Abstract
Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memory.
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McGrath, M. Memory and epistemic conservatism. Synthese 157, 1–24 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-0011-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-0011-3