Skip to main content
Springer Nature Link
Log in

A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness

  • Chapter
Consciousness and Self-Regulation

  • 237 Accesses

Abstract

See More

I was asked, as a philosopher, to address an audience primarily of psychobiologists about the nature of consciousness. Many people—among them, quite likely, many readers of the present volume—might find this a little strange: After all, would a conference of physicists really invite a philosopher to address them on the nature of matter? Or of biologists on the nature of life? Perhaps; but why not? Let me first say something about the sort of thing a philosopher may legitimately have to say, before going on to make what I hope will be some useful, substantive claims of my own.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

') var buybox = document.querySelector("[data-id=id_"+ timestamp +"]").parentNode var buyingOptions = buybox.querySelectorAll(".buying-option") ;[].slice.call(buyingOptions).forEach(initCollapsibles) var buyboxMaxSingleColumnWidth = 480 function initCollapsibles(subscription, index) { var toggle = subscription.querySelector(".buying-option-price") subscription.classList.remove("expanded") var form = subscription.querySelector(".buying-option-form") var priceInfo = subscription.querySelector(".price-info") var buyingOption = toggle.parentElement if (toggle && form && priceInfo) { toggle.setAttribute("role", "button") toggle.setAttribute("tabindex", "0") toggle.addEventListener("click", function (event) { var expandedBuyingOptions = buybox.querySelectorAll(".buying-option.expanded") var buyboxWidth = buybox.offsetWidth ;[].slice.call(expandedBuyingOptions).forEach(function(option) { if (buyboxWidth <= buyboxMaxSingleColumnWidth && option != buyingOption) { hideBuyingOption(option) } }) var expanded = toggle.getAttribute("aria-expanded") === "true" || false toggle.setAttribute("aria-expanded", !expanded) form.hidden = expanded if (!expanded) { buyingOption.classList.add("expanded") } else { buyingOption.classList.remove("expanded") } priceInfo.hidden = expanded }, false) } } function hideBuyingOption(buyingOption) { var toggle = buyingOption.querySelector(".buying-option-price") var form = buyingOption.querySelector(".buying-option-form") var priceInfo = buyingOption.querySelector(".price-info") toggle.setAttribute("aria-expanded", false) form.hidden = true buyingOption.classList.remove("expanded") priceInfo.hidden = true } function initKeyControls() { document.addEventListener("keydown", function (event) { if (document.activeElement.classList.contains("buying-option-price") && (event.code === "Space" || event.code === "Enter")) { if (document.activeElement) { event.preventDefault() document.activeElement.click() } } }, false) } function initialStateOpen() { var buyboxWidth = buybox.offsetWidth ;[].slice.call(buybox.querySelectorAll(".buying-option")).forEach(function (option, index) { var toggle = option.querySelector(".buying-option-price") var form = option.querySelector(".buying-option-form") var priceInfo = option.querySelector(".price-info") if (buyboxWidth > buyboxMaxSingleColumnWidth) { toggle.click() } else { if (index === 0) { toggle.click() } else { toggle.setAttribute("aria-expanded", "false") form.hidden = "hidden" priceInfo.hidden = "hidden" } } }) } initialStateOpen() if (window.buyboxInitialised) return window.buyboxInitialised = true initKeyControls() })()

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Albert, K. Mechanism and metamathematics. Unpublished senior thesis(on file in library). State University of New York, College at Purchase, 1981.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alston, W. Varieties of privelaged access. American Philosophical Quarterly, 1971, 8, 223–241.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berliner, H. Computer backgammon. Scientific American, 1980, 242 (6), 64–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Block, N. Troubles with functionalism. In N. Block (Ed.), Readings in philosophy of psychology (Vol. 1). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brentano, F. Psychology from an empirical standpoint. In G. Vesey (Ed.), Body and mind. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964. (Originally published in 1874.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, G. The believer system (Technical Report RUCBM-TR-34), July 1974. Department of Computer Science, Rutgers University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Casteneda, H. On the logic of attributions of self-knowledge to others. Journal of Philosophy, 1968, 65, 439–456.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, R. Perceiving. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky, N. Language and mind (Enlarged edition). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky, N. Reflections on language. New York: Random House, 1976.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, R. Consciousness and information processing: A biocognitive perspective. In J. Davidson & R. Davidson (Eds.), The psychobiology of consciousness. New York: Plenum Press, 1980.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. Content and consciousness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett D. Intentional systems. Journal of Philosophy, 1971, 68, 87–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. Conditions of personhood. In A. Rorty (Ed.), The identities of persons. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. Towards a cognitive theory of consciousness. In D. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  • Descartes, R. Meditations on first philosophy (with replies to objections). Reprinted in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, ed. by E. S. Haldene and G. R. T. Ross. London: Cambridge University Press, 1911. (First published 1641.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Devitt, M. Designation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eccles, J. Conscious experience and memory. In J. Eccles (Ed.), Brain and conscious experience. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1966.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. The language of thought. New York: Crowell, 1975.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Brain and Behavioral Science, 1980, 3, 63–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • French, P., Uehling, T., & Wettstein, H. Contemporary studies in the philosophy of language. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977.

    Google Scholar 

  • Globus, G. Mind, structure, and contradiction. In G. Globus, G. Maxwell, & I. Savodntk (Eds.), Consciousness and the brain. New York: Plenum Press, 1976.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Gödel, K. On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I. In J. van Heijenoort (Ed.), From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967. (Originally published in 1931.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodman, N. Fact, fiction, and forecast. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grice, H. Meaning. Philosophical Review, 1957, 66, 377–388.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. Inference to the best explanation. Philosophical Review, 1965, 74, 88–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. Thought. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hempel, C. Aspects of scientific explanation. New York: Free Press, 1965.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henkln, L. The completeness of the first-order functional calculus. In J. Hintikka (Ed.), Philosophy of Mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. (Originally published 1949.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hintikka, J. Philosophy of mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hiriyani, M. Essentials of Indian philosophy. London: Unwin, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopcroft, J., & Ullman, J. Introduction to automata theory, languages, and computation. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hughes, G. & Cresswell, M. An introduction to modal logic. London: Metheun, 1968.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature (Ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888 (reprinted 1965). (Originally published in 1739.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hunter, G. Metalogic: An introduction to the metatheory of standard first order logic. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

    Google Scholar 

  • James, W. Does consciousness exist? In R. B. Perry (Ed.), Essays in radical empiricism and a pluralistic universe. New York: Dutton, 1912.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaynes, J. The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind. New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1977.

    Google Scholar 

  • John, E. R. “A model of consciousness.” In G. E. Schwartz & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation (Vol. 1). New York: Plenum Press, 1976.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D. Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kleene, S. General recursive functions of natural numbers. Mathematical Annual, 1936, 112, 727–742.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kleene S. Mathematical logic. New York: Wiley, 1967.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knapp, P. The mysterious “Split”: A clinical inquiry into problems of consciousness and brain. In G. Globus, G. Maxwell, & I. Savodnik (Eds.), Consciousness and the brain. New York: Plenum Press, 1976.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. A completeness proof for modal logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1959, 24, 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kripke S. Naming and necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. (Originally published 1972.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Lackner, J. R., & Garrett, M. Resolving ambiguity: Effects of biasing context in the unattended ear. Cognition, 1973, 1, 359–372.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laing, R., Phillipson, H., & Lee, A. Interpersonal perception: A theory and method of research. London: Tavistock, 1966.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. Lucas against mechanism II. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1979, 9, 373–376.

    Google Scholar 

  • Linsky, L. Reference and modality. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

    Google Scholar 

  • Locke, J. An essay concerning human understanding. New York: Dutton, 1961. (Originally published 1690.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Lucas, J. Minds, machines, and Gödel. Philosophy, 1961, 36, 112–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lucas, J. Satan stultified: A rejoinder to Paul Beneceraff. Monist, 1968, 52, 45–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luria, A. R. The human brain and conscious activity. In G. E. Schwartz & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation (Vol. 2). New York: Plenum Press, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. Form, function, and feel. Journal of Philosophy, 1981, 78(1), 24–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mackay, D. Mind-like behavior in artifacts. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1951, 2, 105–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mates, B. Elementary logic (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matson, W. Why isn’t the mind/body problem ancient?” In P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Mind, matter, and method: Essays in philosophy of science in honor of Herbert Feigl. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matthews, G. Consciousness and life. Philosophy, 1977, 52, 13–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, G. The magic number seven plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 1956, 63, 81–97.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Moruzzi, G. Functional significance of sleep with particular regard to the brain mechanisms underlying consciousness. In J. C. Eccles (Ed.), Brain and consciousness experience. New York: Springer, 1966.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, E., & Newman, J. Gödel’s proof. New York: New York University Press, 1958.

    Google Scholar 

  • Natsoulas, T. Consciousness. American Psychologist, 1978, 12, 906–914.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nisbett, R., & Wilson, T. Telling more than we can know. Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 1977, 84(3), 231–259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit, D. Personal identity. Philosophical Review, 1971, 80(1), 3–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Penfield, W. The mystery of the mind. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J. The problem of the essential indexical. Nous, 1979, 13, 3–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Piaget, J. The child and reality: Problems of genetic epistemology. New York: Penguin, 1976.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K., & Eccles, J. The self and its brain. New York: Springer International, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pribram, K. Problems concerning the structure of consciousness. In G. Globus, G. Maxwell, & I. Savodnik (Eds.), Consciousness and the brain. New York: Plenum Press, 1976.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. The analytic and the synthetic. In H. Putnam (Ed.), Mind, language and reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. (a)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. Is semantics possible. In H. Putnam (Ed.), Mind, language and reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. (b)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. (Ed.). Mind, language and reality (Philosophical papers, Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. (c)

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. The meaning of meaning. In H. Putnam (Ed.), Mind, language and reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. (d)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. From a logical point of view and other essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. (Originally published 1951.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. Ways of paradox. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. Elementary logic (rev. ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. (First edition published in 1941.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Rey, G. Survival. In A. Rorty (Ed.), The identities of persons. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rey, G. Functionalism and the emotions. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), Explaining emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories. Review of Metaphysics, 1965, 14(1), 24–54.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. In defense of eliminative materialism. Review of Metaphysics, 1970, 24(1), 112–121.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryle, G. The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, 1949.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schiffer, S. Meaning. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt, C., & D’Addami, G. A model of the common sense theory of intention and personal causation. Proceedings of 3rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schwartz, S. Naming, necessity, and natural kinds. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. Analytic philosophy and mental phenomena. In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol. 6). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. Science, perception, ami reality. London: Routledge and Kegan-Paul, 1963. (First published 1956.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Smart, N. Karma. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 4). New York: Macmillan, 1967.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smullyan, R. Languages in which self-reference is possible. In J. Hintikka (Ed.), Philosophy of mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. (First published in 1957.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Turing, A. On computable numbers with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of London Mathematical Society, 2:42, 230–265.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vesey, G. (Ed.). Body and mind. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964.

    Google Scholar 

  • Webb, J. Mechanism, mentalism, and metamathematics. Hingam, Mass.: D. Reidel, 1980.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, M. The nature of social action. In W. G. Runciman (Ed.), Weber: Selections in translation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. (Originally published 1922.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Weizenbaum, J. ELIZA—A computer program for the study of natural language communication between man and machine. Communication of the association for computing machinery, 1965, 9(1), 36–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wiener, N. The human use of human beings. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, B. Descartes. London: Penguin, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winograd, T. Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press, 1972.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. The blue and brown books. New York: Harper & Row, 1958.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical investigations (Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe). Oxford: Black-well, 1967.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ziff, P. The feelings of robots. Analysis, 1959, 19, 64–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Division of Humanities, State University of New York at Purchase, Purchase, New York, 10577, USA

    Georges Rey

Authors
  1. Georges Rey
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. State University of New York at Purchase, Purchase, New York, USA

    Richard J. Davidson

  2. Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA

    Gary E. Schwartz

  3. University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, USA

    David Shapiro

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1983 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Rey, G. (1983). A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness. In: Davidson, R.J., Schwartz, G.E., Shapiro, D. (eds) Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-9317-1_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-9317-1_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4615-9319-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-9317-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics