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A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies

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We examine in detail three classic reasoning fallacies, that is, supposedly ``incorrect'' forms of argument. These are the so-called argumentam ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument. In each case, the argument type is shown to match structurally arguments which are widely accepted. This suggests that it is not the form of the arguments as such that is problematic but rather something about the content of those examples with which they are typically justified. This leads to a Bayesian reanalysis of these classic argument forms and a reformulation of the conditions under which they do or do not constitute legitimate forms of argumentation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, CF10 3AT, United Kingdom

    Ulrike Hahn

  2. School of Psychology, Birkbeck College London, London, WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom

    Mike Oaksford

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  1. Ulrike Hahn
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  2. Mike Oaksford
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Correspondence to Ulrike Hahn.

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Hahn, U., Oaksford, M. A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies. Synthese 152, 207–236 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-5233-2

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