Abstract
This chapter is a brief transitional discussion between the universal Buddhist-metaphysical features of personhood relevant to generic features of killing (such as volition, psychophysical constitution, and the causal relations between trope-particulars) and more specifically constituted features of personhood that determine distinct intentional classes of, and reasons for, killing. It deepens the claims of Chap. 7, as a preliminary to their engagement in the argument of Chaps. 10 through to 13, and entails a transition from the broader religious concerns of Buddhist soteriology, to this-worldly conceptions of criterial norms and values for the rational evaluation of acts. The argument thus turns to the social-cognitive construction of persons qua propertied persons: that understanding of persons prompting rational claims for the justification of intentional acts. These preconditions involve socioculturally-specific claims about persons, and how they are represented by cognitive agents depending on their interests. This introduces the problematic of the a/symmetrical representation of intentional content as an intersubjective field of contesting claims about persons as such, the evaluation of their imputed properties, and the normative status of claims concerning them. Having established this background for the predication of persons as pertaining to one or another class of persons as apt for killing, these can be summarised in four generic classes: as apt for lethal punishment, for the lethal termination of suffering, for the representation of symbolic (ideological, religious, political) identity attacked in lethal acts, and as the literal objects of lethal self-defence.
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