear plants will, despite its massive investment in new renewables, create an extra 300 million tonnes of CO2 to 2020 from increased fossil fuel use. That will virtually cancel out the 335 Mt savings intended to be achieved in the entire European Union by the 2011 Energy Efficiency Directive from the European Commission. The Bundesnetzagentur on 30 September said that 25 new power plants with total 12 GWe were under construction, 67% powered by black coal and 17% by brown coal - 10.1 GWe coal. While gas plants fit better as back-up for expanded renewables, they are less economic and gas supplies are uncertain.

Electricity from renewable energy 

As Germany's attitude to nuclear energy became ambivalent, policies were adopted to promote renewable sources, notably solar and wind, though Germany is not well placed geographically in relation to either. This is primarily to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. By 2020 it is planned that renewables should contribute 20% of electricity supplies, compared with 11% at present (4% hydro, 6% wind, 1% solar). Due to the feed-in tariffs of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG – Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz) passed in 2000, wind power has become the most important renewable source of electricity production in Germany.  From 12,000 MWe in 2002, at the end of 2010, 27,214 MWe of wind capacity was installed, 32% of EU total.  Renewable electricity fed into the grid is paid for by the network operators at fixed tariffs. The costs are passed on to electricity consumers, so that there are no subsidies by the government. The tariffs are different for specific technologies and subject to a reduction of about 5% each year as an incentive for price reductions in new plant. The price is guaranteed for 20 years after completion of the plant, so that the operators have confidence in their planning criteria.

 The Federal Ministry's July 2007 progress report on the EEG said that in 2006, the costs to the electricity consumer resulting from the differential costs of electricity covered by the EEG in 2006 amounted to EUR 3.2 billion plus EUR 100 million for the provision of energy balancing. The average feed-in tariff apart from solar PV is 8.5 c/kWh, or 16.4 cents including solar PV in 2006 (solar PV being up to 49 cents). Wind provides nearly half of the renewable input and feed-in tariffs for new wind plants are generally 8.2 c/kWh on land and 9.1 c offshore. The combined subsidy from consumers and government totals some EUR 5 billion per year.

Uranium mining

From 1946 to 1990, some 220,000 tonnes of uranium (260,000 t U3O8) was mined in the former GDR, in Saxony and East Thuringia, notably at Wismut, with substantial environmental damage. Much of this was used in Soviet weapons programs, and for fuel in Eastern Europe.  In 1991, 1207 tU was produced, in 1992: 232 tU and thereafter small amounts resulting from decommissioning and mine closure activities.

A small mine. Ellweiler, operated in West Germany 1960-89. All uranium is now imported, from Canada, Australia, Russia and elsewhere, a total of 3800 t/yr U.

Fuel cycle 

Annual demand for enrichment is about 2.2 million SWU, most of which is provided by Urenco's Gronau plant, with capacity of 1.8 million SWU/yr being expanded to 4.5 million SWU/yr, following 2005 approval by the government coalition. Over 2006-09 the Gronau plant processed about 4500 tonnes per year of UF6, generating about 4000 t/yr of tails. This will double when the new capacity is on line. The licence for expansion limits tails storage to 38,000 t UF6 and 59,000 t deconverted to U3O8.

Most of the depleted uranium tails from the Gronau plant have been sent to Novouralsk in Russia for re-enrichment, but these arrangements finish in 2010. Over 2007 to 2009 Urenco sent 6500 t of tails assaying 0.30% U-235 to Novouralsk for re-enrichment, and 402 tonnes assaying 0.235% to Eurodif in France for re-enrichment. From Russia 270 tonnes of enriched uranium product was returned in this period.

In 2008 & 2009 Urenco shipped 518 tonnes of tails assaying 0.26% or less from Gronau to Areva's W Plant at Pierrelatte in France for deconversion. To the end of 2009, 1700 tonnes of UF6 from Gronau had been deconverted there and returned to Gronau as U3O8.

Fuel fabrication is undertaken by Areva, mostly at Lingen in Germany.

Thirteen German reactors are licensed to use Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel, using plutonium recycled from spent fuel. A MOX plant at Hanau in Hesse has never been allowed to operate, so all MOX fuel is imported.

Until 1994 utilities were obliged to reprocess spent fuel to recover the usable portion and recycle it. From 1994 to 1998 reprocessing and direct disposal were equally acceptable to the federal government, but the policy of the coalition government from 1998 to 2009 was for direct geological disposal of spent fuel and no reprocessing after mid 2005 (although firm contracts for reprocessing, totalling US$ 7.3 billion, were in place with BNFL and Areva).

Radioactive Wastes

In 1963 the federal government issued a recommendation to use rock salt formations for radioactive waste disposal. In 1973 planning for a national repository started, and in 1976 the Atomic Energy Act was amended to make such disposal a responsibility of the federal government.

The utilities are responsible for interim storage of spent fuel, and have formed joint companies to build and operate off-site surface facilities at Ahaus and Gorleben. However, current policy is for interim storage at reactor sites.

The federal government through the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) is responsible for building and operating final repositories for high-level waste, but progress in this has been hindered by opposition from Länder governments. Gesellschaft für Nuklear-Service (GNS) is responsible for all operations regarding the transport and disposal of waste in Germany, at nine sites. It also offers products and services outside Germany. Its 75%-owned subsidiary Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Bau und Betrieb von Endlagern für Abfallstoffe mbH (DBE) constructs and operates repositories, notably Konrad and Gorleben, while decommissioning Morsleben. GNS developed the various types of CASTOR casks for transporting and storing used fuel.

Following an exhaustive site selection process the state government of Lower Saxony in 1977 declared the salt dome at Gorleben to be the location for a national centre for disposal of radioactive wastes. It is now considered a possible site for geological disposal of high-level wastes. These will be about 5% of total wastes with 99% of the radioactivity. A pilot conditioning plant is there. The site could be available as a final repository from 2025, with a decision to be made about 2019. Some EUR 1.5 billion was spent over 1979 to 2000 researching the site. Work then stopped due to political edict, but the new government in 2009 approved resumption of excavation.

Other proposals are for a HLW repository in opalinus clay, which occurs in a number of places in Germany.  In July 2009 new repository criteria came into force, replacing rules dating from 1983. Authorities may now license a high-level waste (HLW) repository only on the basis of scientific demonstration that the waste will be stable in the repository for a million years. In addition, all HLW disposed of in any German repository must be retrievable during the entire period the repository is operated.

Separated high-level wastes from past reprocessing in France and UK are expected to be returned to Germany by 2022 and stored. A total of 166 large casks of glass canisters will be involved, and following the last shipment from La Hague in November 2011, 50 of these are already in storage at Gorleben. Each holds 28 tonnes of vitrified HLW. A further 300+ casks with canisters of compacted wastes from reprocessing could immediately go to a final repository, the canisters possibly in to boreholes.

A pilot reprocessing plant known as WAK (Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage Karlsruhe Betriebsgesellschaft) operated at Karlsruhe from 1971 to 1991, processing 206 tonnes of used fuel.  The separated HLW from this is stored there in liquid form, and after a series of political delays is to be vitrified in 2009-12.  The vitrified waste is to be stored at Greifswald while awaiting disposal in a geological repository.  The low- and intermediate-level wastes from WAK were disposed of in the salt mine repository at Asse in Lower Saxony, and comprised about half of the wastes emplaced there. 

The Asse salt mine repository, licensed by federal and state agencies in the 1960s and 1970s, is now closed. It received wastes from 1967 to 1978, it is in poor condition and is seen to represent a failure of proper licensing process. The BfS decided in 2010 that the wastes should be moved from it, and rejected an alternative of filling it with concrete to provide a stable matrix for the 126,000 drums there.  The wastes are likely to be moved to Konrad. 

The Konrad site (a former iron ore mine) has been under development as a repository since 1975, and was licensed in 2002 for intermediate- and low-level waste disposal, but legal challenges were mounted. These were dismissed in March 2006 and again in April 2007. A construction licence was issued in January 2008.  Konrad will initially take some 300,000 cubic metres of wastes - 95% of the country's waste volume, with 1% of the radioactivity.  DBE plans for it eventually to accommodate 650,000 cubic metres of wastes.  It is expected to be operational about 2014.

The Ahaus facility is used for storing intermediate-level wastes, including some used HEU fuel from research reactors. In 2010 the BfS approved shipment of 951 used fuel elements from the Rossendorf reactor in 18 sealed containers to Mayak in Russia for reprocessing, on the basis of the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program. Rossendorf, in east Germany, was closed in 1991.

The salt dome repository at Morsleben in east Germany for low and intermediate-level wastes was licensed in 1981, re-licensed post reunification, and was closed in 1998. It is in poor condition and is being stabilised with concrete at a cost reported to be EUR 2.2 billion. 

Konrad, Asse and Morsleben are all in central Germany between Hanover and Magdeburg, Gorleben is about 100 km southeast of Hamburg.  Ahaus is in western Germany.

Decommissioning

Up to 2012, 19 experimental and commercial reactors had been shut down and were being decommissioned. Five of these are VVER-440 units at Greifswald, closed in 1990 following reunification (unit 6 was complete but did not operate), with 235 unused fuel assemblies being sold to Paks in 1996. Unit 5 had a partial core melt in November 1989, due to malfunctioning valves (root cause: shoddy manufacture) and was never restarted.

Five are various BWRs, two are HTRs, one is the large and relatively modern Muelheim-Kaerlich PWR shut down since 1988 due to licensing difficulties, one is Stade PWR closed in November 2003, one is Obrigheim PWR closed in May 2005, one is a prototype GCHWR and one is a prototype VVER.  Gundremmingen A was shut down following an accident in 1977. High tension lines from the plant short circuited requiring rapid shutdown of the plant, which resulted in pressure relief valves flooding it with slightly radioactive water. Repairs and modernisation were deemed uneconomic

Eleven of the 19 involve full demolition and site clearance. These will create about 10,000 cubic metres of decommissioning waste.

Two units of a 4-unit VVER-1000/V320 power station were under construction at Stendal, but halted in 1990. Unit 1 was about 85% complete.

In 2012 eight reactors were shut down by government edict, for political reasons. The four operators have a total of more than EUR 30 billion set aside for decommissioning and waste disposal. However, it is not yet clear if and when most of these will be decommissioned, though EnBW has announced that its two reactors – Neckarwestheim-1 and Phillipsburg-1 – will be directly dismantled without any safestor period.

Decommissioning the currently operating reactors is expected to produce some 115,000 cubic metres of decommissioning wastes.
 

Research

From 1956 a number of nuclear research centres were set up in West Germany, and most of these as well as university institutes were equipped with research rectors. Most of these reactors are now shut down and the centres have changed their roles.

In 1960 a 16 MWe experimental nuclear power plant ordered in 1958 was started up. Then in 1961 the AVR 13 MWe experimental high temperature reactor at Juelich was ordered, with fuel as a pebble bed. It operated for over 750 weeks from 1967 to 1988, most of the time with thorium-based fuel.

The 300 MWe THTR reactor at Uentrop was developed from the AVR and operated 1985-88 also using thorium-based fuel. Fuel fabrication was on an industrial scale. Several design features made the AVR unsuccessful, though the basic pebble bed concept was again proven. It drove a steam turbine.

An 80 MWe HTR-modul was then designed by Siemens and licensed in 1989, but was not constructed.

A fast breeder reactor, the 17 MWe Kompakt KNK 2 was built by Siemens and ran from 1978 to 1991. The much larger SNR-300 was also constructed by Siemens in the 1970s but for political reasons was never commissioned. The 1500 MWe SNR-2 was designed by KWU but not built.

In East Germany a research institute opened in 1956 and its research reactor started operation the following year. The first East German power reactor, the 70 MWe Rheinsberg PWR (VVER 220/V210), was connected to the grid in 1966, operating until it was closed by political decision in 1990.

In 1969 Siemens and AEG merged their nuclear activities to form Kraftwerk Union (KWU). KWU developed a series of PWR units culminating in the standardised 1300 MWe Konvoi design, of which only three were built (though six preceding ones were similar).

Through the 1990s Siemens-KWU with utilities worked with EdF and Framatome to develop the 1600 MWe EPR, now marketed by Framatome ANP (formed from Framatome-Siemens nuclear merger).

At Juelich, Urenco maintains a centrifuge development and manufacturing centre.

Regulation and safety

In 1955 the West German government established an Atomic Ministry (BfA)with strong European links. The Atomic Energy Act was promulgated in 1959 and is the core legislation relevant to licensing and safety. The Radiation Protection Ordinance, Nuclear Licensing Procedure Ordinance and six other ordinances support this.

The Federal Ministry of Environment (BMU) is the main national body involved with licensing and supervising nuclear facilities, and is supported by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection - Bundesamt fur Strahlenschutz (BfS). However, licensing of nuclear power plants and other facilities is actually done by the states, which are responsible for implementing federal laws. The BMU supervises this and can issue binding directives.

Under BMU, the Reaktorsicherheitkommission or Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) conducts safety review of nuclear power reactors.

Also under BMU, the Entsorgungskommission (ESK) or Waste Management Commission operates.

 The BfS is responsible for construction and operation of nuclear waste facilities. Individual utilities are responsible for setting aside funds for waste disposal and decommissioning. As of 2003, some EUR 35 billion had been set aside - about 55% of this for wastes and 45% for decommissioning.

The Verband der Grosskessel-Besitzer e V was founded in 1920 as the federation of the owners of large boilers. VGB PowerTech e.V. (VGB) is the European technical association for power and heat generation and works in close co-operation with Eurelectric on European level and with the corresponding water association (BDEW) on the national level. It undertakes research relevant to nuclear plant safety. 

Public Opinion

German public sentiment has been split in relation to support of nuclear energy.  A poll late in 1997 showed that some 81% of Germans wanted existing nuclear plants to continue operating, the highest level for many years and well up from the 1991 figure of 64%. The vast majority of Germans expected nuclear energy to be widely used in the foreseeable future. The poll also showed a sharp drop in sympathy for militant protests against transport of radioactive waste.

After the crucial October 1998 election a poll confirmed German public support for nuclear energy. Overall 77% supported the continued use of nuclear energy, while only 13% favoured the immediate closure of nuclear power plants.

In November 1998 Germany's electric utilities issued a joint statement pointing out that achievement of greenhouse goals would not be possible without nuclear energy. A few days later the Federation of German Industries declared that the "politically undisturbed operation" of existing nuclear plants was a prerequisite for its cooperation in reaching greenhouse gas emission targets. Nuclear energy then avoided the emission of about 170 million tonnes per year of carbon dioxide, compared with 260 Mt/yr being emitted by other German power plants.

A poll early in 2007 found that 61% of Germans opposed the government's plans to phase out nuclear power by 2020, while 34% favoured a phase out.  Another poll in mid 2008 (N=500) showed that 46% of Germans want the country to continue using nuclear energy; another 46% said they support the nuclear phase out policy, and 8% were undecided.

Non-proliferation

Germany is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state. Its safeguards agreement under the NPT came into force in 1977 and it is also under the Euratom safeguards arrangement. In 1998 it signed the Additional Protocol in relation to its safeguards agreements with both IAEA and Euratom. It is also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Sources:
Nuclear Engineering International, Feb 1996; July 2004;
NEI World Nuclear Industry Handbook 2004;
IAEA 2003, Country Nuclear Power Profiles. 

Bundesnetzagentur, May 2011, Update of report on the impact of nuclear power moratorium on the transmission networks and security of supply.  

Konrad Mazur, 5/10/11, Coal and gas power plants to replace part of nuclear power plants in Germany by 2014. OSW Centre for Eastern Studies.
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2011-10-05/coal-and-gas-power-plants-to-replace-part-nuclear-power-plants-german