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DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE WAR

VOL. II

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE WAR

VOLUME II

DIPLOMATIC— Part 2

LONDON

PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE

1917

INTRODUCTION

THE TIMES " DOCUMENTARY HISTOliY OF THE
WAR is a collection of documents concerning the
War in all its aspects, so arranged as to record the events
of the great struggle in which the Nations are now involved,
and the circumstances which led up to them.

It consists of documents issued officially or recognised
by the various belligerents, such as diplomatic correspondence,
proclamations, ultimatums, military orders, reports, des-
patches, messages from monarchs to their peoples, etc.,
together with public statements by responsible Ministers
and Correspondence in the Press of an authoritative
character ; the whole collated, classified, indexed, and where
necessary cross-referenced and annotated.

The documents are left to speak for themselves, except
where brief unbiased notes are needed to elucidate them.
These are placed within square brackets, to distinguish
them from the notes in the originals.

The Times, with its network of Correspondents in all parts
of the world, is in a particularly favourable position to obtain
information, and, having at its service an experienced staff,
is able to reach sources not generally accessible to others.

As the large mass of documents involved in the collection
has been systematically classified and arranged from the
commencement of the War, it has been found possible to
issue to the pubhc simultaneously a representative series of
volumes.

DIPLOMATIC 2 v

INTRODUCTION

A survey of the constantly accumulating material would
appear to indicate that The Times Documentary History
OF THE War will be grouped into at least five main
divisions : —

I. Diplomatic.

II. Naval.

III. Military.

IV. Overseas, comprising documents dealing with

events in the Dominions and Possessions Over-
seas and in enemy territories not included in
the first three divisions.

V. International Law, including documents relating
to the Laws of War, the Proceedings of Prize
Courts, etc.

Each division will appear in its own distinct set of
volumes.

PREFATORY NOTE

THIS volume is very closely connected with its pre-
decessor, of which, indeed, it would have formed part
had not the mass of material made a division into two more
convenient. Both relate to the same period and subject — the
Outbreak of the War — and the Preface to the first elucidates
the contents of both. In the first volume also will be found
an explanatory list of the principal persons mentioned in the
diplomatic correspondence ; but for the convenience of the
reader the list of abbreviations is here reproduced.

The index of the present volume incorporates all the
references contained in that of its predecessor and is thus
a combined analytical index to both.

Vll

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

B = The British Blue-book.

G = The Belgian Grey-book (official translation).

0 = The Russian Orange-book (official translation).

R = The Austro-Hungarian Red-book (official transla-
tion).

S = The Serbian Blue-book (official translation).

W = The German White-book (" only authorised trans-
lation," pubUshed by Liebheit & Thiesen,
Berlin).

t = The French Yellow-book (official translation).

C.D.D. = " Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to
the Outbreak of the European War. Lon-
don : Printed under the authority of His
Majesty's Stationery Office by Harrison &
Sons, Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty.
1915."

D.O.W. = " Documents relating to the Outbreak of the
War. Published by the Imperial German
Foreign Office." (An Enghsh translation
of the second German White-book, " Akten-
stiicke zum Kriegsausbruch. Herausgegeben
vom Auswartigen Amte." Verlag von Georg
Stilke, Berhn.)

DIPLOMATIC 2 ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

app. = appendix.

end. = enclosure, enclosed.

Eng. tr. = Official English Translation.

exh. = exhibit.

F.O. = British Foreign Office.

intro. = introduction.

Note. — In the marginal cross-references the seven "blue-books" are
distinguished by their index letters {see list above), and the individual
despatches by their numbers. A number standing alone, without an index
letter, refers to a despatch in the same book in which the cross-reference
itself appears.

CONTENTS

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G] .

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S] .

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W]

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R]

GERMANY AND JAPAN .

KING GEORGE V. AND M. POINCARE

KING GEORGE V. AND THE TSAR

FOREIGN OFFICE NOTICES ("A STATE OF WAR")

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS :

{a) Documents Published by Germany

(6) Documents Published by Great Britain .

THE ACTION OF GERMANY . • • '

ITALY AND AUSTRIAN INTENTIONS AGAINST SERBIA

PAGE

75
IZ3
165
293
304
309
312

314
326

350
353
393

CONTENTS

PAGE

BRITISH SPEECHES :

I. In the House of Commons ..... 397

II. Public Speeches ...... 439

FOREIGN ADDRESSES. PROCLAMATIONS AND MESSAGES . 468

TREATIES 487

INDEX TO VOLS. I. AND II 511

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

THE WAR

PUBLISHED BY THE

BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of
His Majesty. October 1914.

[Official Translation Published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous
No. 12 (1914). Cd. 7627.]

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

[G.J

LIST OF CONTENTS.

Count E. de Dudzeele
to M. Davignon

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Paris,
Berlin, London, Vi-
enna, and St. Peters-
burg

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at The
Hague, Rome, and
Luxemburg

M. M. de Welle to M.
Davignon

Count Clary to M.
Davignon

Baron Beyens to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

1914.
July 24

Forwards text of Austro-
Hungarian ultimatum to
Serbia

Instructions for eventual
presentation of a note to
the respective Govern-
ments informing them of
Belgian determination to
remain neutral in the event
of a European war

Instructions eventually to
present a note to the Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs in
same terms as that to be
addressed to the five
Powers guaranteeing Bel-
gian neutraUty . .

Forwards text of reply of
Serbian Government to
the Austro-Hungarian note

Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment consider the Serbian
reply unsatisfactory and
have broken off diplomatic
relations with Serbia

British Government suggest
intervention at Vienna
and St. Petersburg by
Great Britain, France,
Germany, and Italy to
find a basis of compromise.
Germany alone has not
yet replied

[6.]

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

Count E. de Dudzeele
to M. Davignon

(Telegraphic)

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Berlin,
Paris, London, Vien-
na, St. Petersburg,
Rome, The Hague,
and Luxemburg

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Berlin,
Paris, and London

M. Davignon to all Bel-
gian Heads of Mis-

sions

(Telegraphic)

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Berlin,
Paris, and London

M. Davignon to Belgian
Legations at Berlin,
Paris, and London

Count de Lalaing to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

1914.
July 28

Aug. I

Declaration of war by Aus-
tria-Hungary against Ser-
bia

an Government have
placed army on strength-
ened peace footing. This
step should not be mis-
taken for mobilisation , .

French assurance to Belgium
that no French troops
wiU invade Belgium even
if considerable forces are
massed upon the Belgian
frontiers ..

Belgian mobilisation ordered
as from Saturday, ist
August

British Government have
asked French and German
Governments separately
if each of them is prepared
to respect Belgian neutral-
ity, provided it is not
violated by any other
Power

Baron van der Elst has re-
minded German Minister
of the assurances given by
Germany to Belgiiun re-
garding respect of her
neutrality

France accepts British sug-
gestion that she should not
violate Belgian neutrahty,
provided it is respected
by Germany (see No. 11)

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

E6.3

No.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

Baron Beyens to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

1914.
Aug. I

Germany refuses to answer
British proposal to respect
Belgian neutrality

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Berlin,
Paris, and London

France explains the condi-
tions on which she will
respect Belgian neutrality

M. Davignon to Belgian

Ministers accredited

to Guarantor Powers

(Telegraphic)

To carry out the instructions
contained in the despatch
of 24th July (see No. 2)

M. Davignon to Belgian
Legations at Rome,
The Hague, and
Luxemburg

(Telegraphic)

To carry out the instructions
contained in the despatch
tif 24th July (see No. 3)

M. Eyschen to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

The President of the Luxem-
burg Government protests
against the violation of
the neutrality of the Grand
Duchy guaranteed by the
Treaty of London of 1867

M. Davignon to the
Belgian Ministers ac-
credited to Guarantor
Powers

French Minister has pub-
lished his declaration of
ist August. Belgium
would greatly value a
similar assurance from
Germany . .

Herr von Below to M.
Davignon

Presentation of German ulti-
matum. Germany calls
upon Belgium to allow
the passage of German
troops

Interview between Herr
von Below and Baron
van der Elst

Germany complains to Bel-
gium of the violation of
her frontiers by dirigibles,
and a French patrol

[G.l

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

No.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

M. Davignon to Herr
von Below

1914.
Aug. 3

Belgian reply to German
ultimatum. Belgium can-
not fail in the duties im-
posed upon her by the
treaties of 1839 . .

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Paris,
London, Vienna, Ber-
lin, St. Petersburg,
and The Hague

(Telegraphic)

Informs of German action
and of Belgian attitude

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Berlin,
Paris, London, Vien-
na, and St. Petersburg

Belgium has informed France
that for the moment she
does not appeal to the
guarantee of the Powers.
She wiU eventually decide
what must be done

The King of Belgium to
the King of England
(Telegraphic)

Belgium makes a supreme
appeal to the British Gov-
ernment to safeguard her
neutraUty

Count de Lalaing to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

Great Britain declares she
will go to war if the neu-
trality of Belgium is vio-
lated (see No. 23)

Herr von Below to M.
Davignon

Germany will take, if neces-
sary by force of arms,
such steps as she may con-
sider necessary for her
safety in face of French
menaces . .

Sir F. VilUers to M.
Davignon

Great Britain expects Bel-
gium to resist to her ut-
most the pressure exerted
by Germany to make her
abandon her neutrality
and that she wiU appeal
to the guaranteeing Powers

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

[G.J

No.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

<0
BO
CIt

Baron Fallon to M.
Davignon

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at London
and Paris

(Telegraphic)

M. Davignon to Herr
von Below

Herr von Below to M.
Davignon

M. Davignon to Baron
Grenier

(Telegraphic)

M. Davignon to Baron
Beyens

(Telegraphic)

Baron Beyens to M.
Davignon

Count de Lalaing to M.
Davignon

1914,
Aug. 4

Holland informs Belgian
Government that she may
perhaps be forced to estab-
lish war buoying of the
Scheldt 35

Violation of Belgian territory
at Genmienich . . . . 36

Forwards passports to Ger-
man Minister . . . . 37

Germany leaves German in-
terests in Belgium in hands
of the United States of
America . . . . . . '7

Belgian Government request
Spanish Government to
take charge of Belgian
interests in Germany . . 37

Instructions to ask for his
passports . , . . • • 37

Speech of Herr von Beth-
mann HoUweg in the
Reichstag, in which the
Chancellor admitted that
Germany committed an
injustice in disregarding
the protests of the Luxem-
burg and Belgian Govern-
ments . . . . . . 38 ~

British attitude in the
European dispute . . 38

[G.]

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

No.

Count de Lalaing to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Paris,
London, and St.
Petersburg

Count de Lalaing to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

M. Davignon to British,
French, and Russian
Ministers at Brussels

Count de Lalaing to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Paris,
London, and St.
Petersburg

(Telegraphic)

1914.
Aug. 4

Great Britain expects that
Norway, Holland, and Bel-
gium will resist German
pressure and will preserve
their neutrahty. In that
event they will be sup-
ported by her

Summary of the diplomatic
situation. No act of war
having been conmiitted
before the expiration of
the ultimatum, the Cabinet
decided on 3rd August, at
10 o'clock, not yet to
appeal to the guarantee-
ing Powers

Great Britain has called upon
Germany to respect Bel-
gian neutrahty. The ulti-
matum expires at midnight

German troops
tered Belgium
Government
Great Britain,
Russia to co-
guaranteeing
the defence
territory . .

having en-
, the Belgian
appeal to
France, and
•operate, as
Powers, in
of Belgian

Great Britain has declared
war against Germany . .

Belgiimi appeals to the
Powers guaranteeing her
neutrahty

Summary of the diplomatic
situation . .

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

[G.l

No.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

■48

M. Davignon to all
Heads of Belgian Mis-

sions

Baron Beyens to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

Baron Grenier to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

Baron Guillaume to M.
Davignon

Sir F. Villiers to M.
Davignon

Count de Lalaing to
M. Davignon

(Telegraphic)

Baron Fallon to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

M. Davignon to Baron
Grenier

(Telegraphic)

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Paris,
London, and St.
Petersburg

1914.
Aug. 5

In virtue of article 10 of the
Fifth Hague Convention of
1907, Belgium, in forcibly
repelling the infringement
of her neutrality, commits
no hostile act

Staff of Belgian Legation in
Germany will leave Berlin
on 6th August

Spanish Government under-
take the protection of
Belgian interests in Ger-
many

Germany declared war on
France on 3rd August at
6 p.M

Great Britain agrees to co-
operate, cLS a guaranteeing
Power, in the defence of
Belgian territory

British fleet wiU ensure free
passage of the Scheldt for
the provisioning of Antwerp

War buoying is about to be
established (see No. 29) . .

Belgian Government thank
Spanish Government for
taking charge of Belgian
interests in Germany

France and Russia agree to
co-operate with Great
Britain in the defence of
Belgian territory

[G.]

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

No.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

53 M. de Weede to M.
Davignon

54 M. Davignon to Baron
Fallon

(Telegraphic)

55 Baron Fallon to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

56 M. Davignon to Baron
Fallon

(Telegraphic)

57 M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at Paris and
London

(Telegraphic)

Baron Guillaume to
M. Davignon

Baron Fallon to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

Baron Guillaume to
M. Davignon

(Telegraphic)

1914.
Aug. 6

Communicates declaration of
Netherlands neutraUty in
war between Belgium and
Germany . .

Regulation of commercial
navigation of the Scheldt
(see No. 50)

Same subject as above

Belgian Government anxious
that war should not ex-
tend to Central Africa.
Do French and British
Governments agree to
Belgian proposal to neutra-
Use the Congo conventional
basin ?

Despatch explaining preced-
ing telegram

France reserves her reply
respecting Belgian pro-
posal to neutralise Congo
conventional basin

Communication of a fresh
German proposal repeat-
ing the ultimatum of 2nd
August

French Government are in-
clined to proclaim the
neutraUty of the Congo
conventional basin (see
No. 59)

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

[G.]

Baron Fallon to M.
Davignon

M. Davignon to Baron
Fallon

(Telegraphic)

M. Davignon to British,
Russian, and French
Ministers

M. Davignon to Belgian
Ministers at London,
Paris, and St. Peters-
burg

Mr. Whitlock to M.
Davignon

Sir F. Villiers to M.
Davignon

M. Klobukowski to M.
Davignon

1914.
Aug. 10

Communicates German text
(containing an error) of
the second German pro-
posal and a translation of
that document (containing
another error)

Belgian Government have
received the fresh German
proposals and wiU reply
shortly

To ask German Government
the meaning they attach
to the word " Auseinander-
setzung " . .

Belgian Government com-
municate to Represen-
tives of the guaranteeing
Powers the text of the
second German note and of
the reply which they pro-
pose to return

Luxemburg authorities have
asked Belgian Minister to
leave Luxemburg. In
the circumstances, Belgian
Government have not
taken a similar step with
regard to Luxemburg
Representative at Brussels

United States of America
agree to take charge of
German interests in Bel-
gium

Great Britain concurs in
proposed Belgian reply to
second German ultimatum
(see No. 65)

French Government hkewise
entirely agree in proposed
reply (see No. 65)

[G.J

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

No.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

70 Baron Fallon to N.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

71 M. Davignon to Baron
Fallon

(Telegraphic)

72 M. Sazonof to M. Davig-
non

(Telegraphic)

73 Baron Fallon to M.
Davignon

74 Baron Guillaume to M.
Davignon

75 Count de Lalaing to M.
Davignon

76 M. Tombeur to M
Rankin

(Telegraphic)

77 Count Clary to M.
Davignon

(Telegraphic)

78 M. Davignon to Baron
Fallon

(Telegraphic)

79 M. Davignon to all
Heads of Belgian Mis-
sions

1914.
Aug. 12

The German text contained
an error. The meaning is
" her conflict with France"

The new German proposal re-
peats the proposal con-
tained in the ultimatum of
2nd August. Belgium can
only repeat the reply she
gave to that ultimatum . .

Russian Government con-
gratulate Belgian Govern-
ment on their firm and
dignified attitude (see No.
65)

Belgian reply to second
German proposal pre-
sented on 13th August . .

France no longer wishes to
neutralise the Congo con-
ventional basin (see Nos.
57 and 58)

British Government cannot
agree to Belgian proposal
to neutrahse the Congo
conventional basin

Germans attacked Belgian
Congo on 22nd August . .

Austria-Hungary declares
war against Belgium . .

Belgian reply to Austro-
Hungarian declaration of
war

Information respecting Ger-
man allegations against
Belgium contained in
British Parliamentary
White Paper

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 1]

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING

THE WAR.

(July 24 — August 29.)

No. I.

Count Enembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna,
to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the text of the
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia.

Enclosure in No. i.
[Text of Austro-Hungarian note, for which see B. 4.]

No. 2.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna,
and St. Petersburg.

Brussels, July 24, 1914. l^^^ No.

THE Belgian Government have had under their con-
sideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not
be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian
independence and neutrality a communication assuring them
of Belgium's determination to fulfil the international obUga-
tions imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war break-
ing out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a

communication would be premature at present, but that

events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to

■forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the

Belgian representatives abroad.

[G. 2] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [July 24,

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and
to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give
you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by
you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more
threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you
should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which
you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a
communication necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on
these instructions.

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given
for the mobiUsation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our
earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful
settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme
measure of precaution.

Enclosure in No. 2.

[See Nos. 3 THE international situation is serious, and the possibiUty
and 17.] of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the
Belgian Government.

Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties of a
neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April ig,
'"[See p. 1839'" ' 3,nd those duties she wiU strive unflinchingly to fulfil,
487-] whatever the circumstances may be.

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been
so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her
territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities
break out upon her frontiers.

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutraUty
'''' [cf. No. have nevertheless been taken by the Government. "" The
I3-] Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such
strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence
of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts
of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of
defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these

measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to

fulfil her international obligations ; and it is obvious that

they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with

1914] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 3]

any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the
Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers.
In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to
communicate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration
by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be
good enough to take note of it.

g;^ A similar communication has been made to the other
Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

No. 3.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and
Luxemburg.

Brussels, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE addressed an undated circular note, a copy of [See No.
which is enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited 17J

to the Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality
of Belgium.

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany
become imminent, this circular note will be communicated
to the Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, in order
to inform them of our fixed determination to fulfil those
international obligations that are imposed upon us by the
treaties of 1839. '" '" [See p.

The communications in question would only be made 487.]

upon telegraphic instructions from me.

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I
shall request you also, by telegram, to notify the Government
to which you are accredited of the step we have taken, and
to communicate to them a copy of the enclosed circular
note for their information, and without any request that
they should take note thereof.

My telegram will inform you of the date to be given to
the circular note, which you should be careful to fill in on
the copy which you hand to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its
enclosure should be treated as strictly confidential until the
receipt of fresh instructions from me.

[G. 4] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [July 25,

Enclosure in No. 3.

[See Enclosure in No. 2.)

No. 4.

Monsieur Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade,
to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text
of the reply returned by the Serbian Government to the
Austro-Hungarian note of the 10 (23) July.

Enclosure in No. 4.

[Text of the Serbian reply, for which see B. 39.]

No. 5.

Communication made on July 26, 1914, hy the Austro-Hun-
garian Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

MONSIEUR PASHITCH gave the reply of the Serbian

''I [B. 39.] Government "' to the Austro-Hungarian note before six
o'clock yesterday. This reply not having been considered
satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been broken off and
the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have ,left

'"'[B. 23, Belgrade."' Serbian mobilisation''' had already been ordered

3I-] before three o'clock.
'"LC/.B.32,
Y. 75(2).] No. 6.

Baron Bey ens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 27, 1914.

ACCORDING to a telegram from the British Charge
d'Affaires at Belgrade, the Serbian Government have given
way on all the points of the Austrian note. They even allow
the intervention of Austrian officials if such a proceeding is
in conformitj^ with the usages of international law. The

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 8]

British Charge d' Affaires considers that this reply'" should "'[B. 39-]
satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless,
a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particu-
larly because hostilities against Serbia have not begun.
The British Government suggest"' mediation by Great "" [B. ro,
Britain, Germany, France, and Italy at St. Petersburg and ^^-^

Vienna in order to find some basis for compromise. Germany
alone has not yet replied.'^' The decision rests with the "'[c/. B.
Emperor. 43]-

No. 7.

Count ErrembauU de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to
M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the
declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia. '^' '" [Text B.

No. 8.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna,
St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

Brussels, July 29, 1914.

THE Belgian Government have decided to place the army
upon a strengthened peace footing."' (')[c/. y.

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation. 87.3

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium
consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on
the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed
militia ; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the
recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry
division comprise effective units of the same strength as
those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier
zones of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions
which may be addressed to you.

II-B 17

[G. 9] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [July 31,

No. 9.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

THE French Minister came to show me a telegram from
the Agence Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and
<^'[c/.No. said:—"'

125 • Y "I ^^^^^ *^^^ opportunity to declare that no incursion of

119.3 French troops into Belgium will take place, even if consider-
able forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country.
France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as
Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. In-
structions in this sense will be given to the French authorities."
I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for his communication,
and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the
greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our
neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We
have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the
German Government will be the same as that of the Govern-
ment of the French Republic.

No. 10.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
all Heads of Belgian Missions abroad.

(Telegram.) Brussels, July 31, 1914.

THE Minister of War informs me that mobiUsation has
[c/. No. been ordered, "" and that Saturday, the ist August, will be the
II.] first day.

No. II.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

THE British Minister asked to see me on urgent business,
and made the following communication, which he had hoped

(2)

I9I4JI BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. U]

for some days to be able to present to me : Owing to the
possibility of a European war. Sir Edward Grey has asked
the French and German Governments separately'" if they "'[B. 114.]
were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality pro-
vided that no other Power violated it : —

" In view of existing treaties I am instructed to inform
the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and
to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will
do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she
desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and
maintain it." '"' <^'[c/. B.

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this com- i^5]

munication, '"' which the Belgian Government particularly '" [cf. B.
appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other 128.]

nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured
that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and
that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the
excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had
always existed between us, would respect and maintain that
neutrahty.

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which
had been considerably developed in consequence of our
recent re-organisation, were sufficient to enable us to defend
ourselves energetically in the event of the violation of our
territory.

In the course of the ensuing conversation. Sir Francis
seemed to me somewhat surprised at the spewed with which
we had decided to mobiUse our army. '^' I pointed out to him '" [No. 10.]
that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision'"' before '"'[c/. B.
we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our 9o-l

new military system, and the temporary nature of the
measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary
for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our
neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our
strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and
stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before
continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result
of which would be communicated to me.

{G. 12] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [July 31,

No. 12.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

IN the course of the conversation which the Secretary-
General of my Department had with Herr von Below this
morning, he explained to the German Minister the scope of
''' [See No. the military measures which we had taken, "' and said to
^•3 him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil
our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied
an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister
if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his
predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the
Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give.

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as
a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of
Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the
case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be
violated by Germany.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that
a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate
on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to
dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point
of view of the relations between the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann HoUweg replied that he had fully
appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representa-
tions. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating
Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public
declaration Germany would weaken her military position
in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side,
would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly
understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann
HoUweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled
the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made

1914] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 12]

reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the
Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.
Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation
with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the senti-
ments expressed at that time had not changed.

Enclosure in No. 12.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, May 2, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice the declara-
tions respecting Belgian neutrality, as published in the
semi-ofi&cial Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, made by the
Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the Meeting
of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th : —

" A member of the Social Democrat Party said : ' The
approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed
with apprehension in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany
will not respect the neutraUty of Belgium.'

" Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, rephed : ' Belgian
neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and
Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.''" w[cf. Nos.

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of 20,35.1
the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he
had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made
respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium.

" In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social
Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War,
rephed : ' Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify
the proposed reorganisation of the German mihtary system.
That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany
will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrahty of Belgium
is guaranteed by international treaty.'

"A member of the Progressive Party having once again
spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declara-
tion in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear."

[G. 13] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August i,

No. 13.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
\cf Nos (Telegram.) London, August i, 1914.

14,38.] GREAT BRITAIN has asked France and Germany

•''[B. 114.] separately if they intend to respect Belgian territory'" in
the event of its not being violated by their adversary. Ger-
many's reply is awaited. France has replied in the af&rma-
'='[B. 125.3 tive.™

No. 14.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur
Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, August i, 1914.

'''[B. 114.] THE British Ambassador has been instructed"' to inquire
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of
war, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, and I under-
stand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer

'*' [B. 122 ; the question. '*'

C/.N0.38.]

No. 15.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.

Brussels, August i, 1914.

(5) r^/ No. 9 ^ HAVE the honour to inform you that the French Minister
and note.] has made the following verbal communication"' to me : —

" I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an
international war, the French Government, in accordance
with the declarations they have always made, will respect
the neutraHty of Belgium. In the event of this neutrahty
not being respected by another Power, the French Govern-
ment, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary
to modify their attitude."

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side
[c/. No. 2 had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure
^"^1^) ■' that our independence and our frontiers should be respected. '"'
22

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 18J

No. i6,

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at
Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August i, 1914.

CARRY out instructions contained in my despatch of
the 24th July.

(See No. 2.)

No. 17.

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at
Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914.

CARRY out instructions contained in my despatch of the
25th July.

(See No. 3.)

No. 18.

Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government,
to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with [Duplicate
the following facts : According to information which has of B. 147
just reached the Grand Ducal Government, early on the ^^^ ^^
morning of Sunday, August 2, German troops entered Luxem- ^^^'^
burg territory"' by the Wasserbillig and Remich bridges, '"[c/- No.
proceeding more particularly towards the south and to- 35 ; also
wards the town of Luxemburg, capital of the Grand Duchy, y' ^1^2
A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammu- 133 j
nition have passed along the railway from Wasserbillig to
Luxemburg, where they are expected at any moment. These
incidents constitute acts plainly contrary to the neutraUty
of the Grand Duchy, guaranteed by the Treaty of London
of 1867."" The Luxemburg Government have not failed to '"'[Seep,
protest vigorously to the German Representative at Luxem- 489-]
burg against this act of aggression. An identic protest will
be telegraphed to the German Secretary of State at Berhn.

EG. 19] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 2,

No. 19.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna,
and St. Petersburg.

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

I WAS careful to warn the German Minister through
Monsieur de Bassompierre that an announcement in the
Brussels press by Monsieur Klobukowski, French Minister,
would make public the formal declaration which the latter
"'[No. 15.] had made to me on the ist August."' When I next met
Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added
that up to the present he had not been instructed to make
us an official communication, but that we knew his personal
opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right
to entertain towards our eastern neighbours. I at once
replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated
in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to
doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added,
however, that we should attach the greatest importance to
the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian
nation would hear of with joy and gratitude.

No. 20.

'^' [Pre- Note presented "" by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister
sentedat ^f Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister

L^"'no. /^^ Foreign Affairs.

23.3 Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien. —

(Tres Confidentiel.) Brussel, den 2. August 1914.

DER Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlassige Nach-
nichten vor iiber den beabsichtigten Aufmarsch franzosischer
Streitkrafte an der Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sie lassen
keinen Zweifel iiber die Absicht Frankreichs, durch belgisches
Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzugehen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der Besorgniss nicht
erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz besten Willens, nicht im Stande
sein wird, ohne Hiilfe einen franzosischen Vormarsch mit
so grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzuwehren, dass darin eine
ausreichende Sicherheit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 20]

gefunden werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbsterhaltung
fiir Deutschland, dem feindlichen Angriff zuvorzukommen.
Mit dem grossten Bedauern wiirde es daher die deutsche
Regierung erfiillen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der Feindseligkeit
gegen sich darin erblicken wiirde, dass die Massnahmen
seiner Gegner Deutschland zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch
seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zu betreten.

Um jede Missdeutung auszuschliessen, erklart die Kaiser-
liche Regierung das Folgende :

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feindseligkeiten
gegen Belgien. Ist Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstehenden
Kriege, Deutschland gegeniiber eine wohlwoUende Neutralitat
einzunehmen, so verpftichtet sich die deutsche Regierung,
beim Friedensschluss Besitzstand und Unabhangigkeit des
Konigreichs in voUem Umfang zu garantieren.

2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obiger Voraussetz-
ung, das Gebiet des Konigreichs wieder zu raumen, sobald
der Friede geschlossen ist.

3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher Haltung Belgiens ist
Deutschland bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den Koniglich
Belgischen Behorden alle Bediirfnisse seiner Truppen gegen
Barzahlung anzukaufen und jedeh Schaden zu ersetzen,
der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht werden konnte.

4. SoUte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegen
treten, insbesondere ihrem vorgehen durch Widerstand der
Maas-Befestigungen oder durch Zerstorungen von Eisen-
bahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen Kunstbauten
Schwierigkeiten bereiten, so wird Deutschland zu seinem
Bedauern gezwungen sein, das Konigreich als Feind zu
betrachten. In diesem FaUe wiirde Deutschland dem Konig-
reich gegeniiber keine Verpflichtungen iibernehmen konnen,
sondern miisste die spatere Regelung des Verhaltnisses beider
Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung der Waffen iiberlassen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der bestimmten
Hoffnung hin, dass diese Eventualitat nicht eintreten, und
das die Konigliche Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Mass-
nahmen zu treffen wissen wird, um zu verhinderen, dass
Vorkommnisse, wie die vorstehend erwahnten, sich ereignen.
In diesem Falle wiirden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die
beide Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eirie weitere und dauemde
Festigung erfahren.

EG. 20] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 2,

(Translation.)
(Tres Confidentielle.)

LE Gouvemement allemand a regu des nouvelles sAres
d'apres lesquelles les forces frangaises auraient rintention de
marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur. Ces nouvelles
ne laissent aucun doute sur rintention de la France de marcher
sur I'Allemagne par le territoire beige.

Le Gouvemement Imperial allemand ne peut s'empecher
de craindre que la Belgique, malgre sa meilleure volonte,
na sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours une marche
frangaise d'un si grand developpement. Dans se fait on
trouve une certitude suffisante d'une menace dirigee contre
I'Allemagne. C'est un devoir imperieux de conservation pour
I'Allemagne de prevenir cette attaque de I'ennemi. Le
Gouvemement allemand regretterait tres vivement que la
Belgique regardat comme un acte d'hostilite contre elle le
fait que les mesures des ennemis de I'Allemagne I'obligent
de violer de son cote le territoire beige.

Afin de dissiper tout malentendu le Gouvemement alle-
mand declare ce qui suit :

1. L'AUemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hostilite contre la
Belgique. Si la Belgique consent dans la guerre qui va
commencer a prendre une attitude de neutrahte amicale
vis-a-vis de I'Allemagne, le Gouvemement allemand de son
cote s'engage, au moment de la paix, a garantir le Royaume
et ses possessions dans toute leur etendue.

2. L'AUemagne s'engage sous la condition enoncee a
evacuer le territoire beige aussitot la paix conclue.

3. Si la Belgique observe une attitude amicale, I'Allemagne
est prete, d'accord avec les autorites du Gouvemement beige,
a acheter contre argent comptant tout ce qui est necessaire
a ses troupes et a indemniser pour les dommages causes en
Belgique.

4. Si la Belgique se comporte d'une fagon hostile contre les
troupes allemandes et particulierement fait des difficultes a
leur marche en avant par une opposition des fortifications de
la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes, chemins de fer,

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 20]

tunnels ou autres ouvrages d'art, TAUemagne sera obligee
de considerer la Belgique en ennemie.

Dans ce cas I'Allemagne ne prendra aucun engagement
vis-a-vis du Royaume, mais elle laissera le reglement ulterieur
des rapports des deux £tats I'un vis-£l-vis de I'autre a la
decision des armes.

Le Gouvemement allemand a I'espoir justifie que cette
Eventuality ne se produira pas et que le Gouvernement beige
saura prendre les mesures appropri^es pour Tempecher de se
produire. Dans ce cas les relations d'amitie qui unissent les
deux Etats voisins deviendront plus etroites et durables.

(Translation.)

Imperial German Legation in Belgium,

(Very Confidential.) Brussels, August 2, 1914.

RELIABLE information has been received by the German [cf. B. 153 ;
Government to the effect that French forces intend to march Y. 141.]
on the Une of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This informa-
tion leaves no doubt as to the intention of France"' to march '''[Denied,
through Belgian territory against Germany. Y. 149 ;

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, ^'" ^°^:
in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without ^Iso No!
assistance, to repel so considerable a French inva.sion with 21.]
sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee
against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-
defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such
hostile attack. The German Government would, however,
feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of
hostility'" against herself the fact that the measures of ''"[c/. Nos.
Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protec- 60, 62
tion, to enter Belgian territory. (end.) 5

In order to exclude any possibiUty of misunderstanding ' ^^^'^
the German Government make the following declaration :

I. Germany has in view no act of hostiUty against Belgium.
In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to
maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany,
the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion
of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of
the Belgian Kingdom in full.

[G. 21] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 2,

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned con-
dition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of
peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is pre-
pared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase
all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to
pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused
by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in
particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their
march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by
destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works,
Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium
as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations
towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the rela-
tions between the two States must be left to the decision of
arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct

hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian

Government will know how to take the necessary measures

to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those men-

[Reply, tioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two

No. 22.3 neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

-No. 21.

Memorandum of an Interview asked for at 1.30 a.m., on August
3, by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with
Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs.

AT 1.30 a.m. the German Minister asked to see Baron
van der Elst. He told him that he had been instructed by
his Government to inform the Belgian Government that
French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French
cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of inter-
national law, seeing that war had not been declared.

The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these
incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany.
Baron van der Elst then observed that in that case he could
not understand the object of this communication. Herr von

1914] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 22]

Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to inter-
national law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that
other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed
by France."' '''[c/. Nos.

20, 22.]

No. 22.

Note communicated by Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German
Minister.

[Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.).]

PAR sa note du 2 aoftt 1914, le Gouvernement aUemand a
fait connaitre que d'apres des nouvelles sftres les forces
frangaises auraient I'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par
Givet et Namur, et que la Belgique, malgre sa meilleure
volonte ne serait pas en etat de repousser sans secours une
marche en avant des troupes frangaises.

Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimerait dans I'obligation
de prevenir cette attaque et de violer le territoire beige.
Dans ces conditions, I'AUemagne propose au Gouvernement
du Roi de prendre vis-a-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et
s'engage au moment de la paix a garantir I'integrite du
Royaume et de ses possessions dans toute leur et endue. La
note ajoute que si la Belgique fait des difficulties a la marche
en avant des troupes allemandes, I'AUemagne sera obligee de
la considerer comme ennemie et de laisser le reglement
ulterieur des deux Etats I'un vis-^-vis de I'autre a la decision
des armes.

Cette note a provoque chez le Gouvernement du Roi un
profond et douloureux etonnement.

Les intentions qu'elle attribue a la France sont en con-
tradiction avec les declarations formelles qui nous ont 6te
faites le 1" aofit, au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique.

D'ailleurs, si contrairement a notre attente une violation
de la neutralite beige venait a etre commise par la France
la Belgique remplirait tous ses devoirs intemationaux et son
armee opposerait a I'envahisseur la plus vigoureuse resistance.

Les traites de 1839 confirmes par les traites de 1870
consacrent I'independance et la neutralite de la Belgique sous
la garantie des Puissances et notamment du Gouvernement
de Sa Majeste le Roi de Prusse.

[G. 22] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 3,

La Belgique a toujours ete fidele a ses obligations inter-
nationales ; elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de
loyale impartialite ; elle n'a neglige aucun effort pour main-
tenir ou faire respecter sa neutralite.

L'atteinte k son independance dont la menace le Gouv-
ernement allemand constituerait une flagrante violation du
droit des gens. Aucun interet strategique ne justifie la
violation du droit.

Le Gouvernement beige en acceptant les propositions qui
lui sont notifiees sacrifierait I'honneur de la nation en meme
temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-a-vis de I'Europe.

Conscient du role que la Belgique joue depuis plus de
80 ans dans la civilisation du monde, il se refuse a croire
que I'independance de la Belgique ne puisse etre conservee
qu'au prix de la violation de sa neutralite.

Si cet espoir etait d^fu le Gouvernement beige est ferme-
ment decide a repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir
toute atteinte a son droit.

(Translation.)
[c/. Y. 141 ;
B. 153.3 Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.)

"'[No. 20.] THE German Government stated in their note'" of the
2nd August, 1914, that according to rehable information
French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and
Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions,
would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an
advance of French troops.

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves
compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian
territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the
Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards
her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee
the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their fuU
extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in
the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would
be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the
ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States
to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon
the Belgian Government.

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 23]

The intentions attributed to France by Germany'" are '"[Nos. 20,
in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on ^^-l

August I, in the name of the French Government.''" ""[No. 15.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectations, Belgian neutral- ^^^ ^^° P'
ity should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil ^^^'^
her international obHgations and the Belgian army would
offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader. '°' "'[c/- Nos.

The treaties of 1839,"' confirmed by the treaties of 1870,"" ^3. 4o-]
vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under '^'C'^*^ P-
the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government (5)rc^ ^
of His Majesty the King of Prussia. ^83_]'

Belgium has always been faithful to her international
obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal
impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain
and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German
Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of
international law. No strategic interest justifies such a
violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the
proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of
the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more
than eighty years in the civiUsation of the world, they refuse
to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be pre-
served at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are

firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power,

every attack upon their rights.'" '"'["Z- Nos.

J t- ^ 23,40.]

No. 23.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
Belgian Ministers at St, Petersburg, Berlin, London,
Paris, Vienna, The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 3, 1914.

AT 7 p.m. last night Germany presented a note'" propos- <')[No. 20.]
ing friendly neutraUty. This entailed free passage through
Belgian territory, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the
independence of Belgium and of her possessions on the con-
clusion of peace, and threatened, in the event of refusal, to

[G. 24] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 3

"'[See No. treat Belgium as an enemy.'" A time limit of twelve hours'*'

26 ; B. ^as allowed within which to reply.
,j,^53. I59-] Our answer"" has been that this infringement of our

24 • see neutrality would be a flagrant violation of international law.

note on To accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the

Y. 141. 3 honour of the nation. Conscious of her duty, Belgium is
"1 [No. 22.] firmly resolved to repel any attack {une agression) by all
<*' [cf. Nos. means in her power. '"
22, 40 ; Y.
152. Also

P- 42'-5 No. 24.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna,
and St. Petersburg.

Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914 (12 noon).

AS you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an

1=1 [No. 20.1 ultimatum"* which expires this morning, 3rd August, at

w[c/. No. 7 a.m.'^' As no act of war has occurred up to the present

23-3 the Cabinet has decided that there is, for the moment, no

">[c/. No. need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers."'

40.3 Xhe French Minister has made the following statement to
me upon the subject :

" Although I have received no instructions to make a
declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of
their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian
Government were to appeal to the French Government as
one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French
Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal ;
if such an appeal were not made it is probable that — ^unless
of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in
self-defence — the French Government would not intervene
until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance."
I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support which
the French Government had been good enough to offer us in
case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Govern-
ment were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of
<»• [cf. No. the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to
40.3 be done. ""

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 26]

No. 25.

His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King

George.

(TeMgramme.) Brussels, August 3, 1914.

ME souvenant des nombreuses marques d'amitie de
votre Majeste et de ses predecesseurs, de I'attitude amicale
de TAngleterre en 1870, et de la preuve de sympathie qu'elle
vient encore de nous donner, je fais un supreme appel a
I'intervention diplomatique du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste
pour la sauvegarde de la neutralite de la Belgique.

(Signe) ALBERT.

(Translation.)
(Telegram.)

MINDFUL of the numerous marks of friendship of your [cf. B. 153 •
Majesty and of your Majesty's predecessors, as well as the «^so p. 411.3
friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870 and of the proofs
of sympathy which she has once again shown us, I make the
supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your
Majesty's Government to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium.

No. 26.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(T^legramme.) London, August 3, 1914.

J'AI montre votre telegramme au Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres, que I'a communique au Conseil des Ministres.
Le Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres m'a dit que si notre
neutralite etait violee, c'etait la guerre avec I'AUemagne.

(Translation.)
(Telegram.)

I SHOWED your telegram"' to the Minister for Foreign wsee No.
Affairs, who has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for 23.
Foreign Affairs has informed me that if our neutrality is
violated it means war with Germany.

n-c 33

[G. 27] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 4,

No. 27.

Herf von Below Saleske, German Minister, to Monsieur Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(The original is in French.)

[Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.).']
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'AI ete charge et j'ai I'honneur d'informer votre
Excellence que par suite du refus oppos6 par le Gouverne-
ment de Sa Majeste le Roi aux propositions bien intentionnees
que lui avait soumises le Gouvernement Imperial, celui-ci se
verra, a son plus vif regret, force d'executer — au besoin par
la force des armes — les mesures de securite exposees comme
indispensables vis-a-vis des menaces fran9aises.

Veuillez agreer, &c.

(Signe) VON BELOW.

(Translation.)

[Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.).]

[cf. B. 154 ; IN accordance with my instructions, I have the honour
Y. 154.] to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal"*

'"[No. 20.] of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned
proposals made to them by the German Government, the
latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take
— if necessary by force of arms — those measures of defence
already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace
of France.

No. 28.

Note communicated by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister
at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

(Translation.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

""[B. 155.3 ^ ^^ instructed"" to inform the Belgian Government that
if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the
object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality,
34

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 29]

His Britannic Majesty's Government expect Belgium to
resist with all the means at her disposal.

In that event. His Britannic Majesty's Government are
prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire,
in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Govern-
ment with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted
by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee
for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity
of Belgium.

No. 29.

Belgian Minister at The Hague to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Hague, August 4, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday
evening that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be
obliged, owing to the gravity of the present situation, to
institute war buoying on the Scheldt."' '"[See No.

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would 5o.l

announce this decision to me.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the
note in question which was communicated to me yesterday
evening.

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at
night. By day navigation will be possible, but only with
Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary
nautical instructions. In this way both Dutch interests iu
the defence of their territory, and Belgian interests in the
navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded.

You will note that the Netherlands Government further
ask that in the event of the war buoying being carried out,
we should cause the lightships " Wielingen " and " Wandelaar"
to be withdrawn in order to facilitate the maintenance of
the neutrality of Dutch territory.

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, " sail-
ing up the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit ; sailing
down would be permitted under the same conditions. The
Minister has, however, given me this assurance.

[G. 30] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 4

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided
upon this exceptional measure I shall be informed of it.
About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying.
I will at once telegraph to you.

Note Enclosed in No. 29.

THE Netherlands Government may be compelled, in
order to maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to in-
stitute war buoying upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move
or modify a portion of the actual arrangement of buoys
and lights.

At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has
been so drawn up that when it is brought into force it will
still be possible to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by
day, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished
with the necessary nautical instructions. In thus acting the
Netherlands Government are convinced that they will be
able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in the defence
of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the naviga-
tion of Antwerp.

After the estabhshment of war buoying on the Scheldt,
there would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of
Flushing at night, and as the presence of the hghtships
" Wielingen " and " Wandelaar " is not indispensable to naviga-
tion by day, the Netherlands Government would be much
obhged if the Belgian Government would be good enough,
in the event of the estabhshment of war buoying, to withdraw
these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the
neutrality of Dutch territory.

No. 30.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to Belgian Ministers at London and Paris.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.
(Telegram.)

159 ;'y. the General Staff announces that Belgian territory has
151.3 been violated at Gemmenich.'"
36

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK IG. 84|

No. 31.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that from
to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your
diplomatic status and cease to have official relations with
you. Your Excellency will find enclosed the passports neces-
sary for your departure with the Staff of the legation. '" '" [Reply,

No. 33.]

No. 32.

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 4, 191.4.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
Excellency's note of the 4th August, "" and to inform you '"' [No. 31.]
that I have entrusted the custody of the German Legation
of Brussels to the care of my United States colleague.

No. 33.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914.

PLEASE ask the Spanish Government"' if they will be "'[SeeNos.
good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, 34. 46 ; cf.
and whether in that event they will issue the necessary ^- ^49-3
instructions to their Ambassador at BerHn.

No. 34.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914.

THE German Minister is leaving to-night ; you should
ask for your passports. We are requesting the Spanish
Government"' to authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be (4)rj^Q ^
good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany.

[G. 35] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August

No. 35.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a transla-
tion of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by
the Imperial Chancellor on the subject of the infamous viola-
'''[c/. B. tion of Belgian neutrality : — "'

160. " We are in a state of legitimate defence and necessity

Fulltrans- knows no law.

s^ech° " ^^^ troops have occupied Luxemburg"" and have

P^53-' perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the

Interview dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared

and com- at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of

ments, Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But

(2fr<f vr we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France

^g^f °' could wait ; we could not. A French attack upon our

flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been

fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over

the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and

'" [cf. No. Belgium. ''' For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will

i2(encl.); make reparation so soon as our military object is attained.

see also " Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is

(encl')l ^^^^SS^^^g f°^ ^^^ supreme welfare can only be concerned

with the means of extricating himself ; we stand side by side

with Austria."

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann HoUweg recog-
nises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating
international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and '
that she is committing a wrong against us.

No. 36.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 4, 1914.
I HAVE the honour to inform you that in the House of
"• [See p. Commons this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh
418.] statement"' with regard to the European crisis.

1914] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 36]

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by
Sir E. Grey,"' the Prime Minister read : — '" [See pp.

400 sqq.]

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning
which gave the substance of the second ultimatum presented
to the Belgian Government by the German Government,
which had been sent to you this morning {see No. 27).

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the
frontier at Gemmenich,"" a copy of which I have given to '^'[No. 30.3
Sir A. Nicolson.

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed

to its Anibassador in London this morning '*' with the evident '"[B. i57-3
intention of misleading popular opinion as to its attitude.
Here is the translation as published in one of this evening's
newspapers : —

" Please dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the
part of the British Government with regard to our intentions,
by repeating most positively the formal assurance that, even
in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will
under no pretence whatever annex Belgian territory.

" Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we
solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her
neutrality.

" It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian
territory without making at the time territorial acquisitions
at the expense of Holland.

" Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army
could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which
was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable informa-
tion.

" Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutral-
ity, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent
French advance."

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to
this note of the German Government the British Government
had repeated'*' their proposal of last week,"" namely, that "'[B. 159.3
the German Government should give the same assurances as '^'[B. 114-]
to Belgian neutrality as France had given last week both to
England and to Belgium. The British Cabinet allowed the
Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply.'"' '"[B. 159.3

IG. 37] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 4,

No 37.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British
Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great
Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German
pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they
will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that
event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire
it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alliance to the
said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of
force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain
'^' [See the future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. '"
Nos. 39, J observed to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered : This is in case
her neutrality is violated.

No. 38.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the course of recent
events as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the
Powers which guarantee her neutrality and independence.

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal

^'•[See No communication"" according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipa-

II,] ' tion of a European war, had asked the German and French

Governments separately if each of them were resolved to

respect the neutrality of Belgium should that neutrahty not

be violated by any other Power.

In view of existing treaties. Sir F. Villiers was instructed
to bring this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Govern-
ment, adding that Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was
resolved to maintain her neutrality, and that she expected
other Powers to respect it.

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this
communication, which was in accordance with our expectation,

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 38j

and I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers
who had guaranteed our independence, might rest fuUy
assured of our firm determination to maintain our neutrality ;
nor did it seem possible that our neutrality could be threatened
by any of those States, with whom we enjoyed the most
cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Government, I
added, had given proof of this resolution by taking from now
on all such miUtary measures as seemed to them to be neces-
sitated by the situation.

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communica-
tion on August 1st"' to the effect that he was authorised to '''[No. 15.3
inform the Belgian Government that in case of an international
war the French Government, in conformity with their repeated
declarations, would respect Belgian territory, and that they
would not be induced to modify their attitude except in
the event of the violation of Belgian neutrahty by another
Power.

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already
taken aU the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our
independence and our frontiers.

On the morning of August 2nd I had a fresh conversa-
tion with Sir F. Vilhers, in the course of which he told me
that he had lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of
July 31st'"' to his Government, and that he had been careful (*i[See No.
to quote accurately the solemn declaration which he had 11.]
received of Belgium's intention to defend her frontiers from
whichever side they might be invaded. He added : " We
know that France has given you formal assurances, but Great
Britain has received no reply from Berlin '*' on this subject." '''[c/. Nos.

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a 13. i4-]
declaration from the German Government might appear
superfluous in view of existing treaties. Moreover, the Sec-
retary of State had reaffirmed, at the meeting of the committee
of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913, " that the neutrahty of
Belgium is estabhshed by treaty which Germany intends to
respect."'*' i^'[No. 12,

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minis- (end.)]

ter, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and

handed to me the enclosed note {see No. 20). The German

Government gave the Belgian Government a time limit of

twelve hours within which to communicate their decision. *" *°' [-^^f No.

23.]

[G. 39] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 4

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by
the amazing proposal of the German Government. You will
find a copy enclosed. {See No. 22.)

The ultimatum expired at 7 a.m. on August 3rd. As at
ID o'clock no act of war had been committed, the Belgian
Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment to
'''[c/. No. appeal to the guaranteeing powers.'"

24-1 Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon

<^' [cf. No. this point, and said : — '"
24-] " Although in view of the rapid march of events I have

as yet received no instructions to make a declaration from
my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known
intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were
to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers
guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would
at once respond to Belgium's appeal ; if such an appeal
were not made it is probable that — ^unless, of course, excep-
tional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence —
the French Government would not intervene until Belgium
had taken some effective measure of resistance."

I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support which
the French Government had been good enough to offer us
in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Govern-
ment were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of
the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to
<2' [See No. be done. '^'
40.] Finally, at 6 a.m. on August 4th, the German Minister

made the following communication to me. {See No. 27.)

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the
question of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neu-
'■" [No. 43.] trality. '"

No. 39.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914.

GREAT BRITAIN this morning called upon Germany
'"[B. 159.3 to respect Belgian neutrality."" The ultimatum says that
whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens
42

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 40]

the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes
the passage of German troops ; and whereas Belgian territory
has been violated at Gemmenich ; and whereas Germany
has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that
given last week by France ; therefore Great Britain must once
again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect
of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany,
no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum
expires at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the See No. 37,
British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for
the time being.

No. 40.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
British, French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.
(Translation.)

THE Belgian Government regret to have to announce
to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of
Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty
engagements.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist'" m\cf. No.
by all the means in their power. 22.I

Belgium appeals'*' to Great Britain, France, and Russia to
co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her '^' [pf- No.
territory."' _ ^^'

There should be* concerted and joint action (II y aurait jiso^
une action concertie et commune) to oppose the forcible measures 421.]
taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, ^^^
to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence Not fo'
and integrity of Belgium. - ^o^ '^A '

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she wiU under-
take the defence of her fortified places.

* [In Y. 152, and on p. 421, translated " There would be."]

IG. 413 BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 5,

No. 41.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914.

"'[B. I59-] GERMANY, having rejected the British proposals,"*
Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed
between the two countries as from eleven o'clock.

No. 42.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914.

AFTER the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich,
'"'[No. 40.] Belgium appealed''" to Great Britain, France, and Russia
through their representatives at Brussels, to co-operate as
guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places.

No. 43.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St.
Petersburg.

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

IN my despatch of August 4 {see No. 38) I had the honour
to inform you of the sequence of events which had attended
the international relations of Belgium from July 31st to
August 4th. I added that the Cabinet was considering the
question whether Belgium, whose territory had been invaded
since the morning, should appeal to the guarantee of the
Powers.

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the
British Minister informed me that the proposal which he
had communicated to me, and according to which the British
Government were disposed to respond favourably to our
appeal to her as a guaranteeing power, was cancelled for the
time being. {See No. 37.)

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [6. U]

A telegram from London made it clear that this change of
attitude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain"' '"[B. 159.I
giving Germany a time limit of ten hours within which to
evacuate Belgian territory and to respect Belgian neutrality.
(See No. 39.) During the evening, the Belgian Government
addressed to France, Great Britain, and Russia, through their
respective representatives at Brussels, a note, of which a copy
is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.)

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain,
France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in
the defence of her territory and in the maintenance for the
future of the independence and integrity of her territory.
She will herself undertake the defence of her fortified places.

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received.

No. 44.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having
Diplomatic Relations with Belgium.

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

BY the treaty of April i8th,* 1839, Prussia, France, Great
Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of
the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty
the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the
Netherlands. The treaty runs : " Belgium shall form a
State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has
fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accom-
plished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiahty, she has
neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause
that neutrality to be respected.

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have
learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a
Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian
territory in violation of the obhgations undertaken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage
against international law provoked by no act of ours.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel
by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon

* [The correct date of the treaty is April 19th, 1839. For text see p. 487.J

[G. 45] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 5,

their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of
"'[Sefi article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907"' respecting
P- 509I the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the
case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force,
attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be considered as a
hostile act.

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch
to his Excellency, handing him a copy, If the interview
cannot be granted at once you should make the communica-
tion in question in writing.

No. 45.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 5, 1914.

I HAVE received my passports and shall leave Berlin
l'^^* ■^* to-morrow morning for Holland"" with the staff of the
(vol.1., legation,
p. 212) ; No. 46.

contrast
y. 155.] Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to Monsieur

Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914.

THE Spanish Government undertake the custody of
^ MZ^° N^ Belgian interests in Germany, and are to-day sending tele-
^j ^° °' graphic instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

No. 47.

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 5, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the
notification of a state of war between France and Germany,
which has been communicated to me to-day.

Enclosure in No. 47,

[Text of notification, for which see Y. 157.]
46

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [6- 51]

No. 48.

Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British
Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government"' that "'[•Se« No.

His Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action '^°'^

with a view to resisting Germany to be in force and to be

justified by the Treaty of 1839"". ""[Seep.

487.]

No. 49.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914.

GREAT BRITAIN agrees to take joint action in her
capacity of guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian
territory. ''' The British fleet will ensure the free passage of "'[^^^ No.
the Scheldt for the provisioning of Antwerp. ^'^'^

No. 50.

Belgian Minister at The Hague to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 5, 1914. See No. 29.

THE war buoying is about to be estabUshed.

No. 51.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914.

PLEASE express to the Spanish Government the sincere See No. 46.
thanks of the Belgian Government.

£G. 52] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 5,

No. 52.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St.
Petersburg.

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French and

Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning

informing me of the wilhngness of their Governments to

'^' [No. 40.] respond to our appeal, "' and to co-operate with Great Britain

in the defence of Belgian territory.

No. 53.

Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to
Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Brussels, August 6, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency here-
with a copy of the special edition of the Staatscourant con-
taining the declaration of the neutrality of the Netherlands
in the war between Belgium and Germany, and between Great
Britain and Germany.

Enclosure to No. 53.

Laws, Decrees, Nominations, &c.

Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice,. Marine, War, and

the Colonies.

THE Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War,
and the Colonies, authorised to that effect by Her Majesty
the Queen, make known to all whom it may concern that the
Netherlands Government will observe strict neutrality in the
war which has broken out between Great Britain and Ger-
many, and Belgium and Germany, Powers friendly to the

1914] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 58]

Netherlands, and that, with a view to the observance of this
neutrality, the following dispositions have been taken : —

Article i.

Within the limits of the territory of the State, including
the territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and
possessions in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any
kind are permitted, neither may this territory serve as a base
for hostile operations.

Article 2.

Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of
the State by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory
by land is permitted to the troops or convoys of munitions
belonging to the belligerents, nor is the passage across the
territory situated within the territorial waters of the Nether-
lauds by the warships or ships assimilated thereto of the
belligerents permitted.

Article 3.

Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined
for them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be
immediately disarmed and interned until the termination of
the war.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a
belUgerent, who contravenes'" the provisions of articles 2, 4, '" [Should
or 7 will not be permitted to leave the said territory until the be "which
end of the war. JJie"-"

Article 4. "navires

de guerre

No warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to any . . . qui
of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory. contremen-

droni."]

Article 5.

The provisions of Article 4 do not apply to : —

I. Warships or ships assimilated thereto which are
forced to enter the ports or roadsteads of the State on account
of damages or the state of the sea. Such ships may leave

II— D 49

|G. 53] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 6,

the said ports or roadsteads as soon as the circumstances
which have driven them to take shelter there shall have
ceased to exist.

2. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a
belHgerent which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies
or oversea possessions exclusively with the object of com-
pleting their provision of foodstuffs or fuel. These ships
must leave as soon as the circumstances which have forced
them to anchor shall have ceased to exist, subject to the
condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall not
exceed twenty-four hours.

3. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a
belligerent employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or
humanitarian mission.

Article 6.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a
belligerent may only execute such repairs in the ports and
roadsteads of the State as are indispensable to their sea-
worthiness, and they may in no way increase their fighting
capacities.

Article 7.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a
belligerent who may at the commencement of war be within
the territory of the State must leave within twenty-four
hours from the moment of the publication of this declaration.

Article 8.

If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to
different belligerents find themselves at the same time, in
the conditions set forth in Article 5, in the same part of the
world and within the territory of the State, a delay of at least
twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of
each respective belHgerent ship. Except in special circum-
stances, the order of departure shall be determined by the
order of arrival. A warship or ship assimilated thereto
belonging to a beUigerent may only leave the territory of
the State twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant
ship which flies the flag of another belligerent.

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 63]

Article 9.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a
belligerent to which Articles 5 and 7 are applicable may only
be ,provisioned with foodstuffs in the ports and roadsteads
of the country to the extent necessary to bring their provisions
up to the normal limit in time of peace.

Similarly they can only be supplied with fuel to the extent
necessary to enable them, with the stock they already have
on board, to reach the nearest port of their own country.

The same vessel cannot again be provided with fuel until a
period of at least three months shall have elapsed since it was
last provisioned in the territory of the State.

Article 10.

A prize may only be brought into Dutch territory if such
prize is unnavigable, or unseaworthy, or short of fuel or food-
stuffs.

Such prize must leave as soon as the reasons which caused
her to enter Dutch territory cease to exist.

Should such prize fail to do so, immediate orders shall be
given her to leave. In the event of a refusal, all possible
means shall be employed to liberate the prize, with her of&cers
and crew, and to intern the crew placed on board by the
belligerent who has taken it as prize.

Article ii.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to form a corps of
combatants or to open recruiting offices on behalf of the
belUgerents.

Article 12.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take service on board
warships or ships assimilated thereto.

Article 13.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to equip, arm, or man
vessels intended for miUtary purposes on behalf of a belligerent,
or to furnish or deliver such vessels to a belligerent.

IG. 53J BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 6,

Article 14.

It is forbidden in State territory to supply arms or ammu-
nition to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to
a belhgerent, or to come to their assistance in any manner
whatsoever with a view to augment their crew or their
equipment.

Article 15.

It is forbidden in State territory failing previous authorisa-
tion by the competent local authorities, to repair warships
or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to
supply them with victuals or fuel.

Article 16.

It is forbidden in State territory to take part in the dis-
mantling or repairing of prizes, except in so far as is necessary
to make them seaworthy ; also to purchase prizes or con-
fiscated goods, and to receive them in exchange, in gift, or on
deposit.

Article 17.

The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a
distance of three nautical miles, reckoning sixty to the degree
of latitude, from low-water mark.

As regards inlets, this distance of three nautical miles is
measured from a straight line drawn across the inlet at the
point nearest the entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not
wider than ten nautical miles, reckoning sixty to the degree
of latitude.

Article 18.

Further, attention is called to Articles 100, Section i, and
205 of the Penal Code ; " Indisch Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62 ;
Article 7, Section 4, of the Law respecting the status of
Netherlands nationality, and respecting domicile (" Neder-
landsch Staatsblad," 1892, No. 268 ; 1910, No. 216) ; Article
2, No. 3, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands
nationality (" Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 55 ;
" Indisch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 296 ; Articles 54 and 55 of

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 55]

the Penal Code of Surinam ; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal
Code of Cura9oa.)

Similarly, the attention of commanding officers, owners,
and charterers of ships is called to the dangers and incon-
veniences to which they would expose themselves by
disregarding the effective blockade of belligerents, by carrying
contraband of war, or mihtary despatches for belligerents
(except in the course of the regular postal service), or by
rendering them other transport services.

Any person guilty of the acts aforesaid would expose
himself to all the consequences of those acts, and would
not be able, as regards them, to obtain any protection or
intervention on the part of the Netherlands Government.

No. 54.

Monsieur Davimon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 6, 1914.

PLEASE communicate the following note to the Nether- See No. 50.
lands Government : —

The Belgian Government have taken note of the estab-
lishment of war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that
the Netherlands Government will ensure the maintenance of
navigation.

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible
from 30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset,
and that the exchange of pilots should take place at Bath. '" ''' [See Nos.

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Nether- 53. 56.]
lands Government, the Belgian Government think that it is
desirable in the interests of the littoral ports to retain the
lightships of Wielingen and of Wandelaar, '*' and also the '^'[No. ag
buoys of the Wielingen Channel. and end.]

No. 55.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur

Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) The Hague, August 6, 1914.

NAVIGATION on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak
and so long as it is Hght.'" The WieUngen buoys will be '"t«/.No.

53 ^"^'^

[G. 56] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 7,

replaced. The exchange of pilots at Hansweert is easier
and better organised. Are you particularly anxious to have
Bath ?

No. 56.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August y, 1914.

PLEASE express to the Netherlands Government the
sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures
taken to secure navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian
Government are in agreement with the Netherlands Govern-
ment on the subject of the extent of navigation. They had
proposed Bath, but accept Hansweert, since this port has
'^'[c/. Nos. better facilities for the exchange of pilots.'"
54. 55-1

No. 57.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to
the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London.

[Replies : (Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1914.

French, BELGIUM trusts that the war will not be extended to

B°ti^h' Central Africa.'^' The Governor of the Belgian Congo has

No. 75.3 received instructions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude.

(2) [c/. Nos. Please ask the French Government [British Government]

58, 59, 61, whether they intend to proclaim the neutrahty of the French

74. 75-] Congo [British colonies in the conventional basin of the

Congo], in accordance with article 11 of the General Act of

Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that hostilities are

probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi.

No. 58.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London.

Brussels, August 7, 1914.
[No. 57, WITH reference to my telegram of this morning, '" I have
and note.] ^j^g honour to request you to bring to the notice of the French
[British] Government the following information : —

While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General
of the Congo to take defensive measures on the common

(3)

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 59]

frontiers of the Belgian colony and of the German colonies
of East Africa and the Cameroons, the Belgian Government
have suggested to that officer that he should abstain from all
offensive action against those colonies.

In view of the civilising mission common to colonising
nations, the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humani-
tarian reasons, not to extend the field of hostilities to Central
Africa. They will, therefore, not take the initiative of putting
such a strain on civilisation in that region, and the miUtary
forces which they possess there will only go into action in
the event of their having to repel a direct attack on their
African possessions.

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British]
Government share this view and in that case whether it is
their intention, during the present conflict, to avail themselves
of article ii of the General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of
their colonies as are contained in the conventional basin of
the Congo.

I am addressing an identic communication to your col-
league at London [Paris]."' '" [Replies,

Nos. 74,
75-]
No. 59.

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 8, 1914.

I HAVE had the honour of speaking to the President of
the Republic with respect to your telegram of yesterday."' <='[No. 57.J
I had received it during the evening and had immediately
communicated it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They
asked for time to consider it before answering.

Monsieur Poincare has promised me to speak on this
subject to-day to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight
he could see little difficulty in proclaiming the neutrahty of
the French Congo, but he nevertheless reserves his reply.'" '"[S^eNos.
He believes that acts of war have already taken place in the 61,74,75.]
Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity to remind me that
the protection accorded us by France extends also to our
colonies and that we have nothing to fear.

[G. 60] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 9,

No. 60.
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur

Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) The Hague, August 9, 1914.

[See No. THE Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged

^2-3 me to convey to you the following information, the United
States Minister at Brussels having decUned to do so : —

The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a

brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret

that bloody encounters should have resulted from the attitude

of the Belgian Government towards Germany. Germany is

"'[c/. No. not coming as an enemy"' into Belgium, it is only through

^°-^ the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the
military measures of France, to take the grave decision of
entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her
further military operations. Now that the Belgian army
has upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a
very superior force, the German Government beg the King of
the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium
the further horrors of war. The German Government are
ready for any compact with Belgium which can be reconciled
with their arrangements with France. {See No. 70.) Ger-
many once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not her
intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that
such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still
ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will
allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague
to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for
Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm.
I have undertaken it to oblige him.

No. 61.

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur

Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) Paris, August 9, 1914.

See No. 59. THE French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim
the neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of
""[See No. the Congo and are begging Spain''' to make the suggestion at
74.] Berlin.

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 62]

No, 62.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Hague, August 10, 1914.

IN response to a call on the telephone yesterday evening, [See No.
at 9 o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs. 63.3

Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had
just left his room, and had handed him a document which the
United States representative at Brussels had decUned to
forward to you.

The United States official in charge of the German Lega-
tion at Brussels stated that he had received no special instruc-
tions from Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian
Government in the interest of Germany.

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to
his colleague at The Hague, who informed the German repre-
sentative of Mr. Whitlock's refusal.

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step
by approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin.

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these
matters, Herr von Miiller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as
the intermediary of the German Government in this negotia-
tion with you.

His Excellency read me the German text of the document.
I did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation,
and its poor chance of success in this form ; but, solely in
order to oblige the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs,
I promised to telegraph to you immediately ; and this I did
yesterday."' »)[No. 60.3

You will find the German document enclosed in original
and translation.

Enclosure i in No. 62.

DIE Festung Liittich ist nach tapfrer Gegenwehr im [Reply,
Sturm genommen worden. Die Deutsche Regierung bedauert Nos, 71,
es auf das tiefste, dass es infolge der Stellungnahme der 73-]
Belgischen Regierung gegen Deutschland zu bliitigen Zusara-
menstossen gekommen ist. Deutschland kommt nicht als

[G. 62] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August io,

Feind nach Belgien. Nur unter dem Zwang der Verhaltnisse
hat es angesichts der militarischen Massnahmen Frankreichs
den schweren Entschluss fassen mussen, in Belgien einzurucken
und Liittich als Stiitzpunkt fur seine weiteren militarischen
Operationen besetzen zu miissen. Nachdem die Belgische
Armee in heldenmutigem Widerstand gegen die grosse Uber-
lengenheit ihre Waffenehre auf das glanzendste gewahrt hat,
bittet die Deutsche Regierung seine Majestat den Konig und
die Belgische Regierung, Belgien die weiteren Schrecken des
Krieges zu ersparen. Die Deutsche Regierung ist zu jedem
Abkommem mit Belgien bereit das sich irgendwie mit Riick-
sicht auf seine {voir fihe No. 70) Auseinandersetzung mit
Frankreich vereinigen lasst. Deutschland versichert noch-
mals feierlichst, dass es nicht von der Absicht geleitet gewesen
ist sich Belgisches Gebiet anzueignen, und dass ihm diese
Absicht durchaus fern liegt. Deutschland is noch immer
bereit das Belgische Konigreich unverziiglich zu raumen,
sobald die Kriegslage es ihm gestattet. " Der hiesige Ameri-
kanische Botschafter ist mit diesem Vermittlungsversuch
seines Briisseler KoUegen einverstanden."

Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

(Translation.)

LA forteresse de Liege a ete prise d'assaut apres une
defense courageuse. Le Gouvernement allemand regrette le
plus profondement que par suite de I'attitude du Gouverne-
ment beige contre FAllemagne on en soit arrive a des rencon-
tres sanglantes. L'AUemagne ne vient pas en ennemie en
Belgique. C'est seulement par la force des evenements
qu'elle a du, a cause des mesures mihtaires de la France,
. prendre la grave determination d'entrer en Belgique et
d'occuper Liege comme point d'appui pour ses operations
rriilitaires ulterieures. Apres que I'armee beige a, dans une
resistance heroique contre une grande superiorite, main-
tenu I'honneur de ses armes de la fagon la plus brillante, le
Gouvernement allemand prie Sa Majeste le Roi et le Gouverne-
ment beige d'eviter a la Belgique les horreurs ulterieures de la
guerre. Le Gouvernement allemand est pret a tout accord
avec la Belgique, qui peut se concilier de n'importe quelle
maniere avec ses arrangements avec la France. L'AUemagne
58

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 63]

assure encore une fois solennellement qu'elle n'a pas et^
dirigee par rintention de s'approprier le territoire beige et
que cette intention est loin d'elle. L'AUemagne est encore
tou jours prete k ^vacuer la Belgique aussitot que I'etat de la
guerre le lui permettra.

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis ici est d'accord avec cette
tentative de mediation de son collogue de Bruxelles.

(Translation.)

THE fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a
brave defence. The German Government most deeply regrets
that bloody encounters should have resulted from the Belgian
Government's attitude towards Germany. Germany is not
coming as an enemy into Belgium."' It is only through the L^/. Jmo.
force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military ^°'^

measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering
Belgium and occupjdng Liege as a base for her further military
operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the
honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic
resistance to a very superior force, the German Government
beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government
to spare Belgium the horrors of war. The German Govern-
ment are ready for any compact with Belgium which can in
any way be reconciled with their arrangements with France.
Germany gives once more her solemn assurance that she has
not been animated by the intention of appropriating Belgian
territory for herself, and that such an intention is far from
her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium
as soon as the state of war wiU allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador here concurs in this attempt
at mediation by his colleague in Brussels.

No. 63.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.
(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914.

THE Belgian Government have received the proposals See No. 62-.
made to them by the German Government through the inter- and
mediary of the Netherlands Government. They will forward enclosures^
a reply shortly.

[G. 641 BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August ic,

No. 64.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914.

DOUBT exists as to the meaning of the word " Ausein-

1^1 [See No. andersetzung," which you translate by "arrangement."'"

70-1 Please ascertain whether the German Government have in

mind any arrangements which we may have come to with

France, or a settlement of the dispute between France and

Germany.

No. 65.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the British, Russian, and French Ministers at
Brussels.

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the
Belgian Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Nether-
lands Minister for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the
following proposal from the German Government. [See
No. 62, enclosure 2.)

The Belgian Government propose to return the following
'^'[See No. reply"' to this communication :

7^-3 " The proposal made to us by the German Government

repeats the proposal formulated in their ultimatum of

<^' [No. 20.] August 2.'^' Faithful to her international obhgations, Bel-

'•" [No. 22.3 gium can only reiterate her reply"' to that ultimatum, the

more so as since August 3 her neutrality has been violated,

a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the

^'' [N OS. 48, guarantors of her neutrality have responded"" loyally and

5^-3 without delay to her appeal."

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers
^5) guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium should have cognizance

68,69,73 of these documents.'" '

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 66]

No. 66.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St.
Petersburg.

Brussels, August lo, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the circumstances
which led to the departure of the Belgian representative
from Luxemburg.'" "'['^Z-

The General Ofi&cer commanding the German troops in ^^^g^^'s
the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German departure,
Minister in that town, on August 8, of the desire of the military y. 156.3
authorities for the departure of the Belgian representative at
the Grand Ducal Court.

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President
of the Government, a note, of which the following is a
translation :

" Your Excellency, " Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.

" In consequence of the completely hostile attitude
adopted by Belgium towards Germany, the military authori-
ties find themselves obliged to insist upon the departure of
the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg.

" His Excellency the German Officer commanding begs
Count van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home
in such a way that he may be able, within twenty-four hours,
to see General von Ploetz at Coblentz, with a view to settUng
the details of the further stages of his journey. It is impos-
sible for him to travel except via Treves-Coblentz.

(Signed) " VON BUCH."

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to
Count van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the
following terms :
« gjjj " Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.

" I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the
enclosed copy of a note from the German Minister, informing
me that the German military authorities demand your depar-
ture.

[G. 67] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August u,

" You will find in it the conditions which they attach
thereto.

" Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities
advise you to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out
your journey by motor would expose you to being too frequently
stopped for reasons connected with the control of the roads.
But the choice is left to you.

" The German Minister will come to me for your answer.

" I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my
present task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations
which have existed between us, and I hope that your journey
may be carried out under the best possible conditions.

(Signed) " EYSCHEN."

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand
Ducal Government had no choice in their attitude, and that
the course they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied
any discourteous intention towards the King of the Belgians
or towards Belgium, decided that there was no reason, in
these circumstances, for requesting the Luxemburg Charge
d'Affaires to leave Belgium,

No. 67.

Mr. Whitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 11, 1914.

THE United States Legation received a telegram to-day
from Washington, conveying the information that the United
States Government had, at the request of the German Govern-
ment, consented, as a matter of international courtesy, to
undertake the protection of German subjects in Belgium.

In accordance with the instructions contained in this
telegram, we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake
to use our good and friendly offices with the Belgian Govern-
ment for the protection of German subjects. The pleasant
relations which we have had with you in this matter up to the
present convince me that we may continue them with the
same object on the same pleasant footing.

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 70]

No. 68.

Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August ii, 1914.

I HAVE telegraphed to Sir E. Grey the German com- See No. 65
munication"' and the proposed reply. ">[No. 62,

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency (end).]
the entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Govern-
ment. The latter can only declare their approval of the
terms of the reply which the Belgian Government propose
to give to this attempt to sow discord between the Powers
at present united for the defence of the treaties violated by ,
Germany.

No. 69.

Monsieur Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to
Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Brussels, August 11, 1914.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the See No. 65
French Government give their entire concurrence to the reply
which the Belgian Government propose to return to the new
German ultimatum. '"' '" [No. 62,

The reply is one which was to be expected from a Govern- (end.)]
ment and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful
violation of their territory.

France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing
Power of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium.

No. 70.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 12, 1914.

THE German text contained a mistake : instead of See No. 64.
" seine Auseinandersetzung," it should read " ihre," and
thus be translated " their conflict with France."

[G. 711 BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 12

No. 71.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.
(Telegramme.) [Brussels, August 12, 1914.]

PRifiRE de remettre le telegramme suivant au Ministre
des Affaires fitrangeres :

" La proposition que nous fait le Gouvernement allemand
reproduit la proposition qui avait et6 formulee dans I'ultima-
tum du 2 aodt. Fidele a ses devoirs internationaux, la
Belgique ne pent que reiterer sa reponse a cet ultimatum,
d'autant plus que depuis le 3 aout sa neutralite a ete violee,
qu'une guerre douloureuse a ete portee sur son territoire, et
que les garants de sa neutralite ont loyalement et immediate-
ment repondu a son appel."

(Translation.)
- (Telegram.) Brussels, August 12, 1914.

PLEASE communicate'" the following telegram"" to the
[See No. Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs :

2'[c/. No. " The proposal ''' made to us by the German Government

65.3 repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum"'

[No. 63, of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations,

(end.)] Belgium can only reiterate her reply'^' to that ultimatum,
^' [No. 20.] ^Yie more so as since August 3rd, her neutrality has been

' ^^^- ^^'^ violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory,
'"[Nos 48 ^^^ ^^^ guarantors of her neutrality • have responded'*'

52.] ' loyally and without delay to her appeal."

No. 72.

Monsieur Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign

Affairs.

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, August 13, 1914.

PLEASE thank the Belgian Government for their com-
«« o- 5- munication, and express to them the pleasure which the
Russian Government feel at the firm and dignified attitude
upon which they are heartily to be congratulated.
64

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [0,. 74]

No. 73.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at the Hague, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Hague, August 13, 1914.

I HAD the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, See No. 71
and I at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for
Foreign Affairs, the Belgian reply to the second German
proposal.

His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian com-
munication to the German Minister forthwith.

No. 74.

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August ±6, 1914.

IN the course of a conversation which I had this morning See Nos. 57
with Monsieur de Margerie,"' I turned the conversation to and 58.
colonial affairs and to the action which you had instructed "'[Political
me to take in your telegram and your despatch of the 7th ^^'^ °^
instant.

Monsieur de Margerie reminded me that the French
Government had approached Spain,'" but the latter had not '"[No. 61.3
answered before knowing the views of Great Britain. It
seems that the latter has still given no answer.

Monsieur de Margerie considered that in view of the
present situation Germany should be attacked wherever
possible ; he believes that such is also the opinion of
Great Britain, who certainly has claims to satisfy ; France
wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she had
been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir
incident.

Monsieur de Margerie added that a success would not be
difficult to obtain.

II-E 6s

[G. 75] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 17,

No. 75.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 17, 1914.

See Nos. 57 IN reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the
and 58. honour to inform you that the British Government can-
not agree to the Belgian proposal to respect the neutrality,
of the belligerent powers in the conventional basin of the
Congo.

German troops from German East Africa have already
taken the offensive against the British Central African Pro-
tectorate. Furthermore, British troops have already attacked
the German port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have des-
troyed the wireless telegraphy station.

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if
they were convinced from the political and strategical point
of view of the utihty of the Belgian proposal, would be unable
to adopt it.

The British Government believe that the forces they are
sending to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition.
They will take every step in their power to prevent any
risings of the native population.

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account
of German activity which has been noticed near Bonar and
Ekododo.

No. 76.

Monsieur Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to
Monsieur Renkin, Belgian Minister for the Colonies.

(Telegram.) Elizabethville, August 26, 1914.

THE Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tan-
ganyika and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd.
Two of their natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh
attacks are expected.

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 77}

No. 77.

Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at
The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign

Affairs.)

(T61egramme.) \The Hague, August 28, 1914.]

D'ORDRE de mon Gouvernement, j'ai I'honneur de
notifier a votre Excellence ce qui suit :

" Vu que la Belgique, apres avoir refuse d'accepter les
propositions qui lui avaient ete adressees a plusieurs reprises
par TAUemagne, prete sa cooperation militaire a la France
et a la Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes deux ont declare la
guerre a I'Autriche-Hongrie, et en presence du fait que,
comme il vient d'etre constate, les ressortissants autrichiens
et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux des
autorites Royales, dfi subir un traitement contraire aux
exigences les plus primitives de I'humanite et inadmissibles
meme vis-a-vis des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, I'Autriche-
Hongrie se voit dans la necessite de rompre les relations
diplomatiques et se considere des ce moment en etat de
guerre avec la Belgique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel
de la legation et confie la protection de mes administres au
Ministre des £tats-Unis d'Amerique en Belgique. De la part
du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal les passeports sont remis
au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele."

(Translation.)

The Hague, August 28, 1914.
(Telegram.)

ON the instructions of my Government, '" I have the honour w [See R.
.to inform your Excellency as follows : — 67.]

" Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the pro-
posals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is
affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain,

[G. 783 BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 29'

both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-
Hungary, and whereas, as has just been proved, Austrian and
Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under
the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment con-

''*[5ee No. trary to the njost primitive demands of humanity'" and
78]- inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, there-
fore Austria finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic
relations and considers herself from this moment in a state
of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the
staff of the Legation and I am entrusting the protection of
Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium.
The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his pass-

'"' [Reply, ports to Count Errembault de Dudzeele."™

No. 78.1

No. 78.

Monsieur Davignon,, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at the Hague.

(Telegramme.) \_Antwerp, August 29, 1914.]

PRI£RE accuser reception a Legation Autriche par
intermediaire Ministre Affaires Etrangeres declaration de
guerre Autriche-Hongrie k Belgique et aj outer ce qui suit :

" La Belgique a toujours entretenu des relations d'amiti6
avec tous ses voisins sans distinction. Elle a scrupuleusement
rempli les devoirs que la neutralite lui impose. Si elle n'a
pas cru pouvoir accepter les propositions de I'AUemagne,
c'est que celles-ci avaient pour objet la violation des engage-
ments qu'elle a pris a la face de I'Europe, engagements qui
ont ete les conditions de la creation du Royaume de Belgique.
Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple, quelque faible qu'il soit, puisse
meconnaitre ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s'inclinant
devant la force. Le Gouvernement a attendu, non seulement
les delais de I'ultimatum, mais la violation de son territoire
par les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel a la France
et a I'Angleterre, garantes de sa neutralite au meme titre que
I'Allemagne et I'Autriche-Hongrie, pour cooperer au nom et
en vertu des traites a la defense du territoire beige.

En repoussant par les armes les envahisseurs, elle n'a
meme pas accompli un acte d'hostilite aux termes de I'article
10 de la Convention de La Haye sur les droits et devoirs des
Puissances neutres.

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 781

L'AUemagne a reconnu elle-meme que son agression con-
stitue une violation du droit des gens et ne pouvant la justifier
elle a invoque son interet strategique.

La Belgique oppose un dementi formel a I'affirmation que
les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois auraient subi en
Belgique un traitement contraire aux exigences les 'plus
primitives de I'humanitie.

Le Gouvernement Royal a donne, des le debut des hos-
tilites, les ordres les plus stricts quant a la sauvegarde des
personnes et des proprietes austro-hongroises.

(Translation.)

(Telegram.) Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

PLEASE inform the Austrian Legation through the
Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-
Hungary's declaration of war"' against Belgium, and add idtno. 77.]
the following : —

" Belgium has always entertained friendly relations with
all her neighbours without distinction. She had scrupulously
fulfilled the duties imposed upon her by her neutraUty. If
she has not been able to accept Germany's proposals, "^' it '^' [Nos. 20,
is because those proposals cdntemplated the violation of her 62 (end.).]
engagements toward Europe, engagements which form the
conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom. She has
been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may
be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yielding
to force. The Government have waited, not only until the
ultimatum'"' had expired, but also until Belgian territory <='[No. 20.3
had been violated by German troops,'*' before appealing to i^i[No. 30.I
France and Great Britain, '°' guarantors of her neutrality, (») [No. 40.3
under the same terms as are Germany and Austria-Hungary,
to co-operate in the name and in virtue of the treaties in
defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by
force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as
laid down by the provisions of article 10 of The Hague Con-
vention'*' respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers. <«»[Sefi

" Germany herself has recognised that her attack con- p. 509.3
stitutes a violation of international law,"' and, being unable '"[No. 35.]
to justify it, she has pleaded her strategical interests.

[G. 79] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 39,

" Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian

and Hungarian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgium

<"' [No. contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity.'"

11^ " The Belgian Government, from the very commencement
of hostilities, have issued the strictest orders for the pro-
tection of Austro-Hungarian persons and property."

No. 79.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Belgian Ministers abroad.

Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

UNDER date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch
to the Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to
call attention to certain allegations made by the German
Government which are mentioned in the Blue-book recently
published by the British Government.

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy
of the despatch in question and of its enclosures.

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of
the Government to which you are accredited.

Enclosure i in No. 79.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London.

Brussels, August 17, 1914.

THE Blue-book recently published by the British Gov-
ernment contains [see No. 122, p. 65) the text of a telegram
despatched from Berlin on the 31st July by Sir E. Goschen
•2- [SeeB. to Sir E. Grey, in which the following passage occurs'*' : —

"It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary
of State] said, that the German Government consider that
certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium.
As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn
for Germany had been placed under an embargo already."

The incident to which the German Secretary of State
alluded in his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which
he considered as an hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubt-
less refers to the application of the Royal decree of the 30th

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 793

July, which provisionally prohibited the export from Belgium
of certain products. As you will see from the explanation
in the following paragraph, the incident with which we are
reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has
wished to attribute to it.

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in
the Moniteur Beige the following day forbade, provisionally,
the export, both by land and by sea of a series of products,
more especially of cereals. On the 31st July the German
Minister at Brussels called my attention to the fact that the
Antwerp customs were detaining cargoes of grain addressed
to Germany, which, as they were merely transhipped in our
port, were in reality only in transit. Herr von Below Saleske
requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should be
allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the Ger-
man Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office
brought the matter to the notice of the Ministry of Finance,
and the following day, the 2nd August, that Department
informed us that instructions had been forwarded to the
Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction to Germany.

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information,
copies of the correspondence exchanged on this subject with
Herr [von] Below Saleske. You will observe that nothing in
our attitude can be taken as showing any hostile dispositions
towards Germany ; the steps taken by the Belgian Govern-
ment at that time were nothing more than those simple
precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to
adopt in such exceptional circumstances.

It would be as well that you should address a communica-
tion to the British Government in order to explain the real
facts of the case.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to
Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

I AM informed from Antwerp that the Customs have
forbidden the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain
for Germany.

[G. 79] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 29,

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of
the export of grain, but of grain in transit, the goods in ques-
tion having been merely transhipped at Antwerp, I have the
honour to ask your good offices in order that the vessels in
question may be allov/ed to leave for Germany.

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me
if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods
specified in the Moniteur of to-day.

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible
convenience, I have, &c.

Enclosure 3 in No. 79.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.

Brussels, August i, 1914.

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I
have the honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of
the 30th July concerns only the export and not the transit
of the products mentioned.

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of
Finance and begged him to issue precise instructions to the
Customs officials in order that any error in the application
of the above-named decree might be avoided.

Enclosure 4 in No. 79.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

WITH reference to the note which your Excellency was
good enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the
honour to inform you that the Minister of Finance has in-
structed the Customs that the prohibitions estabUshed by
the Royal decrees of the 30th July last only apply to actual
exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods regularly
declared in transit at the time of import. Moreover, when
72

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 79]

duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consumption,
although they are really intended for export, they are com-
monly the object of special declarations of free entry, which
are considered as transit documents. In short, if it should
happen that such goods had been declared as for consumption
without restriction, as though they were to remain in the
country, the Customs would still allow them to leave the
country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch
receipts, bills of lading, &c., that they were to be exported
forthwith in transit.

I would add that the export of grain with which your
note deals was authorised on the ist August.

THE SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK.

(Official Translation from "Collected Diplomatic Documents."

[Cd. 7860].)

TABLE OF CONTENTS.*

No.

Name.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

Subject.

P-I

M. Yov. M. Yovano-

vitch to M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

1914.
Vienna,
June 29

Anti-Serbian assertions of
Vienna Press . .

ft If

(Telegraphic)

Vienna,
June 30

The Serajevo outrage
ascribed in Vienna to
conspiracy engineered
in Serbia

Dr. M. Yovanovitch to
M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

BerHn,
June 30

Berlin Press connects Sera-
jevo outrage with Serbia

(Telegraphic)

Growing German hostiUty
towards Serbia, fostered
by false reports from
Vienna and Budapest . .

M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch to M. Pashitch

Vienna,
June 30

Conversation with Baron
Macchio. Serbian Gov-
ernment condemn the
outrage and loyally
desire good relations . .

M. Georgevitch to
M. Pashitch

Constanti-
nople,
June 30

Conversation with Aus-
trian Ambassador, who
understood that Count
Berchtold was satisfied
with Serbian attitude . .

[Supplied by the Editor.]

[S.J

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK

No.

Name.

Place and

Date of
Despatch.

Subject.

M. Boshkovitch to
M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

1914.

London,

July I

Enghsh newspapers, on
information from Aus-
trian sources, attribute
the outrage to Serbian
revolutionaries

M. Pashitch to all Ser-
bian Legations

Belgrade,
July I

Charges against Serbia
absurd ; she will re-
double her vigilance ;
anti-Serbian Press cam-
paign to be stopped by
all available means

M. Yov. M. Yovano-

vitch to M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

Vienna,
July I

Describes anti- Serbian
demonstrations and
propaganda. Belgrade
Press should be moderate

Dr. Vesnitch to
M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

Paris,
July 2

French Government ad-
vise Serbia to be calm . .

M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch to M. Pashitch

Vienna,

Julys

Describes manifestations
hostile to Serbia, and
misrepresentations by
Vienna Press . .

JJ It

f J

Conversation with Baron
Macchio, who severely
criticizes the Serbian
Press and accuses the
Great Serbian agitators

Dr. Vesnitch to
M. Pashitch

Paris,
July 4

Conversation with
M. Viviani, who advises
an attitude of calmness
and dignity . . . .

Dr. Spalaikovitch to
M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

Petrograd,
July 4

Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs incul-
cates calmness

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK

[S,3

No.

Place and

Date of
Despatch.

M. Yov. M. Yovano-

vitch to M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

M. Pashitch to all
Serbian Legations

(Telegraphic)

Dr.f M. Yovanovitch
to M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

M. Pashitch to all
Serbian Legations

(Telegraphic)

1914.
Vienna,
July 6

Vienna,
July?

Belgrade,
July 9

Berlin,
July 14

Belgrade,
July 14

Growing excitement against
Serbia owing to tone of
Serbian Press . .

Analysis of articles in
Vienna Press upon the
Serajevo outrage

Excitement undiminished.
Emperor's appeal for
calmness. Alternative
courses between which
Austria must choose . .

Crown Prince Alexander
receives threatening
letters from Austria-
Hungary

German Secretary of State
says Austria cannot
tolerate provocative
attitude of Serbian Press

Austrian Korrespondenz-
bureau's misrepresenta-
tions of Serbian Press.
The Austrian papers
originate the contro-
versy. Serbian public
opinion relatively calm

False reports spread by
Austro-Hungarian news-
papers to excite pubHc
opinion against Serbia

[S.J

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK

No.

Name.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

Subject.

•

M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch to M. Pashitch

1914.
Vienna,
July 14

PubUc opinion again ex-
cited by Literary Bureau
of Austrian Foreign
Office. Official German
circles especially ill-dis-
posed. Nette Freie

■ Presse calls for war.
Bourse very depressed

» jj

Vienna,
July 15

The Position in Austria-
Hungary, where secrecy
is enjoined. Diplomatic
steps at Belgrade will
follow magisterial in-
quiry at Serajevo

II li

Serbia will be accused of
tolerating revolutionary
elements. German Em-
bassy encourages anti-
Serbian policy . .

it It

Forecast of Austrian
action against Serbia . .

Dr. M. Yovanovitch to
M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

Berlin,
July 16

Secretary of State says
Great Serbian propa-
ganda should be ener-
getically suppressed . .

100

M. Boschkovitch to
M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

London,
July 17

Efforts of Austrian Em-
bassy to win over
English Press. Austria
will probably seek to
humihate Serbia

100

M. Ljub Michailovitch
to M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

Rome,
July 17

Italy desires maintenance
of complete Serbian
independence . .

lOI

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK

ES.1

No.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

Dr. Spalaikovitch to
M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

M. Pashitch to aU
Serbian Missions
abroad

(Telegraphic)

M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch to M. Pashitch

Baron Giesl von GiesUn-
gen to Dr. Patchou

Dr. Patchou to all
Serbian Legations

(Telegraphic)

M. Pashitch to Dr.
Spalaikovitch

(Telegraphic)

M. Pashitch to
M. Boschkovitch

(Telegraphic)

1914.

Petrograd,

July 18

Belgrade,
July 19

Vienna,
July 20

Belgrade,
July 23

Belgrade,
July 24

Conversation with M.
Sazonof concerning
provocative attitude of
Vienna Press . .

Relates course of events
since Serajevo outrage.
Serbia willing to put
accompUces on trial, but
cannot accept demands
directed against her
dignity

Austria's intentions secret,
but probably prepar-
ing for war against
Serbia. MiUtary prepar-
ations near the frontier

Transmits the Austrian
note

Austrian Minister will
leave Belgrade unless a
favourable answer is re-
ceived within two days.
No Serbian Government
could accept all the
Austrian demands

Will appeal to friendly
Powers. If war in-
evitable, Serbia will
carry it on

Hopes British Govenunent
may induce Austrian
Government to moder-
ate their demands

lOI

106

107

[S.I

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK

No.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

Dr. Spalaikovitch to
M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

Crown Prince Alex-
ander to the Tsar

(Telegraphic)

M. Pashitch to all
Serbian Legations

(Telegraphic)

Serbian Government
to Austria

Baron Giesl
M. Pashitch

M. Pashitch to all
Serbian Legations

Count Berchtold to
M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch

The Tsar to the Crown
Prince of Serbia

(Telegraphic)

The Crown Prince to
The Tsar

(Telegraphic)

1914.

Petrograd,

July 24

Belgrade,
July 24

Belgrade,
July 25

Vienna,
July 25

Petrograd,
July 27

Nish,
July 30

Conversation with Count
Pourtales, who declares
that the matter con-
cerns Austria and Ser-
bia only

Appeals for aid . .

Serbia will accept the
demands as far as pos-
sible. Hopes Austria
will accept the full
satisfaction offered

The Serbian reply to the
Austrian note . .

Announces diplomatic
rupture. Is leaving
Belgrade to-night

Has communicated reply
to Austria. Relations
broken off. Skupshtina
summoned for July 27th
at Nish. Order for
mobilisation issued

Announces rupture
diplomatic relations

Reply to Crown Prince's
appeal. (No. 37.)

Thanks for No. 43

108

109

III

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK

[S.3

No.

Name.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

Subject.

Count Berchtold to
M. Pashitch

(Telegraphic)

M. Pashitch to all Ser-
bian Legations

(Telegraphic)

Dr. Spalaikovitch to
M. Sazonof

M. Sazonof to Dr.
Spalaikovitch

M. Pashitch to Dr.
M. Yovanovitch

(Telegraphic)

Serbian Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to
German Legation

Dr. M. Yovanovitch to
M. Pashitch

M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch to M. Pashitch

1914.
Vienna,
July 28

Nish,
July 28

Petrograd,
July 28

Petrograd,
July 30

Nish,
August 4

Nish,
August 6

Berlin,
August 6

Nish,
August 16

Austrian ^ declkration of
war against Serbia

Announces Austrian de-
claration of war

Informs him of Austrian
declaration of war, and
begs him to lay petition
from Serbian natibn
before throne of the Tsar

Will lay before His Majesty
the Serbian petition . .

Instructs him to leave
Germany immediately

Requests German Lega-
tion to leave Serbian
territory

Final interview with Ger-
man Under-Secretary of
State, who ascribes
war to Russian mobi-
lisation. Austria would
probably have been
satisfied with occupa-
tion of Belgrade

Narrative of events
Austria-Hungary

III

112

113

114

II— F

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. H

THE SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK.

No. I.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 16/29, I9I4-

THE Vienna Press'" asserts that the magisterial enquiry "i[c/. No.
has already shown that the Serajevo outrage was prepared 3]

at Belgrade ; '^' further, that the whole conspiracy in its '^' [cf. Nos.
wider issues was organised at Belgrade among youths inspired 2, 8, 30.]
with the Great Serbian idea, and that the Belgrade Press
is exciting public opinion by publishing articles about the
intolerable conditions prevailing in Bosnia. Press articles
of this kind, according to the Vienna Press, are exercising a
strong influence, as Serbian newspapers are being smuggled
in large quantities into Bosnia.

No. 2.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 17/30, 1914.

THE tendency at Vienna ''' to represent, in the eyes of '"[c/. No.
Europe, the outrage committed upon the Austro-Hungarian 4]

Crown Prince as the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia
is becoming more and more apparent. The idea is to use
this as a political weapon against us. The greatest attention
ought, therefore, to be paid to the tone adopted by our
Press'*' in its articles on the Serajevo outrage. '*'[^/- No.

83 ^°"^

[S. 8] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June i;,

No. 3.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargi A' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 1914.

"i[c/.No. THE Berlin Press,"' in publishing articles based on
^■■' information from Vienna and Budapest, in which the Serajevo
outrage is connected with Serbia, is misleading German public
opinion.

No. 4.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 1914.

THE hostility of public opinion in Germany towards

us is growing, and is being fostered by false reports coming

"'I [c/. Nos. from Vienna and Budapest. "" Such reports are being dili-

2, 21, 30.] gently spread in spite of the contradictions issued by some

newspapers and news agencies.

No. 5.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Vienna, June 17/30, 1914.
AS Count Berchtold was not able to receive me when I
called, I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs concerning the Serajevo outrage. In
the course of our conversation I adopted the following line
of argument : —

" The Royal Serbian Government condemn most ener-
getically the Serajevo outrage and on their part will certainly
most loyally do everything to prove that they will not tolerate
within their territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal
proceedings calculated to disturb our already delicate rela-
tions with Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 6]

Government are prepared also to submit to trial any persons
implicated in the plot, in the event of its being proved that
there are any in Serbia. "* The Royal Serbian Government '^' [c/- No.
notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their 3o.]

way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an inde-
pendent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic,
demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September
ultimatum, &c.) remained loyal in their desire to establish
a sound basis for our good neighbourly relations. You know
that in this direction something has been done and achieved.
Serbia intends to continue to work for this object,'^' convinced ""['^Z- Nos.
that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Sera- ^- ^- 3o]
jevo outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work."

Baron Macchio has taken note of the above and promised
to communicate to Count Berchtold all that I said to him.

On the same day I communicated to the French and
Russian Ambassadors the substance of this conversation.

No. 6.

M. M. Georgevitch, Charge d' Affaires at Constantinople, ta
M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

Constantinople, June 17/30, 1914.

I HAD to-day a long conversation with the Austro-
Hungarian Ambassador here concerning the Serajevo out-
rage. I expressed the hope that this regrettable event —
whatever is said about it in certain diplomatic circles —
would not unfavourably influence the relations between Serbia
and Austria-Hungary which lately had shown considerable
improvement. ''' '''[c/. Nos.

He replied that such an eventuality was impossible, and 5- 8> 30-]
ought not to be contemplated. He was also of opinion that
Serbo-Austro-Hungarian relations had much improved lately.
He added that the work in that direction ought to be persevered
in. He informed me that from his latest conversations with
Count Berchtold he understood that the latter was satisfied
with the attitude adopted by the Serbian Government, and
that he, on his part, sincerely desired friendly relations with
Serbia.

[s. 7] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June i|

No. 7.

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister in London, to M. N. Pashitch,

Prime Minister and Minister forJForeign Affairs.
(Telegraphic.) London, June 18/July 1, 1914.

BASING their information upon reports coming from
'" [c/. No. Austrian sources,'" nearly all the Enghsh newspapers'"
,„, r ,„ ^■" attribute the Serai evo outrage to the work of Serbian
27.1 revolutionaries.

No. 8.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, June 18/July 1, 1914.

THE Austrian and Hungarian Press are blaming Serbia
more and more for the Serajevo outrage. Their aim is
transparent, viz., to destroy that high moral reputation
which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest
advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young
and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Serajevo
outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles
of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, imme-
diately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial
not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria-
Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country,
as recent occurrences have proved. At a moment when
Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her
'5' [c/. Nos. relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, '" it is absurd
5. 6, 30.] to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired
acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest
interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage.
Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both
assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been
careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events
she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such
elements existing within her borders will take the severest
measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything
in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order
to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 101

frontiers. But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna
and Hungarian Press to mislead European public opinion,
and lay the heavy responsibility for a crime committed by
an Austrian subject at the door of the whole Serbian nation
and on Serbia, who can only suffer harm from such acts
and can derive no benefit whatever.

Please act in the sense of the above views, and use all
available channels in order to put an end as soon as possible
to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European Press.

No. 9.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.

Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign

Affairs. '

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June zS/July i, 1914.

THERE were demonstrations last night in front of the
Legation. I may say that the police showed considerable
energy. Order and peace were maintained. As soon as I
obtain positive information that the Serbian flag has been
burned, I wiU lodge a complaint in the proper quarters.
I will report to you the result. Hatred against Serbians
and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially by
the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna Press, and military
circles. Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations
taking place in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade Press to
be as moderate as possible in tone. The tendency towards
us here is still the same. It is expected that the decision
as to the attitude to be adopted towards Serbia and the
Serbians wiU be taken after the funeral.

No. 10.

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, June -K^JJuly 2, 1914.

THE French Government advise us to maintain an mr^i -^^^
attitude of the greatest possible calm and composure'" in 13^' j^^
official circles as well as in public opinion. 30!]

IS. 11] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June 20,

No. II.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs. '

Vienna, June 20/ July 3, 1914.

YESTERDAY being the day on which the remains of
the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were brought
from Serajevo to Vienna, I gave instructions that the national
flag at my residence should be hoisted at half-mast as a sign
of mourning.

Yesterday evening, on this account, protests were made
by the concierge, the other tenants, the landlord's agent,
and the landlord himself, who demanded the removal of
the flag. Explanations proved of no avail, and the assistance
of the police authorities was requested. The latter privately
asked that the flag should be removed in order to avoid
further disorders. The flag was not removed, and accordingly
noisy demonstrations took place last night in front of the
Legation. The conduct of the police was energetic, and
nothing happened to the flag or to the building which might
constitute an insult. At 2 a.m. the crowd dispersed.
To-day's papers, more particularly the popular clerical
papers, publish articles under the heading " Provocation by
the Serbian Minister," in which the whole incident is falsely
described.

The flag on the Legation building remained flying the
whole time up to the conclusion of the service at the Court
Chapel. As soon as this ceremony was concluded, the flag
was removed. People from all over the quarter in which I
Hve went to the Prefecture, the Municipality, and the State
Council to demand the removal of our flag.

The crowd was harangued by Dr. Funder, director-in-chief
of the Catholic Reichspost, Hermengild Wagner, and Leopold
Mandl, all of whom are known as the chief instigators of the
attacks in the Austrian and German Press against Serbia and
the Serbians.

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 12]

No. 12.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.

Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign

Affairs.

Vienna, June 20/ July 3, 1914.

IN the course of a conversation which I had with the
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office on the subject of the
Serajevo outrage, Baron Macchio severely criticised the
Belgrade Press and the tone of its articles. He argued that
the Belgrade Press was under no control and created die
Hetzereien gegen die Monarchie. I told him that the Press
in Serbia was absolutely free/" and that as a result private m[cf. Nos.
people as well as the Government very often suffered ; there 20, 30.]
were, however, no means of proceeding against the Press
except by going to law. I told him that in the present
instance the fault lay with the Austrian and Hungarian
Press which was controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment. Was it not true that during the past two years the
Austrian and Hungarian Press had been attacking Serbia, in
such a manner as to offend her most sensitive feelings ? The
anniversary of the unfortunate war with Bulgaria had taken
place a few days ago. I had myself witnessed the great
lack of respect with which the Vienna Press had written
about Serbia and the Serbian army during and after the
war, as well as in many other matters. The Press in Belgrade
was much more moderate. For instance, in the present
case, a terrible crime had been committed and telegrams
were being sent from Vienna to the whole world accusing
the entire Serbian nation and Serbia of being accomplices
of the detestable Serajevo outrage. All the Austrian news-
papers were writing in that strain. Was it possible to remain
indifferent ? Even if the criminal was a Serbian, the whole
Serbian nation and the Kingdom of Serbia could not be held
guilty, nor could they be accused in such a manner.

Baron Macchio replied, " Nobody accuses the Kingdom
of Serbia nor its Government, nor the whole Serbian nation.
We accuse those who encourage the Great Serbian scheme
and work for the realisation of its object."

■ 89

[S. 13] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June 21.

I told him that it appeared to me that from the first the
nationaUty of the criminal had been deliberately put forward
in order to involve Belgrade and to create the impression
that the outrage had been organised by Serbia. This had
struck me immediately, as I knew that up till now the Serbians
of Bosnia had been spoken of as die Bosniaken, bosnische
Sprache, die Orthodoxen aus Bosnien, while now it was being
said that the assassin was ein Serbe, but not that he was a
Bosnian nor that he was an Austrian subject. . . .

" I repeat," said Baron Macchio, " that we do not accuse
the Serbian Government and the Serbian nation but the
various agitators. ..."

I begged him to use his influence in order to induce the
Vienna Press not to make matters more difficult by its accusa-
tions in this critical moment, when Serbo-Austrian relations
were being put to a severe test.

No. 13.

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, June 21/ July 4, 1914.

I HAD a long conversation on Wednesday last on the
subject of the Serajevo outrage with M. Viviani, the new
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was somewhat concerned
at what had occurred. I made use of this opportunity to
describe to him briefly the causes which had led to the out-
rage, and which were to be found, in the first place, in the
irksome system of Government in force in the annexed
provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as
well as in the whole policy of the Monarchy towards anything
orthodox. He understood the situation, but at the same
time expressed the hope that we should preserve an attitude

[c/. Nos. of calm and dignity'" in order to avoid giving cause for

10, 14, fresh accusations in Vienna.

3°-] After the first moment of excitement public opinion here

has quieted down to such an extent that the Minister-President
himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to
soften the expressions used in the statement which he had
made earlier on the subject in the Senate.
90

(1)

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 16]

No. 14.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd* to M. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, June 21/ July 4, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the out-
rages committed upon Serbs in Bosnia will increase the
S5rmpathy of Europe for us. He is of opinion that the accusa-
tions made against us in Vienna will not obtain credence.
The chief thing is for public opinion in Serbia to remain
cahn.'" <''[c//Nos.

10, 13,
No. 15. 30.]

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 2'^/ July 6, 1914.

THE excitement in military and Government circles
against Serbia is steadily growing owing to the tone of our
Press, '"' which is diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian («' [cf. No.'
Legation at Belgrade. 19]

No. 16.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Vienna, June zz/July 6, 1914.

THE principal lines and tendencies to be found in the
articles of the Vienna Press on the subject of the Serajevo
outrage are as follows : — '" '" [«/• Nos.

20 21 22

As long ago as Sunday afternoon, June 15/28 last, when 30'] '
the Vienna newspapers issued extra editions regarding the
outrage upon the Crown Prince, the headlines announced
that both the perpetrators were Serbians ; moreover, this
was done in such a manner as to leave the impression that

* ["His Majesty the Emperor has, this i8th (31st) of August, been
pleased to ordain that the city of St. Petersburg shall henceforth be called
the city of Petrograd." — Journal de Petrograd, Aug. 20 (Sept. 2), 1914.]

[S. 16] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June 23,

they were Serbs from Serbia proper. In the later reports,
which described the outrage, there was a marked tendency
to connect it with Serbia. Two cijcumstances were especially
emphasised and were intended to indicate Belgrade as the
place of origin of the outrage, viz. : (i) the visit to Belgrade
of both of the perpetrators ; and (2) the origin of the bombs.
As the third and last link in this chain of evidence, the Vienna
papers began to publish the evidence given by the assassins
at the trial. It was characteristic to find that the Hungarian
Korrespondenzbureau, and the Hungarian newspapers, especi-
ally the Az Eszt were alone in a position to know all about
this " evidence." This evidence mainly tends to show :
(i) that it has been established that the perpetrators, while
in Belgrade, associated with the comitadji Mihaylo Cigano-
vitch ; and (2) that the organiser and instigator of the
outrage was Major Pribitchevitch.

Another tendency became apparent at the same time,

viz. : to hold the " Narodna Odbrana " responsible for this

'^' [cf. No. outrage. '" Further, on Friday last, the latest announcement

30-] which the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau made to the

newspapers stated : — '

" The enquiries made up to the present prove conclusively
that this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the
two perpetrators, a large number of persons have been
arrested, mostly young men, who are also, like the per-
petrators, proved to have been employed by the Belgrade
Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the outrage, and who
were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and revolvers."

On the same day, late at night, the Hungarian Korres-
pondenzbureau sent the following request to the news-
papers : —

" We beg the Editor not to publish the report relating
to the Serajevo outrage, which appeared in our evening's
bulletin."

At the same time the Vienna Korrespondenzbureau pub-
lished the following official statement : —

" We learn from authoritative quarters that the enquiries
relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret.
All the details, therefore, which have appeared in the pubhc
Press should be accepted with reserve."

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 173

Nevertheless, the Budapest newspapers continued to
publish alleged reports on the enquiry. In the last " report "
of the Budapest newspaper A Nap, which was reprinted
in yesterday's Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the re-
sponsibility for the outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still
further emphasised. According to this report the accused
Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the
chief instigator of the outrage.

No. 17.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashifch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Vienna, June 24/ July 7, 1914.

IN influential circles the excitement continues undimin-
ished. Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the
Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary respectively,'" and '" [Seep.
to the Minister of Finance; Herr Bilinski, in which an appeal 483]

is made for calmness, it is impossible to determine what
attitude the Government will adopt towards us. For them
one thing is obvious ; whether it is proved or not that the
outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they
must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great
Serbian agitation within the Habsburg Monarchy. In what
manner they will do this and what means they will employ
to that end has not as yet been decided ; this is being dis-
cussed especially in high Catholic and military circles. The
ultimate decision will be taken only after it has been definitely
ascertained what the enquiry at Serajevo has brought to
light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings
of the enquiry.

In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the
following courses:"" either to regard the Serajevo outrage 'i*' [c/. No.
as a national misfortune and a crime which ought to be dealt 25.]

with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case
Serbia's co-operation in the work will be requested in order
to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty ;
or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan-Serbian, South-
Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifestation of
the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are

[S. 18] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June 26.

many indications that influential circles are being urged to
adopt the latter course : it is therefore advisable to be ready
for defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted,
we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this
respect.

No. 18.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 26/ July 9, 1914.

THE Crown Prince Alexander is receiving threatening
letters from Austria-Hungary nearly every day. Make use
of this in course of conversation with your colleagues and
journalists.

No. 19.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 1/14, 1914.

THE Secretary of State has told me that he could not
understand the provocative attitude of the Serbian Press and
the attacks made by it against Austria-Hungary, who, as a
[cj. No. Great Power, could not tolerate such proceedings.'"

No. 20.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914.

(i) The Austrian Korrespondenzbureau is showing a
'-' [cf. Nos. marked tendency to excite public opinion in Europe. '^'
16, < 21, This Biureau interprets neither correctly nor sincerely the
22, 30.] tone adopted by the Belgrade Press. It selects the strongest
expressions from such articles as contain replies to insults,
threats and false news designed to mislead public opinion,
and submits them to the Austro-Hungarian pubUc.
94

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 21]

(2) The Korrespondenzbureau quotes especially extracts
from articles from those Serbian newspapers which are not
the organs of any party or corporation.

(3) As far back as the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary
prohibited the entry into the country of all Serbian political
and other newspapers, and thus our Press would not be in a
position to excite public opinion in Austria-Hungary and
Europe if the Korrespondenzbureau did not lay stress on
and spread broadcast the items of news which it gathers from
various Serbian papers, in every instance exaggerating them.
Six days ago the entry into Austria-Hungary of the Odyek,
the organ of the Independent Radical Party, was prohibited ;
thus all our papers are now prevented from entering Austria-
Hungary;

(4) With us the Press is absolutely free.'" Newspapers '"[c/. Nos.
can be confiscated only for Ihe-majesU or for revolutionary 12, 30.]
propaganda ; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There

is no censorship of newspapers.

In these circumstances, you should point out for their
information, where necessary, that we have no other con-
stitutional or legal means at our disposal for the control of
our Press. Nevertheless, when the articles in our papers are
compared with those of Austria-Hungary, it is evident that
the Austro-Hungarian papers originate the controversy, "'^ '^' [cf. No.
while ours merely reply. ^^-^

Please also emphasise the fact that public opinion in
Serbia is relatively calm, and that there is no desire on our
part to provoke and insult Austria-Hungary. No one in
Europe would know what our newspapers were writing if the
Korrespondenzbureau did not publish these items of news
with the intention of doing as much harm as possible to
Serbia.

No. 21.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914.

DURING the past few days the Austro-Hungarian news- ^^^
papers'" have been spreading reports to the effect that there ''■5'' ^°^"
have been demonstrations at Belgrade against the Austro- 23.']^°'^^'

[S. 22] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July i,

Hungarian Legation, that some Hungarian journalists were
killed ; that Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade were
maltreated and are now panic-stricken ; that at the funeral

'" [cf. No. of the late M. Hartwig"' Serbian students made a demon-
30 ! R. stration against the Austro-Hungarian Minister, etc. All

^^^^^j „ these reports are absolutely untrue and imaginary.'" Com-
4 30 1 ^ plete calm prevails in Belgrade and there were no demonstra-
tions of any kind this year, nor has there been any question
of disorder. Not only do the Austro-Hungarian Minister
and his staff walk about the town without being molested in
any way, but no Austro-Hungarian subject has been in any
way insulted, either by word or deed, as is reported by the
Viennese papers ; still less was any attack made upon the
house of any Austro-Hungarian subject or were any of their
windows broken. Not a single Austro-Hungarian subject
has had the slightest cause for any complaint. All these
false reports are being purposely spread in order to arouse
and excite Austro-Hungarian pubhc opinion against Serbia.
The whole of Belgrade and the entire diplomatic body
were present to-day at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig ;
there was not the slightest sign of resentment shown by any-
body. During the whole ceremony exemplary order was
maintained ; so much so that foreigners were impressed with
the good behaviour of the crowd, which was such as does not
always prevail on similar occasions even in their own countries.
Be good enough to communicate the above to the Govern-
ment to which you are accredited and to the Press.

No. 22.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Vienna, July 1/14, 1914.

i^'[c/. Nos. ONCE more public opinion has been excited against us'''

16, 20, 21" by the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry

30-] for Foreign Affairs. With the exception of the Zeit and the

Arbeiter Zeitung, all the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have

obtained from that Bureau the material and tone of their

articles on the subject of the Serajevo outrage. You have

yourself seen what kind of material and tone this is.

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S, 23]

I am reliably informed that official German circles here
are especially ill-disposed towards us.'" These circles have '"[c/. No.
had some influence upon the writings of the Vienna Press, ?4;B.95;
especially upon those of the Neue Freie Presse. ^- ^°' ^°'

This latter paper is still anti-Serbian d I'outrance. The
Neue Freie Presse, which is widely read and has many friends
in high financial circles, and which — ^if so desired — ^writes in
accordance with instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau,
briefly summarises the matter as follows : " We have to
settle matters with Serbia by war ; "" it is evident that '"' [c/. No.
peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to 52 ; B. 20 ;
war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through ^- ^^^
now."

The Bourse'^' is very depressed. There has not been <''[c/. Nos.
such a fall in prices in Vienna for a long time. Some securities 23, 52.]
have fallen 45 kronen.

No. 23.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.

THE most important question for us is, what, if any, are
the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government as
regards the Serajevo outrage. Until now I have been unable
to find this out, and my other colleagues are in a similar
position. The word has now been passed round here not
to tell anybody anything.'" '*'[<^/- Nos.

The evening before last the Ministers of the Dual Mon- ^^' ^^'^
archy held a meeting. It has not been possible to learn
anything about the object and the result of this meeting.
The communique issued on the subject was brief and obscure.
It appears that the consequences of the Serajevo outrage
were discussed at length, but that nothing was decided. It
is not clear whether the Chief of Staff and the Naval Com-
mander-in-Chief were present, as was rumoured. After this
meeting Count Berchtold travelled to Ischl to report to the
Emperor,'" who, after the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, had "'[C/.B.20.]
returned there to recover his health. In the Hungarian
Parliament Count Tisza has replied to the interpellations of

II— G 97

[S. 24] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 2,

the Opposition concerning the Serajevo incident ; you are
acquainted with his statements. His speech was not clear,

"'[c/,No. and I beUeve it was intentionally obscure.'" Some people
52-] saw in it signs of an intention quietly to await the develop-
ment of events and of calmness in the attitude of the Austro-
Hungarian Government, while others saw in it hidden
intentions for (I should say) an action as yet undecided.
It was noted that there was no occasion for haste until the
results of the magisterial enquiry were announced. Some
time has now elapsed ; the matter has been spoken of, dis-
cussed, written about and distorted ; then came the death

""[c/. No. of Hartwig'^' and the alarm of Baron Giesl. In connection
30 ; R. 6.] Yi/^i^jj ^jjjg again came the interpellations addressed to Count

"* \pi- No. Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament ; '^' you have read his
3° J reply. Many hold the opinion here that this second speech

'" [cf. Y. J5 much more restrained than the first, '" and that this is to

,5) , .^^'^ be attributed to an order from the Emperor. (The Bourse"'
22 "52 1^ ^^^ ^°^ recovered ; both the War Minister and the Chief of
Staff have gone on leave.) I am loath to express an opinion.
In the above-mentioned speech it is to be noted that the
possibility of war is not excluded, in the event of the demands
of Austria-Hungary in regard to the Serajevo outrage not
being complied with.

One thing is certain : Austria-Hungary will take diplo-
matic steps at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial enquiry
at Serajevo is completed and the matter submitted to the
Court.

No. 24.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.

IT is thought here that the magisterial enquiries and
investigations have not produced sufficient evidence to
justify bringing an official accusation against Serbia, but
it is believed that the latter will be accused of tolerating
within her borders certain revolutionary elements. Diplo-
matic circles here criticise and condemn the mode of procedure
of the Austro-Hungarian Government, especially the attitude

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 251

throughout of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna
Press."' There are many who consider our attitude to be '^'[c/. Nos,
correct and in accordance with the dignity of a nation. They 20, 21,
find fault only with the views expressed in some of our news- ^^"^
papers, though they all admit that it is provoked by the
Vienna Press.

In spite of the fact that it appears that the German
Foreign Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy
of Vienna, the German Embassy here'" is at this very '"[c/- No.
moment encouraging such a policy. ^^ ; y

18/20.]
No. 25.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.

WHAT steps will be taken ? In what form ? What
demands will Austria-Hungary make of Serbia ? I do not
beheve that to-day even the Ballplatz itself could answer
these questions clearly and precisely. I am of opinion that
its plans are now being laid, and that again Count Forgach
is the moving spirit.

In an earUer report'" I mentioned that Austria-Hungary (3)[No. 17.]
has to choose between two courses : either to make the
Serajevo outrage a domestic question, inviting us to assist
her to discover and punish the culprits ; or to make it a case
against the Serbians and Serbia, and even against the Jugo-
slavs. After taking into consideration all that is being
prepared and done, it appears to me that Austria-Hungary
will choose the latter course. Austria-Hungary will do this
in the belief that she will have the approval of Europe. Why
should she not profit by humiliating us, and, to a certain
extent, justify the Friedjung and Agram trials ? Besides,
Austria-Hungary desires in this manner to justify in the eyes
of her own people and of Europe the sharp and reactionary
measures which she contemplates undertaking internally in
order to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda and the
jugo-Slav idea. Finally, for the sake of her prestige, Austria- (4, r^^ j^^g
Hungary must take some action'*' in the belief that she will 30," 31 •
thus raise her prestige internally a^ well as externally. . . . Y.'ig.]

[S. 26] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 3

Austria-Hungary will, I think, draw up in the form of
"'[B. 4;R.a memorandum an accusation against Serbia. '" In that
8, 19.3 accusation will be set forth all the evidence that has been
collected against us since April, 1909, until to-day ; and I
believe that this accusation will be fairly lengthy. Austria-
Hungary will communicate this accusation to the Cabinets
of the European Powers with the remark that the facts con-
tained therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps
at Belgrade, and to demand that Serbia should in the future
fulfil all the obligations of a loyal neighbour. At the same
time Austria-Hungary will also hand us a note containing her
demands, which we shall be requested to accept uncon-
ditionally.

No. 26.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N.

Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign

Affairs.
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 3/16, 1914.

THE Secretary of State has informed me that the reports
of the German Minister at Belgrade point to the existence
of a Great Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically
suppressed by the Government in the interest of good relations
with Austria-Hungary.

No. 27.

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister at London, to M. N. Pashitch,

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegraphic.) London, July 4/17, 1914.

THE Austrian Embassy is making very great efforts to
[cf. No. ^^^ ^^^^ *h^ English Press'" against us, and to induce it to
7.] favour the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to
■ [cf. B. 18 Serbia. '" The Embassy is submitting to the news editors
and note.] cuttings from our newspapers as a proof of the views expressed
in our Press. The situation may become more acute during
the next few weeks. No reliance should be placed in the
ostensibly peaceable statements of Austro-Hungarian official
circles, as the way is being prepared for diplomatic pressure
upon Serbia, which may develop into an armed attack. It

(3)

100

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 30]

is probable that as soon as Austria-Hungary has taken
action at Belgrade she will change her attitude and will seek

to humUiate Serbia. '" '" iPf- , No.

30; Y.45
No. 28. ^riAnote.}

M. Ljub Michailovitch, Minister at Rome, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 4/17, 1914.

I HAVE obtained reliable information to the effect that
the Marquis di San Giuliano has stated to the Austro-Hun-
garian Ambassador that any step undertaken by Austria
against Serbia which failed to take into account international
considerations would meet with the disapproval of public
opinion in Italy/" and that the Italian Government desire "" [c/. Y.
to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained. 72]

No. 29.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 5/18, 1914.

I HAVE spoken to the Assistant Minister for Foreign
Affairs on the subject of the provocative attitude of the
Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna Press. '*' '"[c/. Nos.

M. Sazonof told me a few days ago that he wondered why 20, 34.J
the Austrian Government were doing nothing to put a stop
to the futile agitation on the part of the Press in Vienna
which, after all, frightened nobody, and was only doing harm
to Austria herself.

No. 30.

M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to all Serbian Missions abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade,. July 6/19, 1914.

IMMEDIATELY after the Serajevo outrage the Austro-
Hungarian Press began to accuse Serbia of that detestable
crime, which, in the opinion of that Press, was the direct
result of the Great Serbian idea. The Austrian Press further

lOI

[s. 30] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 6,

contended that that idea was spread and propagated by
'''[c/. No. various associations, such as the " Narodna Odbrana,""'
^^•3 " Kolo Srpskich Sestara," &c., which were tolerated by the
Serbian Government.

On learning of the murder, the Serbian Royal Family,
as well as the Serbian Government, sent messages of condol-
ence, and at the same time expressed severe condemnation
of and horror at the crime that had been committed. All
festivities which had been fixed to take place on that day in
Belgrade were immediately cancelled.

Nevertheless, the Press of the neighbouring Monarchy

'"' [cf. No. continued to hold Serbia responsible for the Serajevo outrage. ""

•"■•^ Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian Press began to spread in

'=' [cf. Nos. connection with it various false reports, '^' designed to mis-

4. 21.] lead public opinion, which provoked the Belgrade Press

to reply in self-defence, and sometimes to active hostiUty in

a spirit of embitterment aroused by the misrepresentation of

what had occurred. Seeing that the Austro-Hungarian

Press was intentionally luring the Belgrade Press into an

awkward and delicate controversy, the Serbian Government

hastened to warn the Press in Belgrade, and to recommend

it to remain calm and to confine itself to simple denials and

i*'[c/. Nos. to the suppression of false and misleading reports.'*' The

2, 10, 13, action of the Serbian Government was ineffectual in the case

of some of the less important papers, more especially in view

of the fact that newly invented stories were daily spread

abroad with the object of serving political ends not only

against Serbia but also against the Serbs in Austria-Hungary.

The Serbian Government were unable to avert these polemics

between the Serbian and the Austrian Press, seeing that

Serbian law, and the provisions of the constitution itself,

w r / N gyi^rantee the complete independence of the Press and pro-

12, 20 1^' ^i^^^ ^^ measures of control and the seizure of newspapers.'"

These polemics were further aggravated by the fact that the

Vienna and Budapest journals selected passages from such

of the Serbian newspapers as have practically no influence

upon public opinion, strengthened still further their tone,

and, having thus manipulated them, passed them on to the

*"' [cf. Nos. foreign Press with the obvious intention of exciting public

16, 20, 21, opinion in other European countries and of representing

22.] Serbia as being guilty. '"

102

(6)

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S- 30]

Those who have followed the course of these polemics
will know that the Belgrade newspapers merely acted in
self-defence, confining their activities to denials and to the
refutation of falsehoods designed to mislead public opinion,
at the same time attempting to convince foreign Govern-
ments (which, being occupied with other and more serious
affairs, had no time to go into the matter themselves) of the
intention of the Austro-Hungarian Press to excite public
opinion in its own country and abroad.

The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness
to hand over to justice any of their subjects who might be
proved to have played a part in the Serajevo outrage."" The '"[g/. No.
Serbian Government further stated that they had prepared 5-]

a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives. The
draft of a new law in that sense had already been laid before
the State Council, but could not be submitted to the Skup-
shtina, as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally,
the Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as hereto-
fore, to observe all those good neighbourly obligations to
which Serbia was bound by her position as a European State.

During the whole of this period, from the date of the per-
petration of the outrage until to-day, not once did the
Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian Govern-
ment for their assistance in the matter. They did not
demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to
an enquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial.
In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for
information as to the whereabouts of certain students who
had been expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary, and
had crossed over to Serbia to continue their studies. All
available information on this point was supplied.

The campaign against Serbia, however, was unremittingly
pursued in the Austrian Press, and public opinion was excited
against her in Austria as well as in the rest of Europe. Matters
went so far that the more prominent leaders of political
parties in Austria-Hungary began to ask questions in Parlia-
ment on the subject of the outrage, to which the Hungarian
Prime Minister replied.'" It is evident from the discussions •"'[No, 23.3
in this connection that Austria is contemplating some action, "' <" [cf. Nos.
but it is not clear in what sense. It is not stated whether the 25, 52 ; Y.
measures which are to be taken — more especially military ^9-^

103

[S. 30] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 6,

measures — will depend upon the reply and the conciliatory
attitude of the Serbian Government. But an armed conflict
is being hinted at in the event of the Serbian Government
being unable to give a categorically satisfactory reply.

On the sudden death of the Russian Minister, M. de Hart-
'''[c/. No. wig,'" at the residence of the Austrian Minister, the polemics
23 ; R. 6.] in the newspapers became still more acute ; nevertheless
this sad event did not lead to any disorders even during the
""[c/. No. funeral'" of M. Hartwig. On the other hand, the Austro-
^^•3 Hungarian Legation was so perturbed by certain false reports
that Austrian subjects began to conceal themselves, some
of them taking refuge in the Semlin and Belgrade hotels,
and others in the Legation itself. At 5 p.m. on the day of
the King's birthday, which passed in the most orderly manner,
I was informed by the Austrian Minister, through the Vice-
Consul, M. Pomgraz, that preparations were being made for
an attack that night on the Austrian Legation and on Austro-
Hungarian subjects in Belgrade. He begged me to take the
necessary steps for the protection of Austro-Hungarian
subjects and of the Legation, stating at the same time that
he held Serbia responsible for all that might occur. I replied
that the responsible Serbian Government were not aware of
any preparations of this kind being made, but that I would
in any case at once inform the Minister of the Interior, and
beg him at the same time to take such measures as might be
necessary. The next day showed that the Austrian Legation
had been misled by false rumours, for neither any attack
nor any preparations for attack were made. Notwithstanding
this, the Austro-Hungarian Press took advantage of this
incident to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia
and to what lengths she was ready to go. It went even further
and tried to allege that something really had been intended to
happen, since M. Pashitch himself had stated that he had heard
of such rumours. All this indicates clearly the intention to
excite public opinion against Serbia whenever occasion arises.

When all that has been said in the Hungarian Parliament
is taken into consideration, there is reason for apprehension
that some step is being prepared against us which may
produce a disagreeable effect upon the relations between
Serbia and Austria-Hungary. There is still further ground
for such apprehension, as it is abundantly evident that the

104

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 303

enquiry which is being made is not to be Umited to the per-
petrators and their possible accompUces in the crime, but is most
probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea.

By their attitude and the measures they have taken, the
Serbian Government have irrefutably proved that they are
working to restrain excitable elements, and in the interests
of peace and the maintenance of good relations with all their
neighbours. The Government have given their particular
attention to the improvement and strengthening of their
relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,"' which had '''[c/. Nos.
lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and 5. 6, 8.]
of the questions which arose therefrom. With that object
in view, the Serbian Government proceeded to settle the ques-
tion of the Oriental Railway, the new railway connections,
and the transit through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods
for Constantinople, Sofia, Salonica, and Athens.

The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests
require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be
firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason
they fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-
Hungary may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government
to make a d-marche which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia
as a State, "' and to put forward demands which could not be <"' [c/. No.
accepted. 27 ; Y.

I have the honour therefore to request you to impress upon ^91
the Government to which you are accredited our desire to
maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to
suppress every attempt directed against the peace and public
safety of the neighbouring Monarchy. We will likewise meet
the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of
our being requested to subject to trial in our independent
Courts any accomplices in the outrage who are in Serbia
— should such, of course, exist.

But we can never comply with demands which may be
directed against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be
inacceptable to any country which respects and maintains
its independence."' '"[c/. No.

Actuated by the desire that good neighbourly relations 32 (p.
may be firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly ^'^^)-\
Governments to take note of these declarations and to act
in a conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise.

105

[S. 313 SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 7,

No. 31.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 7/20, 1914.

IT is very difficult, indeed almost impossible, to ascertain
here anything positive as to the real intentions of Austria-
Hungary. The word has been passed round to maintain
'" [c/. Nos. absolute secrecy about everything that is being done. '"
23. 52.3 Judging by the articles in our newspapers, Belgrade is taking
an optimistic view of the questions pending with Austria-
Hungary. There is, however, no room for optimism. There
is no doubt that Austria-Hungary is making preparations of a
serious character. What is chiefly to be feared, and is highly
probable, is, that Austria is preparing for war against Serbia.
The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be
nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail
to take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia.
It is believed that the two opportunities previously missed
— the annexation of Bosnia and the Balkan war — have been
extremely injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the
conviction is steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars,
is completely exhausted, and that a war against Serbia would
in fact merely mean a military expedition to be concluded by a
speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war could
be brought to an end before Europe could intervene.

The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasised
by the military preparations which are being made, especially
in the vicinity of the Serbian frontier.

No. 32.

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at
Belgrade, to Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister
and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914-
I HAVE the honour to transmit to Your Excellency
herewith the enclosed Note which I have received from my
Government, addressed to the Royal Serbian Government.
Handed personally at 6 p.m.

[See B. 4.]
106

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 35]

No. 33.

Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914-

THE Austro-Hungarian Minister handed me this afternoon
at 6 p.m. a note in regard to the Serajevo outrage embodying
the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and
insisting on a reply from the Serbian Government within
two days, i.e., by Saturday, at 6 p.m. He informed me
orally that he and his staff would leave Belgrade unless a
favourable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated
time.

Some of the Ministers being absent from Belgrade the
Serbian Government have not as yet come to any decision,
but I am in a position to state now that the demands are
such that no Serbian Government could accept them in
their entirety.''' '"[c/. No.

35 ; B. 10 ;
No. 34. 0.1,41]

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, I9i4-

I INFORMED the Russian Charge d' Affairs that I would
hand in the reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on
Saturday at 6 p.m. I told him that the Serbian Government
would appeal to the Governments of the friendly Powers to
protect the independence of Serbia. If war was inevitable,
I added, Serbia would carry it on."' '"[c/- O. 9.3

No. 35.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. M. Boschkovitch, Minister in London.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.

I INFORMED the British Charge d' Affaires to-day that
the Austro-Hungarian demands were such that no Govern-
ment of an independent country could accept them in their

107

[S. 36] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July ii,

'1' [cf. No. entirety. '" I expressed the hope that the British Government
33 and flight possibly see their way to induce the Austro-Hungarian
note.j Government to moderate them. I did not conceal my
anxiety as to future developments.

No. 36-

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Pefrogrdd, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 11/24, ^9M-

AS I was leaving M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated

the contents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the

German Ambassador. He seemed to be in very good spirits.

During the conversation which followed in regard to the

Austro-Hungarian demarche I asked Count Pourtales to

indicate to me some way out of the situation created by

the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The Ambassador replied

that this depended on Serbia alone, since the matter in

'" [c/. B. 9.] question must be settled between Austria and Serbia only,""

and did not concern anyone else. In reply I told Count

Pourtales that he was under a misapprehension, and that he

would see before long that this was not a question merely

'" [c/. 0. 10; between Serbia and Austria, but a European question. '*'

R. 26 ; W.

intro.]

No. 37.

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander to His
Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, I9I4-

[See O. 6.]

No. 38.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914-

A BRIEF summary of the reply of the Royal Govern-
ment was communicated to the representatives of the allied
108

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 40]

Governments at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day.
They were informed that the reply would be quite conciliatory
on all points, and that the Serbian Government would accept
the Austro-Hungarian demands as far as possible. The
Serbian Government trust that the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment, unless they are determined to make war at all costs,
will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in
the Serbian reply.

No. 39.

Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Note. —
Belgrade, July 12/25, ^9M-

[See B. 39.]

No. 40.

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at
Belgrade, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 12/25, ^9H-

AS the time limit stipulated in the note, which, by order
of my Government, I handed to His Excellency M. Patchou,
on Thursday, the day before yesterday, at 6 p.m., has now
expired, and as I have received no satisfactory reply,'" I '"[<=/• Nos.
have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am leaving ^i. 42 ; R.
Belgrade to-night together with the staff of the Imperial
and Royal Legation.

The protection of the Imperial and Royal Legation,
together with aU its appurtenances, annexes, and archives,
as well as the care of the subjects and interests of Austria-
Hungary in Serbia, is entrusted to the Imperial German
Legation.

Finally, I desire to state formally that from the moment
this letter reaches Your Excellency the rupture in the diplo-
matic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will
have the character of a fait accompli.

log

(1)

(3)

[S. 41] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 12,

No. 41.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914-
I COMMUNICATED the reply to the Austro-Hungarian
[c/. R. 24 Note to-day at 5.45 p.m."' You will receive the full text'"'
—"two of the reply to-night. From it you will see that we have
™"?*^fn gone as far as was possible. When I handed the note to
(^'Ib^^'^ 1 ^^^ Austro-Hungarian Minister he stated that he would
'■ ■ ^^ have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would
then give an immediate answer. As soon as I returned to
[No. 40.3 the Ministry, I was informed in a note'*' from the Austro-
Hungarian Minister that he was not satisfied with our reply,
and that he was leaving Belgrade the same evening, with
the entire staff of the Legation. The protection of the
Legation and its archives, and the care of Austrian and
Hungarian interests had been entrusted by him to the German
Legation. He stated finally that on receipt of the note
diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary
must be considered as definitely broken off.

The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the

Skupshtina to meet on July 14/27 at Nish, whither all the

Ministers with their staffs are proceeding this evening. The

Crown Prince has issued in the name of the King, an order

'*' [See note, for the mobilisation of the army,'^' while to-morrow or the

p. 126. cf. ^^y after a proclamation will be made in which it wiU be

32 ; Y. 75 announced that civilians who are not liable to military

(2);R.23.3 service should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should

proceed to their appointed posts and defend the country

to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia being

attacked.

No. 42.

Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna.

Vienna, July 12/25, 1914-
AS no satisfactory reply has been given to the note which
the Imperial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Pleni-

IIO

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 45]

patentiary handed to the Royal Government on the 10/23
instant, I have been compelled to instruct Baron Giesl to
leave the Serbian capital'" and to entrust the protection of "^[See No,
the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty 4o-J
to the German Legation.

I regret that the relations which I have had the honour
to maintain with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated,
and I avail myself of this opportunity to place at your disposal
the enclosed passports for your return to Serbia, as well as
for the return of the staff of the Royal Legation.

No. 43.

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal
Highness the Crown Prince of Serbia.

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 14/27, 1914.

[See O. 40.]

No. 44.

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, to His
Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 17/30, 1914.

[See O. 56.]

No. 45.

Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 15/28, 1914.

THE Royal Serbian Government not having answered [Duplicate
in a satisfactory manner the note of July 10/23, ^9M> pre- ofR.37.]
sented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the
Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled
to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and,

III

[S. 46] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 15,

with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-
Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in

"I [c/. No. a state of war with Serbia. "'
46; B.
50 {note
verbale).] ^^^ ^^

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign

Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.
(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 15/28, 1914.

THE Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on
Serbia at noon to-day by an open telegram to the Serbian
'''[No. 45] Government.""

No. 47.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Sazonof,
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Petrograd, July 15/28, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform Your Excellency that I
have received from M. Pashitch the following urgent telegram
despatched from Nish at 2.10 p.m.

" The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on
Serbia to-day at noon by an open telegram to the Serbian
"'[No. 45.] Government."*''

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of this
regrettable act, which a Great Power had the courage to
commit against a small Slav country which only recently
emerged from a long series of heroic but exhausting battles,
and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity for my country,
to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the peace
of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by
the whole civilised world and severely punished by Russia,
'^'[c/. 0. 1.] the protector of Serbia.'^'

I beg Your Excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition
from the whole Serbian nation before the throne of His
"'[See No. Majesty.'"'
48-3 I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my

loyalty and respect.
112

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 50]

No. 48.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M.
Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd.

Petrograd, July 17/30, 1914.
I HAD the honour to receive your note"' of July 15/28, '"[No. 47.]
No. 527, in which you communicated to me the contents of
the telegram received by you from His Excellency, M. Pas-
hitch, in regard to the declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-
Hungary. I sincerely regret this sad event, and will not
fail to lay before His Majesty the petition by the Serbian
nation, whose interpreter you are.

No. 49.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to Dr. M. Yvvanovitch, ChargS d' Affaires at
Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 22/ August 4, 1914.

PLEASE inform the Imperial Government that you have

received instructions to leave Germany, together with the

staffs of the Legation and Consulate. You should leave

immediately. '" '"' [cf. No.

XT . 50.3

No. 50.

The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German

Legation at Nish.

Nish, July 21 /August 6, 1914.

THE Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the
honour to inform the Imperial Legation that, in view of the
state of war which now exists between Serbia and Austria-
Hungary, and of that between Russia and Germany, the
ally of Austria-Hungary, the Royal Serbian Government,
in view of the solidarity of her interests with Russia and her
allies, considers the mission of Baron Gieslingen, the Imperial
German Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary,
to be at an end. The Royal Serbian Government requests
His Excellency to leave Serbian territory with the staff of the ^^^
Legation. '" The necessary passports are enclosed herewith. ^'^'' ,

II — H 113

[S. 51] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 24,

No. 51.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Berlin, July 2^/ August 6, 1914.

ON the occasion of my visit to the Under-Secretary of

State, M. Zimmermann, for the purpose of breaking off

diplomatic relations, he stated, in the course of conversation,

that Germany had always cherished friendly feelings towards

Serbia, and that he regretted that owing to the political

groupement our relations had to be broken off. He blames

'^' [cf. B. Russia only, '" as the instigator of Serbia, for the develop-

134 ; Y. ments which have occurred, and which wiU have grave con-

■^■^7 ; O- sequences for all nations. If Russia, at the last moment —

^ ' •^.' just when it appeared possible that an armed conflict might

be avoided — ^had not ordered the mobilisation of her whole

'"'[c/.B. forces, there would have been no war,'^' for Germany had

t l:^^' -"^38 ; used her whole influence in Austria-Hungary in order to

• 109.J i^j-^jjg about an understanding with Russia. Austria-Hungary .

would have probably been satisfied with the occupation of

*"[c/. B. Belgrade, '*' when negotiations would have begun with a

88, 98, yigYv to regularising the relations between Serbia and Austria*

112 ; 0.

67.]

No. 52.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Nish, August 3/16, 1914.

FROM June 17/30 the Serbian Legation at Vienna was
practically surrounded by police and gendarmes, while the
staff were under constant police supervision. Our move-
ments and our communications with the outer world were,
as you can imagine, rendered extremely difficult ; the attitude
of the population towards the Legation and its staff was
inclined to be menacing.

After the beginning of July (o.s.) even telegraphic com-
munication with you became difficult, while matters developed
with such rapidity that I was unable to report to you some

114

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 521

of the events which preceded our armed conflict with Austria-
Hungary. I accordingly do so now.

Up to the end of June (o.s.) the whole question of the
Serajevo outrage appeared to be developing normally. At
the commencement of July, however, a change took place
as regards the question of the consequences of the Serajevo
affair. There were no tangible proofs that a radical change
had taken place, but it was to some extent indicated by
certain vague signs and sjmaptoms which betrayed the exis-
tence of some hidden intentions. "' First of all, the Vienna '" [cf. Nos.
and Budapest Press, in conformity with instructions issued 23, 30,
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ceased to publish reports 3i-]
of the magisterial enquiry relating to the Serajevo outrage.
The Press began also to represent the whole matter as a
question which must be settled between Serbia and Austria-
Hungary alone — eventually by war. ''^ <"' [cf. No-.

Moreover, statements to this effect were communicated 22; R. 6.1
to the leading Vienna newspapers by the German Embassy.
Exceptions were : the semi-official Fremdenblatt, which was,
in general, more moderate in the tone of its articles ; Die
Zeit : and the Arheiter Zeitung.

Simultaneously with this new attitude on the part of the
Press, a very unsettled condition of affairs developed on the
Bourse,"' such as it had not witnessed during the whole m[cf. Nos.
course of recent events in the Balkans. In private conversations 22, 23.]
also and in high financial circles the " settlement with Serbia "
was declared to be the only way out of the general financial
and economic crisis prevailing in Austria-Hungary ever since
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under secret
instructions it was ordered that gold should be gradually
withdrawn from circulation, and a corresponding rise in
exchange took place.

A further indication was the clumsy explanation given
of the reasons which had induced the Minister for War,
Krobatin, and the Chief of the General Staff, Hetzendorf, to
interrupt their leave of absence and return to Vienna. The
Chief of Staff constantly travelled to the south, east, and
north of Austria, and at that time had had an interview
with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Moltke,
in Bohemia, I believe, at Carlsbad.

All the reserves which had been called out for the June

js, 52] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [August 3,

manoeuvres in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept with the
colours beyond the stipulated period.

The number of soldiers belonging to the permanent
establishment in Austria-Hungary allowed to go home on
short leave of absence in order to gather in the harvest, and
to attend to other private affairs, was much larger than is
usually the case ; at the same time those whose duties were
of a military-administrative nature were called upon in ever
increasing numbers.

Another indication was the non-committal nature of the
answers given to several interpellations in the Hungarian
""[c/. No. Diet by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza,'" a
23.] statesman who is very clear as a rule in his political state-
ments.

The attitude of the Ballplatz was especially characteristic.
None of the usual weekly receptions by Count Berchtold were
held. They suddenly ceased at the Ballplatz to discuss the
Serajevo outrage with the representatives of foreign coun-
"'[c/. Nos. tries ;"" or, if discussion did arise, it seemed as if instructions
23, 31-1 had been issued on the subject ; that is to say, it was men-
tioned to everyone in such a manner as to dispel all appre-
hensions and suspicion that Austria-Hungary was preparing
some serious step against Serbia. They acknowledged that
some step would be undertaken at Belgrade as soon as the
results of the magisterial enquiry should have sufficiently
established the connection between Belgrade and the Serajevo
outrage. But, at the same time, it was said that this step
<"[c/. Y. would not be such as to give rise to any uneasiness. ''' The
20, 159 Russian Ambassador, who spoke several times on the subject
(vol. I., ^j^j^ Count Forgach, in the absence of Count Berchtold,
P- 422).] ^^g unable to discover the true nature of Austria's intentions.
M. Schebeko told me that Count Szapary, the Austro-Hun-
garian Ambassador at Petrograd, who, for family reasons,
was at that time stopping in Vienna, had said to him that the
step to be taken at Belgrade would be of conciliatory character.
According to M. Schebeko, Count Szapary had also assured
M. Sazonof that the intended Austro-Hungarian Note to
Serbia would not be such as to cause Russia any dissatisfaction.
The French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, who, under instructions
from his Government, had drawn the attention of the Ball-
platz to the complications which might arise should the
116

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 52]

eventual demands which it was intended to make of Serbia
not be of a moderate nature, was told by the principal Under-
Secretary, Baron Macchio, '" that the Austro-Hungarian ''' [c/. Y.
Government, appreciating the friendly and conciliatory action 20.3

of the French Government, would only put forward such
demands, embodied in a note to the Serbian Government,
as Serbia would be able to accept without difficulty. I drew
the, attention of the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente to
the fact that such an assurance might well conceal the true
nature of the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment, and that the powers of the Triple Entente might then
be confronted by certain faits accomplis which Europe would
be compelled to accept in order to avoid a general European
war.

The line followed by the Ballplatz was, moreover, com-
paratively successful, as all those of my colleagues whom I
saw during that period were more or less dissuaded from
believing that Austria-Hungary contemplated any serious
step which could provoke European complications. Many
of the members of the diplomatic body were so firmly convinced
of this that they were preparing at that time to quit Vienna
on long leave of absence''" at various watering places. '''|[c/. B.

Nevertheless, it was known that a note was being drawn i6i,voLI.,
up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which would contain (P-2i4)-]
the accusations against Serbia, and also the demands of
Austria-Hungary. This task was entrusted to Count Forgach,
formerly Austro-Hungarian Minister in Serbia. At the same
time it was universally believed that of the foreign repre-
sentatives, the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky,
was the only one who was kept informed of the note even in
its minutest details,'" while I had reason to believe that he '^' [cf. B.
was also co-operating in drafting it. In view of the above, 95;Y. 15.I
the representatives of the friendly Powers agreed with me
in thinking that the note would impose very difficult terms
on Serbia, but that there would be no inacceptable demands.
When the contents of the note'" were pubUshed all of them '"[B. 4]
were surprised, not to say dumbfounded.

In the same way as the contents of the note were kept
secret, a similar amount of secrecy was observed in regard
to the date of its presentation. On the very day that the
note was presented at Belgrade, the French Ambassador had

[S. 52] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [August 3,

*''[c/. Y. a prolonged conversation'" with the Principal Under-
20.] Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs — Count Berchtold
was again absent at Ischl — on the subject of the note. Yet
Baron Macchio did not tell M. Dumaine that the note would
be presented at Belgrade that afternoon, and published in
the newspapers on the following day.

On the pubUcation in the Vienna papers on the morning
of July 11/24 of the contents of the note, which Baron Giesl
had presented to the Serbian Government, a feehng of de-
jection came over the friends both of Serbia and of the peace
of Europe. It was only then realised that serious European
complications might ensue, though it was. not believed that
it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government
to provoke them. This feeling of depression was increased
by the tone of the articles in the Viennese newspapers, with
the exception of Die Zeit and Arheiter Zeitung, and by demon-
strations in the streets, which clearly showed that war would
""f^/- ^- be a most welcome solution"" — a war with Serbia, of course.
I I (vo . Q^ ^Yy^x day, after having two or three conversations, I
21^!] realised that an armed conflict between Serbia and the Dual
(3 Monarchy was inevitable, "" even should Serbia accept all

y.'jj'githe demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian Note, from
the first to the last. The attitude of the people in the streets
towards our Legation was such that I expected even personal
attacks upon the members of the staff.

The French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and
the Russian Charge d'Affaires held the view that the step
taken by Austria-Hungary should be considered not as a
note but as an ultimatum. They disapproved of the form,
the contents, and the time limit of the note ; they also
declared it to be inacceptable.

In the course of conversation with them on the subject
of the note I pointed out that those passages in it which
dealt with the order by the King to the Army, with the dis-
missal of officers and Government officials, and especially
'"[B. 4, ^^3± which referred to the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian
stipuia- officials in the " Suppression of the subversive movement
tion No. in Serbia against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy,""'
5] would be inacceptable as not being compatible with the

[c/. No. dignity and sovereignty of Serbia."' Only a victorious war,
30 <p. I said, could enforce the acceptance of conditions which were

105).] ,i8

(5)

SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 52J

so humiliating to an independent State, In reply to their
enquiry whether it would not perhaps be better to accept
the conditions and avoid war for the present, I said that the
Austro-Hungarian Note, which amounted in fact to a declara-
tion of war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that,
even if Serbia should accept all the conditions without reserve,
Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her army
to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that
the conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary
that Austria-Hungary had drafted such a note.

To M. Dumaine, Sir M. de Bunsen, and the Russian
Charg6 d' Affaires, the unexpected character of the note was
the cause not only of surprise but also of alarm, in view
of the complications which they feared might ensue. The
Russian Ambassador, M. Sch^beko, previously to the presenta-
tion of the note, had stated on several occasions to his
colleagues that Russia could not remain indifferent'" to<''[c/. O.
any step taken by Austria-Hungary, which might have as i''J

an object the humiliation of Serbia. He also expressed the
same view at the Ballplatz. Hence the apprehension felt
by the three Ambassadors, who at once foresaw the possibiUty
of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The day after the note was presented. Prince Kudachef
went to see Count Berchtold to discuss the matter, "" In *" W- R-
reply to his statement, that the note as it stood was inaccept- ■'^^•J

able, and that Russia could not watch with indifference the
humiliation of Serbia, Count Berchtold said that Austria-
Hungary had been obliged to take this step as her very
existence was threatened ; that she could not withdraw nor
alter the demands made in the note, and that he considered
that the matter in dispute concerned Serbia and Austria-
Hungary alone and that no other Power had any grounds for
interference.

Count Berchtold's reply did not allow of any further
doubts as to the intention of Austria-Hungary to chastise
Serbia by force of arms without the consent of the European
concert. From conversations which I had at that time
with the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente — who, during
the whole of that difficult period showed every kindness and
attention to me and to the staff of the Legation — it seemed
quite clear that Austria-Hungary had been assured, and felt

iig

[S. 52] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [August 3

convinced, that the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian conflict would

'" [c/. B. 9 be locaUsed, '^' as she would otherwise not have decided upon

and note.] g. note which undoubtedly meant war. It was also clear

that Austria-Hungary was confirmed in this impression

especially — and perhaps solely — by Herr von Tschirschky,

the German Ambassador in Vienna. Herr von Tschirschky

was the only one who thought, and even stated publicly, that

Russia would remain quiet while Austria-Hungary carried

<'" [cf. B. out her punitive expedition against Serbia. "" He declared

32-] that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would easily

control the Panslavists, in the same way as he had done

last year, and that Russia was not disposed at the moment

to begin a discussion of the many vexed questions in Europe

and Asia which were her main concern. It was necessary,

'"[c/. B. 18 according to Herr von Tschirschky, to give Serbia a lesson.'*'

and note.] Russia had no right to interfere. As far as Germany, he

said, was concerned, she was in the fullest sense of the word

conscious of what she was doing in giving Austria-Hungary

her support in the matter.

These statements of Herr von Tschirschky have induced
many to hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke
a European war, on the ground that it was better to have
war with Russia before the latter had completed her military
reorganisation, i.e., before the spring of 1917. This point
of view had formerly been freely discussed and even written
about in Vienna. " The longer the matter is postponed,
the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple
Alliance." On the other hand, rumours from the most
authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in
Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse did not approve
of Austria's policy on this question, and that Herr von
Tschirschky has exceeded the instructions given to him.

The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, on his return
from Petrograd, did his utmost at the Ballplatz to obtain
an extension of the brief time limit given to the Serbian
Government for a reply to the Austro-Hungarian Note,
and to discover some way which might lead to an exchange
of views between Vienna and ' Petrograd in regard to the
whole question, but until July 13/26, when we met, his
efforts had proved unavailing. From the conversations I
then had with him, I gathered that the Austro-Hungarian

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 52]

Note, in its contents and in its form, was regarded as a
challenge to Russia and not to Serbia, and that Russia would
not permit the humiliation of Serbia,"' even if war were to '"[c/. Y.
be the price. 18, 20.3

On the day of my departure from Vienna, M. Schebeko
told me that, in spite of the many great difficulties to be
overcome, there was a prospect of arriving at a solution by
which an armed conflict might be avoided by means of
discussion between the Russian Government and Count
Sz£ipS,ry. "" A feeling of depression, however, prevailed in "" [c/- B. 43
Vienna as soon as reports began to be spread that the Austro- ^^^^ote.}
Serbian conflict would bring about a war between Russia and
the Dual Monarchy.

131

THE GERMAN WHITE=BOOK

(Only authorized translation)

How Russia and her Ruler betrayed

Germany's confidence and thereby

caused the European War*

WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES

DRUCK UND VERLAG: LIEBHEIT & THIESEN, BERLIN

[Price 40 pf.]

* [This sub-title is not in the original German White-book itself, the
title page of which, literally translated, is simply : " The German Wliite-
book. Laid before the German Reichstag on August 4th, 1914. Berhn :
Published by Carl Heymann. 1914. Price 50 pf."]

Vff.] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [August

Foreign Office, Berlin, August, 1914.

ON June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the
throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess
of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band
of Serbian conspirators. The investigation of the crime
through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the
fact that the conspiracy against the Ufe of the Archduke and
successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade
with the co-operation of Serbian officials, and executed with
arms from the Serbian State arsenal. This crime must have
opened the eyes of the entire civilised world, not only in
regard to the aims of the Serbian policies directed against
the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which
the pan-Serb propaganda in Serbia had no hesitation in
employing for the achievement of these aims.

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionising

and final separation of the south-easterly districts from the

<^' [cf. R. Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Serbia. '"

intro., R. This direction of Serbia's policy has not been altered in the

"' °"] least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of

Serbia in which it vouchsafed a change in these pohcies

toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good

'"'[c/. B.4.] and neighbourly relations.""

In this manner for the third time in the course of the
last six years Serbia has led Europe to the brink of a world-
war.

It could only do this because it believed itself supported
in its intentions by Russia.

Russia, soon after the events brought about by the
Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavoured to found a union
of the Balkan States under Russian patronage and directed
against the existence of Turkey. This union which succeeded
in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her
European possessions, collapsed over the question of the
distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dis-
mayed over this failure. According to the idea of the
Russian statesmen a new Balkan union under Russian patron-
age should be called into existence, headed no longer against
Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkan, but against the
existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the

124

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W.J

idea that Serbia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Mace-
donia which it had received during the last Balkan war, in
exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be
taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this
plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with
the aid of French propaganda, and Serbia promised Bosnia
and the Herzegovina.

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that
it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of
self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer
this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal
Government appraised [sic) [" benachrichtigte "] Germany
of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our
heart we were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the
situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary
to end the movement in Serbia directed against the conserva-
tion of the monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warhke attitude
of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon
the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in
accordance with our duty as allies.'" We could not, however, "'[c/.R.26j
in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at O. lojS.
stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not com- 36.]
patible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these
trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests
were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the
Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace
the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of
Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian
sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable
the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A
morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian
pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could
count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be
able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our
easterly and westerly neighbours. We, therefore, permitted
Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia
but have not participated in her preparations.

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Serbian
Government a note, "" in which the direct connection between '*' [B. 4.J
the murder at Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not

125

IW.l GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [August.

only countenanced but actively supported by the Serbian
Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation
of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was
requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as
necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire
the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary
examination on Serbian territory and the final dissolution
of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary.
The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of forty-
eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.

The Serbian Government started the mobilisation of its
army one day after* the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian
note.

As after the stipulated datef the Serbian Government

<''[B. 39.] rendered a reply'" which, though complying in some points

with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all

essentials the endeavour through procrastination and new

negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy,

<"[B. 23; the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Serbia*"'

O. 31 ; without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further

^- 5-] Serbian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently

experienced.

* [This is inconsistent with statements in the Austro-Hungarian docu-
ments. The Austro-Hungarian note was transmitted on July 23. {See
B. 4.) An official communique from the Vienna Press Bureau, on July 28,
recorded in the French Yellow-book [Y. 75 (2) ] states that orders for
mobilisation were given by the Serbian Government " on the day on which
their reply was due and before it was in fact submitted " — -i.e., on July 25.
Similarly, the communication made on July 26 by the Austro-Hungarian
Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs states that
Serbian mobilisation was ordered before 3 o'clock on the afternoon of July 25.
{See G. 5 ; cf. S. 41 ; R. 23, 29.)]

■]• [This is inconsistent with statements made elsewhere in the diplomatic
correspondence. The " stipulated date " for the delivery of the Serbian
reply was Saturday, July 25, at 6 p.m. [see par. 10 of the Austro-Hungarian
note, B. 4.) A despatch from the Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade on
July 27 states that the Serbian reply was handed to the Austro-Hungarian
Minister at Belgrade " before the expiration of the time limit of the ulti-
matum " (0. 13). The Austro-Hungarian communication at Brussels
(G. 5) mentioned in the footnote above records that the reply was given
" before 6 o'clock " on the 25th. The Austrian Minister left Belgrade at
6.30 the same evening because the reply was not considered satisfactory.
(G. 5, B. 23.)]

126

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W.|

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war
with Serbia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July
by declaring war."' '"[B. 50 ;

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position ^- ^3-1
that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone*
which it would have to settle with Serbia. We therefore
directed our efforts toward the localising of the war, and
toward convincing the other Powers that Austria-Hungary
had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon
her by the conditions. "" We emphatically took the position "" [B. 9.]
that no civilised country possessed the right to stay the arm
of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and poUtical crime,
and to shield the Serbians against their just punishment. In see exhibits
this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign ' * ^•
Powers."' '^'[c/. O.

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government com- ^^-^

municated to the Russian Government that the step under-
taken against Serbia implied merely a defensive measure
against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must
of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly
behaviour of Serbia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary
had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in
the Balkan. see exhibit 3.

In answer to our declaration that the German Government
desired, and aimed at, a localisation of the conflict, both the
French'*' and the Enghsh'^' Governments promised an action <''[c/.Y.28,
in the same direction. But these endeavours did not succeed 36.]
in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Serbian '°' ^^f- ^- .
disagreement. ^^''

The Russian Government submitted an official communi-
que on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly
remain indifferent"' in the Serbo- Austrian conflict. The '"[0. 10.
same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ^^s date is
M. Sazonof, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtal^, ^^^ ^^'^
in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government see exhibit 4.
declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg,
that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only
wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation see exhibit 5.
by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial

* [In the " authorized translation " pubhshed in Berlin this word is
emphasised by widely-spaced type.]

127

[W.]

'"'[c/. Y.

62.3
•''[c/. Y.

50.3
see exhibits
6, 7, 8, 9.

see exhibits
10, loa, lob.

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [August

gain in Serbia, the decision concerning the peace of the world
rested exclusively with St. Petersburg."'

The same day the first news of Russian mobilisation'^*
reached Berlin in the evening.

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St.
Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the
danger of this Russian mobilisation. The Imperial Ambassador
at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following
declaration to the Russian Government :*

" Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us
to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the
army.
<^' [c/. R. " But mobilisation means war.'^'
intro., "As we know the obUgations of France towards Russia,

p. 180.] ^]^^g mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and
France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain
such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch
the existence of the Serbian kingdom, we are of the opinion that
Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can
all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the
integrity of Serbia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to
question the latter. It will be easy in the further develop-
ment of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Suchom-
hnof, gave the German military attache his word of honour

* Note [to British official reprint]. — ^This passage takes a somewhat
different form in the German text, a translation of which is as follows : —

" The same was declared by the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, M.
Sazonof, to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtales. (See exhibit 4.)
On the afternoon of July 26 the Imperial and Royal {that is the Austrian)
Government declared again through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg that
Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace on her
frontiers. (See exhibit 5.) In the course of the same day, however, the
first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin. (See exhibits '6, 7, 8,
and 9.) On the evening of the 26th, the German Amlsassadors at London,
Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed energetically to point out the
danger of this Russian mobihsation. (See exhibits 10, loa, and lob.) After
the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that she did not claim
territorial gain in Serbia the decision concerning the peace of the world
rested exclusively with St. Petersburg. On the same day the Imperial
Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following
declaration to the Russian Government."

128

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W.J

that no order to mobilise had been issued, merely prepara-
tions were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves
called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Serbian frontier,
the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kieff,
Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilised,"' under no cir- '" [See B.
cumstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e., St. 70 (i)]
Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the
object of the mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, the
Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders
and referring to the diplomats. The military attach^ then see exhibit
pointed to these mobilisation measures against Austria- "•
Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilisa-
tion came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about
preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance
the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure
of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexan-
drovo garrison.

On July 27th, the first information was received concerning
preparatory measures taken by France : the 14th Corps dis-
continued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison.

In the meantime we had endeavoured to localise the
conflict by most emphatic steps [" durch nachdrucklichste
Einwirkung auf die Kabinette."]

On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal™ '*'[B. 36.J
to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and
Serbia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany,
France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in
regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we
approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we ,„ r , ^
could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a .^i

European tribunal. "' see exhibit

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, '^■
but it foundered upon Austria's declining it,'*' as was to be '*'[B. 61,
expected. 62.]

Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend
to the Austro-Serbian conflict, which is to be considered as a
purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations
between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our
endeavours to bring about an understanding between these =ee exhibits
two powers. ' '^' '"*'

ii-i 129

[W.] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [August,

We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the

conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward

see exhibit Grcy's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary

'^' should decide that either the Serbian reply was sufficient, or

<^' [cf. B. that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. '" The

46, 67.] Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation

of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having

see exhibit already been opened. ""

w'r f-R "^^ ^^*^^ ^^ ^^'^^ ^^ continued our attempts to the utmost

^'^'' ' , 1 and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance com-
patible with the dignity of the monarchy.*

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken
[" iiberholt "] by the military preparations of Russia and
France.

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official

notification in Berlin that four army districts had been

<*'[B 70 mobilised."' At the same time further news was received

^y -i ' concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France,

see exhibit ■: both on water and on land.

11^ On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Peters-

"> [cf. B. 93 burg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, '*'
(2)-] in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows :

" The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge
my Government to participate in a quadruple conference! to
find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those
demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Serbia. I
could merely promise to report the conversation and took the
position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step
of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas appeared now
extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now
was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the
same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with
regard to Serbia, i.e., an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-
Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests
by disclaiming any territorial aspiration — a great concession
on the part of a state engaged in war — should therefore be

* [This passage printed in italics is, in the Berhn " authorized transla-
tion/' emphasised by more widely-spaced type.]

t Note [to official British reprint]. — ^The German word translated " con-
ference" is konversation : the German text also contains the words auf
freundschaftlichem Wege ("in a friendly manner").

130

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W.]

permitted to attend to its affair with Serbia alone. There
would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter
of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Serbia.

" I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire
Austro-Serbian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general
European conflagration, and I endeavoured to present to the
Secretary the magnitude of this danger.

" It was impossible to dissuade Sazonof from the idea
that Serbia could not now be deserted by Russia."

On July 29th, the German Military Attach^ at St. Peters-
burg wired the following report on a conversation with the
Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army :

" The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call
on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His
Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to
reiterate once more that everything had remained as the
Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered con-
firmation in writing and gave me his word of honour in the
most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobihsa-
tion, viz., calling in of a single man or horse up to the present
time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume
a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasise that in
the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired
no mobihsation.

" As, however, I had received here many pieces of news
concerning the calUng in of the reserves in different parts
of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general
that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's
word of honour he replied that such news was wrong, but that
possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.

" I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mis-
lead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in
view of the abundant and positive information about the call-
ing in of reserves."

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its
threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly
pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no con-
versation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambas-
sador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th,
at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with w ^^f, y.
Sazonof.'" Count Szapary was empowered to explain to 104.]

131

[W.] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [AuGus

the Russian minister the note to Serbia though it had been
overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion
on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sazonof all
questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.
Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces-
santly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which

see exhibit wc hopcd to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of

^^' the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded

the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations,
that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Serbia,

'i'[c/.B.88, i.e., after her march into Serbia.'" We thought that Russia
98-] would accept this basis.

During the interval from July 29th to July 31st* there
appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian
measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the
East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of
war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier
allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobiUsation was
in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such mea-
sures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg
on word of honour.

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the
Anglo-German mediation whose tendencies and basis must
have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been

'"I [Y. 118.3 received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobihsation. '"

During the same days, there took place between His
Majesty the Kaiser, and Tsar Nicolas an exchange of tele-
grams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Tsar
to the menacing character of the Russian mobiUsation during

l^^2^^^^^^^ the continuance of his own mediating activities.

23, 23'a. ' ' On July 31st, the Tsar directed the following telegram

<"[SeeY. to His Majesty the Kaiser :"'

app. v.,and " I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits

addition, tj^e hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is

442-^ 1^^ technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations
which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobiUsation.

* Note [to official British reprint]. — The following words appear here
in the German text : wdhrend diese unsere BemUhungen um Vermittelung,
von der englischen Diplomatie unterstiitzt, mit steigender Dringlichkeit fort-
gefiihri wurden (" whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were being
continued with increasing energy, supported by EngUsh diplomacy").

132

442-3-]

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK |W.l

It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations
between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will under-
take no provocative action. I give You my solemn word
thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and
I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the
welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

" Your cordially devoted

" NICOLAS."

This telegram of the Tsar crossed with the following
sent by H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m. : —

" Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request
for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Govern-
ment and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this
action was taking place. Your troops were being mobilised
against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already
communicated to You, my mediation has become almost
illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I
receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are
going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the
security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I
have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts
for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I
who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now
threatens the entire civihsed world. It rests in Your hand
to avert it. No one threatens the honour and peace
of Russia, which might well have awaited the success of
my mediation. The friendship for You and Your coxmtry,
bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed,
has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully
by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially
during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be
preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue these
mihtary preparations which menace Germany and Austria-
Hungary."

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobi-
lisation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against
us and already ordered during the afternoon* of the 31st of

* Note [to official British reprint].— The German text says here Vor-
mittag (morning).

133

[W.] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [August,

'^' [cf. Y. July, '" was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of
^^^•] the Tsar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.

After the Russian general mobilisation became known
in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was
instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the
Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war
see exhibit as counter-measure against the general mobilisation of the
^'*" Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobi-

lisation if Russia did not cease its military measures against
Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified
Germany thereof.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris
was instructed to demand from the French Government a
""[Y. 117.] declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neutral
see exhibit in a Russo-Gcrmau war. ""

^^' The Russian Government destroyed through its mobili-

<"[c/. O. sation, menacing the security of our country,'" the laborious
70, 76.] action at mediation of the European cabinets.* The Russian
mobilisation in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian
Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt,
in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that
Russia wanted war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered
his note to M. Sazonof on July 31st at 12 o'clock
'^'[0. 70.] midnight.'^'

The reply of the Russian Government has nevef\ reached
us.

Two hours after the expiration of the time limits the Tsar
telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows : —

" I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that
You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from
You the same guaranty which I have given You, viz., that
these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue
to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the
universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid
of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to

* Note [to official British reprint]. — The German text adds here kurz
vor dem Erfolge {" just as it was on the point of succeeding" .

t [Emphasised in the BerHn " authorized translation " by widely-spaced

type-]

134

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W.J

prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence
Your urgent reply."

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied : —

" I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yester-
day to Your Government the way through which alone war
may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day
noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with
the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced
to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable
reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless
misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great
grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must
ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your
troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest
violation of our frontiers."

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the
receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered
the mobihsation of the entire German Army and Navy"' on "'[B.^s'isS;
August ist at 5 p.m. Y. 130.]

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed
that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a
satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should
declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after gee exhibit
the refusal of our demands. However, before a confirmation 26.
of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say,
already in the afternoon of August ist, i.e., the same after-
noon on which the telegram of the Tsar, cited above, was
sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into
German territory, «' '"' [c/- R-

Thus Russia began the war against us. 57-]

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our
question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m."" '^ [Y. 117.]

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and un-
satisfactory reply'*' on August ist at i p.m. which gave no '^'[c/. Y.
clear idea of the position of France, as he limited himself 135.]

to the explanation that France would do that which her see exhibit
interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the ^'''
mobilisation of the entire French army and navy was
ordered.'" '"[B. 136;

On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities. ' ^^'^'^

135

EW.]

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK

[July 23

French
text and
trans-
lation,

B.4-]

THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.
The Note of Austria-Hungary to Serbia,"'

_. Presented July 2^rd in Belgrade.

ON March 31st, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister to
the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by order
of his Government :

" Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by
the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will there-
fore adapt herself to the decisions which the Powers are going
to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By
following the councils of the powers, Serbia binds herself to
cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has
assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and
she binds herself further to change the direction of her present
policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live
with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations."

The history of the last years, and especially the painful
events of June 28th, have demonstrated the ejdstence of a
subversive movement in Serbia whose aim it is to separate
certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This
movement, which developed under the eyes of the Serbian
Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the
territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of
assassinations and muiders.

Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in
the declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Serbian
■Government has done nothing to suppress this movement.
She suffered the criminal doings of the various societies and
associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled
language of the Press, the glorification of the originators of
assassinations, the participation of officers and ofi&cials in
subversive intrigues ; she suffered the unwholesome propa-
ganda in pubhc education, and lastly permitted all manifesta-

136

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK

tions which would mislead the Serbian people into hatred
of the monarchy and into contempt for its institutions.

This sufferance of which the Royal Serbian Government
made itself guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the
events of June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the
ghastly consequences of such sufferance.

It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of
the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the
murder at Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the
murderers received the arms and bombs with which they
were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged
to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation
of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and
carried out by lealding Serbian frontier officials.*

The cited results of the investigation do not permit
the Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer
the attitude of waiting, which it has assumed for years to-
wards those agitations which have their centre in Belgrade,
and which from there radiate into the territory of the
monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the
Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate
intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace
of the monarchy.

In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal
Government is forced to demand official assurance from the
Serbian Government that it condemns the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e., the entirety of the
machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the
monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself
to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorizing
propaganda.

In order to give to these obhgations a solemn character,
the Royal Serbian Government will pubUsh on the first
page of its official organ of July 26th, 1914, the following
declaration :

" The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propa-
ganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e., the entirety
of those machinations whose aim it is to separate from the

* [The paragraph : " It becomes plain . . . Serbian frontier officials "
is emphasised in the Berhn " authorized translation " of the German White-
book by widely-spaced type.]

137

[W.l GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 23,

Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging thereto,
and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these
criminal actions.

" The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian
officers and officials have participated in the propaganda cited
above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neigh-
bourly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly
bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31st, 1909.

" The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects
every thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations
of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers
it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of its
officers and officials, and of the entire population of the king-
dom, that it will henceforth proceed with the utmost severity
against any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and
suppress which it will make every effort."

This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the
cognizance of the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the
King, and it is to be published in the official organ of the
Army.

The Royal Serbian Government binds itself, in addition,
as follows :

1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of,
and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and
whose general tendency is directed against the latter's terri-
torial integrity ;

2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society
Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propa-
ganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other
societies and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves
with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal
Government will take the necessary measures, so that the
dissolved societies may not continue their activities under
another name or in another form ;

3. Without delay to ehminate from the pubhc instruction
in Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors, as well as the
means of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or
may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

4. To remove from military service and the administra-
tion in general all officers and officials who are guilty of
propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with

138

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W.J

a communication of the material which the Imperial and
Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial
and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate
to the Royal Government ;

5. To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and
Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a move-
ment directed against the territorial integrity of the mon-
archy ;

6. To commence a judicial investigation against the
participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on
Serbian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and
Royal Government will participate in the examinations ;

7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major
Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Serbian State
officials, who have been compromised through the result of
the investigation ;

8. To prevent through effective measures the participation
of the Serbian authorities in the smuggling of arms and
explosives across the frontier and to dismiss those officials
of Shabatz and Loznica, who assisted the originators of the
crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier ;

9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government ex-
planations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high
Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad who have not
hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express them-
selves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria-
Hungary after the outrage of June 28th.

10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply
from the Royal Government at the latest until Saturday
25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir concerning the results of
the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they concern points
7 and 8 is enclosed with this note."

{

Enclosure.

The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and
accomplices in the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the
assassination on June 28th has, so far, yielded the following
results :

I. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during
his stay in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo

139

[W.] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 25,

Princip, Nedeliko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic
and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were
used by the criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic
and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic
in Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the
arsenal of the Serbian Army in Kragujevac.

4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciga-
nowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades,
and gave instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to
Princip Grabez in a forest near the target practice field of
Topshider — (outside Belgrade) .

5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia
and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the
smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation
was organised by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals
with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected
by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of
Loznica, as well as by the custom-house official Rudivoy
Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other persons.

"> [C/. the The Serbian Answer."'

more exact

British offi- Presented at Vienna, July 2$th, 1914.

cial transla-
tion of this (With Austria's commentaries"" [in italics].)

document,

R. 34; also THE Royal Government has received the communication
~: ,39 ; Y. q£ ^Yyq Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and
<^'rSee is convinced that its reply will dissipate any misunderstand-
Italian i^ig which threatens to destroy the friendly and neighbourly
comment, relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdom
B. 64.] of Serbia.

The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there
have been renewed protests against the great neighbourly
monarchy like those which at one time were expressed in
the Skupshtina, as well as in the declaration and actions of
the responsible representatives of the state at that time,
and which were terminated by the Serbian declaration of
March 31st, 1909 ; furthermore that since that time neither
140

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W.l

the different corporations of the kingdom, nor the officials
have made an attempt to alter the political and judicial
condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal
Government states that the I. and R. Government has made
no protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a text
book, in regard to which the I. and R. Government has received
an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has given during
the time of the Balkan crisis in numerous cases evidence of
her pacific and moderate policy, and it is only owing to
Serbia and the sacrifices which she has brought in the interest
of the peace of Europe that this peace has been preserved.

The Royal Serbian Government limits itself to establishing
that since the declaration of March 315^, 1909, there has been
no attempt on the part of the Serbian Government to alter the
position of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note,
as we have not insisted that she and her officials have under-
taken anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that
in spite of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has
omitted to suppress the movement directed against the territorial
integrity of the monarchy.

Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the
entire direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly
and neighbourly relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy,
and not only not to interfere with the possession of Bosnia.

The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for
expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper
articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which
are of very common appearance in other countries, and which
ordinarily are not under the control of the State. This, all
the less, as the Royal Government has shown great courtesy
in the solution of a whole series of questions which have
arisen between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has
succeeded to solve the greater number thereof, in favour of
the progress of both countries.

The assertion of the Royal Serbian Government that the
expressions of the press and the activity of Serbian associations
possess a private character and thus escape governmental con-
trol, stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states
and even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly
everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain control

141

IW.] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 25,

of the state. This is also provided for by the Serbian institu-
tions. The rebuke against the Serbian Government consists in
the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press and
its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be hostile to
'^' [c/. the the monarchy. "'
more jj^e Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised

accurate ^y ^-^^ assertions that citizens of Serbia had participated in
t[on^in' ■'^he preparations of the outrage in Sarajevo. The Govern-
R. 34 ment expected to be invited to co-operate in the investigation
(pp. 255- of the crime, and it was ready in order to prove its complete
257-)] correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to whom
it would receive information.

This assertion is incorrect^ The Serbian Government was
accurately informed about the suspicion resting upon quite
definite personalities and not only in the position, but also
obliged by its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously.
The Serbian Government has done nothing in this direction.

According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government,
the Royal Government is prepared to surrender to the court,
without regard to position and rank, every Serbian citizen,
for whose participation in the crime of Sarajevo it should
have received proof. It binds itself particularly on the first
page of the official organ of the 26th of July to publish the
following enunciation :

" The Royal Serbian Government condemns every propa-
ganda which should: be directed against Austria-Hungary,
i.e., the entirety of such activities as aim towards the separa-
tion of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian mon-
archy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable consequences
of these criminal machinations."

The Austrian demand reads :

" The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda
against Austria-Hungary. ..." The alteration of the declara-
''''[Re- tion as demanded by us,^"'' which has been made by the Royal
ferredto, Serbian Government, is meant to imply that a propaganda
■ 4-J directed against Austria-Hungary does not_ exist, and that it is
not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the Serbian
Government reserves itself the subterfuge for later occasions
that it had not disavowed by this declaration the existing propa-
ganda, nor recognised the same as hostile to the monarchy,
142

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK fW.]

whence it could deduce further that it is not obliged to suppress
in the future a propaganda similar to the present one.

The Royal Government regrets that according to a
communication of the I. and R. Government certain Serbian
officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda
just referred to, and that these have therefore endangered
the amicable relations for the observation of which the
Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself through the
declaration of March 31st, 1909.

The Government . . . identical with the demanded text.

The formula as demanded by Austria reads :

" The Royal Government regrets that Serbian officers and
functionaries . . . have participated . . ."

Also with this formula and the further addition " according to
the declaration of the I. and R. Government," the Serbian
Government pursues the object, already indicated above, to
preserve a free hand for the future.

The Royal Governnient binds itself further :

I. During the next regular meeting of the Skupshtina
to embody in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the incite-
ment to hatred of, and contempt for, the monarchy is to be
most severely punished, as well as every publication whose
general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of
Austria-Hungary .

It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the con-
stitution to embody an amendment into Article 22 of the
constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such
publications as is at present impossible according to the
clear definition of Article 22 of the constitution.

Austria had demanded :

I. "To suppress every publication which incites to hatred
and contempt for the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy."

We wanted to bring about the obligation for Serbia to take
care that such attacks of the press would cease in the future.

Instead Serbia offers to pass certain laws which are meant
as means towards this end, viz. :

[a) A law according to which the expressions of the
press hostile to the monarchy can be individually punished,
a matter, which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as

143

gw.] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 25,

the individual prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely
possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the
few cases of this nature would not he punished. The
proposition, therefore, does not meet our demand in any
way, and it offers not the least guarantee for the desired
success.

{b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which
would permit confiscation, a proposal, which does not
satisfy us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no
use to us. For we want the obligation* of the Government
to enforce* it and that has not been promised us.

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and
evasive, as we are not told within what time these laws will be
passed, and as in the event of the not passing of these laws by
the Skupshtina everything would remain as it is, excepting the
event of a possible resignation of the Government.

2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note
of the I. and R. Government does not submit them that the
society Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have
committed, up to the present, any criminal actions of this
manner through anyone of their members. Notwithstanding
this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the
I. and R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna
Odbrana, as well as every society which should act against
Austria-Hungary.

The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated
societies hostile to the monarchy fills the entire public life of
Serbia ; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable reserve if the
Serbian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it.
Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we
have asked besides :

" To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies
to prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another
name and in another form."

In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly
silent, so that through this semi-concession there is offered us
no guarantee for putting an end to the agitation of the associa-
tions hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana.

* [The words " obligation " and " enforce " are emphasised in the Berlin
" authorized translation " by widely-spaced type.]

■144

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W.]

3. The Royal Serbian Government binds itself without
delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia any
thing which might further the propaganda directed against
Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R. Government furnishes
actual proofs.

Also in this case the Serbian Government first demands
proofs for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public
instruction of Serbia while it must know that the textbooks
introduced in the Serbian schools contain objectionable matter in
this direction and that a large portion of the teachers are in the
camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies.

Furthermore, the Serbian Government has not fulfilled a
part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its
text the addition desired by us ; " as far as the body of instructors
is concerned, as well as the means of instruction " — a sentence
which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Mon-
archy is to be found in the Serbian schools.

4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those
officers and officials from the military and civil services in
regard to whom it has been proved by judicial investigation
that they have been guilty of actions against the territorial
integrity of the monarchy ; it expects that the I. and R.
Government communicate to it for the purpose of starting
the investigation the names of these officers and officials, and
the facts with which they have been charged.

By promising the dismissal from the military and civil
services'-^'' of those officers and officials who are found guilty by '"[^eefoot-
judicial procedure, the Serbian Government limits its assent p°*® *°
to those cases in which these persons have been charged with a ' ^'^k
crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand 261.]
the removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propa-
ganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally not punishable
in Serbia, our demands have not been ftdfilled in this point.

5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear
about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and
R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part
of the Royal Serbian Government to permit the co-operation
of officials of the I. and R. Government on Serbian territory,
but it declares that it is willing to accept every co-operation
which does not run counter to international law and criminal
law, as well as to the friendly and neighbourly relations.

II-K X45

[W.3 GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 25,

The international law, as well as the criminal law, has
nothing to do with this question ; it is 'purely a matter of the
nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special
agreement. The reserved attitude of Serbia is therefore incom-
prehensible and on account of its vague general form it would
lead to unbridgeable difficulties.

6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a
matter of course to begin an investigation against all those
persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th
and who are in its territory. As far as the co-operation in
this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and
R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as
this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal pro-

'1' ["in cedure. Yet in some cases'" the result of the investigation
einzelnen might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials.
Fallen," c/. j'/je Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable :
in^R^^4°'^ I. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants
p. 262.] ' ^-* i^^ outrage.

2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in

the examinations (" Recherche " in contrast with " enquete

judiciaire").

f^'[Re- 3.™ It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government

i&rve&to, officials participate in the Serbian court procedure; they were

^- "4-] to co-operate only in the police researches which had to furnish

and fix the material for the investigation.

If the Serbian Government misunderstands us here, this
is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference
between " enquete judiciaire " and simple police researches.
As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation
which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable
results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible
manner the co-operation of our officials {precedents for such
police intervention exist in great number) it tries to justify its
refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.

7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of
the day on which the note was received the arrest of Major
Voislar Tankosic. However, as far as Milan Ciganowic is
concerned, who is a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
and who has been employed till June 28th with the Railroad
Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him,
wherefore a warrant has been issued against him.

146

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W.]

The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as
soon as possible, for the purpose of conducting the investiga-
tion, the existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of
guilt, obtained in the investigation at Sarajevo.

This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation,
Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three
days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that
Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place,
it is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Serbian service
on June 2Sth. In the second place, we add that the prefect of
police at Belgrade who had himself caused the departure of this
Ciganowic and who knew his whereabouts, declared in an
interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not
exist in Belgrade.

8. The Serbian Government will amplify and render
more severe the existing measures against the suppression of
smuggling of arms and explosives.

It is a matter of course that it wiU proceed at once against,
and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service ■
on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated, their duty and
who have permitted the perpetrators of the crime to cross
the frontier.

9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations
about the expressions which its officials in Serbia and abroad
have made in interviews after the outrage and which, accord-
ing to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, were hostile
to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. Government
points out in detail where those expressions were made, and
succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually been
made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government
itself will take care that the necessary evidences and proofs
are collected therefor.

The Royal Serbian Government must he aware of the inter-
views in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government
that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews
and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation,
it shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfil the
demand.

10. The Royal_^Government will notify the I. and R.
Government, so far as this has not been already done by
the present note, of the execution of the measures in question

[W. exh. 1] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 23,

as soon as one of those measures has been ordered and put
into execution.

The Royal Serbian Government beheves it to be to the
common interest not to rush the solution of this affair and
it is therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not
consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to
accept a peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision
of this question to the International Court at The Hague or
by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have
participated in the working out of the declaration given by
'" ^Seep. the Serbian Government on March 31st, 1909."'
136.]

The Serbian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time.*

''•[c/.B.g.] Exhibit i.'^'

The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London,
and St. Petersburg, on July Z'^rd, 1914.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government
concerning the circumstances under which the assassination
of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took
place, disclose clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda
. has set itself and the means which it utilises for their realisa-
tion. Through the published facts the last doubt must
disappear that the centre of action of the efforts for the
separation of the south Slavic provinces from the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Serbian
Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays its
activity with the connivance of members of the Government
and of the Army.

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series
of years. In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb
chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis. Only
to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the

* [This sentence is not in the German text of the White-book. In place
of it appears, with the heading, " Extract from the Austro-Hungarian
Records," a summary, dated " Vienna, July 27," of the " dossier con-
cerning the Serbian conflict " (R. 19), which, it states, " was made public
to-day" (July 27).]

148

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W. exh. 1]

Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intefcession
of the powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to
which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the
part of Serbia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance
of future well-behaviour which the Serbian Government
gave at that time,'" it has not kept. Under the very eyes, '" [See •p.
at least with the tacit sufferance of official Serbia, the pan- ^36-1

Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and
intensity ; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the threads
of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is
compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preserva-
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any longer
idly the doings across the border through which the safety
and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened.
With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands
of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as
justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public
opinion as well as by the Government in Serbia does not
preclude the fear that the Serbian Government will decline
to meet these demands"" and that it will allow itself to be '^'[c/.
carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria- wording
Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian "^, ®^"'
Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a
great power, but to press its demands with the Serbian
Government and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to
military measures, in regard to which the choice of means
must be left with it.

I have the honour to request you to express yourself in
the sense indicated above to (the present representative "' of '^' [M.
M. Viviani), (Sir Edward Grey), (M. Sazonof) and therewith ^^'^'^Y^""'
give special emphasis to the view that in this question there ^''^^'^"°-J
is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the limitation to which it must
be the earnest endeavour of the powers to insure. We
anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because every
intercession of another power on account of the various
treaty-alliances would precipitate inconceivable consequences.

I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report
after the course of your interview.

149

[W. exh. 2] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 28,

Exhibit 2.
The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany.
Confidential. Berlin, July 28th, 1914.

" You will make the following report to the Government
to which you are accredited :

In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has
published in its note to the Serbian Government, the last
doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-
Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim, was
prepared in Serbia, to say the least with the connivance of
members of the Serbian government and army. It is a
product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years
have become a source of permanent disturbance for the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.

The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especiall}' marked
during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-
restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian govern-
ment and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be
ascribed that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary
was exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The
assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Serbian govern-
<'' [Seep, ment gave at that time,"' it has not kept. Under the very
136-] eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Serbia, the
pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase
in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with
its dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-
Hungarian government persisted to view idly any longer
the intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety
and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened.
With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands
of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only
as justifiable.

The reply of the Serbian government to the demands

which the Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23rd inst.

through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the domina-

""[c/. ting factors in Serbia are not inclined to cease their former

iTeSr^ poHcies and agitation.'" There will remain nothing else for

J.'^j® • the Austro-Hungarian government than to press its demands,

150

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W. exh. 2]

if need be through miUtary action, unless it renounces for
good its position as a great power.

Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter
of course and a task of Russia's to actively become a party
to Serbia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and
Serbia. For the European conflagration which would result
from a similar step by Russia, the Novoe Vremya believes
itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it
does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield.

The Russian Press thus turns conditions upside down.
It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict
with Serbia, but it is Serbia which, through unscrupulous
favour toward pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, threatens the same in her
existence and creates conditions, which eventually found
expression in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If Russia
beheves that.it must champion the cause of Serbia in this
matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must
realise that it makes the Serb activities its own, to under-
mine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility, '" "' [cf. B.
if out of the Austro-Serbian affair, which all other great i34;Y.56
powers desire to localise, there arises a European war. This ^^ ^^■^^'
responsibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more j-Qg,, lob,
heavily as Count Berchtold has ofi&cially declared to Russia below.]
that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Serbian
territory or to touch the existence of the Serbian Kingdom,
but only desires peace against the Serbian intrigues threatening
its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial government in this question
is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-
Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction
of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the scattering or weaken-
ing of the triple alliance with a complete isolation of the
German Empire in consequence. Our own interest therefore
calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary."" The duty, if at ""[c/.Y.i6,
all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points ^°\ ^'/^
to the support by ourselves of those endeavours which aim at ^^ note.j
the localisation of the conflict, faithful to the course of those
policies which we have carried out successfully for forty-four
years in the interest of the preservation of the peace of Europe.

151

[W. exh. 3] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 24,

Should, however, against our hope, through the inter-
ference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support,
faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbour-monarchy with
all the power at our command. We shall take the sword
only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness that
we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon
the peoples of Europe.

Exhibit 3.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the
Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.

COUNT BERCHTOLD has asked to-day for the Russian

'" [Prince Charge d'affaires'^' in order to explain to him thoroughly and

Kuda- cordially Austria-Hungary's point of view toward Serbia.

•] After recapitulation of the historical development of the past

few years, he emphasised that the Monarchy entertained

'^'[c/. 0. no thought of conquest toward Serbia."" Austria-Hungary

k t^*1 "^o^ld ^'^^ claim Serbian territory. It insisted merely that

this step was meant as a definite means of checking the

Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstance, Austria-

'" [c/. B. 93 Hungary must have a guaranty'^' for continued amicable

(^)--l relations with Serbia. It was far from him to intend to bring

about a change in the balance of powers in the Balkan. The

Charge d'affaires who had received no instructions from St.

Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary ad referendum

with the promise to submit it immediately to Sazonof.

Exhibit 4.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the
Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.

I HAVE just utilised the contents of Order 592 in a

prolonged interview with Sazonof. The Secretary (Sazonof)

indulged in unmeasured accusations toward Austria-Hungary

and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively

that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that

I*' [c/. 0. the Serbo- Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the

10.] parties concerned.'*

132

J9I4] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK JW. exh. 8]

Exhibit 5.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor.
Telegram of July 26th, 1914.

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended
interview with Sazonof this afternoon. '" Both parties had '" [cf. O.
a satisfactory impression as they told me afterwards. The 25.]

assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no
idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her
frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary.

Exhibit 6.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the
Chancellor on July z^th, 1914.

MESSAGE to H.M. from General von Chelius (German
honorary aide de camp to the Tsar).

The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were
suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their
garrisons at once. The manoeuvres have been cancelled.
The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of ofl&cers
instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains great
excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the im-
pression that complete preparations for mobilisation against
Austria are being made.

Exhibit 7.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the
Chancellor on July 26th, 1914.

THE military attache requests the following message to
be sent to the general staff : —

I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for
IKieff and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and
improbable elsewhere.

Exhibit 8.

Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor

on July 2yth, 1914.

KOVNO has been declared to be in a state of war.

153

[W. exh. 9] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 27,

Exhibit 9.

Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor ^

on July zyth, 1914.

HAVE learned reliably that French XlVth corps has
discontinued manoeuvres.

Exhibit id.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at
London. Urgent. July 26th, 1914.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY has declared in St. Petersburg

officially and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial

'^' [c/. 0. gain in Serbia ; '" that it will not touch the existence of the

28 ; B. 90 Kingdom, but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions.

and note.] According to news received here, the call for several classes

of the reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to

mobilisation.* If this news proves correct, we shaU be forced

to countermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our

desire to localise the conflict and to preserve the peace of

Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at

St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.

Exhibit loa.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial
Ambassador at Paris. July 26th, 1914.

AFTER officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hun-

,2 gary has no intention to acquire territorial gain'" and to touch

28 1 ^^^ existence of the Kingdom, the decision whether there is

r , Y ,5^0 be a European war rests solely with Russia"' which has to

and note ; ^^^^ ^^^ entire responsibiUty. We depend upon France with

also exhs! which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of

2, lob.] the peace of Europe'^' that it will exercise its influence at

'■■'[c/. Y. St. Petersburg in favour of peace.

"57 ]

* Note [to ©facial British reprint].— The German text adds here auch-

gegen uns {" also against us").
154

(3)

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W. exh. 121

Exhibit lob.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at
St. Petersburg on July 26th, 1914.

AFTER Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial
disinterestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance
of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests
solely upon Russia."' We trust still that Russia will under- <"[c/. exh.
take no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of loa and
Europe. °ote.]

Exhibit ii.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the n) rMaior
Chancellor on July zjth, 1914. von

MILITARY Attache «' reports a conversation with the ^^S^^i'^g-I
Secretary qi War :'" ''' [cf. R.

Sazonof has requested the latter to enhghten me on the ^^J
situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of
honour that no order to mobilise has as yet been issued. "' '*' {"f- ^•
Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were 33-]
called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Serbian
frontier, such military districts as are directed toward Austria,
viz., Kieff , Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilised. '*' '^' [See B.
Under no circumstances those on the German frontier. War- 70 (i)-]
saw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired
very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation
against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the
diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the
friendly intentions, but considered mobilisation even against
Austria as very menacing.

Exhibit 12.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at
London on July zjth, 1914.

WE know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward
Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London.'" It is "'[B. 36.J
impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Serbia
before a European tribunal.*" Our mediation must be limited '"[c/. B.
to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict. 43-]

155

[W. exu. 13] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 25,

Exhibit 13.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at
London on July 2$th, 1914.

THE distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an

<" [See B. Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian conflict '" is perfectly

25,] correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any

more than England, and as heretofore we take the position

<''[c/.B. 9.] that this question must be localised"" by virtue of all Powers

refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that

Russia will refrain from any action in view of her respon-

sibihty and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared,

in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart

from our known duties as allies [" vorbehaltlich unserer

is)r f T} bekannten Biindnispflichten"], to intercede between Russia

18 84.1 ^^*^ Austria jointly with the other powers.'"

Exhibit 14.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at
St. Petersburg on July 28th, 1914.

WE continue in our endeavour to induce Vienna to
elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian
^^'[c/. B.^ action in Serbia'^' in a manner both convincing and satis
^Y\ factory to Russia. The declaration of war which has mean-
while ensued alters nothing in this matter.

94-;

Exhibit 15.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in
London on July zyth, 1914.

[cf. B. W-E have at once started the mediation proposal in

71.] Vienna"' in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We
<"' [of. B. have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire
45.] of M. Sazonof for a direct parley with Vienna.'*'
156

(6)

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W. exh. 18]

Exhibit i6.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the
Chancellor on July 28th, 1914.

COUNT BERCHTOLD requests me to express to Your
Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English
mediation proposal.'" He states, however, that after the (d [b. 36.]
opening of hostilities by Serbia and the subsequent declara-
tion of war, the step appears belated."' <^| [c/.B.6i,

62.]

Exhibit 17.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at
Paris on July zgth, 1914.

NEWS received here regarding French preparations of
war"' multipUes from hour to hour. I request that You call m ^cf. R.
the attention of the French Government to this and accen- 45.]
tuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures
on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening
state of war {drohende Kriegsgefahr),^*^ and while this would ^^^.f^ ^^_
not mean a call for the reserves or mobiUsation, yet the 34; also
tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for B. iia;
the preservation of peace. ^- ^^7-1

Exhibit 18.

Telegram of the Military Attach^ at St. Petersburg to H.M. the
Kaiser on July ^oth, 1914.

PRINCE TROUBETZKI said to me yesterday, after
causing Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to
Tsar Nicolas : Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor'" (5)rExh
has come. He has just told me the telegram has made a 20.]

deep impression upon the Tsar but as the mobilisation against
Austria had already been ordered '*' and Sazonof had con- m^^y^
vinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, (i).]

His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more.
I then told him that the guilt for the measureless conse-
quences lay at the door of premature mobilisation against
Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a

157

[W. exh. 19] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 31

local war with Serbia, for Germany's answer was clear and

"|[c/. O. the responsibility rested upon Russia'" which ignored Austria-

28 ; B. 90 Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial

andnote.] ^^^^ -^ Serbia. Austria-Hungary mobilised against Serbia

"[c/. O. and not against Russia"" and there was no ground for an

5I-] immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added

that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's

phrase that " she could not desert her brethren in Serbia,"

after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I told him finally he

need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilised.

Exhibit 19.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at
Rome on July ■^xst, 1914.

j3 WE have continued to negotiate between Russia and

i^2-is^" Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams

and below.] between His Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Tsar/''

as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through

''•[B. 70 the mobiUsation of Russia'" all our efforts have been greatly

(i)-] handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite

of pacifying assurances Russia is* taking such far-reaching

measures against us that the situation is becoming continually

more menacing.

Exhibit 20.|

I. — His Majesty to the Tsar.

July 28th, 10.45 P-^-
I HAVE heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression
which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against
Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going
on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which
Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The
spirit which made the Serbians murder their own King and
his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You

* Note [to official British reprint]. — The German text adds here aUen
uns zugegangenen Nachrichten zufolge (" according to all the information
that has reached us ").

t [See Y. app. V. and note (vol. I., p. 442), for an omitted letter from
the Tsar to the Emperor William.]
158

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W. exh. 22]

will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all
other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all
those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall
suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty
encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide
of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which
has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use
my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a
frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope
confidently that You will support me in my efforts to over-
come all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin.

(Signed) WILHELM.

Exhibit 21.
II. — The Tsar to His Majesty.

Peterhof Palace, July 2gth, i p.m.
I AM glad that You are back in Germany. In this
serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An igno-
minious war has been declared against a weak country and
in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous.
I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure
exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures
which wiU lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European
war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship
to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going
too far.

(Signed) NICOLAS.

Exhibit 22.
III. — His Majesty to the Tsar.

July 2gth, 6.30 p.m.
I HAVE received Your telegram and I share Your desire
for the conservation of peace. However, I cannot — as I told
You in my first telegram — consider the action of Austria-
Hungary as an " ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows

159

W. exh. 23] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 30,

from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they
are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary
is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty
that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into
deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explana-
tion of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended
no territorial gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore
of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain
a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing
Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe
that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between
Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which — as
I have already telegraphed You — ^my Government endeavours
to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures
by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-
Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us
desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator
which — ^upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid — I
willingly accepted.

(Signed) WILHELM.

Exhibit 23.

IV. — His Majesty to the Tsar.

July 30th, I a.m.

MY Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention
of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences
of a mobilisation ; I have told You the same in my last
telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Serbia,
and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be
the case according to Your advice and that of Your Govern-
ment, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of the
mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly
manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire,
is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of
decision now rests upon Your shoulders. You have to bear
the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed) WILHELM.
160

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W. exh. 25j

Exhibit 23a.
v.— The Tsar to His Majesty.

Peterhof, July ^oth, 1914, 1.20 p.m.

I THANK You from my heart for Your quick reply. I
am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the
Kaiser) with instructions. The mihtary measures now taking
form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason
of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with
all my heart that these measures will not influence in any
manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very
highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that
an understanding can be a.rrived at with us.

NICOLAS.

Exhibit 24.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at
St. Petersburg on July ^zst, 1914. Urgent.

IN spite of negotiations still pending and although we
have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilisation,
Russia has mobilised her entire* army and navy,'" hence ^^
also against us. On account of these Russian measures we !y- " "| :
have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim R^sa.]
the threatening state of war,"" which does not yet imply w.^/ g^^g
mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if 17, 25 ;
Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and also Y.
against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours and notifies us ii7-]
definitely to this effect."" Please to communicate this at ojr^j q
once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication. 7o;k.54.]

Exhibit 25.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in
Paris on July 3isf, 1914. Urgent.

RUSSIA has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and
fleet,'"' therefore also against us in spite of our still pending ,^

* [Emphasised in Berlin " authorized translation " by widely -spaced Y. ii8 ;
type.] R. 52.]

11— L 161

[W. exh. 26] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [August i,

mediation.* We have therefore declared the threatening state

'^'[c/. exh. of war"' which is bound to be followed by mobilisation

24 and unless Russia stops within 12 hours all measures of war

"°*^"^ against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably impUes war.

Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain

neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in

'*! [See Y. 18 hours. '" Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed

■'■■'^^-J necessary.

Exhibit 26.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in
St. Petersburg on August xst, 12.52 p.m. Urgent.

IF the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to
our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this after-
'" [See 0. noon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement : '"
7^-3 " Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts
de la crise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant
a un desir que lui en avait ete exprime par Sa Majeste
I'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste I'Empereur d'AUemagne
d'accord avec I'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un role
mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg,
lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la
mobilisation de la totaUte de ses forces de terre et de mer.

" A la suite de cette mesure menagante motivee par aucun
preparatif militaire de la part de I'AUemagne, I'Empire
AUemand se trouva vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent.
Si le Gouvernement Imperial eflt manque de parer a ce
peril il aurait compromis la securite et I'existence meme
de I'AUemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement AUemand
se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste
'"[Correc- I'Empereur de toutes les Russies en sistant'^' sur la cessation
ted into (jes ^its actes miUtaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire
inTTarer ^^^^^ ^ P^^^^ demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus, que
issue of the son action etait dirigee contre I'AUemagne, j'ai I'honneur
document. 3 d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir a Votre Excel-
lence ce qui suit :

" Sa Majeste I'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom

* Note [to official British reprint].— The German text adds here und
obwohl wir selbsi keinerlei Mohilmachungsmassnahmen geiroffen haben (" and
although we ourselves have taken no measures towards. mobilisation").

162

1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W. exh. 27]

de I'Empire releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre
avec la Russie."

Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this
instruction by Russian time.

Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection
and affairs to the American Embassy.

Exhibit 27.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor
on August 1st, 1.05 p.m.

UPON my repeated definite inquiry whether France
would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war,
the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which
her interests dictated. "' '" [c/. Y.

"7, 125.]

163

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK.

(Official Translation from "Collected Diplomatic Dociiments."

Cd. 7860.)

TABLE OF CONTENTS.*

No.

Name.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

Subject.

Ritter von Storck
to Count Berch-
told

1914.

Belgrade,

June 29

Rejoicings at Belgrade over
news of assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand

182

(Telegraphic)

Belgrade,
June 30

Serbian police have taken no
steps to follow up clues
to the crime

183

Consul - General
Jehlitschka to
Count Berchtold

Uskub,
July I

Applause and satisfaction at
Uskub and Pristina over
news of the outrage

183

Coimt Szecsen to

Coimt Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

Paris,
July 4

President of French Republic
is convinced that Serbian
Government would readily
meet Austria in the judicial
investigation and prosecu-
tion of accomplices

184

Herr Hoflehner to
Count Berchtold

Nish,
July 6

Satisfaction and joy at Nish
over Serajevo outrage

184

Freiherr von Giesl
to Coimt Berch-
told

Belgrade,
July 21

Serbian policy aims at separa-
tion of Southern Slav
territories from Austria-
Hungary' and her destruc-
tion as a Great Power. Ser-
bian press campaign of lies
and hatred. Further injury
to position of monarchy
cannot be permitted

185

[SuppUed by the Editor.]

16S

[R.]

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

Count Berchtoldto
Freiherr v. Giesl

Count Berchtold to
Ambassadors in
Berlin, Rome,
Paris, London,
St. Petersburg,
Constantinople

Count Berchtold to

Count Mensdorff

(Telegraphic)

Count Mensdorff to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

Count Szecsen to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

tt }t

(Telegraphic)

II }i

(Telegraphic)

1914.
Vienna,
July 22

Vienna,
July 23

London,
July 24

Paris,
July 24

Austrian note to Serbia. [See
B. 4]

Commentary upon Austrian
note. Serbian machina-
tions against Austria-Hun-
gary and Austrian patience
in face of Serbia's provoca-
tive attitude

Serbian Govermnent have
taken no steps to discover
traces from the Serajevo
outrage to Belgrade, but
have tried to obliterate
them. The short time
limit indispensable

Communication of Austrian
note. Sir E. Grey regrets
the short time limit and
has fears concerning peace
of Europe^ Statement of
Austrian point of view . .

Has communicated Austrian
note and explained Austrian
point of view ; the question
must be brought to an issue
directly between Austria
and Serbia. M. Bienvenu-
Martin does not defend
Serbia's attitude . .

Baron Schoen will communi-
cate the German view that
the matter concerns only
Austria and Serbia

German Ambassador's de-
marche. French Govern-
ment hope the controversy
will find a direct and
peaceful solution . .

I66

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

.R.I

No.

Name.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

Subject.

Count Szapary to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

1914.
St. Peters-
burg,
July 24

Discussion of Austrian note
with M. Sazonof and reply
to his objections . .

195

Russian official
communique

Russia cannot remain in-
different to the dispute . .

196

Count Szapiry to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

Conversation between M. Sa-
zonof and Count Pourtales:
Austria does not intend to
devour Serbia, but would
not accept interference ..

197

Count Berchtold to

Count Mensdorff

(Telegraphic)

Vienna,
July 24

Demarche at Belgrade not a
formal ultimatum, but a
demarche with a time limit.

198

Count Berchtold to
Count Szdpary

i»

Has assured Russian Charge
d' Affaires that Austria does
not intend to humiUate
Serbia, or aim at increase
of territory

198

Count Berchtold to
Ambassadors at
Berlin, Rome,
Paris, London,
St. Petersbvu-g,
Constantinople

Vienna,
July 25

Transmits dossier with refer-
ence to the Great Serbian
propaganda and its connec-
tion with the Serajevo out-
rage

199

Count Berchtold to
Freiherr von
Macchio

(Telegraphic)

Lambach,
July 25

Refuses consent to extension
of the time limit . .

243

Count Berchtold to
Count Szdpary
(Telegraphic)

Bad Ischl,
July 25

Announces and gives reasons
for this refusal

243

Freiherr von Giesl
to Count Berch-
told
- (Telegraphic)

Belgrade,
July 25

Administrative and military
preparations in Serbia

244

167

IB.]

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

No.

Name.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

24
25

Freiherr von Giesl
to Count Berch-
told (Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

Serbian Govern-
ment to Austrian
Government

Count Berchtold to
Count Szapary

(Telegraphic)

Count Szapary to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

Count Berchtold to

Count Mensdorii

(Telegraphic)

Count Berchtold to
Ambassadors at
BerUn, Rome,
London, Paris,
St. Petersburg
(Telegraphic)

1914.
Semlin,
July 25

July 25

Vienna,
July 25

St. Peters-
burg,
July 26

Vienna,
July 26

General mobiHsation ordered
in Serbia

Rupture of diplomatic rela-
tions with Serbia . .

Serbian note in reply

Austria aware that Serbian
dispute might develop into
a coUision with Russia, but
her action based upon
fundamental considerations
of national pohcy . .

Demand for participation of
Austrian representatives in
suppression of subversive
movement in Serbia to be
explained " in strict con-
fidence " to M. Sazonof . .

Count Pourtales has warned
M. Sazonof as to conse-
quences of Russian mobiU-
sation measures. Russian
assiurance that no mobihsa-
tion orders had been issued

Sir E. Grey's attention to be
called to Serbian mobilisa-
tion

Serbia's refusal of Austria's
demands compels the latter
to resort to the sharpest
measures . .

168

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

[R.3

No.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

31 Count Szapary to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

32 Count Berchtold to
Count Szapary

(Telegraphic)

33 Count Szogy^ny to
Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

34 Count Berchtold to
Ambassadors in
Berlin, Rome,
London, Paris,
St. Petersburg

35 Count Szogyeny to
Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

36 Freiherr von Mtiller
to Count Berch-
told

(Telegraphic)

37 Count Berchtold to
Serbian Foreign
Office

(Telegraphic)

38 Count Berchtold to
Count Szogyeny

(Telegraphic)

1914.
St. Peters-
burg,
July 27

Vienna,
July 27

Berlin,
July 27

Vienna,
July 27

Berlin,
July 28

Tokio,
July 28

Vienna,
July 28

Conversation with M. Sazonof
explaining Austria's action ;
no thought of quarrelling
with Russia . . . . 251

As long as the war remains
locahsed Austria aims at no
territorial acquisitions . . 252

Military precautions" in
Russia 252

Conveys text of Serbia's reply,
annotated with remarks
by Austria . . . . . . 253

Germany declines British pro-
posal for mediation through
conference in London . . 266

Declaration by Japan Times
that in case of war Japan
would maintain strictest
neutraUty . . . . . . 266

Declaration of war against
Serbia. [See S. 45.] . . 267

It has been explained to Sir E.
Grey that Austria has in
view neither territorial ac-
quisition nor destruction
of Serbian independence,
but satisfaction and guaran-
tees for the future. British
conference proposal out-
stripped by events . . 267

X69

[R.]

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

No.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

39 Count Berchtold to

Count Mensdorff

(Telegraphic)

40 Count Berchtold to
Count Szapary
(Telegraphic)

41 Count Berchtold to
Count Mensdorff
(Telegraphic)

42 Count Berchtold to
Count Szogy^ny
(Telegraphic)

43 Count Berchtold to
Count Szogyeny
(Telegraphic)

44 Count Berchtold to
Ambassadors at
St. Petersburg,
London, Paris,
and Rome

(Telegraphic)

170

1914.
Vienna,
July 28

Vienna,
July 28

Vienna,
July 29

Explanation for Sir E. Grey
of Austrian dossier. Serbian
reply intended to deceive
Europe without giving
guarantee for the futiire

M. Sazonof's proposal for
further exchange of ideas
upon the Austrian de-
mands refused. Serbia
had opened hostilities . .

British Ambassador' s explana-
tion of Sir E. Grey's
attitude and conference
proposal, and Austria's
reasons for declining

Requests Germany to warn
Russia that her partial
mobilisation would lead to
most extensive counter
measures on the part of
Germany as well as Austria

Sir E. Grey's appeal to Ger-
many to induce Austria to
accept Serbian reply as a
basis for discussion

Text of memorandum handed
to German Ambassador in
answer to Sir E. Grey's
appeal

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

-R.}

No.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

Count Szecsen to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

Count Szogy^ny to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

Count Szapdry to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

Count Berchtold to
Count Szogyeny
(Telegraphic)

Count Berchtold to
Count Szapary
(Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

1914.

Paris,

July 29

Berlin,
July 29

St. Peters-
burg,
July 29

Vienna,
July 29

Vienna,
July 30

German Ambassador commis-
sioned to inform M. Viviani
that French military pre-
parations may compel
Germany to take similar
measures, which would be
dangerous ; Germany relies
on support of France in
localising the dispute

German Government has de-
clared at St. Petersburg
that Russian mobilisation
would be followed by Ger-
man mobilisation . .

Conversation with M. Sazonof .
Austria did not desire to
injure Russian interests or
intend to annex Serbian
territory or touch Serbian
sovereignty. Urgently

necessary to stop military
competition

If Russian mobilisation is not
stopped, Austrian mobilisa-
tion must follow . .

Is ready to discuss questions
affecting directly Austrian
relations towards Russia . .

Conversation with Russian
Ambassador concerning
M. Sazonof's complaints
against Austria. Austrian
attitude explained

276

278

279

280

171

[R.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

Place and

No.

Name.

Date of
Despatch.

Subject.

i
(U

Count Berchtold to

1914.
Vienna,

Discussion between Sir E.

Ambassadors at

July 31

Grey and Prince Lich-

London and St.

nowsky communicated by

Petersburg

Herr von Tschirschky. At

(Telegraphic)

request of Russia Sir E.
Grey has renewed proposal
for mediation A quatre.
Austria prepared to enter-
tain it, on conditions

282

Count Szdpary to

St. Peters-

General mobiUsation of Rus-

Count Berchtold

burg,

sian Army and Fleet

283

(Telegraphic)

July 31

Count Berchtold to

Vienna,

Necessity for defensive miU-

Austrian Diplo-

July 31

tary measures in Gahcia.

matic Represen-

Pourparlers with St. Peters-

tatives

burg continue

283

(Telegraphic)

Count Szecsen to

Paris,

German declaration that, if

Count Berchtold

July 31

Russian general mobilisa-

(Telegraphic)

tion is not stopped within
twelve hours, Germany will
mobiUse. Inquiry as to
French neutrality in war
between Germany and
Russia ; answer requested
within eighteen hours

283

Count Szapary to

St. Peters-

Russia, dissatisfied with

Count Berchtold

burg,

Austria's declaration as to

(Telegraphic)

July 31

her intentions, has ordered
general mobihsation

284

tt 1}

St. Peters-

Conversation with M. Sazonof.

(Telegraphic)

burg,
August I

Austria prepared to dis-
cuss with Russia interpre-
tation of her note to
Serbia

284

172

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

[R-l

No.

Name.

Place and

Date of

Despatch.

Subject.

Count Szogy^ny to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

1914.

Berlin,

August 2

Russian troops have crossed
German frontier. Ger-
many at war with Russia

285

Count Mensdorif to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

London,
August 4

British ultimatum to Ger-
many. Sir E. Grey says
that while Austria is not at
war with France there is
no cause for conflict with
Great Britain

385

Count Berchtold to
Count Szapary
(Telegraphic)

Vienna,
August 5

Austria's declaration of war
against Russia

286

Count Berchtold to

Count Mensdorff

(Telegraphic)

Vienna,
August 6

Austria will not open hostiU-
ties against Great Britain
without previous declara-
tion of war

287

Count Szecsen to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

Paris,
August 8

French inquiry whether Inns-
bruck Army Corps has been
brought to French frontier

287

Count Berchtold to
Count Szdcsen
(Telegraphic)

Vienna,
August 9

News of Austrian participa-
tion in Franco-German war
a complete invention

287

Count Sz6csen to

Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic)

Paris,
August 10

French Foreign Minister has
information that an Aus-
trian Army corps has
been brought to Germany,
French Ambassador in-
structed to leave Vienna . .

288

Count Berchtold to
Count Mensdorff

Vienna,
August II

Assertion that Austrian army
corps has been sent to
Germany is unfounded . .

289

Count Mensdorff
to Count Berch-
told

(Telegraphic)

London,
August 12

Declciration of war by France
and Great Britain against
Austria

289

173

[R.]

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

No.

Name.

Place and

Date of

Despztch.

Subject.

The Japanese Am-
bassador to
Count Berchtold

1914.

Vienna,

August 20

Transmits a copy of Japan's
ultimatum to Germany . .

290

Count Berchtold to
Count Clary
(Telegraphic)

Vienna,
August 22

Austria's declaration of war
against Belgium . .

292

Prince Hohenlohe
to Count Berch-
told

(Telegraphic)

Berlin,
August 23

Germany will not answer
Japanese ultimatum; pass-
ports sent to Japanese
Charge d' Affaires . .

292

Count Berchtold to
Freiherr von
Muller

(Telegraphic)

Vienna,
August 24

Austrian ship Elisabeth
to take part in fighting at
Tsingtau. Representatives
recalled from Japan

293

Serbian names are spelt as in the German original according
to the Croatian system. The following is the signification of
the sounds :

s = sh in the English " ship."

c ch ,, „ " church."

c (the same, softer),

c ts in the English " mats."

\ y „ „ "yeu."

gj dj „ „ " adjourn."

z j in the French " jour."

174

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. Intro.

INTRODUCTION.

SINCE the dynasty of the Kargeorgevic ascended the
blood-stained throne of Serbia, and surrounded itself with
those who had conspired against the life of King Alexander,
the Kingdom has continually, though by different paths and
with varied intensity, pursued the aim of undermining by
hostile propaganda and revolutionary plots, those territories
of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by the Southern
Slavs, in order to tear them away from the Monarchy,'" '"[c/. B. 4
whenever the general political condition might be favoui'able (vol. I.,
to the reahsatidn of the Great-Serbian claims.'" P- ^^) '

To what a pitch the hopes of the kingdom on the Save ,3, . ', ^'1^
had been raised, and how near she thought herself to the g .' g g j
attainment of their aspirations, appeared in the embittered
animosity and the deep disappointment which were created
in this crazy and deluded country by the annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and which brought her to the verge
of war.

Left in the lurch by Russia, the protecting Power, who
did not at the moment consider herself sufficiently prepared,
in the spring of 1909 the Serbian Government found them-
selves compelled to give a solemn declaration before Europe, '" '" [B. 4
that they recognised the new political and international con- (vol- I-.
ditions which had been created by the annexation, and to P" ^^^^
acknowledge that the interests of Serbia had not been affected
thereby. They were also compelled to dissolve the gangs of
armed men which had been raised against the Monarchy,
and to undertake for the future to maintain friendly relations
with Austria-Hungary.

The expectations were not fulfilled that it would now be
possible for the Monarchy to live in peace and good neigh-
bourly relations with Serbia,'*' as she had lived during the '*'[c/. No.
rule of the Obrenovic, and, as was then the case, to show 8 ; B. 4
goodwill to, and further the interests of this State, which (^°^ ^■'
owes to Austria-Hungary the recognition of her independence ^' ^^^'^
at the Berlin Congress. The Serbian Government who, by

175

[R. Intro.] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly
and neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted
their press to foment hatred against the Monarchy in an
unprecedented way ; they permitted associations formed on
Serbian territory under the leadership of high officers, civil
servants, teachers and judges, pubUcly to pursue their aims
with the object of stirring up revolution in the territories
of Austria-Hungary ; they did not prevent prominent mem-
bers of their military and civil administration from poisoning
the public conscience in such a way that common assassina-
tion was regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against
the Monarchy. From the atmosphere created by this
malicious agitation there sprang up a whole series of murderous
attacks on high functionaries of the Monarchy, which ended
in the execrable crime against the exalted person of the heir
to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand^ which had
been carefully prepared in Serbia. However, the sacrifice of
his life for the Fatherland, by which our enemies in their
mad folly expected that the downfall of the Monarchy
would be accelerated, brought all the peoples of Austria-
Hungary together in fiery unanimity around the dynasty.
The whole world learned how unshakable were the founda^
tions on which the Monarchy rests, and how firmly and
loyally her sons cling to one another. All felt it ; there was
no room for any doubt that our honour, our self-respect and
our deepest interest peremptorily demanded that we should
deal with the criminal conspiracies of Serbia and obtain
guarantees for the security of Austria-Hungary.

The unhappy experience which the Imperial and Royal
Government had had with this dishonest neighbour showed
us the only way by which our interests could be secured.

It was necessary to present to Serbia all such demands
"' [c/. B. 93 and to require from her such guarantees*" as would ensure
(i) and the punishment of the accomplices in this shameful outrage
note.J and the suppression of the Great-Serbian projects. Since
the unparalleled patience of Austria-Hungary had been
interpreted as weakness by Serbia, the Belgrade Government
must be made to understand that the Monarchy was deter-
mined if necessary to. go to the utmost limit in order to
maintain her prestige and the integrity of her territories ;
and that she could not tolerate any longer the intrigues of

176

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. Into*.]

the Save Kingdom, which were meant to deceive the Powers,'" '''W- No.
by an apparent agreement to the demands of Austria-Hungary, 39 '^-3*'
while at the same time she kept open the possibiUty of con- ^^ ^^'''
tinuing her underhand attack against the Monarchy as she
had done after the solemn promise of 1909. Against the
usual Serbian tactics of using the most reprehensible means
to work for the separation of the Southern-Slav territories
of Austria-Hungary, and then, when the Monarchy called her
to account, of seeking protection and impunity from the
Powers, there was only one way open to the Imperial and
Royal Government of protecting their territory, and making
an end of the injury done to their commercial life by the
constant repetition of the intolerable attacks engendered by
Serbian aspirations, if they- were to avoid endangering the
peace of Europe. From the beginning, the Imperial and
Royal Government met the apprehensions of the Powers with
the assurance that the Monarchy would not go beyond what
was necessary for the protection of her own interests, and
did not propose any annexation of territory. '"' Within these '*' [c/. B. 90
limits, which she had imposed upon herself, she must, how- and note.]
ever, insist that the controversy with Serbia should be carried
through as a question directly concerning Austria-Hungary
and this State. The request made by Russia"' for an "'[B. 13;
extension of the time given to Serbia for answering our O- 4-3
demands would have given the Belgrade Government an
opportunity for new subterfuges and for further procrastina-
tion, and would have opened the door to the interference of
single Powers in the interests of Serbia. It was therefore
necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit. '^' '*'[No. 20.3
Although before sending her crafty and evasive answer,'"' ""[B. 39.3
Serbia had ordered general mobilisation,'*' and thereby '"'[No. 23.
publicly proclaimed her hostility, the Monarchy waited two ^^ ^ote,
days before proceeding to a declaration of war.'" The ,j,^^^^'^
suggestion of the British Government '°' that the settlement of ? '. A°' '
the Serbian controversy should be entrusted to a conference (s) rg ^'i 3
of the Powers did not reach Vienna until after the opening
of hostilities, and was therefore outstripped by events. This
proposal was, however, in itself, not well suited to securing
the interests of the Monarchy. Nothing but the integral
acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian demands on the part
of the Belgrade Government would have given a guarantee

II— M X77

[R., Intro.] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

for a tolerable relationship with Serbia. The Entente Powers,
however, were guided by the desire of substituting for the
effective demands of Austria-Hungary, which were painful
to Serbia, a method of compromise, by which every security
for a future correct attitude on the part of the Save Kingdom
would have been lost, and Serbia would have been encouraged
to continue her endeavours to bring about a separation of
the Southern territories of Austria-Hungary.

When the Imperial and Royal Government demanded
P- 4-] from Serbia"' that she should punish those accomphces in
the crime of Serajevo who were in Serbian territory, and
fulfil the duties which are a necessary condition for friendly
relationship between neighbouring States, their only object
was to protect our dynasty from outrage and the territory
of the Monarchy from criminal intrigues. They were repre-
senting the common interest of the civilised world that
murder and outrage should not be used with impunity as a
weapon in political controversy, and that Serbia should not
continue incessantly to menace the peace of Europe by her
aspirations.

The Entente Powers were guilty of a serious wrong when,
under the spell of their own political interests, they closed
their ears to these postulates of public morality and humanity,
and ranged themselves beside the Kingdom with its load
of guilt. Had they listened to the assurances of the Monarchy
which, by her conservative policy and her love of peace
during the violent changes which had taken place in the
Balkan Peninsula, had gained full right to their confidence,
and had they maintained a waiting attitude towards the
Serbian conflict, the world-war would have been avoided.
It is they who must be made answerable before history for
the immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human
race.

There can be no doubt that the small Serbian State would
never have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely
concealed, to work for the separation from the great neigh-
bouring Monarchy of the territories which were inhabited by
Southern Slavs, if she had not been sure of the secret approval
and protection of Russia, and if she had not been able to
depend on the powerful pan-Slavist tendency in the Empire
of the Tsar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary, to
178

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R- tatro.]

come to the aid of the Kingdom in her struggle for the
reaUsation of the Great-Serbian projects.

In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire
has extended over gigantic areas with the elementary force
of a glacier, and has, again and again, subdued fresh races
under the Muscovite rule, suppressing their culture, religion
and language. As the supreme and inflexible aim of this
restless pressure towards universal dominion there stands
before her the possession of the Dardanelles, which would
secure to the Russian Empire predominance in the Near
East and in Asia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an
opening independent of the will of other countries.

As the realisation of these plans would injure important
interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was
therefore bound to encoimter the inevitable opposition of
these Powers, it was the endeavour of Russian policy to
weaken their power of resistance. The powerful central
European union which barred the way to the universal
dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must
be isolated. The first step was to hem in the Hapsburg
Monarchy by the creation of the Balkan Union, and to
undermine its authority by the pan-Slavist and Serbian
intrigues in its frontier territories. A necessary condition for
carrying out this plan was the overthrow and expulsion of
the Turks in order that the increased power of the Christian
Balkan States should be available against the two central
Powers.

When the Balkan Union broke up owing to the quarrel
over the territory which had been torn from Turkey, and
the Russian plans were threatened with failure, " the Pro-
tector of the Slavs" allowed Bulgaria to be overthrown,
humiliated and deprived of the largest share of the territory
which she had won. The Balkan Union which, after the
overthrow of the Turks, could now be directed rather against
Austria-Hungary and Germany, and could be used by Russia
and France for changing the relations of the European Powers,
was to be set on foot again by the prospect of the acquisition
of fresh territories, planned at the cost of the Monarchy,
through a successive pushing forward of frontier from east
to west. In this criminal game of Russian diplomacy, which
threatened the existence of the Monarchy and the peace of

179

[R. Intro.] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

the world, Serbia was a catspaw which Russia would not
give up even in order to avoid general war.

The Imperial and Royal Government — and the documents
provided in this collection give ample evidence of this —
again and again almost up to the outbreak of war assured
the Cabinet of St. Petersburg that they would not violate

<i'[c/. B. 90 any Russian interest, would not annex any Serbian territory,'^'
and note.] and would not touch the sovereignty of Serbia, and that
they were ready to enter into negotiations with the Russian
Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.
Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied with
the solemn declarations of the Imperial and Royal Govern*
ment ; as early as the 24th July, in the communique of that

(s) ng J. ^ date, "" she assumed a threatening tone, and on the 29th July,
although Austria-Hungary had not mobilised a single iiian
against Russia, she ordered the mobilisation of the military

"'' [B. 70 districts of Odessa, Kieff , Moscow and Kazan ; ''' this was
(i).] a threat to the Monarchy ; on the 31st July she ordered general

*^'[No. 52.] mobilisation,'*' disregarding the repeated warnings of the
Imperial and Royal Ambassador, and the declaration of
the German Government, which had been made on the 26th,
that preparatory military measures on the part of Russia
would force Germany to counter measures which must con-
sist in the mobilisation of the army, and that mobilisation

w[W., meant war.'^'
p. 128.] On the 24th July the Imperial and Royal Ambassador, in

""[No. 14.] conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,'"
laid stress on the peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her
only object was to make an end to the menace to our dynasty
from Serbian bombs, and to our territory from the revolution-
ary machinations of Serbia.

The attainment of this end was a vital question to the
Monarchy. She could not, therefore, allow herself to be
terrorised by the possibility of a conflict with Russia, in the
event of that country taking Serbia under her protection ;
she must make an end of the intolerable situation, that a
Russian charter should give the Serbian Kingdom continued
impunity in her hostility to Austria-Hungary.

On the 30th July the British Secretary of State again

'"[c/. B. suggested that Austria-Hungary, in her conflict with Serbia,
103.3 should avail herself of the mediation of the Powers.'" Guided
180

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. Intro.]

by their desire to do the utmost in their power to maintain
general peace, the Imperial and Royal Government declared
themselves ready to accept this mediation.'" The honour i^' [No. 51.]
and the interest of Austria-Hungary, however, required that
this should not take place under the pressure of the threatening
measures of Russia. It was, therefore, a paramount necessity
for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilisation
in the Empire of the Tsar should, first of all, be revoked. This
demand the St. Petersburg Cabinet answered by mobilising
the whole of the Russian forces.

In alliance with the self-seeking policy of Great Britain,
and the desire for revanche of the French Republic, the St.
Petersburg Government disdained no means of securing pre-
dominance in Europe to the Triple Entente and paving the
way for their boldest schemes.

Russia's unscrupulous hands tried to weave the threads
of her poUcy into a snare to be cast over the head of the
Monarchy. When Austria-Hungary, following the dictates
of self-preservation, determined to tear the web to pieces,
Russia attempted to stay the hand of the Imperial and Royal
Government and to humiliate the Monarchy.

Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests,
Austria-Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted
with the choice of protecting their rights and their safety,
or of giving way before the threats of Russia.

They took the road pointed out by honour and duty.

[R. 1] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [June 29,

No. I.

Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold.

Belgrade, June 29, 1914.

UNDER the terrible shock of yesterday's catastrophe it
is difficult for me to give any satisfactory judgment on the
bloody drama of Serajevo with the necessary composure and
judicial calm. I must ask you, therefore, to allow me for
the moment to limit myself to putting on record certain
facts.

Yesterday, the 15/28, the anniversary of the battle of

'"[A.D. the Amselfeld,"' was celebrated with greater ceremony than

1389] usual, and there were celebrations in honour of the Serbian

patriot, Milos Obilic, who in 1389 with two companions

treacherously stabbed the victorious Murad.

Among all Serbians, Obilic is regarded as the national
hero. In place of the Turks, however, we are now looked
on as the hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which
has been nourished under the aegis of the Royal Government
and the agitation which has for many years been carried
on in the press.

A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems,
therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three
young criminals of Serajevo, Princip, Cabrinovic and the
third person still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They
also shot down an innocent woman, and may therefore think
that they have surpassed their model.

For many years hatred against the Monarchy has been
sown in Serbia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is
murder.

The news arrived at about 5 o'clock ; the Serbian Govern-
ment at about 10 o'clock caused the Obilid festivities to be
officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for
a considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of eye-
witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in
'''[c/. Nos. delight,"" and remarks were heard, such as : " It serves them
3, 5l right, we have been expecting this for a long time," or " This
is revenge for the annexation."

182

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 3]

No. 2.
Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 30, 1914.

TO-DAY I sent an inquiry to Herr Gruic, General Secretary
of the Foreign Office, to ask the obvious question what
measures the Royal police had taken, or proposed to take,
in order to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously
are partly to be found in Serbia.

The answer was that the matter has not yet engaged the
attention of the Serbian police. '" '"[<=/• No.

No. 3.
M. Jehlitschka, Consul-General, to Count Berchtold,

ilskub, July I, 1914.

ON the 15/28 June the Feast of St. Vitus (Corpus Christi
Day), which on this occasion coincided with the 525th anni-
versary of the battle of the Amselfeld (1389), was for the first
time officially celebrated as the " Festival of the Liberation "
of the Serbian nation.

For four months a special committee had worked at making
this celebration an especially solemn and magnificent demon-
stration of Serbian nationality.

The propaganda connected with this at the same time
extended to Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, but especially to
Hungary ; those who took part in it received free passes on
the Serbian State railways ; food and lodging at low prices,
maintenance by public bodies, &c., were promised.

The agitation was carried on with energy, and was with a
definite end in view.

The visitors to the celebration at Pristina were brought
in special trains.

The various speeches ran riot in historical reminiscences,
which were connected with the scene of the celebration, and
dealt under different aspects with the well-known theme of
the union of all Serbia and the " liberation of our brethren
in bondage " beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as
Bosnia and Dalmatia.

183

[R. 4] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 4,

When, during the course of the evening, the news of the
horrible crime of which Serajevo had been the scene was
circulated, the feeling which animated the fanatical crowd
was, to judge by the numerous expressions of applause reported
to me by authorities in whom I have absolute confidence,
'"[c/. Nos, one that I can only characterise as inhuman."'
1.5-3 In view of this attitude of the population, which was

also displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Serbian press to
divest Serbia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was
received by a representative gathering with such unvarnished
satisfaction, collapse miserably.

No. 4.
Count Szicsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 4, 1914.

TO-DAY I communicated to M. Poincare the thanks of
the Imperial and Royal Government for their sympathy.

In referring to the hostile demonstrations against Serbia
among us, he mentioned that after the murder of President
Camot, all Italians throughout France were exposed to the
worst persecutions on the part of the people.

I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no
connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while
in the present case it must be admitted that for years past
there has been an agitation in Serbia against the Monarchy
fomented by every means, legitimate and illegitimate.

In conclusion, M. Poincare expressed his conviction that
the Serbian Government would meet us with the greatest
willingness in the judicial investigation and the prosecution of
the accomphces. No State could divest itself of this duty,

No. 5.
Herr Hoflehner, Consular Agent, to Count Berchtold.

Nish, July 6, 1914.

THE news of the terrible crime at Serajevo, which had
been only too successful, created here a sensation in the fullest
sense of the word. There was practically no sign of conster-
nation or indignation ; the predominant mood was one of

184

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 6}

satisfaction and even joy, and this was often quite open with-
out any reserve, and even found expression in a brutal way.'" '"[c/. Nos.
This is especially the case with the so-called leading circles ^' 3-3
^ — the intellectuals, such as professional politicians, those
occupied in education, officials, officers and the students.
Commercial circles adopted a rather more reserved attitude.

All explanations made by official Serbian circles or indi-
vidual higher personalities purporting to give expression to
indignation at the crime and condemnation of it, must have
the effect of the bitterest irony on anyone who has had an
opportunity, during the last few days, of gaining an insight
at first hand into the feelings of the educated Serbian people.

On the day of the crime the undersigned had gone to a
coffee garden at about 9 o'clock in the evening without any
suspicion of what had happened, and here received from an
acquaintance his first information as to the very definite
rumour which was being circulated. It was painful in the
highest degree to see and hear what a feeling of real deUght
seized the numerous visitors who were present, with what
obvious satisfaction the deed was discussed, and what cries
of joy, scorn and contempt burst out — even one who has
long been accustomed to the expression of political fanaticism
which obtains here, must feel the greatest depression at what
he observed.

No. 6.

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Belgrade, July 21, 1914.

AFTER the lamentable crime of June 28th, I have now
been back at my post for some tinie, and I am able to give
some judgment as to the tone which prevails here.

After the annexation crisis the relations between the
Monarchy and Serbia were poisoned on the Serbian side by
national chauvinism, animosity and an effective propaganda
of Great-Serbian aspirations'* carried on in that part of our «-i|i/. b. 9.]
territory where there is a Serbian population ; since the last
two Balkan Wars, the success of Serbia has increased this
chauvinism to a paroxysm, the expression of which in some
cases bears the mark of insanity.

185

[R. 6] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 21,

I may be excused from bringing proof and evidence of
this ; they can be had easily everjrwhere among all parties,
in political circles as well as among the lower classes. I put
it forward as a well-known axiom that the policy of Serbia
is built up on the separation of the territories inhabited by
Southern Slavs, and as a corollary to this on the abohtion of the
Monarchy as a Great Power ; this is its only object.

No one who has taken the trouble to move and take part
in political circles here for a week can be blind to this truth.

The hatred against the Monarchy has been further in-
tensified as a result of the latest events which influence political
opinion here ; among them I count the crime of Serajevo,
<"[c/. S. 21, the death of Hartwig"' and the electoral campaign.
23. 30J The crime at Serajevo has aroused among the Serbians

an expectation that in the immediate future the Hapsburg
States will fall to pieces ; it was this on which they had set
their hopes even before ; there has been dangled before their
eyes the cession of those territories in the Monarchy which
are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, a revolution in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the unreliability of the Slav regiments
— this is regarded as ascertained fact and had brought system
and apparent justification into their nationalist madness.

Austria-Hungary, hated as she is, now appears to the
Serbians as powerless, and as scarcely worthy of waging war
with ; contempt is mingled with hatred ; she is ripe for
destruction, and she is to fall without trouble into the lap
of the Great-Serbian Empire, which is to be realised in the
immediate future.

Newspapers, not among the most extreme, discuss the
powerlessness and decrepitude of the neighbouring Monarchy
in daily articles, and insult its officials without reserve and
without fear of reprimand. They do not even stop short of
the exalted person of our ruler. Even the official organ
refers to the internal condition of Austria-Hungary as the true
cause of this wicked crime. There is no longer any fear of
being called to account. For decades the people of Serbia
has been educated by the press, and the policy at any given
time is dependent on the party press ; the Great-Serbian
propaganda and its monstrous offspring the crime of
June 28th, are a fruit of this education.

I pass over the suspicions and accusations with regard to

186

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 6]

the death of Hartwig, which are on the verge of insanity, and
were characterised by The Times as " ravings " * ; I do not
mention the lying campaign in the press which, however,
might strengthen Serbians in the conviction that the Govern-
ment and the representatives of Austria-Hungary are out-
laws, and that appellations such as murderer, rogue, cursed
Austrian, &c., are suitable stock epithets for us.

The death of Hartwig and the recognition of the gravity
of this loss to the Serbian political world, have let loose a
fanatical cult of the deceased ; in this people were influenced
not only by gratitude for the past, but also by anxiety
for the future, and outbid one another in servile submis-
siveness to Russia in order to secure her goodwill in time to
come.

As a third factor the electoral campaign has united all
parties on a platform of hostility against Austria-Hungary.
None of the parties which aspire to ofifice will incur the
suspicion of being held capable of weak compliance towards
the Monarchy. The campaign, therefore, is conducted under
the catchword of hostility towards Austria-Hungary,

For both internal and external reasons the Monarchy
is held to be powerless and incapable of any energetic action,
and it is believed that the serious words which were spoken
by leading men among us are only " bluff."

The leave of absence of the Imperial and Royal Minister
of War and Chief of the Staff have strengthened the conviction
that the weakness of Austria-Hungary is now obvious.

I have allowed myself to trespass too long on the patience
of Your Excellency, not because I thought that in what
I have said I could tell you anything new, but because I con-
sidered this picture led up to the conclusion which forces
itself upon me that a reckoning with Serbia, a war for the
position of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its
existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided."' '"[^/- S. 52

If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia, we (P- ^^5)1
shall share the responsibiUty for the difiiculties and the

* " The latest suggestion made in one of them (the Serbian newspapers) is
that M. de Hartwig' s sudden death in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at
Belgrade the other day was due to poison. Ravings of that kind move the
contempt as well as the disgust of cultivated people[s], whatever their poUtical
sympathies may be." — The Times, July 16, [1914].

187

[R. 7] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 22,

vinfavourable situation in any future war which must, how-
ever, sooner or later be carried through.

For any observer on the spot, and for the representative
of Austro-Hungarian interests in Serbia, the question takes
the form that we cannot any longer put up with any further
injury to our prestige.

Should we therefore be determined to put forward far-
reaching requirements joined to effective control — for this
alone could clear the Augean stable of Great-Serbian intrigues
— ^then all possible consequences must be considered, and
from the beginning there must be a strong and firm deter-
|«[c/. Y. 45 mination to carry through the matter to the end.'"
and note.] Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed
by long discussions and ending only in an unsound com-
promise, would be the hardest blow which could be directed
against Austria-Hungary's reputation in Serbia and her
position in Europe.

No. 7.
Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Giesl in Belgrade.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.
Austrian Note to Serbia.

[See B. 4.]

No. 8.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in
Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and

<«i[c/.B.9.] . Constantinople.'''

13) rg . Vienna, July 22, 1914,

From (Translated from the French.)

tMs^'"^ THE Imperial and Royal Government felt compelled to
despatch address the following note to the Royal Serbian Government
is a on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the medium of the
duplicate Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade (see instructions
of the to the Imperial and Royal Envoy in Belgrade of July 22nd,
vatSnr-^914).'^'

in B. 4 ^^ *^® 3^st March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government

(vol. I., p. addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the
85).] text is reproduced above,
188

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 83

On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked
on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb
subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing
for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the
Serbian frontier.

Serbia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups,
whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of
disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies
and groups count among their members generals and diplo-
matists. Government officials and judges — ^in short, men at
the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Serbian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this
propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and
not a day passes without the organs of the Serbian press
stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neigh-
bouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less
openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on
by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary
and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudes-
cence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Serbian politicians,
which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of
the kingdom ; individuals belonging formerly to bands
employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at
the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-
Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary
has been exposed for years, the Serbian Government have
not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest
step. The Serbian Government have thus failed in, the duty
imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March,
1909,"'. and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the w^see B. 4,
undertaking given to Austria-Hungary. voL I., p.'

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in 81.]
the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired
by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy and the hope that the Serbian Government would
end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's
friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent

189

[R. 8] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 22

attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial
and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would
finally decide to follow an analogous Une of conduct on its
own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a develop-
ment of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after
the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government,
by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a
considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards
the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the
proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate
on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal conse-
quences were demonstrated to the whole world on the
28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy
and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at
Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and
Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and
urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Serbian
Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threaten-
ing the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that
in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement
with the sentiments of all civilised nations; who cannot
permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed
with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe
to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from
Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment hold at the disposal of the . . . .* Government a
"'[No. 19.1 dossier ^^^ elucidating the Serbian intrigues and the connection
between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the
Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other
signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in
the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* [This blank, left vacant in the original Austrian text, is filled up by th(!
word " British" in the official British translation.]
190

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 9]

No. 9.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 23, 1914.

AS among the Entente Powers, Great Britain might be
most easily led to form an impartial judgment on the step
which we are to-day taking at Belgrade, I request Your
Excellency in the conversation'" which you will have on the '"[SeeB.
24th instant on the occasion when you hand in our circular 5-]

note at the Foreign Office, to point out among other matters
that it would have been within the power of Serbia to render
less acute the serious steps which she must expect from us,
by spontaneously doing what is necessary'^' in order to '*"[<;/. B. 3,
start an inquiry on Serbian soil against the Serbian accom- 5]
plices in the crime of the 28th June, and by bringing to light
the threads, which, as has, been proved, lead from Belgrade
to Serbia [s/c].''' '"[Should

Up to the present time, although a number of notorious ^ ".*° „
indications point to Belgrade, the Serbian Government have so^m^Ger-
not taken any steps in this direction ;"' on the contrary, they man text.]
have attempted to wipe out the existing traces. w [c/. no.

Thus, from a telegraphic despatch from our Legation at 2.]

Belgrade, it is to be gathered that the Serbian civil servant
Ciganovic, who is compromised by the independent testimony
of the affidavits of both criminals, on the day of the outrage
was still in Belgrade, and three days afterwards, when his
name was mentioned in the papers, had already left the town.
As is well known also, the director of the Serbian press declared
that Ciganovic is completely unknown in Belgrade.

With regard to the short time limit attached to our de-
mand, this must be attributed to our long experience of the
dilatory arts of Serbia.

The requirements which we demand that Serbia shotdd
fulfil, and which indeed contain nothing which is not a matter
of course in the intercourse between States which are to live
in peace and friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotia-
tions and compromise ; and, having regard to our economic
interests, we cannot take the risk of a method of political
action by which it would be open to Serbia at pleasure to
prolong the crisis which has arisen.

191

[R. 10] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 24,

No. 10.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) London, July 24, 1914.

'''[B.4] HAVE just handed the circular note'" to Sir Edward

'"i^c/. B. 5.] Grey,'*' who read it carefully. At the fifth heading, he asked
what it meant ; to introduce officials of our Government in
Serbia would be equivalent to the end of Serbian political
independence. I answered that co-operation of, e.g., police
officials, in no way affected the sovereignty of the State.

He regretted the time limit, as in this way we should
be deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak
of excitement and bringing pressure to bear upon Belgrade
to give us a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to
send an ultimatum if answer not satisfactory.

I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of
defence against continued revolutionary undertakings which
threaten the territory of the Monarchy, protection of our
most vital interests, complete failure of the concihatory
attitude which we had hitherto often shown to Serbia, who had
had more than three weeks to set on foot of her own accord
investigations as to accomplices in outrage, &c.)

The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short
time limit, but recognised that what was said as to com-
plicity in the crime of Serajevo, as well as many of our other
requirements, was justified.

He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which
only concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia. He is, how-
ever, very " apprehensive " that several Great Powers might
be involved in a war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and
France, he observed that the terms of the Franco-Russian
AUiance might be more or less to the same effect as those of
the Triple Alliance.

I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated

with emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to

<'' [c/. B. 93 gain for ourselves some sort of guarantees,'" as hitherto

(i) and Serbian promises have never been kept. I understood that in

note.] ^jjg fj^j-g^ place he considered the question only as it influences

the position of Europe. He must, however, in order to be

fair to our point of view, put himself in our situation.

192

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. H]

He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this
subject, said he must have time to study the note more
carefully. He was to see the German and the French Ambas-
sadors, as he must first of all exchange ideas with the Powers
who are allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively,
but have themselves no direct interest in Serbia.

No. II.

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic) Paris, July 24, 1914.

I HAVE just read instructions of the 22nd instant"' to the' "'[No. 8. ;
Minister of Justice, who is entrusted with the representation '^i- ^- ^S-l
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his absence, and left
copy.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, who had received information as to
the contents of our d&marche at Belgrade through this morn-
ing's papers, seemed to be considerably impressed by my
communication. Without entering on any more detailed
discussion of the text, he readily agreed that recent events
and the attitude of the Serbian Government made energetic
action on our side quite comprehensible.

Point 5 in the note handed in at Belgrade seemed to make
a special impression on the Minister as he asked me to read
it to him twice.

The Minister thanked me for my communication which,
he said, would be carefuUy examined. I took the opportunity
to impress on him that the question was one which must be
brought to an issue directly between Serbia and us, but that
it was in the general interests of Europe that the trouble
which for years past had been kept up by Serbian intrigues
against us should at last make way for a clear situation.

All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the
first rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to
Serbia completely to change her attitude, and to satisfy our
just demands.

The Minister said that it was the duty of Serbia to proceed
energetically against any accomplices of the murderers of
Sarajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While lajdng
special stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary,

n-N 193

tK- 12] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 24,

and on the good relations which existed between our two
countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy would
be brought to an end peacefully in a manner corresponding
to our wishes.

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend
in any way the attitude of Serbia.

No. 12.

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 24, 1914.

BARON SCHOEN will, in accordance with instructions,
'"[SeeY. make a communication here to-day'" that according to the
28.3 view of the Berlin Cabinet, our controversy with Serbia is a
matter which concerns only Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

In this connection, he would give them to understand that
in case third States should wish to intervene, Germany, true

'"' [c/. Nos. to the obligations of her alliance, would be on our side. "'

16, 26 ;

W. exh. 2 ;

also -.T

German No. I3.

Chancellor, (j^^^^^ Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 24, 1914.

BARON SCHOEN has just made the demarche as he was
<^'[Y.28; instructed."'

c/. O. 8.] ]y[ Bienvenu-Martin said to him he could not yet express

himself definitely. He could, however, already say this, that
the French Government are also of opinion that our con-
troversy with Serbia concerns Belgrade and Vienna alone, and
that it was hoped here that the question would find a direct
and peaceful solution.

The Serbian Minister here had already been advised that
his Government should give way in every point so far as it
was possible, with the limitation, however, " so far as their
sovereign rights were not affected."

Baron Schoen laid stress on the European necessity that
the focus of constant disturbance at Belgrade must at last be
done away with.

194

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 1*1

No. 14.

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) 5^. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs on receiving me, said
that he knew what brought me to him, and he would at once
explain to me that he could not take up any definite attitude
towards my demarche. I began by reading out my instruc-
tions. The Minister interrupted me for the first time on the
mention of the series of outrages, and, on my explanation,
asked if then it had been proved that they all had originated
at Belgrade. I laid stress on the fact that they all sprang
from Serbian instigation. In the further course of the reading
he said that he knew what it was all about : we wanted to
make war on Serbia, and this was to serve as a pretext. I
replied that our attitude during recent years was a sufficient
proof that we neither sought nor required pretexts against
Serbia. The formal declaration which is required did not
eUcit any objection from the Minister ; he only continued to
maintain that Pasid had already expressed himself to this
effect. This I corrected. " II dira cela 2$ fois si vous voulez,"
said he. I said to him that no one among us was attacking
the integrity of Serbia or the dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed
himself most vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna
Odbrana, which Serbia would never undertake. The partici-
pation of Imperial and Royal of&cials in the suppression of
the revolutionary movements elicited further protest on the
part of the Minister. Serbia then will no longer be master in
her own house. " You will always be wanting to intervene
again, and what a life you will lead Europe." I answered
that if Serbia shows goodwill it will be a quieter life than
hitherto.

The commentary'" added to the communication of the "'[No. 8.]
note was listened to by the Minister with fair composure ; at
the passage that our feelings were shared by those of all
civilised nations, he observed that this was a mistake. With
all the emphasis I could command, I pointed out how regret-
table it would be if we could not come to an imderstanding
with Russia on this question, in which everything which is

195

[R. 15] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BCX)K [July 24,

most sacred to us was at stake and, whatever the Minister
might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The
Minister attempted to minimise the Monarchical side of the
question.
•"[No. 19.3 With regard to the dossier'^' which was put at the disposal
of the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we
had given ourselves this trouble, as we had already delivered
the ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not
really desire an impartial examination of the matter. I said
to him that the results which had been attained by our own
investigations were quite sufficient for our procedure in this
matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and
that we were only ready to give the Powers further informa-
tion if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret.

M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been
issued he was not in the least curious. He represented the
matter as if we only wanted to make war with Serbia whatever
happened. I answered that we were the most peace-loving
Power in the world, but what we wanted was security for our
territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues, and the pro-
tection of our djmasty from bombs.

In the course of the further discussion, M. Sazonof again
made the observation that we certainly had created a serious
situation.

In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the Minister
was throughout unaccommodating and hostile.

No. 15.
Communique of the Russian Official Gazette.

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.
THE St. Petersburg telegraphic agency announces : —
The official journal publishes the following commu-
•"'Pupli- nique :^'''
io*1but°' Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to

date Serbia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian

differs.] Government the greatest anxiety. The Government

are closely following the course of the dispute between
the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain
indifferent.
196

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 16J

No. 16.
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

AFTER a Council of Ministers which lasted for five hours,
M. Sazonof this evening received the German Ambassador,
and had a long conversation with him.

The Minister took the point of view^ which is probably to
be considered as the outcome of the Council of Ministers, that
the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian conflict was not a matter con-
fined to these States, but a European affair, as the settlement
arrived at in the year 1909 by the Serbian declaration had
been made under the auspices of the whole of Europe. "' <i| [c/. B.

The Minister pointed out particularly that he had been 17]

disagreeably affected by the circumstance that Austria-
Hungary had offered a dossier"" for investigation when an (»'[No. 19.3
ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would require
an international investigation of the dossier, which had been
put at her disposal. My German colleague at once brought
to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not
accept interference in her difference with Serbia, and that
Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which
would be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a Great Power.

In the further course of the conversation, the Minister
explained that that which Russia could not accept with
indifference was the eventual intention of Austria-Hungary
" de divorer la Serbie." Count Pourtales answered that he
did not accept any such intention on the part of Austria-
Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most special in-
terest of the Monarchy. The only object of Austria-Hungary
was " d'infliger d la Serbie le chdtiment justement meriti."^"^ '''[c/.B. 18,
M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria- 32.]
Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this, even
if explanations on this point had been made.

The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof
that Germany should work with Russia at the maintenance
of peace. The German Ambassador assured the Russian
Minister that Germany certainly had no wish to bring about wr^f ^^
a war, but that she naturally fully represented the interests xz and
of her ally. '** note.]

197

[R. 17] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 24,

No. 17.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914.

IN answer to Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday :
"'[c/. B. I beg you to explain at once to Sir Edward Grey'^' that

14-3 our demarche of yesterday at Belgrade is not to be considered
as a formal ultimatum, but that it is merely a demarche with
a time limit, which, as Your Excellency will be good enough
to explain to Sir Edward Grey in strict confidence, will — ^if
the time limit expires without result — for the time be followed
only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and by the
beginning of the necessary military preparations, as we are
absolutely resolved to carry through our just demands.

Your Excellency is empowered to add that if Serbia, after

the expiration of the time limit, were only to give way under

the pressure of our military preparations, we should indeed

have to demand that she should make good the expenses which

'^'[c/. No. we had incurred ;"• as is well known, we have already had

20.] twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilise because of Serbia.

No. 18.
Count Berchtold to Count Szdp&ry at St. Petersburg.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

I RECEIVED the Russian Charge d' Affaires on the

[c/. B. morning of the 24th,'" and assured him that I attached

18 ; S. 52 special importance to bringing to his knowledge as soon as

(P- ii9)-l possible the steps we were taking in Belgrade, and explaining

to him our point of view as regards them.

Prince Kudachef, while thanking me for this courtesy,
did not hide his anxiety as to our categorical procedure against
Serbia, and he observed that there had always been appre-
hension at St. Petersburg that out demarche might take the
form of a humiUation of Serbia, which must have an echo in
Russia.

I took the opportunity of reassuring ihe Russian Charge
d'Affaires as to this. Our aim was to clear up the untenable
198

(3)

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19J

position of Serbia as regards the Monarchy, and with this
object to cause the Government of that State on the one hand
pubUcly to disavow the tendencies directed against the present
position of the Monarchy, and to suppress them by adminis-
trative measures, and on the other hand to make it possible
for us to satisfy ourselves that these measures were honestly
carried out. I explained at greater length the danger, not
only to the integrity of the Monarchy, but also to the balance
of power and the peace of Europe, which would be involved
in giving further scope to the Great-Serbian propaganda,
and how all the dynasties and, not least, the Russian, would
apparently be threatened, if the idea took root that a move-
ment which made use of murder as a national weapon could be
continued with impunity.

In conclusion, I pointed out that we did not aim at any
increase of territory, '" but only at the maintenance of what *^' [c/. B. 90
we possess, a point of view which could not fail to be under- ^^^ note.]
stood by the Russian Government.

Prince Kudachef remarked on this that he did not know
the view of his own Government, and also did not know what
position Serbia would take towards individual demands.

At the conclusion of our interview the Charge d' Affaires
expressly said that he would not fail to bring to the notice of
his Government the explanation which I had given him of
the step we had taken, especially to the effect that no humilia-
tion of Serbia was intended by us. '^' '^' [See Y.

45 and
note.]

No. 19.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at
Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Con-
stantinople.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

YOUR EXCELLENCY will find herewith the dossier
mentioned in the circular note to the Powers'" with reference '"[No. 8 ;
to the Great-Serbian propaganda, and its connection with '^f- ^- ^Sl
the Serajevo murder.

Your Excellency is instructed to bring this dossier to the
notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

199

[R. 193 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

"' [Dupli- Enclosure. '"

Y. 75 THE Serbian agitation, which has as its object the separation from

(end.), the Austrian Monarchy of the Southern Slav districts in order to unite
but a them with the Serbian State, dates from far back,
different This propaganda on Serbian soil, always the same in its ultimate
transla- object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached one of its
tion. culminating points at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing
This dos- Qg ^jig protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purpose openly
ster was g^jjjj undisguisedly, and attempted, under the patronage of the Serbian
Dublic in Government, to attain its ends by every means in its power.
Vienna While the whole of the Serbian press was calling for war against

on July the Monarchy by malicious invectives in which facts were perverted,
27 ; see apart from other means of propaganda, associations were being formed
footnote, to prepare for this war.

p. 148.] The Narodna Odbrana stood out as the most important of these
associations. Having its origin in an already existing revolutionary
committee, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact
it took the form of an organisation of Serbian military and civil of&cials
wholly dependent on the Foreign Office at Belgrade. Amongst its
founders one may mention : General Bozo Jankovic, ex-ministers Ljuba
Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic, and Velislav Vulovic, Zivojin Dacic
(Director of the Government printing establishment), and Majors (then
Captains) Voja Tankosic and Milan Pribicevic. This association
aimed at the creation and equipment of free companies for use in
the impending war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (See
Appendix 2.)

A convincing description of the activity at that time of the Narodna
Odbrana will be found amongst others in the deposition of Trifko
Krstanovic, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of his
evidence before the district court at Serajevo ; he was then at Belgrade,
and had been accepted by the Narodna Odbrana, with other subjects
of the Monarchy, as a komitadji. At the beginning of 1909, Krstanovic
had arrived with about 140 fellow-members at a school established
for the formation of new bands at Cuprija (in the district of Jagodina),
managed by Captains Voja Tankosic and Dusan Putnik. The only
instructors at this school were Serbian officers. General Bozo Jankovic
and Captain Milan Pribicevic inspected the three-monthly courses of
these bands at regular intervals.

The new komitadjis received their training in musketry, bomb
throwing, mine laying, blowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges,
and the destruction of telegraph wires. According to the instructions
of their leaders, it was their duty to put into practice in Bosnia and
Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired.
200

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R- 191

By this action, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged
by the Serbian Government, the Narodna Odbrana was thus prepared
for guerrilla warfare against Austria-Hungary. In this way subjects
of the Monarchy were led into treason against their country, and
induced, as Serbian emissaries, systematically to practice under-
hand attacks against the means of defence of their country.

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the declaration
made by the Serbian Government on the 31st March, 1909, <i' in which *^'[S«fiB. 4,
the Government of Belgrade announced that they were prepared to ^°^- '^•> P-
accept the new situation created in municipal and international law •^•J
by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and solemnly promised
to maintain in future friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy.

With this declaration, the agitation, which constituted a source
of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, seemed to have come to an
end, and the road to an amicable rapprochement between Serbia and the
Monarchy to have been entered on. Deprived of the encouragement
of the Serbian Government, and combated by that Government in
accordance with their engagements, the propaganda hostile to the
Monarchy could only have continued a shadowy existence and would
^ have been condemned to early destruction. On the other hand, the
ties of language, race and culture existing between the Southern Slav
districts of the Monarchy and Serbia ought to have resulted in the
realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual
friendship and parallel interests.

These hopes, however, have not been realised.

Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued, and under
the eyes of the Serbian Government, who have done nothing to sup-
press this movement, the anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda has
only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy
has been fanned and kindled into an irreconcilable feeling. The Serbian
people alike by adapting their former course of action to the new
situation and by supplementing it by fresh methods were summoned
to the " inevitable death struggle " against Austria-Hungary. Secret
ramifications have been systematically spread towards the Slav dis-
tricts in the south of the Monarchy whose subjects have been incited
to treason against their country.

Above all, the Serbian press has since then worked incessantly
in this spirit.

Up to the present time no fewer than eighty-one newspapers
appearing in Serbia have had to forfeit their right to delivery through
the post on account- of their contents faUing within the scope of the
penal law.

There is hardly a clause in the penal code protecting the sacred
person of the Monarch and the members of the Imperial Family, or

201

[R. 191 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25.

the integrity of the State, that has not been violated by Serbian
papers.

A few examples of these press views, selected from the great mass
of material published by the press at various dates, are contained in
Appendix I.

Without entering into a detailed account of these expressions of
Serbian public opinion, it is necessary to note that in spite of the
formal recognition accorded by Serbia, it has never ceased to consider
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both before and after
the event, as a robbery committed against Serbia for which repara-
tion is due. This idea not only constantly recurs with every modula-
tion of its coarse language in the papers professing most advanced
views, but also finds expression in hardly veiled terms in the Samou-
frava, which is in such close touch with the Foreign Office of Belgrade.
(See Appendix I (&).)

Nor can one omit to draw attention to the manner in which the
attempt made on the 15th June, 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajic
against the Feldzeugmeister von Vareianin, Governor of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, was turned to account by the press.

As is known, Zerajic had killed himself immediately after his deed,
and before committing it had burnt all his papers. Under these
circumstances, it was impossible to throw full light upon the motives
of his crime. It could, however, be inferred from a document found
on his person that he was a follower of the views of Krapotkin. Evi-
dence collected leads likewise to the conclusion that the crime was
of an anarchist type.

This, however, did not prevent the Serbian press from celebrating
the criminal as a national Serbian hero and from glorifying his
deed. Indeed, the Politika protested strongly against the idea
that Zerajic was an anarchist, and declared him to be " a
Serbian hero whose name all Serbians will repeat with respect and
grief."

The Politika considers the i8th August* of the same year as
a suitable opportunity on which to return to the crime of Zerajic,
" whose name will be sacred to the people," and to celebrate the
outrage in verse. (See Appendix I [a].)

In this way this crime, which had nothing to do with the territorial
aspirations against the Monarchy, was exploited for the furtherance
of these ideas and by the glorifying of Zerajic, murder was hailed
in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation
of this aim and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This
approbation of murder as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle
against the Monarchy reappears later in the press in. discussing the

* Birthday of His Imperial and Apostolic Majesty.
202

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 191

attempt made by Jukic against the Royal Commissioner von Cuvaj.
(See Appendix I (c).)

These newspapers, which were circulated not only in Serbia but
also, as we shall show later, illicitly smuggled into the Monarchy by
well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this
mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for
the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana became the centre of the agitation
carried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its
head at the time of the annexation still control it. Now as then, they
still control it in the capacity of the most active and energetic organisers,
the most violent opponents of the Monarchy ; General Bozo Jankovic,
Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government printing establishment),
and Majors Milan Pribicevic and Voja Tankosic. Organised on a
broad and far-reaching scale and constituted on a strict hierarchical
basis (see Appendix 2, " Organisation "), the Narodna Odbrana
counted soon some 400 committees which developed a very active
agitation.

Moreover, the Narodna Odbrana became closely allied with the
" shooting federation " (Schiiizenbund) , (762 societies), the great
Sokol* Association " Dusan " (2,500 members), the Olympian Club,
the association of horsemen {Reiterverein) , " Prince Michael," the
society of sportsmen (Jagerbund), and the league of development
[KuUurliga) , as well as numerous other associations all of which,
subordinate to it, were under the guidance and protection of the
Narodna Odbrana, and worked on the same lines. Becoming more
and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a com-
plete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are nothing but
members of the single body of the Narodna Odbrana.

Thus the Narodna Odbrana has set up all over Serbia a close
network of agitation, and has attracted to its principles all those
who were receptive of its ideas.

The official publications of the Narodna Odbrana demonstrate
sufficiently clearly the spirit which animates it.

While in its statutes, it represents itself as an " educational society "
{Kulturverein) concerning itself only with the spiritual and physical
improvement of the Serbian population and its material progress, the
Narodna Odbrana discloses in its official pubhcation (see Appendix 2)
the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its
"reorganised programme": to preach to the Serbian people the
sacred truth by " fanatical and indefatigable work " under the

* Sokol = falcon. The name given to gymnastic associations throughout
Slav countries which have adopted the falcon as their emblem. [Note
added in official English translation.]

203

£R. 19] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

pretence that the Monarchy wishes to " take away Serbian hberty and
language and even to destroy her " ; that it is an essential necessity
to wage against Austria-Hungary, her " first and greatest enemy,"
' ' a war of extermination with rifle and cannon, ' ' and ' ' by every means ' '
to prepare the people for this war, which is "to liberate the con-
quered territories," in which " seven million brothers are suffering
in bondage."

All the efforts " at an educational programme " (Kulturbestrebungen)
of the Narodna Odbrana are exclusively concerned with this idea
simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people
for the longed-for death struggle against the Monarchy.

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna Odbrana work in the
same spirit ; the Sokol Association at Kragujevac will serve as an
example (see Appendix 3).

As in the case of the Narodna Odbrana, of&cers, professors and
civil servants are at its head.

The speech in which its President, Major Kovacevic, opened the
annual meeting of 1914, made absolutely no mention of physical
training, which is supposed to be the real object of a Sokol association,
and confined itself solely to " the preparations for war " against the
" dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the
north " who " robs millions of Serbian brothers of their liberty and
rights, and holds them in bondage and chains."

In the administrative reports of this association the technical
work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines
for the avowal of the real " objects of the activities of the adminis-
tration," namely, the preparation of national development and the
strengthening of the " oppressed nation " with the object of enabling
it to carry out its " incomplete programme and its unfinished task,"
and to accomplish that " great action " " which is to be carried out
in the near future," " the liberation of those brothers who live across
±he Drina, who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified."

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send forth
the appeal that " falcons must be reared " capable " of bringing
freedom to the brothers still in bondage."

As in the case of the " educational programme " of the Narodna
Odbrana, the gymnastic activity of the Sokols is not the real object
but merely a means at the service of the same propaganda carried
on in the same spirit, and even with the very same words.

When the Narodna Odbrana appeals to the " people " for a death
struggle against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the
Serbian people, but to all Southern Slav nationaUties. In the eyes .
of the Narodna Odbrana, the Slav regions in the south of the Monarchy
are regarded as " our subjected Serbian territories." (See Appendix 4.)
The^ Southern Slav subjects of the Monarchy are further also
04

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 191

expected to take part in this " national work." This " healthy
and necessary work " is, therefore, to be carried on beyond the Serbian
frontier. The Narodna Odbrana recruits its " heroes for this holy
war " even on the soil of the Monarchy, and among them Obilic, the
murderer of Murad, is to light them on their way as an example of
sacrifice for one's country worthy of imitation.

But in order to incite " brothers outside Serbia " to share in " the
work of private effort," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch
with the " brothers beyond the frontier." It is not said in the publi-
cations of the society, how this intimate association is carried out,
no doubt because it appertains to that part of the " common work "
which " for many reasons cannot, or ought not to be divulged."

How comprehensive this branch of its activity is, can be seen by
the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna Odbrana,
but also certain of its local committees contain special sections for
" foreign affairs."

This " foreign " activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated
branches is extremely varied.

What is relatively less dangerous inasmuch as it can be officially
controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by distinguished
members of the Narodna Odbrana in the south-eastern parts of the
Monarchy where they speak before various societies on national or
educational subjects. These tours give the speakers the desired
opportunity, which is indeed the chief object of these journeys, of
explaining the true aims of the associations in language more or less
veUed, which is intelligible to those who are already initiated.

Amongst these emissaries, one of the best known is Zivojin Dacic
(Director of the Government printing establishment), already several
times alluded to ; it was he who, on the 8th August, 1909, issued an
" appeal " to the Serbian people in which he called Austria-Hungary
the enemy of Serbia, and exhorted them to prepare for the war against
the Monarchy. On numerous occasions, Dacic undertook tours
of this nature in the south-eastern districts of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy. During one of these lectures at Karlovci in 1912, he
flung his accustomed prudence to the winds and spoke openly of the
" union of all Serbs against the common foe," by which he designated
Austria-Hungary in unmistakable language.

More dangerous are the relations with associations in the Monarchy
formed by Serbian associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna
Odbrana under the cloak of community of interests and of culture ;
for the mutual visits of these associations, whether by delegates or
in bodies, which escape all official control, are utilised by the
Serbians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, at the weU-known feast of the Prosvjeta Asso-
ciation at Serajevo, in September, 1912, an envoy of the Narodna

205

|R. 19] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

Odbrana had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to
his society. (See Appendix 6.) The message which the representative
of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac brought to the " brothers in
Bosnia " at this feast was : " We have not forgotten you ; the wings
of the falcon of Sumadija are still powerful " — a thought which in
confidential intercourse would no doubt have found quite a different
■expression and one better corresponding to the tendencies of this
society which we have already explained. (See Appendix 3.) As to
the events that take place at meetings of the same kind in Serbia,
the Itnperial and Royal authorities cannot have any information
founded on unimpeachable authority, as they only possess on this
matter confidential information which it is dif&cult to check. In this
■connection, one may mention the visit of Agram students to Serbia
in April, 1912, who received from the Serbians an ofiicial military
reception accompanied even by a review of troops in their honour,
and that in a manner so suggestive that the administrative report of
the Sokol Association at Kragujevac could say : " This event marks
the beginning and germ of a great deed which will be accomplished
in the near future, it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the
people bursts its bonds and until there is no barrier that has not been
destroyed."

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro-
Hungarian authorities that the Serbian Sokol associations have
succeeded in inducing similar societies in the Monarchy to estabhsh
a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the
character of which is not yet quite clear, for the inquiries on this
point are still in progress. Up to the present, however, the informa-
tion obtained permits the conclusion that traces have been dis-
covered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Serbian
Sokols and their friends have poisoned the minds of certain groups
of mistaken and misled persons in the Monarchy.

This propaganda which is aimed at wider circles, and is rather of
a preparatory nature, assumes minor importance compared with
that of the " foreign work " which is conducted by the Narodna
Odbrana and its friends in the form^ of personal agitation among
individuals. It is in this field that the most melancholy results are
shown.

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the
poison of rebellion to the circles of men of mature age as well as those
of irresponsible youth.

It is thus, for example, that the late officers of the Honved V.B.,
D.K., V.M., and the heutenant of Croatian- Slavonian Gendarmerie
V.K., led astray by Milan Privicevic, left the service of the army of
the Monarchy under most suspicious circumstances and turned to
Serbia ; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their dreams

206

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19]

unrealised and some of them, at any rate, are thinking of returning
to the Fatherland they have betrayed.

The agitation introduced from Serbia into the middle schools of
Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily too well known to need illustration ;
what is less known is that people who have been expelled from
Croatian and Bosnian schools owing to grave breaches of discipline,
are received in Serbia with open arms, and often even protected by the
State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. The Serbian schools
with their anti-Austrian staffs, and their large number of professors
and teachers who are members of the Narodna Odbrana, are clearly
establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind.
A very notable case of this sort may be quoted here. In March, 1914,
several pupils of the Training College of Pakrac (Croatia) were dismissed
on account of a strike. They went to Serbia, where some of them
immediately obtained situations as schoolmasters, while others were
admitted to a college for teachers. One of those who had been thus
dismissed, and who was connected with anti-Austrian circles, declared
publicly that he and his people would give a proof, during the sojourn
of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province was Serbian
territory. It is, as we may add, highly significant that during the
stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia, the Royal Serbian
Prefect of the district of Krajna gave to the three training college
students, who were thus gravely implicated, Serbian passports in
which he falsely described them as Serbian subjects, although he
must have known that they were Croatians. With these pass-
ports, the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without
being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and
arrested.

All this is not, by a long way, enough to give a complete repre-
sentation of the " foreign " activity of the Narodna Odbrana.

The Imperial and Royal Government had been informed for a
long time past by confidential reports that the Narodna Odbrana
had made military preparations for the war which it desired to make
against the Monarchy, inasmuch as it kept emissaries in Austria-
Hungary, who, as soon as hostiUties broke out, would attempt in the
usual guerrilla manner to destroy means of transport and equipment
and stir up revolt or panic. (See Appendix 7.)

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the District Court at
Serajevo against Jovo Jaglicic and his associates for espionage
(Appendix 6), confirm this confidential information. As at the time
of its foundation, the preparation for guerrilla warfare still figures in
the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, to which must now be
further added a complete system of espionage.

It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna Odbrana,
described as " reorganised," is in reality an extended programme

207

[R. 19] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 2;

which includes the preparation for a " war of extermination " against
the Monarchy, and even its realisation, and finally the unfurling of
the " ancient red flag of the Narodna Odbrana."

Acts of terrorism must finally result from this atmosphere of hatred
against the Monarchy, which is pubhcly and secretly provoked, and
from an agitation which considers itself free from all responsibility ;
in order to bring them about, all means are regarded as permissible
in the struggle against Austria-Hungary, including even without
any sense of shame common acts of murder.

On the 8th June, 1912, a man named Lukas Jukic shot von Cuvaj,
the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that the Councillor
(Banalrat) Von Hervoic, who was seated in the same carriage, was
mortally wounded. Jukic, in his flight, shot a policeman who was
pursuing him, and wounded two others.

From the subsequent public investigation it appeared that Jukic
was saturated with the ideas and plans propagated by the Narodna
Odbrana, and that although Jukic had for some time past been
devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only
matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade, together with
the Agram students on the i8th of April, 1912. At the noisy celebra-
tions in honour of the visitors, Jukic had entered into relations with
several people belonging to the circle of the Narodna Odbrana, with
whom he had had political discussions. A few days afterwards he
returned to Belgrade, and there received from a Serbian major a bomb,
and from a comrade the Browning pistol with which he carried out
his crime.

In the opinion of experts, the bomb found at Agram was made
in an arsenal for military purposes.

Jukic's attempt had not been forgotten, when on the 18th of
August, 1913, Stephen Dojcic, who had returned from America,
made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron
Skerlecz, at Agram — an attempt which was the outcome of action
organised by the Serbians among the Southern Slavs living in America,
and which was also the work of the " foreign " propaganda of the
Narodna Odbrana and its confederates.

A pamphlet by the Serbian, T. Dimitrijevic, printed in Chicago,
and entitled " Natrag u staro ognjiste vase," with its unbridled
attacks against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and its
appeal to the Serbians of the Monarchy with reference to their impend-
ing " deUverance," and urging them to migrate home to Serbia,
demonstrates the fact that the propaganda carried out unchecked
in America from Serbia, and that carried on from Serbia in the territory
of the Monarchy, worked on parallel lines.

And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a new
outrage, this time unsuccessful.

208

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. IQ]'

On the 20th of May, 1914, Jakob Schafer made an attempt at the
Agram Theatre on the Ufa of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlecz, an
attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a poUce official.
The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired
by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of Hercigonja and his
five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Serbia.

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukic,
Hercigonja fled to Serbia (October, 1912), where together with his
accomplice Marojan Jaksic, he consorted with the komitadjis and
members of the Narodna Odbrana. As frequently happens when
immature minds are excited by occupying themselves too early with
poUtical questions, the result of this corrupting company was here
also disastrous. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma
learnt in Belgrade that the Southern Slav territories of Austria-Hungary
must be separated from it and re-united to the Serbian kingdom. He
had further been pursuaded by the teachings of the friends with
whom he associated there, that this object should be pursued by
means of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office and
leading politicians of the Monarchy as the only means of obtaining
this end.

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at
Agram and converted some of them to his ideas. Foremost among his
plans was the carrjdng out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the
throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

A few months before proceedings had been taken against Luka
Aljinovic for treasonable agitation. In the course of these proceed-
ings three witnesses declared that Aljinovic had told him that in
the year 1913 he had received at Belgrade 100 dinar from the Narodna
Odbrana, and a similar sum from a secret association of students,
for purposes of agitation, but especially to carry out an attempt on
the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Narodna Odbrana
and those who shared in its views, has of late been primarily directed
against the person of the hereditary Archduke. From these facts,
the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna Odbrana, as well
as the associations hostile to the Monarchy in Serbia, which were
grouped round it, recently decided that the hour had struck to trans-
late theory into practice.

It is noteworthy, however, that the Narodna hmits itself in this
way to inciting, and where the incitement has fallen on fertile soil
to providing means of material assistance for the realisation of its
plans, but that it has confided the only dangerous part of this propa-
ganda of action to the youth of the Monarchy, which it has excited
and corrupted, and which alone has to bear the burden of this miserable
" heroism."

II— o 209

[R. 19] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history

and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th of June

(see Appendix 8) .

I'' [c/ B 4 Princip "^' and Grabez ''' are characteristic examples of young men

annex.] ' who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of

the Narodna Odbrana.

At Belgrade, where he frequented the society of students imbued
with these ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of the
Serbian element hostile to the Monarchy was particularly acute on
the occasion of his tour in the annexed territories.

He was joined, by Cabrinovic, who moved in the same circles, and
whose shifting and radically revolutionary views, as he himself admits,
as well as the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and the reading
of the Serbian papers, inspired him with the same sense of hostility
to the Monarchy, and brought him into the propaganda of action.

Thanks to the state of mind in which he already was, Grabez
succumbed very quickly to this milieu, which he now entered.

But however far this plot may have prospered, and however
determined the conspirators may have been to carry out the attempt,
it would never have been effected, if people had not been found, as
in the case of Jukic, to provide the accomplices with means of com-
mitting their crime. For, as Princip and Cabrinovic have expressly
admitted, they lacked the necessary arms, as well as the money to
purchase them.

It is interesting to see where^ the accomplices tried to procure
their arms. Milan Pribicevic and Zivojin Dacic, the two principal men
in the Narodna Odbrana, were the first accomplices thought of as
a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already
become a tradition amongst those ready to commit crimes, that they
could obtain instruments for murder from these representatives of
the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these
two men were not at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless baulked
this plan. However, Princip and Cabrinovic were not at a loss in
finding other help, that of Milan Ciganovic, an ex-komitadji, and now
a railway official at Belgrade, and at the same time an active member
of the Narodna Odbrana, who, in 1909, first appeared as a pupil
at the school (Bandenschule) at Cuprija (see Appendix 5). Princip
and Cabrinovic were not deceived in^ their expectations, as they at
once received the necessary help from Ciganovic.
12) r / R A ^^^ latter, and at his instigation, his friend Major Voja Tankosic, '"'
annex 1 °^ '*^® Royal Serbian Army, also one of the leaders of the Narodna
Odbrana, who has already been mentioned several times, and who,
in 1908, was at the head of the school of armed bands at Cuprija
(see Appendix 5), now appear as moving spirits and active furtherers

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 191

in the plot ; the repulsive manner in which they approved as a matter
of course, is significant of the moral qualities of the whole anti-
Austrian movement. They had at first only one doubt, and that but
a fleeting one, as to whether the three conspirators were really resolved
to commit this act. This doubt, however, soon disappeared, thanks
to their insidious counsels. Thenceforth they were prepared to give
every assistance. Tankosic produced four Browning pistols, ammuni-
tion and money for the journey ; six hand-grenades from the Serbian
army supplies completed the equipment, of which the composition
and origin recalls the case of Jukic. Anxious about the success of
the attempt, Tankosic had the conspirators instructed in shooting,
a task which Ciganovic carried out with a success which has since
been fully proved. Tankosic and Ciganovic were further anxious to
ensure secrecy for the plot by special means which had not been bar-
gained for by the assassins. They therefore supplied cyanide of
potassium, telling the two culprits to commit suicide after the crime,
a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to themselves,
as secrecy would thus relieve them of the slight danger which they
were incurring in the enterprise. Sure death for the victims of their
corruption, perfect security for themselves, this is the motto of the
Narodna Odbrana, as was already known.

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was
necessary that the bombs and arms should be secretly smuggled into
Bosnia. There again Ciganovic gave all the assistance in his power ;
he wrote out for the conspirators the exact route to be followed, and
assured them of the collusion of the Serbian Customs of&cials for
getting them into Bosnia. The way in which this journey, described
by Princip as " mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave
no doubt but that this route was a secret one, prepared in advance,
and already often used for the mysterious designs of the Narodna
Odbrana. With an assurance and a certainty which could only
result from long habit, the frontier guards at Sabac and Loznica lent
their administrative organisation for the purpose. The secret trans-
port with its complicated system of ever-changing guides, who were
summoned as if by magic, and who were always on the spot when
wanted, was effected without a hitch. Without inquiring into the
object of this strange journey of some immature students, the Serbian
authorities set this smooth machinery into motion at a word from
the ex-komitadji and minor railway official, Ciganovic. However,
they had no need to ask any questions, as from the instructions they
had received, it was perfectly clear that a new " mission " of the
Narodna Odbrana was being carried out. The sight of the arsenal
of bombs and revolvers caused the exciseman Grbic merely to smile
good-naturedly and approvingly — sufficient proof of how accustomed
they were on this " route " to find contraband of this nature.

211

[R.l9,app.i3 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25.

The Royal Serbian Government have taken a grave responsibility
on their shoulders, in allowing all this to take place.

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria-
Hungary, they have allowed their press to disseminate hatred against
the Monarchy ; they have allowed associations established on their
own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials,
of professors and of judges, to carry on openly a campaign against
the Monarchy, with the ultimate object of inciting its citizens to
revolution ; they have not prevented men devoid of all moral scruples,
who share in the direction of its military and civil administration
from poisoning the public conscience, so that in this struggle low
murder appears as the best weapon.

APPENDIX I.
Opinions of the Serbian Press.

{a) The Politika on the i8th August, 1910, on the occasion of
the eightieth birthday of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty,
published a large portrait of Bogdan Zerajic, who, two months
earlier, had made a murderous attack on the Governor of Bosnia,
Freiherr Von Varesanin. In the article dealing with this, the
following observations were made : — " Two months ago, on the 2nd
of June (old style), on the opening day of the Diet of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, a young Serbian, the student Bogdan Zerajic, made
an attempt in Serajevo to kill the Governor of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, General Marian Varesanin. Zerajic fired five shots at this
renegade, who had assured his career by pouring out the blood of
his brothers in the famous insurrection in Rakovica, but, owing to
a remarkable accident, did not succeed in killing him. Whereon
the brave and composed Zerajic fired the sixth and last bullet through
his own head, and immediately fell dead. In Vienna, they knew very
well that it was not the reading of Russian and revolutionary writings
which had induced Zerajic to make his attempt, but that he acted
thus as the noble scion of a race which wished to protest against
foreign rule in this bloody way. Therefore, they sought to hush up
the whole matter as quickly as possible, and — contrary to their custom
— to avoid an affair which would have still more compromised the
Austrian Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Vienna, it
was desired that every memory of Zerajic should be extinguished, and
that no importance should be attached to his attempt ; but just this
fear of the dead Zerajic, and the prohibition against mentioning his
name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought it about that his
name is spoken among the people as something sacred to-day, on
the i8th of August, perhaps more than ever.

212

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19. app. H

" To-day, we too light a candle at his grave and cry ' Honour to
Zerajic ! '"

To this is added a poem, the translation of which is as follows : —

" Bosnia lives and is not dead yet.
In vain have you buried her corpse ;
Still the chained victim spits fire.
Nor is it yet time to sing the dirge.
With devil's hand you have scratched a grave for her
But the living dead will not descend into the vault ;
Emperor, dost thou hear ?
In the flash of the revolver the leaden bullets hiss about

thy throne !
These are not slaves ; this is glorious freedom
Which flashes from the bold hand of the oppressed !
Why does this horrible Golgotha shudder ?
Peter drew the sword in Christ's defence.
His hand fell, but out of the blood
A thousand brave hands wiU rise ;
That shot was only the first herald
Of the glorious Easter after Golgotha's torments."

(6) On the 8th October, 1910, on the occasion of the anniversary
of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Politika and
the Mali Journal, the last of which appeared with a black border,
pubhshed articles in which they indulged in violent attacks against
Austria-Hungary. Europe must convince herself that the Serbian
people still think always of the " revanche." The day of the " revanche "
must come ; for this the feverish exertions of Serbia to organise her
military power as well as the feeling of the Serbian people and their
hatred of the neighbouring kingdom were a guarantee.

On the same occasion the Samouprava wrote on the 9th October,
1910, " Abuse and excesses are no fit means to express true patriotism ;
quiet, steady and honest work alone leads to the goal."

(c) On the i8th April, 1911, the Politika said : " Except for
a few cynics, no one in Serbia would be glad to see King Peter
proceeding to Vienna or Budapest. By the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the possibility of friendship between Serbia and
Austria-Hungary was once for all destroyed. Every Serbian feels
that."

(d) The Beogradske Novine wrote on the 18th April, 1911 : —
" Even in Government circles the projected journey of King Peter
to the Emperor Francis Joseph is disapproved. The storm of indig-
nation which has seized the whole of the Serbian race on account of
the King's proposed journey is entirely comprehensible."

213

[R. 19, app. 1] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

{e) The Mali Journal of the 19th April, 1911, says : " A visit
of King Peter to the ruler of Austria-Hungary would be an insult
to all Serbs. By this visit, Serbia would forfeit the right to play the
part of Piedmont. The interests of Serbia can never coincide with
the interests of Austria."

(/) On the 23rd April, 1911, the Politika, the Mali Journal, the
Tribuna, the Beogradske Novine, and the Vecernje Novosti, commented
on the projected visit of King Peter to the Court of Vienna : " Between
Serbia and Austria, friendship can never exist. The projected visit
of King Peter would, therefore, be for Serbia a ' shameful capitula-
tion,' ' a humiliation of Serbia,' ' a solemn sanctioning of all the crimes
and misdeeds that Austria-Hungary has committed against Serbia
and the Serbian people.' "

(g) On the i8th April, 1912, the Trgovinski Glasnik wrote in an
article headed, " The decay of Austria " : —

"In Austria-Hungary decay prevails on all sides. What is now
happening beyond the Danube and the Save is no longer a German,
Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, it is a universal Austrian crisis,
a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Serbians can observe such a develop-
ment of affairs in Austria with satisfaction."

{h) The Balkan, in an article entitled " The Borders of Albania,"
in attacking Austria-Hungary, expressed itself to this effect : "If
Europe is too weak to call a halt to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro
and Serbia will do it, saying to Austria, ' Halt ! no further ! ' A war
between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is inevitable. We have dis-
membered the Turkish Empire, we will dismember Austria too. We
have finished one war, we are now facing a second."

{i) The Vecernje Novosti, of the 22nd April, 1913, appeals to the
Serbian travelling pubHc and to Serbian traders to boycott the
Donau Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft (The Danube Steam Navigation
Company). " No one should travel or consign goods by ships of this
Austrian Company. All who do this should be punished with fines by a
committee. The monies would flow to the funds of the Komitadjis
which are to be applied for the purpose of the coming war with Austria."

{k) The Tribuna of the 26th May, 1913, on the occasion of
the seizure of Ada Kaleh by Austria, writes : " The criminal black and
yellow Austria has again carried out a piratical trick. It is a thief
who, when he cannot steal a whole sack of gold, contents himself with
one dinar."

(l) On the loth June, 1913, on the occasion of the recurrence of
the anniversary of the murderous attack on the Royal Commissary
in Agram by the student Luka Jukic, the Serbian newspapers published
memorial articles. An article in the Pragda stated that : " It
must grieve us to the bottom of our hearts that everyone has not

214

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R.l9,app.l3

acted like our Jukic. We have no longer a Jukic, but we have the
hatred, we have the anger, we have to-day ten million Jukics. We
are convinced that soon Jukic, through his prison window, will hear
the last cannon shot of freedom."

(m) The Mali Journal of the 7th October, 1913, gives a leading
place to an article in which Austria-Hungary is denied the right of
existence, and the Slavonic peoples are invited to support the offensive
campaign contemplated by Serbia.

{n) The Piemont writes on the commemoration day of the
annexation : " Five years ago to-day an imperial decree extended the
sovereignty of the Hapsburg sceptre over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Serbian people will feel for decades yet the grief which was that
day inflicted on them. Shamed and shattered, the Serbian people
groaned in despair. The people vow to take vengeance in attaining
freedom by an heroic step. This day has aroused the energy which had
already sunk to sleep, and soon the refreshed hero will strive for freedom.
To-day when Serbian graves adorn the ancient Serbian territories, when
the Serbian cavalry has trod the battlefields of Macedonia and old
Serbia, the Serbian people having ended their task in the South turn
to the other side, whence the groans and tears of the Serbian brother
are heard, and where the gallows has its home. The Serbian soldiers
who to-day in Dusan's kingdom fight those Albanians who were
provoked against us by the state which took Bosnia and Herzegovina
from us, vowed to march against the ' second Turkey ' even as with
God's help they had marched against the Balkan Turkey. They
make this vow and hope that the day of revenge is drawing near.
One Turkey vanished. The good Serbian God will grant that the
' second Turkey ' will vanish too."

(0) The Mali Journal of the 4th November, 1913, writes : " Every
effort towards a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary is equivalent
to a betrayal of the Serbian people. Serbia must understand the
facts and always hold before her eyes that she has in Austria-Hungary
her most dangerous enemy, and that it must be the sacred obligation
of every Serbian Government to fight this enemy."

(p) On the 14th January, 1914, the Pragda said : " Our new
year's wishes are first of all for our still unfreed brothers sighing under
a foreign yoke. Let the Serbians endure ; after Kossovo came
Kumanovo, and our victorious career is not yet ended."

{q) The Novosti of the i8th January, 1914, published a picture
of " The Blessing of the Water in Bosnia " with the following text r
" Even in places which lie under the foreign yoke, the Serbians preserve
their customs against the day when in glorious joy the day of freedom
dawns."

(r) The Zastava confesses in January, 1914 : " Serbia incites
the Austro-Hungarian Serbians to revolution."

215

[R. 19, app. 2] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25.

(s) The Mali Journal of the 9th March, 1914, writes : " Serbia can
never forget Franz Ferdinand's sabre-rattUng in the Skutari affair."

[t) On the 4th April, 1914, the Zastava writes : " The Austrian
statesmen who only conduct a policy of hatred, a bureaucratic policy,
not a policy inspired by broad vision, are themselves preparing the
ruin of their State."

(m) The Pravda of the 8th April, 1914, says : " Austria has now
lost her right to exist."

{v) In their Easter numbers (April, 1914) all the Serbian newspapers
expressed the hope that soon their unfreed, oppressed brothers under
the yoke would celebrate a joyous resurrection.

(w) In the Tribuna of the 23rd April, 1914, it is stated that : " The
pacifists have invented a new catchword, that of the ' patriotism
of Europe.' This programme can only be realised, however, when
Austria is partitioned."

{x) The Mali Journal of the 12th May, 1914, writes : " What
are called crimes in private life are called, in Austria, politics. History
knows a monster, and that monster is called Austria."

APPENDIX 2.

Extract from the " Narodna Odbrana," an organ published by
THE Central Committee of the Narodna Odbrana Society.
(Narodna odbrana izdanje stredisnog odbora narodne
odbrane. Beograd, 1911. " Nova stamparija " Davidovk^,
Decanska ulica BR. 14, LjUB. Davidovica.)

In a short introduction it is first of all remarked that this pamphlet
" does not completely or exhaustively reproduce the whole work of
the Narodna Odbrana because, for many reasons, it is neither per-
missible nor possible to do this."

The document is divided into three parts of which the first consists
of fourteen chapters and is in the nature of a programme, while the
second contains a report of the activities of the Society, and in the
third examples are given for the organisation of similar societies
abroad.

In the first chapter, " Origin and activity of the first Narodna
Odbrana," it is remarked that the Society was founded as a conse-
quence of the popular movement arising in Serbia on the annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it had the following objects : —

(i) Raising, inspiring and strengthening the sentiment of nation-
ality.

(2) Registration and enlistment of volunteers.

(3) Formation of volunteer units and their preparation for armed
action.

216

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19, app. 2}

(4) Collection of voluntary contributions, including money and
other things necessary for the realisation of its task.

(5) Organisation, equipment and training of a special revolutionary
band (Komitee), destined for special and independent military action.

(6) Development of activity for the defence of the Serbian people
in all other directions. In this connection, it is remarked that owing
to the recognition of the annexation by the Great Powers an end
had been made to all this work of the Society on which, while retaining
its existing constitution, the Society had taken measures to reorganise
its programme and to undertake new work, so that, on the recurrence
of a similar occasion, " the old red War Flag of the Narodna Odbrana
would again be unfurled."

At the beginning of the second chapter, " The new Narodna
Odbrana of to-day," it is stated that " at the time of the annexation,
experience had shown that Serbia was not ready for the struggle
which circumstances imposed upon her, and that this struggle, which
Serbia must take up, is much more serious and more difficult than it
was thought to be ; the annexation was only one of the blows which
the enemies of Serbia have aimed at this land, many blows have
preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are
necessary so that a new attack may not find Serbia equally unpre-
pared." The object assigned to the work to be done by people of
every class is stated to be " the preparation of the people for war in all
forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the
present day," and the means suggested to effect this object are
" strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase
of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvement, &c. ... so
far as individuals and societies can and should assist the State in these
spheres."

The third chapter, " The three principal tasks," begins with a
hint that the annexation has taught that national consciousness in
Serbia is not so strong as it should be in a country which, as a small
fraction of three millions, forms a hope of support for seven millions of
the oppressed Serbian people. The first task of the Society, therefore,
consists in strengthening the national consciousness. The second
task is the cultivation of bodily exercises, the third the proper utilisa-
tion of these activities learned in the field of sport.

In the fourth chapter (Musketry) prominence is given to the value
of good training in musketry, especially having regard to the circum-
stances of Serbia, where the military training only lasts six months.
These observations conclude with the sentence :

" A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new
Serbia, in which every Serbian, from child to greybeard is a rifle-
man."

217

[R. 19, app. 21 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

The fifth chapter, which treats of " The relations of the Narodna
Odbrana to the Sokol societies," begins with a social and political
excursus as to the conditions on which the powers of States depend.
In this connection the fall of Turkey is referred to, and it is said :

" The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part
of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the
North, more fearful and dangerous than the old ; stronger in civilisation
and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come against
us. They want to take our freedom and our language from us and to
crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which
approaches in that quarter. The Serbian people are faced by the
question ' to be or not to be ? ' "

" 'What is the object of the Lectures' is the title of the seventh
chapter, the principal contents of which are covered by the following
sentences :

" The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were largely
propaganda lectures. The programme of our new work was devel-
oped. Every lecture referred to the annexation, the work of the
old Narodna Odbrana and the task of the new. The lectures will
never cease to be propaganda lectures, but they will develop special
branches more and more and concern themselves with all questions
of our social and national life."

In the eighth chapter, " Women's Activities in the Narodna
Odbrana," the ninth " Detail and Lesser Work," and the tenth,
" Renaissance of the Society," the preparation and deepening of the
Society's work and the necessity of a regeneration of the individual,
the nation and the State are treated in reference to the tasks of the
Narodna Odbrana.

The Introduction to the eleventh chapter (" New Obilice and
Singjelice "*) runs as follows : —

" It is an error to assert that Kossovo is past and gone. We find
ourselves in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo of to-day is the gloom
and ignorance in which our people live. The other causes of the new
Kossovo live on the frontiers to the North and West : the Germans,
Austrians and ' Schwabas,' with their onward pressure against our
Serbian and Slavonic South." In conjunction with the reference to

* MiloS Obili(5e (or Kobilid) crept— according to Serbian tradition — into
the Turkish Camp, after the battle on the Amselfeld, and there murdered the
Sultan Murad (Von K^Ilay " Geschichte Der Serben," Vol. I). Stephan
Singjelid, Prince of Resara, played a part during the Serbian Revolution,
1807-1810. In 1809, Singjelic defended the redoubt of Tschagar against
the Turks, and is said to have blown himself into the air, with some of his
followers and many Turks, when outnumbered. (Von Kallay " Die Geschichte
des serbischen Aufstandes.")
218

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19, app.f2|

the heroic deeds of Obilice and SingjeUce, the necessity of sacrifice
in the service of the nation is alluded to, and it is declared that
" national work is interwoven with sacrifice, particularly in Turkey
and in Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities
and dragged to prison and the gallows. For this struggle, also, against
gloom and ignorance there is need of such heroes. The Narodna
Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight with gun and cannon against
the ' Schwabas ' and the other enemies with whom we stand face to
face, our people will provide a succession of heroes. However, the
Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it regards the so-called
peaceful present day conditions as war, and demands heroes too for
this struggle of to-day which we are carrying on in Serbia and beyond
the frontier."

The twelfth chapter treats of " Union with our brothers and
friends," and its principal contents are concentrated in the following
sentences : —

" The maintenance of union with our brothers near and far across
the frontier, and our other friends in the world, is one of the chief
tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. In using the word ' people ' the
Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Serbia.
It hopes that the work done by it in Serbia will spur the brothers
outside Serbia to take a more energetic share in the work of private
initiative, so that the new present day movement for the creation of
a powerful Serbian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all
Serbian territories."

The thirteenth chapter, which is headed " Two Important Tasks,"
proceeds as follows : —

"As we take up the standpoint that the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina has completely brought into the light of day the
pressure against our countries from the North, the Narodna Odbrana
proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy."
This work (that is to say, to depict Austria to the Serbian people
as their greatest enemy) is regarded by the Society, according to-
the following expressions of opinion, as a healthy and necessary task,
in fact, as its principal obligation. For the pamphlet goes on as
follows : —

" Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria,
attacks us to-day from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches
the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our
national position."

The hatred against Austria brought about by this propaganda
is, of course, not the aim but the natural consequence of this work,
the object of which is independence and freedom. If on this account
hatred of Austria germinates, it is Austria who sows it by her advance,

219

JR. 19, app. 2] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

which conduct " makfes obhgatory a war of extermination against
Austria."

After some praise of the modern conception of nationaUsm the
remark is made that in speaking of " freedom and unity," too much is
mere talk. The people must be told that : —

" For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental
essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Serbian terri- J

tories and their union with Serbia is necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, '

and peasants alike. ' ' Perceiving this the people will tackle the national
work with greater self-sacrifice. Our people must be told that the
freedom of Bosnia is necessary for her, not only out of pity for the
brothers suffering there, but also for the sake of trade and the connec-
tion with the sea.

The " two tasks " of the Narodna Odbrana are then again brought
together in the following concluding sentence : — j

"In addition to the task of explaining to the people the danger-
threatening it from Austria, the Narodna Odbrana has the important
duty, while preserving intact the sacred national memories, of giving '

to the people this new, wholesome and, in its consequences, mighty
conception of nationalism and of work in the cause of freedom and
union."

The fourteenth and final chapter begins with an appeal to the
Government and people of Serbia to prepare themselves in all ways
for the struggle " which the annexation has foreshadowed "

Hereon the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are again retapitu-
lated in the following sentences : —

" While the Narodna Odbrana works in conformity with the times
according to the altered conditions, it also maintains all the connections
made at the time of the annexation ; to-day therefore it is the same
as it was at the time of the annexation. To-day, too, it is Odbrana
(defence) ; to-day, too, Narodna (of the people) ; to-day, too, it gathers
Tinder its standard the citizens of Serbia as it gathered them at the time
of the annexation. Then the cry was for war, now the cry is for work.
Then meetings, demonstrations, voluntary clubs (Komitees), weapons
and bombs were asked for ; to-day steady, fanatical, tireless work and
again work is required to fulfil the tasks and duties to which we have
drawn attention by way of present preparation for the fight with gun
and cannon which will come."

The pamphlet and the annual report contain the following inform-
ation as to the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana : —

A Central Committee at Belgrade directs all proceedings of the
JSIarodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana are

220

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R.l9,app.3I

subject to this. The Central Committee is divided into four sections : —
for cultural work, for bodily training, for financial policy, and for
foreign affairs.

District Committees, with their centre at the seat of the offices
of the District Government, conduct the affairs of the Society in the
corresponding districts. Every District Comhiittee divides itself
into sections for culture (the President being the Chairman of the local
branch of the " Culture League"), for bodily training (the President
being a local member of the Riflemen's, Sokol, Sportsmen's and
Horsemen's clubs) and for financial affairs ; some District Committees
have also a section for Foreign Affairs.

Divisional Committees located at the seat of the local authorities
conduct the affairs of the Society in the various divisions.

Local Committees conduct the Society's affairs in the various towns
and villages.

Confidential men are located in those places in the interior of the
country where the constitution of a Committee is not necessary.

Societies " which work in close connection with the organisation
of the Narodna Odbrana " and are supported by the latter in every
respect are the following : —

The Riflemen's Association with 762 societies, the Sokol Association
" Dusan the Strong " with 2,500 members, the Olympic Club, the
Horsemen's Society " Prince Michael," the Sportsmen's Association
and the Culture League.

All these societies are organised on similar lines to those of the
Narodna Odbrana and use their premises, including club houses,
libraries, &c. Distinguished members of these societies are chairmen
of sections in the Committees of the Narodna Odbrana.

APPENDIX 3.

Extracts from the " Report of the Activities of the Sokol
Society Dusan the Strong in Kragujevac in the years
1912-13." (Kragujevac Printing Office " Buducnost " Tm.
Lekic 1914.)

At the head of this report is printed the speech with which the
President, Major Kovacevic of the Serbian Army, greeted the annual
meeting in January, 1914.

" It is known to you," the President began, " that Sokolism,
which arose in the struggle against Germanism, is a purely Slavonic
institution, which has for its aim to unite and to inspire all the
Slavonic brothers, and to give physical and intellectual training for
the struggle against the enemy of Slavism.

[R. 19, app, 3] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25

" We Serbians, as a part of the great Slavonic community, have
taken up the Sokol idea and have agreed to the common work for our
own and our brothers' welfare and happiness.

" We Serbians, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokols,
for we wish to revive the weary and the feeble, to strengthen the weak
and the troubled, t6 free the imprisoned and the enchained. We
have done this now and in earlier wars. We have rescued part of
our brothers from the insolence of the enemy in the South. We have
struck off their fetters, we have rid them of their sufferings and given
them freedom, so that they enjoy happiness, equality and brother-
hood."

After giving a few words of praise to this " noble work " which
" realised a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovacevic proceeded :

" Oh, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the North is more
dangerous and pitiless, because he is stronger in respect of his civilisa-
tion and his economic position.

" This enemy is insatiable in his lusts ; he holds millions of our
brothers in slavery and chains. He took law and freedom from them
and subjected them all to his service. The brothers murmur, call
and beg for still quicker help.

" We must not leave them to the mercy of this fearful and greedy
enemy. We must hurry to their help the sooner because it is our
duty to do so. Could we in any event be happy when so many brothers
live in slavery, suffer and murmur ?

" Brothers and sisters !

" The enemy is dangerous, greedy and troublesome. Let us ever
be on our guard.

" Let us go to work with still greater willingness and self-sacrifice.
Let us be scrupulous according to the sacred Sokol obligation, true
and enduring.

" Let us prepare ourselves for the struggle and for the just Sokol
idea.

" Let us unite and ally ourselves with innumerable Sokol hosts,
and let us always remember that truth which the Serbian Sokols
wrote upon their flag : That only a healthy, powerful, well-organised
people, conscious of its nationality, is fit to defend itself, to struggle,
and to conquer."

The report of the Committee of Management follows the speech
of the President. After a description of the successes in the last wars,
which interfered with the activities of the Society for two years, it is
stated that " the day arrived when we returned to our work, because
our programme was not yet fulfilled, because our task was not yet
ended. A great part of our people still endure the pains of the crucified
Christ ; we have still to visit our brothers beyond the Drina ; we
have still to seek out the town of Serajevo and the inheritance of

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19, app. 8]

St. Sava* ; we must behold the home of Marina Novak, of Deli Radivoj
and of the old Vujadin ; we must cross the mountains of Romanija
and see why Travnik is veiled in mist. That song must end at last :
' Ah ! Bosnia, thou orphan child before God, hast thou nowhere people
of thy race ....'"

After a discussion of various undertakings of the Society, emphasis
is laid on the fact that the Society maintains relations with the brother
societies beyond the Save and the Drina, and special emphasis is laid
on the dispatch of delegates to the Jubilee of the Prosvjeta held in
Serajevo. On this the report remarks : " By sending representatives
to the brothers in Bosnia the Committee intended to say to them —
we have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are
still mighty." After a detailed description of a visit of the Agram
students to Serbiaf and of the dedication of the flag of " the Young
People's Temperance Association," the report of the executive
concludes with the following sentences : —

" These manifestations — the coming of the brother Croats to
Sumadija and the meeting of the ' temperate youth ' from all Serbian
regions are correctly appreciated by our leaders, and one would not
exaggerate if one said that these events indicate the beginning and
the germ of a great deed to be done in the near future.

" They are the expression of a great and, till now, silent awakening
of the national consciousness and of the strength of an oppressed
nation which is not allowed to arise and unite. In a little time this
germ will ripen, and when the soul of the people arises still more,
there will be no barrier which it cannot break, and no obstacle which
it cannot tear down upon its way. The work of strengthening this
power, the assistance and acceleration of the progress of this national
development, the preparation and the support of this idea, was always
the aim of the actions of our leaders."

The treasurer's report enumerates first of all those who have
supported the society. In addition to a number of members of the
Kragujevac District Committee, the following are mentioned and
thanked : —

The District Committee of the " Narodna Odbrana " at Kragujevac,
particularly its " Ritter " section, which often assisted the Sokol

* St. Sava (ob. 1236) is the patron saint of the Serbians. Herzegovina
is the name of Ducatus Sanii Save. The "inheritance of St. Sava" is,
therefore, equivalent in meaning to Herzegovina.

t This visit of the Agram students (April, 1912) to Belgrade, Nish,
Semendria, &c., was used in Serbia as the pretext for a great demonstration
of hostility to the Monarchy. The excursionists were accorded military
honours, and lunches and balls took place in the Military Academy and the
Officers' Club. In Nish, indeed, a military parade was held in honour of the
visitors.

223

IR. 19, app. 4] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

Society with substantial support ; the Headmaster of the Gymnasium
at Kragujevac, who " always showed his fatherly care " to the Sokols ;
the Divisional Commandant of Sumadija, who had substantially sup-
ported the society ; the President of the District Court at Kragujevac ;
the District Chairman and the Parish Chairman at Kragujevac.

After referring to the members of the society who have fallen in
war, the treasurer closes his report with the following words : —

" After so brilliant a victory over a portion of our enemies, those
who control our society hope that you all, from now onwards, will
devote yourselves still more, more unitedly and more entirely, to
the activities of Sokolism so that you may rear falcons in our falcon's
eyrie who, at the given moment, will one day be ready to fly aloft,
and in their mighty flight bring freedom, love and brotherhood to all
our brothers who are not yet free."

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovacevic, President,
by the secretary of the Law Courts, D. V. Brzakovic, as secretary, and
by ten members of the executive, among whom are included two
professors (EmU Lukic and Milan Jankovic), as well as a further
officer (Major of Infantry, Michael Vasic).

It is clear from this annual report, and from a schedule also signed
by Major M. J. Kovacevic and Brzakovic, Secretary of the Law Courts,
and sent to the Kragujevac Sokol Society by the " Srpski Soko " in
Tuzla for completion, that the Sokol Societies in Serbia stand in close
relation with various similar societies in the Monarchy to an extent
not hitherto known.

APPENDIX 4.

The Serbian Official Gazette in the Service of the Narodna

Odbrana.

An appeal by the Narodna Odbrana appears as a supplement to
the Serbian Official Gazette, Srpski Novine, of 28th June, 1914
(new style), and was supplied to all subscribers to the paper.

The following passages occur in this appeal : —

" Brothers and sisters ! Kossovo was only partly avenged, the day
of St. Vitus (Vidovdan) was only partly expiated. Just as far as the
territories reach where our people's speech is heard — the Serbian,
Croatian, and Slovenian — from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to
Carevo-Solo, just as far and wide does the meaning of St. Vitus' Day
and of Kossovo extend. So many souls of our race weep on this terri-
tory ; so many fetters of our brothers clank ; so much work is yet
to be done ; so much have we still to sacrifice. St. Vitus' Day could
formerly mean a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have
already gone so far in the new history of the people ; when behind

224

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19, app. 5]

us stand great and glorious national events, and before us still greater
and more glorious events await us ; to-day when we stand in the
midst of the creation of a great national State ; to-day St. Vitus'
Day must be for us a day of great joy and pride, because of that which
has happened, and sprung from it, and still more because of that
which will come. Men and women of Serbia ! MUHons of our
brothers, Slovenes, Croats, and Serbians beyond our frontiers, look
to-day to us, the Children of the Kingdom, and joy and hope fill their
breast as they now behold to-day's majestic manifestations for the
national cause. God helps the brave ! Forward all ! That part of
our sacred task which is as yet unreaUsed calls us. Belgrade, St. Vitus'
Day, 1914."

APPENDIX 5.

Deposition of Trifko KRSXANOvid, Concerning the Narodna

Odbrana.

The baker's assistant, Trifko Krstanovic, of Zavadonici, was
arrested by a gendarmerie patrol on the night of the 6th-7th July,
1914, because he had been heard to remark shortly after the murderous
attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that this attack was to
be expected, and because this remark brought him under suspicion of
having had knowledge of the plot.

He was, on this account, brought up before the District Court at
Serajevo. The examination of the prisoner revealed that his remark
did not justify the suspicion which had arisen against him, since it,
founded entirely on his earlier knowledge of the activities of the
Narodna, was merely the expression of his conviction that, on
account of the agitation developing in Serbia against the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, and especially against the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, a deed of that kind was to be expected. In the absence
of any material facts in support of the charge, the proceedings against
Krstanovic were accordingly withdrawn, and, having regard to his
knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which had an
important bearing on the inquiry, he was subpoenaed as a witness.

An extract from his depositions taken on the 19th July, 1914,
which is relevant to the matters here in question, is as follows : —

" In the autumn of the year 1908, I crossed the frontier to Serbia
on the Mokra Gora, near Visegrad, to seek work. I first came to
Bagina Balta in the district of Uzice, and as I found no work there,
I went to Belgrade, where I arrived just at the time when the annexa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced. As I saw that the
annexation had caused great popular commotion and excitement,
and that I should not be able to find any work, I went to the Imperial

ii-p 225

[R.l9,app.5] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

and Royal Consulate and tried to][get myself sent home. There I was
told to come back in the afternoon, and that I should then be sent
home. However, as I came out of the Consulate, a gendarme seized
me on the street, and asked me where I came from ; under the im-
pression that I was a spy, he conducted me to a tower [Karaula).
Here I was questioned, and when I said to them that I wanted to go
home, a non-commissioned officer began to abuse me : Why should I
now want to go out of Serbia which now needed more people because
a war with Austria would come ? When I said to him that I had
nothing to live on, he answered me that I would find full maintenance
if I would register myself in the Komitee. In my need I agreed,
and a gendarme took me to the inn ' Zelenom Vijencu ' (' The Green
Wreath '), and introduced me there to Voja Tankosic, the leader of
the Komitee and a captain in the regular army. Here, at the ' Green
Wreath ' I was provided with food and lodging, and, as I saw, other
members of the Komitee lived here. Voja Tankosic told me that
the business of the Komitee was to learn bomb-throwing, the destruc-
tion of bridges, tunnels, telegraphs and railways, because a war between
Serbia and Austria could easily arise. - On this a man took me to a
small building belonging to the Royal Demesne next to the Treasury,
where the offices of the Komitee were situated, and in the office I met
Milan Pribicevic, who enrolled me in the Komitee. At this enrolment,
Milan Pribicevic asked me whether Voja Tankosic had told me the
obligations which I had as a member of the Komitee. To this I
answered ' Yes.' He said that those enrolled must be efficient, strong,
and self-sacrificing. ' There were then about 70 of us enrolled. In
Belgrade we did nothing. After about six weeks our leader Tankosic
informed us that the Great Powers had prohibited our Komitee, and
that we must leave Belgrade and hide ourselves somewhere in an out-
of-the-way place not visited by foreigners. In this way they sent us
to the town of Cuprija. Here we were drilled by the officers Voja
Tankosic, Dusan Putnik, Zivko Gvosdic and Mitar Djinovic, who was
involved in the Montenegrin bomb outrage, and was shot in Montenegro.
In order that no one should become aware of our objects, or know
anything of our numbers, we were forbidden to have intercourse with
outsiders. We practised the throwing of bombs, the construction of
mines, and the destruction of telegraphs, railways, tunnels and bridges.
Every fortnight we were visited by Milan Pribicevic, General Bozo
Jankovic, the pharmacist Skaric, the deputy Zivko Rafajlovic, and a
certain Glisic Milutin, a Treasury official, who watched our drill and
paid for our board on each occasion. Our instructors told us that,
when war was declared, we Komitees would go in advance, then the
volunteers, and then the regular army. There were about 140 men at
Cuprija. Besides board, we had lodging and clothes and 25 para a day
for tobacco. The school lasted about three months, that is until
226

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19, app. 5]

March, 1909. Then the members of the committee told us that we
were dismissed, that we could all go wherever we wished, for the annexa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised by the Great
Powers, and that our Komitee had become useless. On the dissolution
of the Komitee, General Bozo Jankovic told me to enter the service of
Bozo Milanovic at Sabac, where I should receive wages of 50 dinar a
month. He did not tell me what the nature of the service would be.
I accepted, because, as a member of the Komitee, I regarded myself
as bound to obey General Jankovic, and also because I had nothing
to live on, and had to earn my livelihood. In this way I came to Sabac
in March, 1909, and reported myself to Bozo Milanovic, a tradesman
of Sabac. General Jankovic had told me that Bozo Milanovic was
chairman of the Narodna Odbrana in Sabac, and that I should assist
him in connection with this Narodna Odbrana. When I had given
Bozo Milanovic the General's letter and he had read it, he told me that
I must serve him faithfully and carry out his orders. My chief duty
would be to carry his letters wheresoever they were addressed. It
would cost me my life if I failed to carry a letter to its destination, and
if any one else got hold of it. On the next day. Bozo Milanovic gave
me a closed letter which I was to take to Cedo Lukic, Superintendent
of Excise at Serbisch-Raca. On the road to Raca, at the village of
Bogatic, the District Captain stopped me, took the letter from me,
opened it and read it. In the letter it said that Lukic should immedi-
ately buy three boats so that they should be ready if they were required.
100 dinar were enclosed in the letter. On this occasion the Captain
told me that the Ministry had given strict orders that the Komitadji
were to do nothing without orders, so that international diplomatic
intervention should not be provoked. I returned to Sabac and told
Bozo Milanovic what had happened to me. Bozo Milanovic applied
to the District Prefect, who gave orders that the revolver, which the
Captain at Bogatic had taken from me, should be returned. He also
gave orders that the Captain should send the letter to Cedo Lukic to
whom it was addressed. I carried letters of this sort from March,
1909, until October, 1910, and in that time I took 43 letters to Serbisch-
Raca, 55 to Loznica, 5 to Zvornik, 2 to Ljubivija, and I don't know
how many to Koviljaca. I noticed how often L was in each place
because these places are a very long way from Sabac. I took the
letters to the chiefs of the Customs houses in the various places, and
from them I received letters in reply and took them to Bozo Milanovic.
I recollect that on a few occasions I took letters to Sepacka Ada. My
assistant in letter carrjdng was one Vaso Eric, a native of Srebrenica.
Every week I took letters from Bozo Milanovic to Belgrade, and
delivered them to Milan Pribicevic and Bozo Jankovic. I knew
nothing of the contents of these letters, and no one told me anything
about them. So far as I could see, the letters despatched by Bozo

227

[R. I9,app.53 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

Milanovic were not in cipher, but the letters sent by the chiefs of the
Customs houses were written in special characters, a fact which I
observed when Bozo Milanovic opened them. Once I brought one of
these cipher letters to Bozo Milanovic, I think it was from Zvornik,
and he sent me with the letter to Mika Atanasijevic, Professor at
Sabac, to decipher. He did this, as he usually did ; but perhaps he
forgot to close the letter, so that I could read it. The letter stated,
that it was reported from a reliable source, that money was to be
stamped with the likeness of the heir to the throne, and this was an
indication that the Emperor Francis Joseph was about to abdicate.
After about eight months of my service with Bozo Milanovic, Bozo
gave me his visiting-card with a death's head drawn upon it ; on it
was written that I was designated an initiate {povjerenik) of the
Narodna Odbrana. On this occasion he told me, that the business
was spying. . . .

" On one occasion, I learnt from the officer Dusan Opterkic, member
of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana had 23 branches
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beyond this, I do not know what organ-
isation, if any, the Narodna Odbrana has in Bosnia. From time to
time, Milan Pribicevic gave me a revolver, or money for the purchase
of a revolver, for me to give to the Customs officers on the frontier
who served as Komitadjis who had no revolver nor any money to buy
a revolver themselves. It appeared to me that Milan Pribicevic gave
them these things as an honour, just because they were Komitadjis.
I had nothing else to do with arms.

" On one occasion, during my service with Bozo Milanovic, I was
ordered to accompany a man to a peasant in Lijasnica on the Drina,
who would give us all necessary information and show us everything,
so that we two could kill Ljubo Stanaricic, a Serbian officer of Reserve,
who had fled to Bijeljina. For the Committee of the Narodna Odbrana
had learnt that Ljubo Stanaricic was dangerous to the Serbian State,
and had resolved that he should be put to death.

" That man and I received instructions from Bozo Milanovic to
go to a certain place across the Drina, and to kill Ljubo Stanaricic,
who lives just on the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side in the
district of Bijeljin. I and that man had descended into the Drina,
but because the water was deep, and we saw that Ljubo was walking
round his house with a gun on his shoulder, we returned to that pea-
sant's house. As I saw that we could not kill him with the knife, I
sent that man to Sabac to tell Bozo Milanovic that it was not possible
to kill Stanaricic in the manner he desired, namely, with the knife.
On this, I received orders from Bozo Milanovic that we should kill
him in any case. We then determined to shoot him with a gun.
According to Bozo's instructions, the man who was with me was to
shoot and kill him, and I was to confirm whether these instructions

228

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19, app. 61

were carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted gendarme
brought us instructions from the District Prefect of Sabac that we
were to return, and to abandon the original project. And so we
returned to Sabac. •

" In October, 1910, I demanded an increase of pay from Bozo
Milanovic, and, on his refusal, I left his service. From Sabac I went
to Belgrade, where I met General Jankovic, and he had me arrested
for refusing obedience. They took me through various prisons for
about two months, and all because I had refused to obey them, and
they feared I would betray their secrets. Finally, the authorities
decided to send me to Bosnia. In Sabac a prisoner told me that my
life was at stake. The gendarmes accompanied me to Zvornik, where
they handed me over to the Bosnian gendarmes. In this way I came
to Bosnia in December, 1910.

" I know nothing of any ' Black Hand,' with the exception of
what I have read of it in Serbian newspapers. I can't remember now
what was written in the newspapers about the ' Black Hand.' Nor
do I know anjrthing of the ' Black List.' After the annexation there
prevailed in Serbia universal anger and hatred against the person
of the Heir to the Austrian Throne, who was regarded as the sworn
enemy of the Serbians."

Beyond this, Krstanovic referred to his earlier statements, of which
only the following are of interest as supplementing the foregoing
testimony.

The Komitee into which Milan Pribicevic introduced Krstanovic
was set up by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school at Cuprija there
were 20 to 22 Austrian subjects. Milan Ciganovic was also one of the
pupils.

In the school at Cuprija it was inculcated that the Komitee must
be ready to proceed to Bosnia, on the command of the Narodna
Odbrana, and there act according to the orders of their commanders.

APPENDIX 6.

Extract from the Proceedings of the District Court of
Serajevo in the Prosecution of Jovo jAGLicid and others
ii-OR Espionage.

In the year 1913, it was discovered that Jovo Jaglicic and several
accomplices were carrjdng on espionage in Bosnia in the interests of
Serbia. The criminal proceedings instituted in the matter afforded
inter alia opportunities for obtaining an insight into the methods of
the Great-Serbian progaganda, and more especially of the Narodna
Odbrana.

229

:[R. 19, app. 6] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

Jovo Jaglicic made a statement that in the month of August or
September, 1912, he for the first time met Peter Klaric, knovra as
Pesut, formerly a cattle inspector in Foca, who had fled to Montenegro
in 1912 and then became a Komitadji.

At their first meeting Klaric asked Jaglicic whether he knew Rade
Milosevic of Kalinovik, and, on his answering, said that Milosevic was
l5dng very ill in hospital : "It would be a pity if he were to die, we
have spoken of great matters, has he never said anything to you about
them ? " On receiving a negative answer Klaric went on : "I had
something important to tell you, we are Serbians, and must do some-
thing important for Serbia. Come to my office." There the following
conversation ensued between them : —

" Jovan, I will tell you something ; I don't know you yet and
whether you will betray me. I teU you, nevertheless, and if you have
the heart, betray me ! "

On Jaglicic asking him what it was aU about, Klaric answered,
" Brother, in Serbia there is a society called the ' Narodna Odbrana.'
Many people must join this society ; many have been enrolled already
in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the whole Monarchy ; among
them are people of intelligence and means, long-headed people, and if
they can do it why should we not do it too, so that we too may help
a bit ? "

To the question, what was the object of this society, Klaric
answered : —

" The Society has this object : for instance, you are in Kalinovik ;
you let me know what the news is there, how many soldiers, how many
guns, how much ammunition, different arms, who comes, who leaves,
and so on. We have a secret writing, ' cipher,' and use it for corre-
spondence. If you are loyal, you will get it too."

Jaglicic was frightened that Klaric was merely sounding him for
the purpose of denouncing him, and therefore asked him to tell him
the names of some of the members, on which Klaric reflected for some
time and then told him a name, which gave him confidence.

Hereon Klaric said to him : " Shall I give you the ' cipher ' ? "
Jaglicic agreed. Klaric, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it out
on a slip and gave it to Jaglicic.

On another occasion Klaric gave an account of his stay at Banja-
Koviljaca (near Loznica) where he was instructed by the Serbian
captain Todorovic* in bomb-throwing, and when asked by the accused
why he learnt this he answered : "If anything such as I have spoken
of to you comes to pass, it is necessary that I should know how to

* Captain Kosta Todorovic was then in fact Boundary Commissioner
and Director of the Serbian Intelligence Service for the frontier line from
Raca to Ljuboija.

230

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R.19,app.7|

handle bombs, and that I should teach you and you should teach others,
so that powder magazines and other important objects should be
blown up, for in that case we should receive bombs from Serbia."

Klaric then described the appearance of the bombs, and said that
he had already enrolled people who, in case of war, would cut telegraph
and telephone wires.

At these meetings Jaghcic learnt from Klaric that it also apper-
tained to the duties of members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce
Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert, to enlist voltmteers (Komitadjis),
to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots, and so on. Klaric
also informed him that even cipher correspondence between Bosnian
and Serbian members would not be entrusted to the post, but des-
patched across the frontier by reliable messengers.

Klaric further told Jaglicic that on the occasion of the Prosvjeta
celebration (in September, 1912) a Serbian major had stayed in the
Hotel " Europe " with the Serbian deputation which was sent to it,*
that Klaric had taken members of the Narodna Odbrana to him, and
that he had sworn them in.

From a spy Jaglicic learnt that bombs would arrive in Serajevo,
or had already arrived, that these had the appearance of pieces of
soap.f and that two or three would either be sent to this spy or that
he would fetch them.

APPENDIX 7.
From Confidential Reports on the Narodna Odbrana.

The control of the Narodna Odbrana is in the hands of representa-
tives of all parties, so as to win over both the progressives and those
who are hostile to the conspirators. Its actual guiding spirit is
Pribicevic, now Major. The position of secretary is always filled by
an officer on leave.

The object of the Narodna Odbrana is to develop effective pro-
paganda in military and civiUan circles in the Southern-Slav portions
of Austria-Hungary, with the object of preparing for a revolution,
interference with any mobilisation that may take place, and the initia-
tion of panics, revolts, etc.

The organisation has many trusted representatives and emissaries
in the Monarchy, who carry on an unostentatious personal progaganda.

* The Serbian major, Mika Jankovic, appeared as a delegate at the
Prosvjeta celebration.

t The bombs used in the Serajevo attack on the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, as well as those found in the Save, near Brcko, in the year 1913,
which came from the Royal Serbian Arsenal at Kragujevac, can in fact be
compared with pieces of soap.

231

[R. 19,app.8] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

Some are sent specially — to enlist a few men — preferably railway
officials — in the neighbourhood of important bridges, junctions, etc.,
whose duty it is at the appropriate moment to carry out the directions
they have received, or to get them carried out.

Intercourse between the members of the Narodna Odbrana is,
so far as possible, effected by keeping in personal touch with each
other.

Young people, workmen and railwaymen chiefly are enrolled as
members.

APPENDIX 8.

Extract from the Records of the District Court of Bosnia
AND Herzegovina at Serajevo, touching the proceedings

THERE instituted AGAINST GaVRILO PrINCIP AND CONFEDERATES
ON ACCOUNT OF THE CRIME OF ASSASSINATION PERPETRATED ON

THE 28TH June, 1914, on His Imperial and Royal Highness
THE Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este and Her
Highness the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg.

I. The deed and the -perpetrators.

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, Trifko Grabez, Vaso Cubri-
lovic and Cetres Popovic confess that in common with the fugitive
Mehemed Mehmedbasic they contrived a plot for the murder of the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and, armed with bombs and in the case
of some of them with Browning pistols, laid w^it for him on the
28th June, 1914, on his progress through Serajevo for the purpose of
carrying out the planned attack.

Nedeljko Cabrinovic confesses that he was the first of the con-
spirators to hurl a bomb against the Archduke's carriage, which missed •
its mark and which on exploding injured only the occupants of the
carriage following the Archducal motor car.

Gavrilo Princip confesses that he fired two shots from a Browning
pistol against the Archducal motor car, by which the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand and the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg received fatal
■wounds.

Both perpetrators confess that the act was done with intent to
murder.

These confessions have been fully verified by means of the investi-
gations which have taken place, and it is established that the deceased
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the deceased Duchess Sophie of
Hohenberg died as a result of the revolver shots fired at them by
Gavrilo Princip.

232

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19, app. 8]

//. Origin of the plot.

The accused have made the following declarations, which are
essentially consistent, before the examining magistrate : —

In April, 1914, Princip, during his stay at Belgrade, where he
associated with a number of Serbian students in the cafes of the town,
conceived the plan for the execution of an attempt on the life of the
late Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He communicated this intention
to his acquaintance Cabrinovic, who also was in Belgrade at the time.
The latter had already conceived a similar idea and was ready at
once to participate in the attempt. The execution of an attempt on
the Archduke's hfe was^ a frequent topic of conversation in the circle
in which Princip and Cabrinovic moved, because the Archduke was
considered to be a dangerous enemy of the Serbian people.

Princip and Cabrinovic desired at first to procure the bombs and
weapons necessary for the execution of the deed from the Serbian
Major Milan Pribicevic or from the Narodna Odbrana, as they them-
selves did not possess the means for their purchase. As, however.
Major Pribicevic and the authoritative member of the said association,
Zivojin Dacic, were absent from Belgrade at that time, they decided
to try to obtain the weapons from their acquaintance Milan Ciganovic,
who had formerly been a Komitadji and was at that time in the
employment of the State railways.

Princip, through the instrumentality of an intimate friend of
Ciganovic, now got into communication with the latter. Thereupon
Ciganovic called on Princip and discussed the planned attempt with
him. He entirely approved it, and thereupon declared that he would
like to consider further whether he should provide the weapons for
the attempt. Cabrinovic also talked with Ciganovic on the subject
of the weapons.

At Easter Princip took Trifko Grabez, who also was in Belgrade,
into his confidence. The latter is also shown by his own confession to
have declared himself ready to take part in the attempt.

In the following weeks Princip had repeated conversations with
Ciganovic about the execution of the attempt.

Meanwhile Ciganovic had reached an understanding on the subject
of the planned attack with the Serbian Major Voja Tankosic, who was
a close friend of his and who then placed at his disposal for this object
the Browning pistols.

Grabez confesses in conformity with the depositions of Princip
and Cabrinovic that on the 24th May he, accompanied by Ciganovic,
visited Major Tankosic at the latter's request at his rooms. He says
that after he had been introduced Tankosic said to him : " Are you
the man ? Are you determined ? " Whereupon Grabez answered :

233

[R. 19, app. 8] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

" I am." Tankosic next asked : " Do you know how to shoot with a
revolver ? " and when Grabez answered in the negative Tankosic
said to Ciganovic : "I will give you a revolver, go and teach them
how to shoot. "^

Hereupon Ciganovic conducted Princip and Grabez to the military
rifle range at Topcider and instructed them in a wood adjoining the
range in shooting with a Browning pistol at a target. Princip proved
himself the better shot of the two. Ciganovic also familiarised Princip,
Grabez and Cabrinovic with the use of the bombs which were later
given to them.

On the 27th May, 1914, Ciganovic handed over to Princip, Cabri-
novic and Grabez, as their confessions agree in stating, six bombs,
four Browning revolvers and a sufficient quantity of ammunition as
well as a glass tube of cyanide of potassium with which to poison
themselves after the accomplishment of the deed in order that the
secret might be kept. Moreover, Ciganovic gave them some money.

Princip had previously informed Danilo Ilic, at Easter, of his plan
of assassination. He now begged the latter on his return to Serajevo
to enlist certain additional persons, in order to ensure the success of
the attempt.^ Hereupon Ilic according to his confession enlisted Jaso
Cubrilovic, Cetro Popovic and Mehemed Mehmedbasic in the plot.

///. Origin of the bombs.

Only one of the bombs was made use of in the execution of the
attempt. The remaining five bombs came later into the possession
of the police at Serajevo.

In the opinion of the judicial experts these bombs are Serbian
hand-grenades which were factory-made and intended for military
purposes. They are identical with the 21 bombs which were found in
the Save at Brcko in the year 1913 and which were partly in their
original packing, which proved without a doubt that they came from
the Serbian arsenal of Kragujevac.

It is thus proved that the grenades which were used in the attempt
against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand also came from the stores of
the Army Depot at Kragujevac.

Grabez quite spontaneously calls the grenades which were handed
over to him and his accomplices " Kragujevac bombs."

IV. Transport of the three assailants, and of the weapons frQtn Serbia

to Bosnia.

With regard to this Princip makes the following statement : —

Ciganovic told Cabrinovic, Grabez and Princip that they were to
make their way via Sabac and Loznica to Tuzla and there to betake
234

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R.19,app.8|

themselves to Misko Jovanovic who would take over the weapons.
Next they were to go to Sabac and report themselves to the frontier
captain, Major Rade Popovic, to whom he gave them a note, of which
Princip took charge. On the 28th May the three accomplices left
Belgrade with the weapons. At Sabac Princip handed over the note
which he had received from Ciganovic to Major Popovic, who there-
upon conducted all three to the orderly room and drew them up a pass
in which it was stated that one of them was an exciseman and the
other two his colleagues. The pass contained also the name of this
alleged exciseman, but he had forgotten the name. At the same time
Major Popovic handed over a closed letter for the frontier captain at
Loznica, whose name was Pravanovic, Prdanovic or Predojevic.

Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez passed the night at Sabac and went
by train the next morning to Loznica, with a half-price ticket, it may
be remarked, on the strength of the pass which Major Popovic had
drawn up for them. They reached Loznica at noon and delivered to
the frontier captain at that place Major Popovic's letter, in which were
the words : " See that you receive these people and bring them on
their way, you know where." The frontier captain said he would
summon his excisemen from the frontier and give the three into the
charge of the most reliable man. Thereupon he telephoned, and made
an appointment with the chree accomplices for 7 o'clock the next
morning in his oflSce.'

Next morning the three conspirators agreed that Cabrinovic should
take Grafeez's pass and make his way openly to Zvornik, but that
Princip and Grabez should cross the frontier secretly. This plan was
discussed with the frontier captain and it was decided that an excise-
man from Ljesnica called Grbic was to take Princip and Grabez with
him to his tower [karaula) and bring them over the frontier. Cabrinovic
accordingly walked to Banja Koviljaca in the direction of Zvornik.
Princip and Grabez drove with the exciseman Grbic to Ljesnica, where
they deposited the bombs and the revolver in a room in a hotel.
While they were doing so the exciseman Grbic caught sight of these
objects. Princip himself described this journey as mysterious.

Grabez's statement conformed in essentials with Princip's and was
supplemented by an addition to the effect that Grbic laughed when he
saw the bombs and the revolver and merely asked to what part of Bosnia
they were going with those bombs. The excisemen certainly thought
that Grabez and Princip were travelling on a mission.

Grbic and a second exciseman brought Princip and Grabez in a boat
to an island in the Drina. There Grbic instructed them to wait for a
peasant who would come to fetch them. They passed the night on
the island in a peasant's hut to which Grbic had directed them ; next
day came a peasant who conducted them during the night first through
a bog and then over the mountains to the neighbourhood of Priboj,

235

[R. 19, app. 8] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

where he handed them over to the local teacher Cubrilovic, who seemed
to have been already waiting for them, to see them further on their
way.

He took them on to Misko Jovanovic at Tuzla.

Cabrinovic's statement about the events of the journey up to the
point at which he parted with Princip and Grabez conformed in
essentials with those of the latter, and only added by way of supplement
that Major Popovic told them that he did not reach Sabac from
Belgrade till the day before their arrival.

In Loznica, Cabrinovic, Princip and Grabez decided to separate,
as it was too dangerous to go about all three together. The frontier
captain at Loznica, whom they informed of this, applauded their
plan and gave Cabrinovic^ a letter for M. Jaklojevic, the teacher at
Mali-Zvornik. Hereupon Cabrinovic handed over the bombs. Browning
pistol and ammunition which he had been carrjdng, to Princip and
Grabez, and went to Mali-Zvomik with an exciseman who had been told
off to accompany him.

There he found the teacher Jaklojevic, to whom he handed the
letter from the frontier captain of Loznica. Hereupon the former
notified the Serbian frontier guard. When Cabrinovic, with the teacher,
reached this frontier post, a man was already waiting there for them,
who brought them in a boat over the Drina to Gross-Zvornik in Bosnia.

Cabrinovic then proceeded to Misko Jovanovic at Tuzla.

Supplement,

Just before this memoir was closed, minutes of evidence were
published by the District Court at Serajevo from which it appears
that a subject of the Monarchy some days before the 28th June last
desired to make a report to the Imperial and Royal Consulate at
Belgrade to the effect that he suspected that a plan existed for the
execution of an attempt on the life of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
during his presence in Bosnia. It seems that the man was prevented
from making this report by members of the Belgrade police force,
who arrested him on trivial grounds just as he was about to enter
the Imperial and Royal Consulate. The conclusion to be drawn from
the statements contained in the evidence in question would seem
to be that the police officials concerned had knowledge of the planned
attempt, and only arrested this man in order to prevent him from
laying the information.

As these statements have not yet been verified, no opinion can
be expressed at the present stage on their reliability. In view of the
investigations into the matter now pending, the more minute details
of the evidence cannot be published more exactly at present.

236

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R.19,app.93

APPENDIX 9.

The Serbian Press on the Assassination.

(a) The Belgrade newspaper Balkan writes on the 29th June, with
regard to the two perpetrators : —

" Nedeljko Cabrinovic, a compositor by profession, was full of
anarchical ideas, and well known as a restless spirit. Until twenty-
days ago, he lived in Belgrade, whither he came after the war and
was employed in the State printing works. Before his departure he
announced that he was going to Trieste, where he would get work
in a new printing works. Gavrilo Princip also was living at Belgrade
until a short time ago. During the war he offered his services as a
volunteer, but was not accepted, and therefore he left Belgrade.
He returned, however, at Christmas last year to Belgrade, attended
the gymnasium for a time, and left Belgrade almost at the same time
as Cabrinovic, though in a different direction. Princip was a silent,
nervous, hard-working student, and associated with some fellow
students who canie, like himself, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well
as latterly with Cabrinovic. He inclined towards socialistic ideas,
although he had originally belonged to the Young Men Progressive
Party. Princip, like Cabrinovic, was brought up at Serajevo ; the
two have been bound by ties of the closest friendship since their
childhood."

(&) The Piemont, of the ist July, points out that Princip's pro-
test was a sequel to the public protest of the assassin Zerajic. The
explanation of the former's, as of the latter's activities, is to be found
in the system of government in Bosnia. The circumstance that
Princip executed the deed of vengeance on the national festival of
St. Vitus, the day which had been chosen for the manoeuvres, made
the desperate act of the young martjn: more intelligible and more
natural, (The newspaper was confiscated by the police on account
of this article ; the confiscation was, however, annulled the day
after by the Court of First Instance at Belgrade.)

(c) The Young Radical Odjek, of the 3rd July, says : — " The
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of
national enthusiasm in order to celebrate a brutal manifestation of
violence and domination. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal
feelings of resistance, hatred and revenge."

{d) The organ of the Nationalist Party, Srpska Zastava, of the
3rd July, says in an article entitled " Suspicions and Threats " : — •
" The assassination comes to be regarded more and more as the out-
come of the unsound state of affairs in the Monarchy. On the other

*37

0l.l9,app.9] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

hand, the savage persecution of the Serbian people in Bosnia and
Herzegovina evokes the horror of the whole civilised world."

(e) The Progressive newspaper, Pravda, of the 3rd July, writes : —
The policy of Vienna is a cynical one. It exploits the death of the
unfortunate couple for its abominable aims against the Serbian
people."

(/) The Agence des Balkans, of the 3rd July, says : — " The crimes
which have been perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina against
the Serbians have been carried out under the auspices and at the
direct instigation of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military
authorities."

ig) The Pravda, of the 4th July, says : — " All the murders and
assassinations which have been carried out up to the present time
in Austria have arisen from one and the same source. The oppressed
peoples of the Monarchy were obliged to have recourse to this method
of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos of
a reign of terror, it is natural and quite intelligible that the era of
assassinations should have firmly established itself."

{h) The Balkan, of the 5th July, remarks that Austria-Hungary
" must be placed under international control, because of its persecution
of the innocent " ; for Austria-Hungary has less cohesion than Turkey.

{i) The Mali Journal, of the 7th July, writes : — " A sprig of the
Middle Ages has been murdered at Serajevo within the last few days.
He has been murdered by a lad whose grief for the enslavement of
his immediate Fatherland {engeres Vaterland) amounted to a par-
oxysm, that grief which the robbers of the land of his fathers had
brought upon him. What has been the contribution of official Austria-
Hungary to this ? It has answered with general massacres, plunderings
and destruction of Serbian life and property. Only the worthless
distinguish themselves by such heroism. Cowards are always mighty
heroes when they are sure that nothing will happen to them. Only
compare Princip and Cabrinovic with these heroes, and you will at
once see the great difference between them. Civilisation and justice
are a huge lie in Austria-Hungary."

(/) The Tribuna, of the 7th July, says : — " We are of the opinion
that the Serajevo murder was arranged to facilitate the extermination
of the Serbians at one blow."

{k) The Piemont, of the 8th July, reports from Bajina Baschka
that the Austrian officials in Bosnia are preparing a massacre of the
Christians.

(/) The Balkan, of the 8th, publishes a report from Bosnia, under
the title " St. Bartholomew's Day at Serajevo," and pleads for a
general boycott against all the Austrians living in Serbia.

[m) The Mali Journal, of the 8th, appeals to its readers to boycott
the Danube Steamship Company.

238

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R.19,app.91

(«) Under the title " Nothing from Austria-Hungary ! " the
Tribuna, of the 8th, writes that it would be best to order nothing
from Austria-Hungary, to abstain from visiting the Austrian and
Hungarian Spas, and from calUng in doctors from Austria-Hungary.
It says that private initiative can accomplish a great deal in the direc-
tion suggested. The State and the Government offices must not mix
themselves up in this movement. It is enough to appeal to the citizens.

(0) The Stampa, of the 8th, asserts that the Serajevo police are
exposing the arrested assassins to the most inhuman and brutal torture
in order to extort from them untrue confessions on which it is intended
to base complaints against the Serbian people.

[p) The Agence des Balkans, of the gth, reports from Belgrade :
— " Absolutely trustworthy private reports announce that a general
massacre of Serbians is on the point of breaking out in Bosnia and
Herzegovina."

{q) The Balkan, of the gth July, taking as its text Mr. Asquith's
statement on the announcement of the news of the death of Arch-
duke Franz Ferdinand, that he was full of anxiety for the fate of
humanity,* publishes a historical survey of the events of the last 40
years, from which it deduces that the Serbian people during this
period have been exposed to the cruel persecutions of Austria-Hungary's
Jesuitical policy. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, like all the sons of
Loyola, who only work in human blood, and who do homage to the
principle, " The end justifies the means," was bound to be overtaken
by fate and to fall a victim to Jesuitism, as the whole of Austria-
Hungary will also fall. . But by the downfall of Austria-Hungary,
peace and tranquillity would ensue to mankind. The sum of all these
truths emerges in the conclusion that Asquith might with a calm mind
have accompanied the news of the murder with the words, " I am
no longer anxious for the fate of humanity."

[r) The Politika, of the gth July, expresses itself in a leading
article under the heading, " Shameless Lies," as follows : — " The
manner in which the inquiries into the Serajevo murder are being
carried on shows quite clearly what objects Austria is aiming at in
those inquiries. When the assassins, regardless of all the tortures to
which they were exposed, refused to say what was demanded of them,
other individuals were unearthed who expressed themselves ready on
certain conditions to confess a certain degree of complicity in the
murder, but at the same time to implicate aU those persons who were
objectionable to Austria. This method has succeeded for the moment

* "We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes
which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind."

Mr. Asquith's Speech, Times, July i, 1914. [Note added in official
English translation.]

239

[R. 19, app. 9] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

because the hired individuals state whatever they are asked to
state, and the Austrian police take care that these lies are at once
spread to all the points of the compass. Austria has no sense of
shame, and thinks that somebody will be found to believe lies of
this sort."

(s) The Stampa, of the 9th, says that not everything which has
happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been revealed and
attained publicity. Strict secrecy is being maintained. But the truth
will sooner or later come to the surface ; blood-thirsty Austria will
drink, nay, is drinking, Serbian blood, till she can drink no more. It
is reported that there are to-day about ten thousand wounded and
dead in Bosnia.

[t) The Politika, of the loth July, hurls extravagant abuse against
the members of the Imperial House.

(m) The Commercial journal, Trgovinski Glasnik, of the loth
July, talks about the corruption and unscrupulousness of the Austro-
Hungarian policy, which it calls Jesuitical, reckless and dishonour-
able. It is a warning to the Serbian people in Austria-Hungary that
they are not living in a civilised State which guarantees life and
property, but that they must hold themselves armed and ever ready
to defend themselves against the robbery of the officials and the
Government. After the latest occurrences, the Serbian people ought
no longer to wait like a lamb, which any day might be led to the
slaughter, but like a lion ready for a bloody resistance.

[v) In the Stampa, of the loth July, we find : — " Nothing lasts
for ever, nor will Austria-Hungary remain for ever in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The time is not far off when the Serbians who broke
the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will circle round
the Ivan Planina on the Trebevic."

{w) The Pravda, of the loth July, under the title " Boycott
against Good-for-nothings," appeals for a boycott of Austrian firms
in Belgrade, as well as of Austrian wares, and says that it is the duty
of the Narodna Odbrana to see that the boycott is strictly carried
out.

(x) The Zvono; of the i6th July, declares Princip to be the son
of Countess Lonyay, to whom the charge was given that he should
avenge the death of Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer. Arch-
duke Franz Ferdinand.

(y) The Mali Journal, of the 19th July, publishes a report
which says : — " Princip was instigated to make the attempt by an
Austro-Hungarian agent. It is said in Vienna that it is only in the
Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade that the real culprit is to be
found."

(2) The leading Young Radical organ, Odjek, of the 20th July,
writes : — " Austria-Hungary offers a hundred proofs that it will

240

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19, app. 10]

inherit the title of the ' sick man ' of Europe. While in Serbia not
a single Austrian citizen has been molested, villages and towns have
been plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact is one more
proof on how much higher a cultural and moral level Serbia stands
than Austria-Hungary."

APPENDIX 10.
The Local Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, on the

SUBJECT OF THE CRIME AGAINST THE ArCHDUKE FrANZ

Ferdinand.

A confidential communication has come to the ears of the Imperial
and Royal Foreign Office from a reliable correspondent, whose name
will be published at the proper time, according to which the Local
Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, recently held a
meeting at which the president of this Committee, Jasa Nenadovic,
director of the Nish prison, touched on the subject of the assassination
of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, using the following words : " Serbia
was absolutely bound this time to have recourse to a measure like the
assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, because the Archduke,
on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a prominent
and deadly danger for Serbia, and possibly for wider Slavonic circles
also. Had he remained alive, he would have soon challenged Serbia
to war or attacked it, in which case Serbia, which was now so much
weakened materially, and had not yet completed her army re-organisa-
tion, would certainly have been lost. But now Serbia had been rescued
by the Serajevo murder, and one of the dangers which threatened
Serbia in the person of the victim had been swept out of the way.
Serbia would now have rest for several years, as the new heir to
the throne would consider well before walking in the steps of his
predecessor.

"Though he was aware," continued the speaker, "that the murder
of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand would be a heavy blow and a great
grief to Austria-Hungary, and that it would be followed by the torture
of those of our nation who were living in that country, yet he would
not have thought that his suppositions would have been so completely
fulfilled, and that the Croatians would have behaved as they had.
Yet his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that
the Austro-Hungarian officials were cowards and would not dare
to overstep the mark in the measures they took ; unfortunately
however, these friends, and through them, we too had been disap-
pointed. If things went on much longer as they were going at present,
revolvers and bombs would at last have to play their real i61e.

ii-Q 241

[R. I9.app. 11] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

Whatever the God of Serbia has in store, things cannot go on as at
present."

The remarks of the speaker were received with complete approval
by his hearers.

APPENDIX II.
Supplements after going to Press.

I. — To Appendix 8.

The teacher, Cubrilovic, who undertook the guidance of Princip
and Grabez at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which
the following important facts emerge : —

In the year 1911, Cubrilovic, on the occasion of a Sokol expedition
to Sabac, was initiated by Bozo Fovic, a member of the managing
committee of the Narodna Odbrana, into the objects of that
association, and was then appointed representative of the Narodna
Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). At his invitation, Misko Jovanovic
was later nominated representative of the Narodna Odbrana for
Tuzla.

A peasant acted as go-between in the communications with the
Narodna Odbrana, in fact, the same peasant who brought Princip
and Grabez to Cubrilovic, with the information that he was bringing
two Serbian students with weapons to him. When he learned this,
he knew that it was a " mission " from the Narodna Odbrana. Princip
and Grabez told him that they had bombs and revolvers with them,
with a view to making an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand.

2. — Pictures in the Belgrade War Office of a nature hostile to the

Monarchy.

There are four allegorical pictures on the wall outside the reception
hall of the Royal Serbian War Office, of which three are representations
of Serbian victories, while the fourth symbolises the realisation of the
anti-Monarchial tendencies of Serbia.

Over a landscape, partly mountains (Bosnia) , partly plains (South
Hungary), rises the " Zora," the rosy dawn of Serbian hopes. In the
foreground stands a woman in armour, whose shield bears the names
of all the " provinces still awaiting liberation " : Bosnia, Herze-
govina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c.

242

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 21]

No. 20.

Count Berchiold to the Under Secretary, Freiherr von Macchio

at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) Lambach, July 25, 1914.

RUSSIAN Charge d' Affaires telegraphs to me"' that he "'[0. 11.
has received urgent instructions from his Government to 12.I

press for a prolongation of time-limit fixed for the ultimatum
to Serbia. I request Your Excellency to reply to him in
my name that we cannot consent to a prolongation of time-
limit."" Your Excellency will add, that Serbia, even after ""[c/. No.
breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly 9-1

solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although
we shall be obliged in such an event to demand reimburse-
ment by Serbia of all costs and damage incurred by us through
our mihtary measures. "* '" [c/. No.

17-1
No. 21.

Count Berchiold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) Bad Ischl, July 25, 1914.

FOR Your Excellency's information and guidance : —

The Russian Charge d' Affaires called this morning on the
Under Secretary, '*' in order to express in the name of his w fcf. O.
Government the wish that the time-limit fixed in our note 11.]

to Serbia might be prolonged.

This request was based on the grounds that the Powers
had been taken by surprise by our move, and that the Russian
Government would regard it merely as natural consideration
for the other Cabinets, on the part of the Vienna Cabinet, if
an opportunity were given to the former to examine the
data on which our communication to the Powers was based
and to study our prospective dossier."' '^'[No. ig.J

The Under Secretary replied to the Charge d' Affaires
that he would immediately bring his explanation to my
knowledge ; but that he could tell him at once that there
was no prospect of a prolongation of the time-limit fixed
being granted by us. As to the grounds which the Russian
Government had advanced in support of the wish they had

243

ER. 22] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

expressed, they appeared to rest upon a mistaken h37pothesis.
Our note to the Powers was in no way intended to invite
them to make known their own views on the subject, but
merely bore the character of a statement for information,
the communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on
us by international courtesy. For the rest, we regarded our
action as a matter concerning us and Serbia alone, which
action, notwithstanding the patience and longsuffering we
had exhibited for years past, we had been forced by the
development of circumstances to take, much against our own
wish, for the defence of our most vital interests.

No. 22.
Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

CABINET Council met yesterday evening and early this
morning ; form of answer to our note was settled after
several drafts, and is to be delivered to me before the time-
limit expires. I hear that Royal train is being made up ;
gold belonging to the National Bank and to the railway, as
well as the Foreign Office records, are being taken into the
interior of the country. Some of my colleagues are of the
opinion that they must follow the Government ; packing-up
is proceeding at the Russian Legation in particular.

Garrison has left town in field order. Ammunition

depots in the fortress were evacuated. Railway station

thronged with soldiers. The ambulance trains have left

Belgrade, proceeding towards the south. In pursuance of

the instructions which have reached me while I write, we

intend, in the event of a rupture, to leave Belgrade by the

"'[c/. No 6.30 train."'
24;B.23.j

No. 23.

,2, r^gg fQQ^_ Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

note, p. (Telegraphic.) Semlin, July 25, 1914.

c/. G. 5 J ORDERS for general mobilisation were issued in Serbia
S.41.] at 3 p.m."'
244

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [H. 26]

No. 24.

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Semlin, July 25, 1914.

AS a result of the Royal Serbian Government's unsatis-
factory answer to our demands of the 23rd inst., I have
announced"' that diplomatic relations are broken off with (i)[S. 40.]
Serbia, and have left Belgrade'"' with the staff of the Legation, w^^f^ j^tq.
The reply was delivered to me at two minutes to six p.m."' 22 ; B.

23.]

No. 25. -"/*

5.45,,

Note of the Royal Serbian Government of 12/25 J^ly> ^9^A-

[See No. 34, enclosure, p. 254, et seq.]

No. 26.
Count Berchtold to Count Szapdry at St. Petersburg.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

WE were, of course, aware, when we decided to take
serious measures against Serbia, of the possibility that the
Serbian dispute might develop into a coUision with Russia.'*' (4(1-^/ ^^
We could not, however, allow ourselves to be diverted by p. 125 i'
this eventuality from the position we took up towards Serbia, also S. 36 •
because fundamental considerations of national policy brought O- ^o.J
us face to face with the necessity of putting an end to the
state of affairs in which a Russian charter made it possible
for Serbia to threaten the Monarchy continuously without
punishment and without the possibility of punishment.

Should events prove that Russia considered the moment
for the great settlement with the central European Powers
to have already arrived, and was therefore determined on
war from the beginning, the following instructions to your
Excellency appear indeed superfluous.

245

[R. 26] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

It might, however, be conceivable that Russia, in the
event of the refusal of our demands by Serbia, and in face
of the resulting necessity for us of military measures, might
think better of it, and might even be willing not to allow
herself to be swept away by the bellicose elements. It is to
meet this situation that the following explanations have been
drawn up, which your Excellency -will use with M. Sazonof
and the President of the Council, at the right moment, in the
manner which you think best, and when the opportunity, in
your opinion, presents itself.

I assume, generally, that your Excellency in the existing

circumstances, has established a close understanding with

your German colleague, who will certainly have been enjoined

by his Government to leave the Russian Government no

room for doubt that Austria-Hungary, in the event of a

'"[c/. No. conflict with Russia, would not stand alone.'"

12 and I am under no illusion that it will be easy to make M.

note.] Sazonof understand the step taken by us at Belgrade, which

had become inevitable.

There is, however, one factor which cannot fail to impress
the Russian Foreign Minister, and that is the emphasising
of the circumstance that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,
in conformity with the principle to which it has adhered
for decades past, is actuated in the present crisis by no selfish
motives in appealing to arms in order to reach a settlement
of her differences with Serbia.

The Monarchy possesses territory to repletion and has no
desire for Serbian possessions. If a conflict with Serbia is
forced upon us, it will be for us not a conflict for territorial
gain, but merely a means of self-defence and self-preservation.
'"'[No. 8.J The contents of the circular note,"" which in itself is
sufficiently eloquent, are placed in their proper light by the
*''[No. 19.] dossier"' relating to the Serbian propaganda against the
Monarchy, and the various points of connection between
this propaganda and the crime of June 28th.

Your Excellency will draw the Russian Minister's very
particular attention to this dossier and impress upon him
that it is an unique event in history that a Great Power
should have borne with the seditious intrigues of an adjoining
small State for so long a time and with such unparalleled
patience as Austria-Hungary has borne with those of Serbia.

246

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 26]

We had no wish to pursue a poUcy adverse to the ambitions
of the Christian Balkan States, and we have therefore —
notwithstanding that we well knew how little value was to
be attached to Serbian promises — suffered Serbia to increase
her territory after the annexation crisis of 1908 to nearly
double its former extent.

Since that time the subversive movement which has been
fostered in Serbia against the Monarchy has assumed such
excessive proportions that the vital interests of Austria-
Hungary, and even of our Dynasty itself, appear to be
threatened by the revolutionary activities of Serbia.

We must assume that to conservative loyal Russia energetic
measures on our part against this menace to all public order
will appear intelligible and indeed necessary.

When Your Excellency reaches this point in your conver-
sation with M. Sazonof, the moment will have arrived to add
to your explanation of our motives and intentions the hint
that we — as your Excellency will have already been in a
position to explain — aim at no territorial gains, and also did
not wish to infringe the sovereignty of the Kingdom, but
that, on the other hand, we will proceed to extreme measures
for the enforcement of our demands.

That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to
preserve the peace which we considered to be the most
precious possession of nations, was shown by the course of
events during the last 40 years, and by the historical fact
that our gracious Emperor has won for himself the glorious
title of " Protector of the Peace."

We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturb-
ance of the European peace, because we also were of the
opinion that the strengthening of the Balkan States in a,
position of political and national independence would prove
to the advantage of our relations with Russia, and would
also remove all possibility of antagonism between us and
Russia ; also because we have always been ready, in the
shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the
dominant political interests of Russia.

Any further toleration of Serbian intrigues would under-
mine our existence as a State and our position as a Great
Power, thus also threatening the balance of power in Europe.
We are, however, convinced that it is to Russia's own interests,

247

[R. 27] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25,

asj.her peaceful leaders will clearly see, that the existing
European balance of power which is of such importance for
the peace of the world, should be maintained. Our action
against Serbia, whatever form it takes, is conservative from
first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our
position in Europe.

No. 27.

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at Si. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914.

"I [See B. 4, AS point 5 of our demands,"' namely, the participation
voL I., of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government
p. 84. jin the suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia has
^i • iso g^^^^ ^^s^ ^^ special objection on the part of M. Sazonof,
No! 34 yo^r Excellency will explain in strict confidence with regard
(end.), to this point that this clause was interpolated merely out of
pp. 262- practical considerations, and was in no way intended to
263.] infringe on the sovereignty of Serbia.

By " collaboration " in point 5, we are thinking of the
establishment of a private " Bureau de Surete " at Belgrade,
which would operate in the same way as the analogous
Russian establishments in Paris and in co-operation with the
Serbian police and administration.

No. 28. ; ■

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.

I"! [See W. AS the result of reports'" about measures taken for
exhs. 6, 7.] mobihsation of Russian troops. Count Pourtales has called
the Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner
to the fact that nowadays measures of mobilisation would
be a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure. For, in
that event, the purely military consideration of the question
248

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 28]

by the general staffs would find expression, and if that
button were once touched in Germany, the situation would
get out of control.'" "'[c/- No.

M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word 4o-J

of honour that the reports on the subject were incorrect ;
that up to that time not a single horse and not a single
reservist had been called up, and that all the measures that
were being taken were merely measures of preparation in the
military districts of Kieff, Odessa, and perhaps Kasan and
Moscow.™ '"'[MobiU-

Immediately afterwards the Imperial German MiUtary sation in
Attach^ received by courier late in the evening an invitation these
from Suchomlinof, the Minister for War, who explained that g l"fif j
Count Pourtales had spoken with the Foreign Minister about
the Russian military preparations, and as the Ambassador
might have misunderstood certain military details, he was
taking the opportunity of giving him more detailed informa-
tion. In the following telegram from Count Pourtales to
Berlin which has been placed at my disposal, the pertinent
communications from Major von Eggeling are collected :

" The Military Attache reports with regard to a conversa-
tion with the Russian Minister of War.'" M. Sazonof had (3i[c/. w.
asked him to make the military position clear to me. The exh. ii ;
Minister for War gave me his word of honour that as yet ^^o Nos.
no orders for mobilisation of any kind had been issued. For 33. 42j
the present merely preparatory measures would be taken,
not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If
Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, the military districts
of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, which face Austria,
would be mobilised. In no circumstances will mobilisation
take place on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, and St.
Petersburg. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. My
question what was the object of the mobilisation against
Austria, was met with a shrug of the shoulders and a reference
to the diplomatists. I gave the Minister for War to under-
stand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by
us, but that we should also consider mobilisation against
Austria to be in itself extremely threatening. The Minister
emphasised repeatedly, and with great stress Russia's urgent
need of and earnest wish for peace."

249

[R. 29] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 26,

No, 29.
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

HERR VON TSCHIRSCHKY informed me to-day in
pursuance of his instructions that, according to a telegram
from Prince Lichnowsky which had been despatched in
London on the 25th of July at 3 p.m., Sir E, Grey had trans-
mitted to the latter the sketch of an answer from Serbia,
and had remarked in the private letter accompanying it, that
he hoped that the Berlin Cabinet in view of the conciliatory
tenor of this answer would support its acceptance in Vienna.

I consider it desirable that your Excellency should again
approach the matter with the Secretary of State, and call
his attention to the fact that almost simultaneously with the
transmission by him of this letter to Prince Lichnowsky,
namely at 3 p.m. yesterday, Serbia had already ordered the
'"[No. 23.] general mobilisation of her army,'" which proves that no
inclination for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade. It
was not till six o'clock, after mobilisation had been pro-
claimed, that the answer, which had apparently been pre-
viously telegraphed to London and the contents of which
were not reconcilable with our demands, was delivered to
the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade.

No. 30.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at
Berlin,' Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

WE have broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia after
ro , she had refused the demands we had addressed to her."" I
*" ' ^° beg your Excellency now to proceed at once to the Foreign
Minister or his deputy, and to express yourself to him approxi-
mately to the following effect :

The Royal Serbian Government have refused to accept
the demands which we were forced to address to them in
order to secure permanently our most vital interests which
250

(2)

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 811

were menaced by them, and have thereby made it clear that
they do not intend to abandon their subversive aims, tending
towards continuous disorder in some of our frontier provinces
and their final disruption from the Monarchy.

Reluctantly, therefore, and very much against our wish,
we find ourselves obliged to compel Serbia by the sharpest
measures to make a fundamental change in the attitude of
enmity she has up to now pursued.

No. 31.

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

JUST had a long conversation with M. Sazonof.'" Told ("[c/. O.
the Minister I was under the impression that mistaken ideas 25 (dated
were prevalent in Russia with regard to the character of our July26).l
action. We were credited with wishing to push forward into
Balkan territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even
to Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe
our action merely as the starting point of a preventive war
against Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that
parts of it were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our
action was self-preservation and self-defence against hostile
propaganda by word, in writing, and in action, which
threatened our integrity. It would occur to no one in Austria-
Hungary to threaten Russian interests, or indeed to pick a
quarrel with Russia. And yet we were absolutely determined
to reach the goal which we had set before us, and the path
which we had chosen seemed to us the most suitable. As,
however, the action under discussion was action in self-
defence, I could not conceal from him that we could not
allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences,
of whatever kind they might be.

M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described
it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered
that the path which we were pursuing with a view to attain-
ing it was not the surest. He said that the note which we
had delivered was not happy in its form. He had since been

25X

tR. 32] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 27,

studying it, and if I had time, he would like to look it through

once more with me. I remarked that I was at his service,

but was not authorised either to discuss the text of the note

with him or to interpret it. Of course, however, his remarks

were of interest. The Minister then took all the points of

the note in order, and on this occasion found seven of the

ten points admissible without very great difficulty ; only the

two points dealing with the collaboration of the Imperial and

Royal Officials in Serbia and the point dealing with the

•"[See foot- removal of officers and civil servants'" to be designated by us

note to seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form.

No. 34, With regard to the first two points, I was in a position to

pp. 260-1.] g^^g g^j^ authentic interpretation in the sense of your

<'"[No. 27.] Excellency's telegram of the 25th. instant ;'"' with regard to

the third, I expressed the opinion that it was a necessary

demand. Moreover, matters had already been set in motion.

<''[They The Serbians had mobilised on the previous day'** and I did

issued not know what had happened since then.

orders for

mobilisa-

*^0" XT

on July No. 32.

25 ; see

No. 23.] Count BercMold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I EMPOWER your Excellency to declare to M. Sazonof
that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia
remains locahsed, the Monarchy does not aim in any way

'*' [cf. B. 90 at territorial acquisitions of any sort. '^'

and note.]

No. 33.
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914.

M. SAZONOF explained to the German Ambassador that

(5)

28' ^?' ^^ ^°"^^ " guarantee " to him " that on the Russian side no
w! exh! mobilisation had been begun ; though it was true that certain
II.] necessary military precautions were being taken."'"

252

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK IR. 34J

The German military attache at St. Petersburg reports'" "'[5ee No.
that " the Russian Minister of War has given him his word ^^-^
of honour that not a man or a horse has been mobUised ;
however, naturally, certain military precautions have been
taken " ; precautions which, as the German military attache
adds, apparently spontaneously, to his report, " are to be
sure pretty far-reaching."

No. 34.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in
Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

ANNEXED you will find the text, annotated with our
remarks, of the note which the Royal Serbian Government
on the 25th of June transmitted to the Imperial and Royal
Minister at Belgrade.

{See next page.)

253

[R. 34] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 27,

Enclosure.*

Reply of the Royal Serbian Government to the Imperial and
Royal Government of the 12/25 J^^JV. 1914-

<i>[For the TRANSLATION. Q

FiMich THE Royal Serbian Government have received the

text see communication''" of the Imperial and Royal Government of

B. 39.] the loth instant, t and are convinced that their reply will

"TB 4 1 remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair

the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian

Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made
both from the tribune of the national SkupshtinaJ and in
the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives
of the State — protests which were cut short by the declarations
made by the Serbian Government on the i8th t March, 1909
— ^have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the
great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has
been made since that time, either by the successive Royal
Governments or by their agents, to change the political and
legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this
connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made
no representation except one concerning a school book, and
that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government
received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has
several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy
during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to
the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of
European peace that that peace has been preserved.

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for mani-
festations of a private character, such as articles in the press
and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which take
place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events,

* [cf. the same document in W. (p. 140), where the English translation
is made by the German authorities.]
t Old style,
j The Serbian Parliament.

254

I9I4]

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

[R. 84]

Enclosure.

Remarks.

(II

Italian
comment,
B. 64.]

THE Royal Serbian Government confine themselves to
asserting that, since the declarations on the i8th March, 1909,
no attempt has been made by the Serbian Government and
their agents to change the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby they deliberately and arbitrarily shift the ground
on which our d-marche was based, as we did not maintain that
they and their agents have taken any official action in this
direction.

Our charge, on the contrary, is to the effect that the
Serbian Government, notwithstanding the obligations under-
taken in the above-quoted note, have neglected to suppress
the movement directed against the territorial integrity of
the Monarchy.

Their obligation, that is to say, was that they should
change the whole direction of their policy and adopt a friendly
and neighbourly attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, and not merely that they should refrain from
officially attacking the incorporation of Bosnia in the Monarchy.

The proposition of the Royal Serbian Government that
utterances in the press and the activities of societies are of a
private character and are not subject to of&cial control is
absolutely antagonistic to the institutions of modern States,
even those which have the most Hberal law with regard to
press and associations ; this law has a public character and
subjects the press, as well as associations, to State control.
Moreover, Serbian institutions themselves contemplate some

255

[R. 34] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 27,

Translation,
and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal
Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact
that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which
arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof
of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling
the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two
neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained
and surprised at the statements, according to which members
of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated
in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo ;
the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate
in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they
were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their
attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning
whom representations were made to them.

Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and
Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial
any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank,
of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are
forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to
be published on the first page of the Journal officiel, on the
date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration : —

" The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propa-
ganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary — ^i.e.,
the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it,
and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these
criminal proceedings.

" The Royal Government regret that, according to the com-
munication from the Imperial and Royal Government,
certain Serbian officers and functionaries participated in the
256

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 34]

Remarks.
such control. The complaint against the Serbian Govern-
ment is in fact that they have entirely omitted to control their
press and their associations, of whose activities in a sense
hostile to the Monarchy they were well aware.

This proposition is incorrect ; the Serbian Government
were accurately informed of the suspicions v/hich were enter-
tained against quite definite persons and were not only in a
position but also bound by their internal laws to initiate
spontaneous enquiries. They have done nothing in this
direction.

Our demand ran : —

" The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propa-
ganda directed against Austria-Hungary. ..."

The alteration made by the Royal Serbian Government
in the declaration demanded by us implies that no such
propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary exists, or that
they are cognisant of no such propaganda. This formula is
insincere and disingenuous, as by it the Serbian Government
reserve for themselves for later use the evasion that they had
not by this declaration disavowed the then existing propa-
ganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the
Monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they
had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to
that now being carried on.

The wording demanded by us ran : —
" The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and
functionaries . . . participated. ..."

II— R 257

LR. 34] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 27

Translation.

above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the
good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Serbian

'^'[SeeB. 4, Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration'" of the

vol. I., p. 31st March, 1909.*

"The Government, &c " (identical with the text as

demanded) .

The Royal Government further undertake : —
I. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the
Skupshtinaf a provision into the press law providing for
the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and
contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking
action against any publication the general tendency of which
is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.
The Government engage at the approaching revision of the
Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into
article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such
publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present
impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the
Constitution.

* New style. | The Serbian Parliament.

258

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 34]

Remarks.

By the adoption of this wording with the addition " accord-
ing to the communication from the Imperial and Royal
Government " the Serbian Government are pursuing the
object that has already been referred to above, namely, that
of preserving a free hand for the future.

We had demanded of them : —

I. "To suppress any publication which incites to hatred
and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the
general tendency of which is directed against the territorial
integrity of the Monarchy."

We wished therefore to ensure that Serbia should be
obliged to see to it that press attacks of that nature should
be discontinued in future ; we wished therefore to know that
a definite result in this connection was assured.

Instead of this Serbia offers us the enactment of certain
laws which would be calculated to serve as means towards
this residt, viz. : —

{a) A law under which the press publications in question
which are hostile to the Monarchy are to be punished on
their merits {subjectiv) a matter which is of complete indiffer-
ence to us, all the more as it is well known that the prosecution
of press offences on their merits {subjectiv) is only very rarely
possible, and, if any law of the sort is laxly administered, even
in the few cases of this nature a conviction would not be
obtained ; this, therefore, is a proposal which in no way meets
our demand as it does not offer us the slightest guarantee for
the result which we wish to obtain.

(&) A law supplementary to Article 22 of the constitution
which would permit confiscation — a proposal which is equally
imsatisfactory to us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia
is of no use to us, but only the obligation of the Government
to apply it ; this, however, is not promised us.

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory — all
the more so as they are evasive in that we are not told within
what period of time these laws would be enacted, and that in
the event of the rejection of the Bills by the Skupshtina —
apart from the possible resignation of the Government —
everything would be as it was before.

«59

[R. 34] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 27,

Translation.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note
of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with
any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies
have committed up to the present any criminal act of this
nature through the proceedings of any of their members.
Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand
of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the
Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which
may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to eliminate
without delay from public instruction in Serbia everything
that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against
Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the
military service* all such persons as the judicial enquiry may
have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity

* [The German version in the Austro-Hungarian Red-book reads " aus
and civil services" — and this reading is copied in the German White-book
for the insertion of the words " and civil " in the Serbian reply — see B. 39,

see B. 4,

260

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 34]

Remarks.

The whole of the pubHc hfe of Serbia teems with the
propaganda against the Monarchy, of the Narodna Odbrana
and of societies affiliated to it ; it is therefore quite impossible
to admit the reservation made by the Serbian Government
when they say that they know nothing about them.

Quite apart from this the demand we have made is not
entirely complied with, as we further required : —

That the means of propaganda possessed by these associa-
tions should be confiscated.

That the re-establishment of the dissolved associations
under another name and in another form should be prevented.

The Belgrade Cabinet maintains complete silence in both
these directions, so that the half consent which has been given
us offers no guarantee that it is contemplated to put a definite
end to the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy,
especially of the Narodna Odbrana, by their dissolution.

In this case also the Serbian Government first ask for
proofs that propaganda against the Monarchy is fomented
in public educational establishments in Serbia, when they
must know that the school books which have been introduced
into the Serbian schools contain matter of an objectionable
nature in this respect, and that a large proportion of the
Serbian teachers are enrolled in the ranks of the Narodna
Odbrana and the societies affiliated with it.

Moreover, here, too, the Serbian Government have not
complied with a portion of our demand as fully as we required,
inasmuch as in their text they have omitted the addition
which we desired " both as regards the teaching body and also
as regards the methods of instruction " — an addition which
quite clearly shows in what directions the propaganda against
the Monarchy in the Serbian schools is to be looked for.

Inasmuch as the Royal Serbian Government attach to
their consent to the removal of the officers and functionaries
in question from military and civil service* the condition that

dem Militar- und Zivildienste zu entlassen" — "to remove from the military
(p. 145) — see also R. 31. But the French text appears to give no warrant
vol. I., p.114 — although they were included in the Austrian demand —
vol. I., p. 77.]

261

(1)

p. 341 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 27,

Translation.

of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they
expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate
to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers
and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which
are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not
clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made
by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall

[See No, undertake to accept the collaboration '" of the representatives

27.3 of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory,

but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as

agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal

procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government
consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such
persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of
the 15th* June, and who happen to be within the territory
of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry
of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this
purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal
Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would
be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal
procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases {"dans des cas con-
crets " communications as to the results of the investigation in
question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

* Old style.
262

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [«• 34]'

Remarks.

these persons should have been convicted by judicial enquiry,
their consent is confined to those cases in which these persons
are charged with a crime punishable by law. As we, how-
ever, demand the removal of those officers and functionaries
who foment propaganda agkinst the Monarchy, a proceeding
which is not generally punishable by law in Serbia, it appears
that our demand under this head also is not complied with.

International Law has just as little to do with this question
as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State
police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement.
Serbia's reservation is therefore unintelligible, and would be
calculated, owing to the vague general form in which it is
couched, to lead to unsurmountable difficulties when the,
time comes for concluding the prospective agreement.

Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of mis-
representation. "' We desired : — '" [of- No.

(i) The opening of a judicial enquiry {enqu&te judiciaire) ^-3
against accessories to the plot.

(2) The collaboration"' of representatives of the Imperial
and Royal Government in the investigations relating thereto
(" recherches " as opposed to " enquHe judiciaire ").

It never occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial
and Royal Government should take part in the Serbian judicial
proceedings ; it was intended that they should collaborate
only in the preliminary police investigations, directed to the
collection and verification of the material for the enquiry.

If the Serbian Government misunderstand us on this point
they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between
" enquHe judiciaire " and simple " recherches " must be
familiar to them.

In desiring to be exempted from all control in the proceedings
which are to be initiated,which if properly carried through would
have results of a very undesirable kind for themselves, and in
view of the fact that they have no handle for a plausible
refusal of the collaboration of our representatives in the pre-
liminary police investigations (numberless precedents exist for
such police intervention) , they have adopted a standpoint which

263

IR. 34] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 27.

Translation.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening
of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja
Tankosic. As regards Milan Ziganovic, who is a subject of
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th*
June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of rail-
ways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be
so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary
form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual
proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present,
at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the
measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit
traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes
without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry
and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-
Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the
authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of
the remarks made by their officials whether in Serbia or
abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the
statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were
hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and
Royal Government have communicated to them the passages
in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown
that the remarks were actually made by the said officials,
although the Royal Government will themselves take steps
to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and
Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised
under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been
done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been
ordered and carried out.

• Old style.

1914I AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [S, 34]

Remarks.

is intended to invest their refusal with an appearance of justifica-
tion and to impress on our demand the stamp of impracticability.

This answer is disingenuous.

The enquiries set on foot by us show that three days after
the crime, when it became known that Ciganovie was im-
plicated in the plot, he went on leave and travelled to Ribari
on a commission from the Prefecture of Police at Belgrade.
It is, therefore, in the first place incorrect to say that Ciganovic
had left the Serbian State Service on the 25th/28th June.
To this must be added the fact that the Prefect of Police at
Belgrade, who had himself contrived the departure of Ciganovic
and who knew where he was stopping, declared in an inter-
view that no man of the name of Milan Ciganovid existed in
Belgrade.

The interviews in question must be quite well known to the
Royal Serbian Government. By requesting the Imperial and
Royal Government to communicate to them all kinds of details
about these interviews, and keeping in reserve the holding of
a formal enquiry into them, they show that they are not
willing to comply seriously with this demand either.

265

|R. 353 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 28,

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied
with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it
is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of
this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific under-
standing, either by referring this question to the decision of the
International Tribunal of the Hague, or to the Great Powers
which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made

'i'[5eeB. 4, by the Serbian Government on the i8th (31st) March, igog.*"
vol. I., p.

81.]

No. 35.
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914.

'"[B. 36.] THE proposal for mediation made by Great Britain,""
that Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should meet
at a conference at London, is declined so far as Germany

'^'[c/- B. is concerned"" on the ground that it is impossible for Ger-
43-3 many to bring her Ally before a European Court in her
settlement with Serbia.

No. 36.
Freiherr Von Miiller to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) Tokio, July 28, 1914.

TO-DAY'S semi-official Japan Times contains a leading
article which concludes by saying that Japan is on the best
possible terms with the three Great Powers concerned —
Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia — while it is in no
way interested in Serbia. In the case of war, the Imperial
Government would, as a matter of course, maintain the
strictest neutrality.

266

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 38]

No. 37.

Count Berchtold to the Royal Serbian Foreign Office at

Belgrade:^' '''[c/- B

{Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

[See S. 45.]

No. 38.

Count Berchtold to Count Szogyiny in Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

FOR Your Excellency's information and for communica-
tion to the Secretary of State : —

I have received the following telegram from Count Mens-
dorff, dated the 27th inst. : —

" I have to-day had the opportunity of explaining at
length to Sir Edward Grey/'' that our action is not one of ""[c/- B.
aggression but of self-defence and of self-preservation, and 48]

that we have no intention of making any territorial acquisition,
or of destrojdng Serbian independence. What we desire
is to obtain a certain measure of satisfaction for what has
passed, and guarantees for the future.

For this purpose I availed myself of some of the points
out of Your Excellency's communications to Count Szap&,ry. "' '" i^f- No.

Sir E. Grey said to me that he was very much disappointed ■'^
that we were treating the Serbian answer as if it were a
complete refusal.

He had believed that this answer would furnish a basis
on which the four other Governments could arrive at a
peaceful solution.

This was his idea when he proposed a conference. '^' '^'[B. 36.1

The conference • would meet on the assumption that
Austria-Hungary as well as Russia would refrain from every
military operation during the attempt of the other Powers
to find a peaceful issue.

267

[H. 39| AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 28,

(The declaration of Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons

<''[Sei3 to-day'" ampUfies the project of a conference.) When he

P- 397 spoke of our refraining from mihtary operations against

et seq.\ Serbia, I observed that I feared that it was perhaps already

too late. The Secretary of State expressed the view that

if we were resolved under any circumstances to go to war

with Serbia, and if we assumed that Russia would remain

quiet, we were taking a great risk. If we could induce

Russia to remain quiet, he had nothing more to say on the

question. If we could not, the possibilities and the dangers

were incalculable.

As a symptom of the feeUng of unrest he told me that
the British Grand Fleet, which was concentrated in Ports-
mouth after the manoeuvres, and which should have dispersed
to-day, would for the present remain there. ' We had not
called up any Reserves, but as they are assembled, we cannot
at this moment send them home again.'

His idea of a conference had the aim of preventing, if
possible, a collision between the Great Powers, and he also
aimed at the isolation of the conflict. If, therefore, Russia
mobilises and Germany takes action, the conference neces-
sarily breaks down."

I believe that I need not specially point out to Your
Excellency that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far
as it relates to our conflict with Serbia, appears, in view of
the state of war which has arisen, to have been outstripped
by events.

No. 39.
Cotmt Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

WE attach the greatest importance to the point that

Sir E. Grey should appreciate in an impartial manner our

action against Serbia in general, and in particular our refusal

to accept the Serbian answer, and I therefore ask Your

Excellency to take the opportunity of explaining to the

'"'[See B. Secretary of State'^''in detail the dossier '*' which is being

i')rM ^^1 ^^^^ ^° y°^ ^^ post, and that you will emphasise the specially _

[i o. 19.J gg^ijgj^-j- passages ; in the same sense Your Excellency should

discuss with Sir E. Grey the critical observations on the

268

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R- *»]

Serbian note (the text of the note with our observations'" '"[No. 34.I
has been sent to Your Excellency by post yesterday), and
you should make clear to him that the offer of Serbia to
meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended
to deceive"' Europe without giving any guarantee for the <'i[c/. Intro.
future. P- '^1T>

As the Serbian Government knew that only an uncon- ^- 32.
ditional acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the ^3 \ )-l
Serbian tactics can easily be seen through : Serbia accepted
a number of our demands, with all sorts of reservations, in
order to impress public opinion in Europe, trusting that
she would not be required to fulfil her promises. In con-
versing with Sir E. Grey your Excellency should lay special
emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilisation
of the Serbian army was ordered for the afternoon of the
25th July at 3 o'clock,'" while the ansv/er to our note was "'P^o- 23;
delivered just before the expiration of the time fixed, that is ^^^ ^^
to say, a few minutes before 6 o'clock.'^' Up to then we ^'■)xsee Yio.
had made no military preparations, but by the Serbian 24 and
mobilisation we were compelled to do so. note, aZso

footnote
p. 126.

No. 40.
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

FOR your Excellency's information and guidance :

The Imperial Russian Ambassador spoke to me to-day"' («i[c/. B. 93
in order to inform me of his return from short leave in Russia, (i)l
and at the same time to execute a telegraphic instruction of
M. Sazonof. The latter had informed him that he had had
a lengthy and friendly discussion with your Excellency (your
Excellency's telegram of the 27th instant),'" in the course '^'[No. 31.]
of which he had discussed with great readiness the various
points of the Serbian answer. M. Sazonof was of the opinion
that Serbia had gone far in meeting our wishes, but that
some of the demands appeared to him entirely unacceptable,
a fact which he had not concealed from your Excellency.
It appeared to him under these circumstances that the

269

[E. 40] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 28,

Serbian reply might properly be regarded as furnishing a
starting point for an understanding to attain which the
Russian Government would gladly lend a hand. M. Sazonof
therefore desired to propose to me that the exchange of
ideas with your Excellency should be continued, and that
your Excellency should receive instructions with this end
in view.

In reply, I emphasised my inability to concur in such a
proposal. No one in our country could understand, nor could
anyone approve negotiations with reference to the wording
used in the answer which we had designated as unsatisfactory.
This was all the more impossible because, as the Ambassador
knew, there was a deep feeling of general excitement which
had already mastered public opinion. Moreover, on our
side war had to-day been declared against Serbia.

In reply to the explanations of the Ambassador, which
culminated in asserting that we should not in any way sup-
press the admitted hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike
action, but that, on the contrary we should only increase it,
I gave him some insight into our present relations towards
Serbia which made it necessary, quite against our will, and
without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our
restless neighbour, with the necessary emphasis, our firm
intention not to permit any longer a movement which was
allowed to exist by the Government, and which was directed
against the existence of the Monarchy. The attitude of
Serbia after the receipt of our note had further not been
calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because
'^' [No. 23 ; Serbia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory
S. 41 and reply, had ordered a general mobilisation,'" and in so doing
i°^t'ot° ^^^ already committed a hostile act against us. In spite
p.°i26.3 °^ ^^^^' however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday
'^'[c/. N0.41] hostilities were opened against us on the Hungarian frontier ""
on the part of Serbia. By this act we were deprived of the
possibility of maintaining any longer the patience which we
had shown towards Serbia. The establishment of a funda-
mental but peaceful amelioration of our relations towards
Serbia had now been made impossible, and we were compelled
to meet the Serbian provocation in the only form which in
the given circumstances was consistent with the dignity of
the Monarchy.
270

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 41]

No. 41.
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, J^dy 28, 1914.

THE British Ambassador, who discussed matters with
me to-day"' has, in accordance with his instructions, explained w[cf. B.
the attitude of Sir E. Grey withjregard to our conflict with 62.I

Serbia as follows : —

The British Government have followed the previous course
of events during the crisis with lively interest, and they
attach importance to giving us an assurance that they enter-
tain sympathy for us in the point of view we have adopted,
and that they completely understand the grievances which
we have against Serbia.

If England has no ground for making our dispute with
Serbia in itself an object of special consideration, nevertheless
this question cannot escape the attention of the Cabinet at
London, because this conflict may affect wider circles and
thereby imperil the peace of Europe.

To this extent England is affected by the question, and
it is only on this ground that Sir E. Grey has been led to
send an invitation"" to the Governments of those countries (2)[b. 36.]
which are not directly interested in this conflict (Germany,
Italy and France), in order to test in common with them
by means of a continuous exchange of ideas the possibilities
of the situation, and to discuss how the differences may be
most quickly settled. Following the precedent of the London
conference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of
the various States mentioned resident at London should,
according to the view of the British Secretary of State, keep
themselves in continual -contact with him for the purpose
indicated. Sir E. Grey had already received answers expressed
in very friendly terms from the Governments concerned,
in which they concurred in the suggestion put forward.
At present it was also the wish of the Secretary of
State, if possible, to prevent even at the eleventh hour
the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia, and if this were not possible at least to pre-
vent the conflict from causing a collision involving blood-
shed ; if necessary, by the Serbians withdrawing without

271

[E. 41] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 28,

accepting battle. The reply which had reached us from
Serbia appeared to offer the possibility that it might provide
the basis of an understanding. England would willingly be
prepared in this matter to make her influence felt according
to our ideas and wishes.

I thanked the Ambassador for the communication of
Sir E. Grey, and I answered him that I fully appreciated the
view of the Secretary of State. His point of view was,
however, naturally different from mine, as England was not
directly interested in the dispute between us and Serbia,
and the Secretary of State could not be fully informed con-
cerning the serious significance which the questions at issue
had for the Monarchy. If Sir E. Grey spoke of the possibility
of preventing the outbreak of hostilities, this suggestion
came too late, since our soldiers were yesterday fired at by
''' [c/. No. soldiers from over the Serbian frontier, "' and to-day war has
,2 j^ 4^-] been declared by us against Serbia.'^' I had to decline to
'■ ■ "^^'^ entertain the idea of a discussion based on the Serbian answer.
What we asked was the integral acceptance of the ultimatum.
Serbia had endeavoured to get out of her difficulty by sub-
terfuges. We knew these Serbian methods only too well.

Through the local knowledge which he has gained here.
Sir Maurice de Bunsen was in a position to appreciate fully
our point of view, and he would be in a position to give
Sir E. Grey an accurate representation of the facts.

In so far as Sir E. Grey desired to be of service to the
cause of European peace, he would certainly not find any
opposition from us. He must, however, reflect that the peace
of Europe would not be saved by Great Powers placing them-
selves behind Serbia, and directing their efforts to securing
that she should escape punishment.

For, even if we consented to entertain such an attempt
at an agreement, Serbia would be all the more encouraged
to continue on the path she has formerly followed, and this
would, in a very short time, again imperil the cause of
peace.

The British Ambassador assured me in conclusion that he
fully understood our point of view but, on the other hand,
he regretted that, under these circumstances, the desire of
the British Government to arrive at an agreement had, for
the time being, no prospect of being realised. He hoped to

272

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BGOK [R. 42]

remain in constant communication with me as that appeared
to him, on account of the great danger of a European con-
flagration, to be of special value.

I assured the Ambassador that I was at all times at his
disposal, and thereupon our conversation came to an end.

No. 42.

Count Berchtold to Count Sz'dgySny at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I REQUEST your Excellency to go at once to the Chan-
cellor or the Secretary of State and communicate to him the
following"' in my name : '^'[c/. Nos.

" According to mutually consistent reports, received from ^' ^^^^
St. Petersburg, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia n'^
is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has
indeed given an assurance on his word of honour, as has also
the Russian Minister of War, that mobilisation has not up to
now been ordered ; the latter has, however, told the German
Military Attache that the military districts which border on
Austria-Hungary — Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan — ^will
be mobilised, should our troops cross the Serbian frontier.

" Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the
Cabinet at Berlin to take into immediate consideration the
question whether the attention of Russia should not be
drawn, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation
of the above districts amounts to a threat against Austria-
Hungary, and that, therefore, should these measures be
carried out, they would be answered by the most extensive
military counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by
our Ally, the German Empire."

In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it
appears to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first
place, be taken by Germany alone ; nevertheless we are ready
to take this step in conjunction with Germany.

Unambiguous language appears to me at the present
moment to be the most effective method of making Russia
fully conscious of all that is involved in a threatening
attitude.

II-S 273

[R. 43] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 28,

No. 43.
Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

INFORMATION has been received from the Imperial
German Ambassador that Sir E. Grey has appealed to
'''[B. 24.] the German Government'^' to use their influence with the
Imperial and Royal Government, in order to induce them
either to regard the reply received from Belgrade as satis-
factory, or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the
Cabinets.

Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the
British proposal before the Vienna Cabinet for their con-
'^' [Austrian sideration. "•
reply,
No. 44.]

No. 44.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at
St. Petersburg, London, Paris and Rome.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914.

FOR your Excellency's information.
I have to-day handed to the Imperial German Ambassador
the following memorandum in answer to a d-marche made
'^'[See No. here by him : '='
43-]

Memorandum.

The Imperial and Royal Government have received with
deep gratitude information of the communication which the
Imperial German Ambassador made to them on the 28th
inst. with regard to the request of the British Cabinet that
the Imperial German Government should use their influence
with the Vienna Cabinet that they might regard the answer
from Belgrade either as satisfactory, or as a basis for dis-
cussion. So far as concerns what was said by the British
[B 46.] Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, '" the Imperial
and Royal Government desire in the first place to draw
attention to the fact that the Serbian answer in no way
274

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [r. 44l

contains an acceptance of all our demands with one single
exception, as Sir E. Grey appears to assume, but rather
that on most points reservations are formulated, which
materially detract from the value of the concessions which
are made. The points which are not accepted are, however,
precisely those which contain some guarantee for the real
attainment of the end in view.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal their
astonishment at the assumption that their action against
Serbia was directed against Russia and Russian influence
in the Balkans, for this implies the supposition that the
propaganda directed against the Monarchy has not merely
a Serbian but a Russian origin. The basis of our consideration
has hitherto been rather that official Russia has no connection
with these tendencies, which are hostile to the Monarchy,
and that our present action is directed exclusively against
Serbia, while our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir
E. Grey, are entirely friendly.

Further, the Imperial and Royal Government must point
out that to their great regret they are no longer in a
position to adopt an attitude towards the Serbian reply
in the sense of the British suggestion, since at the time
of the d&marche made by Germany a state of war between
the Monarchy and Serbia had already arisen,'" and the "'[S. 45.]
Serbian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by
events.

The Imperial and Royal Government take this opportunity
of observing that the Royal Serbian Government, even before
they communicated their reply, had taken steps towards
the mobilisation of the Serbian forces,"" and thereafter ''"[No. 23 •
they allowed three days to elapse without showing any S. 41 and
inclination to abandon the point of view contained in their "°te-]
reply, whereupon the declaration of war '^' followed on our i" [S. 45.]
side.

If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on
the Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of
peace between the Great Powers, and with a view to the
localisation of the war which has been forced upon us by
many years of Serbian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal
Government could only welcome this.

275

[R. 45] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 29,

No. 45.

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 29, 1914.

FRANCE is unmistakably making certain military prepara-
"'[c/. W. lions'" as is announced by the newspapers, perhaps with a
exh. II.] certain exaggeration.

As I learn in strictest confidence, Baron Schoen is com-
missioned to discuss these preparations with M. Viviani
'"'[c/. Y. to-day,'" and to point out that in these circumstances
loi] Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which
necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not
fail to cause great public excitement when they became known.
In this way the two countries, although they are only striving
for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilisation,
which would be dangerous.

Further, in accordance with these instructions. Baron
Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that
the conflict between us and Serbia should remain localised,
and that in this Germany relies on the support of France.

No. 46.

Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914.

*2'[July26.] AS early as Sunday'*' the German Government declared
at St. Petersburg that Russian mobilisation would have as a
'*'[c/. No. consequence German mobilisation.'*'

28-3 Thereupon there followed on the part of Russia the reply

'"'[No. 33.] announced in my telegram of the 27th inst.'^' Following this

a telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating

that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures

'°'[c/. Y. of mobilisation Germany might be brought to mobUise.'^'

100 ; 0.

58-3 No. 47.

"' [Reply, Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. '"

No. 49.] (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

AS I have learned from the German Ambassador that
M. Sazonof is showing himself greatly excited over your

276

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 47]

Excellency's alleged disinclination to continue the exchange
of ideas with Russia, and over the mobilisation of Austria-
Hungary, which is supposed to be much more extensive
than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against Russia,
I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunder-
standings which seemed to me to exist.

The Minister began by making the point that Austria-
Hungary categorically refused to continue an exchange of
ideas. I agreed in view of your Excellency's telegram of
the 28th July"' that your Excellency had indeed declined, '" [No. 40.]
after all that had occurred, to discuss the wording of the
note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian conflict,
but said that I must make it clear that I was in a position
±0 suggest a much broader basis of discussion in declaring
that we had no desire to injure any Russian interests, that we
had no intention, naturally on the assumption that the
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia remained
localised, of annexing Serbian territory, and that we also had
no idea of touching the sovereignty of Serbia. I was con-
vinced that your Excellency would always be ready to keep
in touch with St. Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian
and Russian interests.

M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been con-
vinced of this so far as territory was concerned, but so far
as the sovereignty of the country was in question he must
continue to hold the opinion that to force on Serbia our
conditions would result in Serbia becoming a vassal State."" (^1 [cf. b.
This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the Balkans, 97 ; also
and this was how Russian interests became involved. He ^^ar to
returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action ^^^^
of Sir E. Grey, &c., and he desired again to point out to me p^'^xo.}
-that Russia recognised our legitimate interest, and desired
to give it full satisfaction, but that this should be clothed
in a form which would be acceptable to Serbia. I expressed
ihe view that this was not a Russian but a Serbian interest,
whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests were
in this case Serbian interests, so that I was obUged to make
an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic.

I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of
anxiety in Russia, because we had mobilised eight corps for
action against Serbia."' M. Sazonof assured me that it was <5i[c/.o.24,

!»77 47-]

[R. 483 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 29,

not he (who knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the
General Staff who had expressed this anxiety. I endeavoured
to convince the Minister that any unprejudiced person could
easily be persuaded that our southern corps could not con-
stitute a menace for Russia.

I indicated to the Minister that it would be well if his
Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, more
especially as it was urgently necessary, if it was desired
to maintain peace, that a speedy end should be put to the
military competition [Lizitieren) which now threatened to
ensue on account of false news. M. Sazonof very character-
istically expressed the view that he could communicate this

•'' {i.e., the to the Chief of the General Staff, for he''^' saw His Majesty every

Chief of the ^^y^

cf ^i -1 The Minister further informed me that a Ukase would be

signed to-day, which would give orders for a mobihsation
"" [See B. in a somewhat extended form. "" He was able, however, to
70 (i).] assure me in the most official way that these troops were not
intended to attack us. They would only stand to arms in
case Russian interests in the Balkans should be in danger.
An explanatory note would make this clear, for the question
here was one of a measure of precaution which the Emperor
Nicholas had found to be justified, since we, who in any
case have the advantage of quicker mobilisation, have now
also already so great a start. In earnest words I drew
M. Sazonof's attention to the impression which such a measure
would make in our country. I went on to express doubt
whether the explanatory note would be calculated to soften
the impression, whereupon the Minister again gave expression
to assurances regarding the harmlessness(!) of this measure.

No. 48.
Count Berchtold to Count Szbgyeny at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I HAVE just heard from Herr von Tschirschky, that the

Russian Ambassador has told him that he has been notified

by his Government that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa,

'''[Sfie B. Moscow and Kasan are being mobilised. ''' He said that

70 (i).] Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power, and

278

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 49]

was obliged to take corresponding measures. The Russian
mobilisation is confirmed by the commanders of our Galician
forces, and, according to a communication from the Imperial
and Royal Military Attach6, in a conversation which
M. Sazonof had to-day with the German Ambassador it
was no longer denied.

I request your Excellency to bring the above without
delay to the knowledge of the German Government, and at
the same time to emphasise that if the Russian measures of
mobilisation are not stopped without delay, our general
mobilisation would have, on military grounds, to follow at
once."' - "'[C/.O.24,

As a last effort to maintain the peace of Europe, I con- 47-]
sidered it desirable that our representative and the representa-
tive of Germany at St. Petersburg, and, if necessary, at Paris,
should at once be instructed to declare to the Governments
to whom they are accredited in a friendly manner, that the
continuance of the Russian mobilisation would have as a
result counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary,
which must lead to serious consequences.

Your Excellency will add that, as can be understood,
in our military operations against Serbia we will not allow
ourselves to be diverted from our path.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburg
and Paris are receiving identical instructions to make the
above declaration as soon as their German colleague receives
similar instructions.

No. 49.
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.

IN answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 2Qth
July.'^' _ '"'[No 47.]

I am of course sttU ready to explain to M. Sazonof, through
your Excellency, the various points contained in our note
addressed to Serbia which however has already been out-
stripped by recent events. I should also attach special
importance, in accordance with the suggestion made to me
through M. Schebeko, also to discussing on this occasion
in a confidential and friendly manner the questions which

277

[R. 50] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 30,

'^'[c/. Nos. affect directly our relations towards Russia.'" From this
50. 56 ; it might be hoped that it would be possible to remove the
Q ll^i ' ambiguities which have arisen and to secure the development

in a friendly manner of our relations towards our neighbours,

which is so desirable an object.

No. 50.

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.

FOR Your Excellency's information and guidance : —

(ir , Q I have to-day explained to M. Schebeko'"' that I have

66.3 been informed that M. Sazonof has been hurt by my flat
•'TNo 40 1 refusal'^' of his proposal as to a discussion with your Excel-
lency, and that he is not less hurt that no exchange of ideas
has taken place between myself and M. Schebeko.

With reference to the first point, I had already permitted
'"'[No. 40.] yoiii^ Excellency by telegram'^' to give M. Sazonof any explan-
tions he desired with regard to the note — which in any case
appears to be outstripped by the outbreak of war. In any
case this could only take the form of subsequent explanations,
as it was never our intention to depart in any way from the
points contained in the note. I had also authorised your
Excellency to discuss in a friendly manner with M. Sazonof
our special relations towards Russia.

That M. Sazonof should complain that no exchange of

ideas had taken place between M. Schebeko and myself must

[c/. No. ^^^t ^^ ^ misunderstanding, '" as M. Schebeko and myself

56*; B. ' had discussed the practical questions two days before, '" a

137.] fact which the Ambassador confirmed with the observation

*' [See No. that he had fully informed M. Sazonof of this conversation.

40-] M. Schebeko then explained why our action against

Serbia was regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburg.

He said that we were a Great Power which was proceeding

against the small Serbian State, and it was not known at St.

Petersburg what our intentions in the matter were ; whether

we desired to encroach on its sovereignty, whether we desired

completely to overthrow it, or even to crush it to the ground.

280

(6)

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 50]

Russia could not be indifferent towards the future fate ot
Serbia,'" which was linked to Russia by historical and other '"[c/- 0.
bonds. At St. Petersburg they had taken the trouble to use ^^J

all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to accept all
our conditions, though this was indeed at a time when the
conditions afterwards imposed by us could not yet be known.
But even with reference to these demands they would do
everything they could in order to accomplish at any rate
all that was possible.

I reminded the Ambassador that we had repeatedly
emphasised the fact that we did not desire to follow any
policy of conquest in Serbia, also that we would not infringe
her sovereignty, but we only desired to establish a condition
of affairs which would offer us a guarantee against being
disturbed by Serbia. To this I added a somewhat lengthy
discussion of our intolerable relations with Serbia. I also
gave. M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how large an
extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for these circum-
stances, even though this result might be contrary to the
wishes of the responsible authorities.

In the further course of our discussion I referred to the
Russian mobilisation which had then come to my knowledge.
Since this was limited to the military districts of Odessa,
Kieff, Moscow and Kasan it had an appearance of hostility
against the Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds
for this might be, as there was no dispute between us and
Russia. Austria-Hungary had mobilised exclusively against
Serbia ; against Russia not a single man ; and this would be
observed from the single fact that the first, tenth and eleventh
corps had not been mobilised. In view, however, of the fact
that Russia was openly mobilising against us, we should
have to extend our mobilisation too, and in this case I desired
to mention expressly that this measure did not, of course,
imply any attitude of hostility towards Russia, and that it
was exclusively a necessary counter-measure against the
Russian mobilisation.

I asked M. Schebeko to announce this to his Government,
and this he promised to do.

281

IR. 51] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 31,

No. 51.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at
London and St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I AM telegraphing as follows to Berlin : —

Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instruc-
tions yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir E.
"'[c/. B. Grey and Prince Lichnowsky'" in which the British Secretary
103.] of State made the following announcement to the German
Ambassador : —

Sazonof has informed the British Government that after
the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia,
he is no longer in a position to deal directly with Austria-
Hungary, and he therefore requests that Great Britain will
again take up her work of mediation. The Russian Govern-
ment regarded the preliminary stoppage of hostilities as a
condition precedent to this.

To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to
>''*[c/. B. Prince Lichnowsky"" that Great Britain thought of a rnedia-
S4] tion d, quatre, and that she regarded this as urgently necessary
if a general war was to be prevented.

I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the
Secretary of State for the communications made to us through
Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of
the change in the situation which has since arisen through
the mobilisation of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain
the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and
Serbia.

The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that
our military action against Serbia should continue to take
its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the
Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian
mobilisation which is directed against us, in which case, of
course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military
counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the
Russian attitude.

282

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 54]

No. 52.

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

THE order for the general mobilisation of the entire Army
and Fleet was issued early to-day. '" '" [cf. B.

113; Y.

No "i-? ^^^' ^•

^^°- 53- exh.24.]

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic

Representatives.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914.

FOR your information and for use in your dealings with
the Government to which you are accredited.

As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Govern-
ment on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military
measures in GaUcia.

These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise
exclusively under the pressure of the Russian measures,
which we regret exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggres-
sive intentions of any kind against Russia, and desire the
continuation of the former neighbourly relations.

Pourparlers between the Cabinets at Vienna and St.
Petersburg appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being
continued,"" and from these we hope that things will quieten m[cf. b.
down all round. no ; O.

No. 54- ^^-^

Count Szicsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador in pursuance of the instructions
of his Government has declared here that if the general
mobilisation ordered by the Russian Government is not
stopped within 12 hours, Germany also will mobiUse.''' At '''[c/. O.
the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France will 7° ^^^
remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and ^°^ > ^■
Russia.'^' An answer to this is requested within eighteen ,4,^^, ' ^'^
hours. The time-limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at jjl' j^^^ i
I o'clock in the afternoon.

283

[R. 55] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 31,

No. 55.

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

|"[Nos. 49, YOUR Excellency's telegram of the 30th July'" has been
5°-3 received.

You will have gathered from my telegram of the 29th

<^'[No. 47.] July,"* that without waiting for instructions I again resumed

<"[c/. B. conversations with M. Sazonof" more or less on the basis

iio ; O. -wrhich has now been indicated to me, but that the points of

' view on the two sides had not materially approximated to

each other.

Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversa-
tions between the German Ambassador and the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia will not accept as
satisfactory the formal declaration that Austria-Hungary
will neither diminish the territory of the Serbian Kingdom
nor infringe on Serbian sovereignty, nor injure Russian
interests in the Balkans or elsewhere ; since then moreover
■<*' [No. 52.] a general mobilisation has been ordered on the part of Russia

(4)

No. 56.

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, August i, 1914.

I VISITED M. Sazonof to-day, and told him that I had
received instructions, but that I must premise that I was
entirely ignorant of the present condition of affairs created in
Vienna by the general Russian mobilisation, and that in
interpreting the instructions which I had received previously,
I must leave this condition out of account. I said that the
[Nos. 49, two instructions of Your Excellency"" dealt with the mis-
50-1 understanding that we had declined further negotiations with
Russia. This was a mistake, as I had already, without in-
structions, assured him. Your Excellency was not only quite
(61 r^,, g prepared to deal with Russia on the broadest basis possible,
137, 161 ; but was also especially inclined to subject the text of our note
y. 120.] to a discussion so far as its interpretation was concerned. '"
284

(S)

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 58?

I emphasised how much the instructions of Your Excellency
afforded me a further proof of goodwill, although I had to
remind him that the situation created since then by the general
mobiUsation was unknown to me ; but I could only hope
that the course of events had not already taken us too far ;
in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the present moment
of extreme anxiety to prove once again the goodwill of the
Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied that
he took note with satisfaction of this proof of goodwill, but
he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations
at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise
less prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral
terrain of London. '" I replied that Your Excellency, as I "' [cf. Y. 98
had already observed, started from the point of view that and note. 1
direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg, so
that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to
his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the
subject with your Excellency.

No. 57.
Count Szogyiny to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914.

THE Secretary of State has just informed me that no
answer has been received from Russia to the German de-
mand.'"' '"'[c/. No.

The Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at 54 ; O-
Schwidden (south-east of Bialla). 7o.]

Russia has thus attacked Germany.'" '^'[c/. W.

Germany, therefore, regards herself as at war with P- ^35]
Russia."' <^'[Declar-

The Russian Ambassador has this morning received his ^tion of
passports ; he intends to leave to-day. ^^' ^•

No. 58.
Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) London, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE just seen Sir E. Grey. The British Government
have sent to Germany an ultimatum on account of Belgium. "" '" [B. 159.3
They expect a reply at 12 o'clock to-night.

285

[R. 59] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [August 5

Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason
why he should make any communication to the Imperial and
Royal Government, and there was no cause why a conflict
should arise between us, so long as we were not in a condition
of war with France. In any case, he hoped that we would
not begin hostihties without the formality of a previous
"'[Reply, declaration of war.'" He does not intend to recall Sir M. de
No. 60.] Bunsen.

Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be
difficult for Great Britain, as the ally of France, to co-operate
with her in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean.

No. 59.

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg.
{Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 5, 1914.

""[Pre- I ASK Your Excellency to hand over the following note"'

sented ^q ^^g Minister for Foreign Affairs : —

Aug. 6 — °

see 0.79.3 " On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned,
the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform
His ,|^Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as
follows : —

" In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia
in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and
Serbia ; and of the fact that, according to a communication
from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that
conflict, to open hostilities against Germany ; and whereas
Germany is consequently at war with Russia ; Austria-
Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia
from the present moment."

After handing over this note Your Excellency will ask
that passports may be prepared, and you will leave without
delay with the entire staff of the Embassy with the exception
of any members who are to be left behind. At the same time
M. Scheb6ko is being furnished with his passport by us.

286

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R- 62]

No. 60.
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 6, 1914.

I HAVE received Your Excellency's telegram of the
4th August."' '^' [No. 58.1

I ask you to assure Sir E. Grey that we will in no case open
hostilities against Great Britain without a previous formal
declaration of war, but that we also expect that Great Britain
will observe towards us a similar attitude, and that she will
not undertake any hostile act against us before formally
declaring war.

No. 61.
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold J'^ '"[Reply,

{Translated from the French.) °' ^'*

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 8, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to go and see •
him in order to communicate to me that, according to positive
information which has reached him, the Innsbruck Army Corps
has been brought to the French frontier. M. Doumergue
wishes to know without delay if this information is correct,
and if it is so, what is the intention of the Imperial and Royal
Government. As France is at war with Germany the despatch
of our troops to the French frontier is, according to the
views held by the Minister, not consistent with the existing
condition of peace between Austria-Hungary and France.
M. Dumaine is commissioned to make a similar communi-
cation to Your Excellency.

No. 62.
Count Berchtold to Count Szicsen at Paris. '" "' [Reply,

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 9, 1914.

WITH reference to Your Excellency's telegram of tbe
8th instant. "' w [No. 61.J

287

JR. 63] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [August io,

After conferring with the General Staff I authorise Your
Excellency to inform the French Government that the infor-
mation regarding the participation of our troops in the
'"*[c/. No. Franco-German war is a complete invention.'" I have
64-] expressed myself in a similar manner to M, Dumaine.

No. 63.

Count SzScsen to Count Berchtold.
{Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 10, 1914.

'"[No. 62.3 I HAVE received your telegram of the 9th August"" and
communicated at once the contents to M. Doumergue. The
Minister, who had received a similar telegraphic report from
M. Dumaine concerning his conversation with Your Excel-
lency, admitted that our troops are not on the French frontier,
but he maintains that he has positive information that an
Austro-Hungarian army corps has been brought to Germany,
and that this makes it possible for that Empire to withdraw
her troops from those districts which are occupied by our
soldiers, and that in the opinion of the Minister this amounts
to a facilitation of German military operations. I repeatedly
drew the attention of the Minister to the wording of the
answer of Your Excellency, and he has admitted that it is
not possible to speak of an effective participation of our troops
in the Franco-German war, but he insisted that it is undeniable
that our troops are present on German territory, and that
this is equivalent to the provision of military assistance to

'" [See No. Germany. '" In these circumstances he has authorised the
^4-] French Ambassador at Vienna to ask for his passports without
delay, and to leave Vienna to-day with the entire staff of the
Embassy. The Minister informed me that in view of this
position, my presence here can be of no use ; indeed in view
of the excitement of the populace it might give occasion
to regrettable occurrences which he desired to avoid. He
offered to place a train at my disposal from to-night onwards
in order that I might leave France. I answered that it was
impossible for me to receive instructions from Your Excel-

<"[c/. No. lency before the evening, but that in view of the recall of
64.] M. Dumaine, I asked him to have my passport prepared. '*'
288

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 65]

No. 64.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

Vienna, August 11, 1914.

THE French Government have commissioned their Am-
bassador here to ask for his passports'" on the ground that an '"[c/. No.
Austro-Hungarian army corps has been sent to Germany, 63.]

whereby it has been possible for the German army staff to
withdraw their troops from those German districts which are
occupied by ovir contingents. This measure of our general
staff indicates in his view the grant of military assistance to
Germany.

Your Excellency should bring to the knowledge of the
British Government that according to information obtained
from a reliable source the assertion made by the French
Government is unfounded. "" "" [cf. No.

62.]

No. 65.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

[Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.) London, August 12, 1914.

I HAVE just received from Sir E. Grey the following
communication : —

At the request of the French Government, who are not in
a position to communicate direct with your Government, I
have to make to you the following communication : —

The Austro-Hungarian Government, after declaring war
on Serbia, and thus taking the first initiative to the hostilities
in Europe, have, without any provocation on the part of the
Government of the French Republic, extended the war to
France : —

(i) After Germany had in succession declared war on
Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government have
joined in the conflict by declaring war against Russia, which
was already fighting on the side of France.

n-T aSg

[R. 663 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [August 20,

(2) According to information from numerous trustworthy
sources Austria has sent troops to the German frontier
under circumstances which amounted to a direct menace to
France.

I In view of these facts the French Government are obhged
to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government that they will
take all measures which make it possible for them to answer
these actions and these threats.

Sir E. Grey adds : —

As a breach with France has been brought about in this
way the British Government feel themselves obliged to
announce that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary will be in
»'[c/. B. a state of war as from 12 o'clock to-night.'"
161.3 ^

No. 66.

The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold.
(Translated from the English.)

My Lord, Vienna, August 20, 1914.

YOUR Excellency will doubtless have already received
information from his Excellency Baron Miiller of the com-
munication which was addressed to the German Government
'*' [cf. Nos. by my Government on the 15th inst. "" Nevertheless I take
68, 69. the liberty, although I have not received any instructions
J'^^ , to do so, to enclose herewith for your Excellency's personal
Japanese information, a copy of a telegram bearing on the matter which
ultima- I have received from Tokio.
turn as
given in

DO.W., Enclosure,

see p.

295il jj^g Japanese Government, who have taken the present

situation into their earnest consideration, have, in accord-
ance with a complete understanding made with the British
Government, for the purpose of strengthening and main-
taining general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which
is one of the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, decided to
290

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 66]

take common action with Great Britain in giving effect
to the necessary measures for this purpose. Nevertheless,
before proceeding with measures of this kind, the Japanese
Government have thought it proper to address a friendly
request to the German Government, which was communi-
cated to them on the 15th August, 1914, in the following
words : —

" (i) All German warships must be withdrawn at once
from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China.
The ships that cannot be withdrawn must be disarmed.

(2) The German Government must unconditionally and
without compensation hand over to the Japanese authorities
the whole of the leased territory of Kiao-chau before the i6th
September, 1914, for the purpose of handing this territory
back to China.

The Japanese Government have informed the German
Government that, in case an answer intimating unconditional
compliance with the above-mentioned demands is not received
before Sunday, the 23rd, at mid-day, they will proceed as
appears necessary to them.

It is earnestly to be hoped that the above-mentioned
demands, for a reply to which so ample time is given, will be
agreed to by the German Government ; should they, however,
not comply with this demand, a course of action which would
be deplored, the Japanese Government wUl be obliged to take
the necessary measures to attain their end."

The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their
present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to
maintain the common interests of Japan and Great Britain,
which are set out in the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, by estab-
lishing a basis of a lasting peace in the territory of Eastern
Asia. The Japanese Government have in no respect the
intention of embarking upon a policy of territorial expansion,
nor do they entertain any other selfish designs. For this
reason the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to
respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers
in Eastern Asia and to refrain from injuring them in any
degree.

291

[R. 673 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [August 22

No. 67.

Count Berchtold to Count Clary at Brussels.
(Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 22, 1914.

I ASK your Excellency to communicate the following

'''[C/.G.77. to the Royal Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once : — '"

Reply " J have the honour to bring the following to the know-

* 7 ■•' ledge of your Excellency in accordance with the instructions

of our Government : —

Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals
made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording
her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of
which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and
whereas as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian
nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes
of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most
'^'[Denied, primitive demands of humanity,"* and inadmissible even
G. 78.] towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria-Hun-
gary finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations,
and considers herself, from this moment, in a state of war
with Belgium.

I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation,
and I am entrusting the protection of my countrymen to the
Minister of the United States in Belgium.

Count Errembault de Dudzeele has received his passports
from the Imperial and Royal Government.

No. 68.

Prince Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 23, 1914.

THE Foreign Office has informed the Japanese Charge

d' Affaires that the Imperial German Government do not

<" [See No. intend to send an answer to the Japanese ultimatum. '*' The

66.3 German Government have instructed their Ambassador at

Tokio, after the expiration of the time allowed by Japan, at

292

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 69]

12 o'clock to-day, to leave Japan, and they will, at the same
time, furnish the Japanese Charge d' Affaires here with his
passports.

At mid-day the Charge d' Affaires was furnished with his
passports, and he will leave Berlin early to-morrow morning
with the staff of the Embassy.

No. 69.

Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Mutter at Tokio.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 24, 1914.

THE Commander of S.M.S. " EUsabeth " has been in-
structed to take part in the fighting at Tsingtau.'" I ask '"[c/. Nos.
your Excellency, in view of the action taken by Japan against ^^' ^7 ;
our Ally, the German Empire, to ask for your passports. 00*1^02!
You should inform the Consulates, and you should travel to
America with the colony and the staff of the Embassy and
of the Consulates. Your Excellency should entrust the
protection of our countrymen and their interests to the
American Ambassador. The Japanese Ambassador here is
being furnished with his passports.

293

GERMANY AND JAPAN

Japanese Foreign Office Statement J^'

Tokio, August 5.

THE Imperial Government entertains the deepest anxiety
regarding the poUtical and economic situation arising from
the latest developments of European politics. It hopes that
peace will be quickly restored and that the war will not
extend and that Japan wiU be able to maintain an attitude
of strict neutrality. It is necessary, however, that the closest
attention be paid to future developments.

In the event of Great Britain becoming involved, the
terms of the Japanese AUiance '*' will be affected and Japan
will take the necessary measures to discharge her obligations
under the treaty. The Imperial Government, however,
sincerely trusts that this contingency may never arise.

{Reuter.)

Telegram from the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Berlin,
to the German Ambassador in Tokio, August 12, 1914.

EAST Asiatic Squadron instructed to avoid hostUe acts
against England in case Japan remains neutral. Please
inform Japanese Government. No answer to this has been
received from Japan.

{D.O.W.)

Ultimatum^^^ presented to the German Government by the Japanese
Chargi d' Affaires, Baron Funakoshi, on August 17,'*' 1914.

CONSIDERING it highly important and necessary in
the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of
disturbance to the peace of the Far East, and to safeguard
the general interest contemplated by the Agreement of
Alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure

295

<''[c/. fuUer
state-
ment
quoted by
Baron
Kato,
p. 298.]

P- 504-]

"'[For de-
claration
accom-
panying
the ulti-
matum,
see
R. 66.]

'^'["Hand-
ed over
to the
German
Govern-
ment on
the 15th
August."
— Baron
Kato, see
p. 300 ; c/.
R. 66.]

GERMANY AND JAPAN [August 19,

a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of
which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese
Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to
the Imperial German Government to carry out the following
two propositions : —

(i) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and
Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all
kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so with-
drawn.

(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15th,
1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition
or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with
a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the
same time that in the event of their not receiving by noon
August 23rd, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German
Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above
advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they
will be compelled to take such action as they may deem
necessary to meet the situation.

(D.O.W.)

Speech by the Japanese Prime Minister.

'"[Count THE Japanese Prime Minister'" in a speech last night""

Okuma.] said :
'TAue.iQ.l

Japan's object is to eliminate from continental China the

root of German influence, which constitutes a constant menace
to the peace of the Far East, and thus to secure the aim of
the alliance with Great Britain. She harbours no design for
territorial aggrandisement and entertains no desire to promote
any other selfish end.

Japan's warlike operations will not, therefore, extend
beyond the limits necessary for the attainment of that object
and for the defence of her own legitimate interests. Accord-
ingly the Imperial Government has no hesitation in announc-
ing to the world that it will take no action such as to give to
the Powers any cause for anxiety or uneasiness regarding the
safety of their territories or possessions.

{Press Bureau, August 20, 1914.)
296

GERMANY AND JAPAN

Japanese Imperial Rescript declaring War upon Germany,

August 23, 1914.

WE, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, on the
throne occupied by the same Dynasty from time immemorial,
do hereby make the following proclamation to all Our loyal
and brave subjects : —

We, hereby, declare war against Germany and We com-
mand Our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against
that Empire with all their strength, and We also command
all Our competent authorities to make every effort in pur-
suance of their respective duties to attain the national aim
within the limit of the law of nations.

Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the
calamitous effect of which We view with grave concern, We,
on our part, have entertained hopes of preserving the peace
of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutraUty, but
the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain,
Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Ger-
many is at Kiao-chau, its leased territory in China, busy with
warUke preparations, while her armed vessels, cruising the
seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening Our commerce and that
of Our Ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

Accordingly, Our Government, and that of His Britannic
Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other,
agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the
protection of the general interests contemplated in the Agree-
ment of AUiance,'" and We on Otu: part, being desirous to attain "' [See
that object by peaceful means, commanded Our Government P- 504-]
to offer, with sincerity, an advice to the Imperial German
Government."" By the last day appointed for the purpose, "" [See
however. Our Government failed to receive an answer accept- p- 295.]
ing their advice.

It is with profound regret that We, in spite of Our ardent
devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare
war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while
we are still in mourning for Our lamented Mother.

' ^ It is Our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valour of
Our^faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the
glory of the Empire be enhanced.

{The Times, August 24, 1914.)

297

GERMANY AND JAPAN

[September 5,

''» [Minister Speech of Baron Kato"' in the Imperial Diet, Tokio, on

Foreign SEPTEMBER 5TH, I914.

Affairs 1

'' (Translation from Japanese Official Gazette. Courteously

supplied by H.E. the Marquis InouyS, Japanese Ambassador

in London.)

AFTER a brief survey of the multifarious circumstances
which led up to the present war. Baron Kato said :

Thus finding the peace of Europe hanging in the balance,
the Imperial Government could not view, but with grave
concern, the further developments of the situation. Deeming
it necessary in these circumstances to make their attitude
clear to the public, the Imperial Foreign Office issued a state-
ment couched in the following terms'" on the 4th August.

" The Imperial Government can hardly view the recent
developments of the European situation but with grave
anxiety both out of political, and economical considerations.
It is needless to say that it is the most earnest wish of the
Imperial Government to see the present conflict brought to a
happy conclusion and peace restored at the earliest possible
moment. In case, however, the present war is to be pro-
tracted against our desire, the Imperial Government sincerely
hope that the conflagration could in all probability be confined
to the localities now affected by it and that they could main-
tain strict neutrality. As to the further developments of the
situation, however, we feel it our duty to follow them with
the closest possible attention. If England were forced to
enter into the rank of combatants and the aims of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance"" were jeopardised in consequence, the
Imperial Government might be obliged to resort to a measure
they deem fit for discharging the obligations laid upon them
by the agreement of the Alliance. It can scarcely be pre-
dicted at the present moment whether the events would take
such a course as to bring about such a contingency. While
entertaining the most ardent wish that things of this kind may
never happen, the Imperial Government are nevertheless
following the development of events with the closest attention."

As clearly stated in this statement, the Imperial Govern-
ment desired from the outset that the European conflagration

29S

"''[c/. con-
densed
state-
ment
trans-
mitted
by

Renter,
p. 295.]

p. 504-]

1914] GERMANY AND JAPAN

should never spread so widely as to involve the Far East in
its calamities. Great Britain, however, having been compelled
to participate in this war, at the beginning of August requested
the Imperial Government under the agreement of the AUiance
to render them assistance in the matter. At that time, the
British trade in the Far East was exposed to great danger
owing to the presence of the German war vessels in the Eastern
Seas, and our oversea trade was also impeded to no small
extent, while at the same time, in Kiau-chao, the German
leased territory in the Far East, every possible effort was
made, day in and day out, to complete the warlike prepara-
tions, with a view to making it the basis of Germany's military
operations in the Orient. The maintenance of peace was
thus rendered very difficult. As you are well aware, the
agreement of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance has for its object
the consolidation and maintenance of general peace in Eastern
Asia, the preservation of the independence and territorial
integrity of China, the consecration of the principle of equal
opportunity in China, and, further, the maintenance of the
territorial rights of Great Britain and Japan in the regions of
Eastern Asia and India, and the defence of their special
interests in these regions. Now owing to the fact that her
trade and commerce in the Orient — to which great importance
is attached by her as one of her special interests in common
with Japan — ^were menaced by her enemies. Great Britain
addressed her request to us to render her such assistance as
was in our power, and the Imperial Government, whose
foreign policy is based upon the Alliance, had no alternative
but to accede to this request and lend her their helping hand
in her hour of need. Moreover, the Imperial Government
deemed it not only a great impediment to the consohdation of
general peace in the Far East, but also prejudicial to the
interest of this Empire, that Germany, whose policy is prone
to be at variance with the aims of the AUiance, should possess
a base for her influence in the Far East. In these circumstances
the Imperial Government could not escape from the con-
clusion that it was inevitable that they should draw the sword
against Germany in compHance with the demand of Great
Britain. After having laid their view before His Majesty the
Emperor, and having obtained the Imperial approval thereof,
the Cabinet made a communication to this effect to the British

299

GERMANY AND JAPAN

[September 5,

Government. Following upon the heels of this communication,
a frank and full exchange of views took place between
the two Governments, which confirmed the Imperial Govern-
ment in the view that it was a matter of supreme importance
that they should at once take suitable measures for the pro-
tection and defence of general interests as contemplated in
the agreement of the Alliance. It need hardly be said at this
juncture that the Imperial Government had not the slightest
idea of plunging themselves into the turmoil of the present
struggle, but they deemed it their duty that they should en-
deavour to ensure permanent peace in the Orient, safeguard
the special interests of our Ally, and uphold the spirit of the
Alliance, thereby consolidating its strength. The Imperial
Government, actuated as they were by the idea that it was
best calculated to realise the object in view if the settlement
of the matter were achieved by peaceful means even at the
eleventh hour, decided to offer sincere advice to the Imperial
German Government. Accordingly the note, couched in the
<"[c/. text following terms'" was handed over to the German Government

in on the 15th August"" :

D.O.W., . .

Considermg it highly important and necessary m

the present situation to take measures to remove all
causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and
to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the
agreement of the Alliance between Japan and Great
Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in
Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim
of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Govern-
ment sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the
Imperial German Government to carry out the following
two propositions :

(i) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese
and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed
vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those which
cannot be withdrawn.

(2) To deliver, on a date not later than 15th Sep-
tember, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, without
condition or compensation, the entire leased -territory
of Kiau-chao, with a view to eventual restoration of the
same to China.
300

see p. 295.]

(2) [Pre-
sented to
the

German
Govern-
ment by
Baron
Funa-
koshi on
Aug. 17,
according
to

D.O.W.,
see p. 295;
cf. R. 66.]

1914] GERMANY AND JAPAN

The Imperial Government announce at the same
time that in the event of their not receiving by noon of
August 23rd, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German
Government signif5dng the unconditional acceptance of
the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese
Government, they will be compelled to take such action
as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

The date prescribed in the above note, namely, 23rd August,
passed, but no reply was received from the German Govern-
ment. The result was the rupture of diplomatic relations
between the two countries and the state of war was brought
into existence. As is still fresh in your minds, the Imperial
Rescript declaring war against Germany"' was issued in the miSee
afternoon of 23rd August. p. 297.3

In regard to Austria-Hungary, her interests in the Orient
are, so to speak, infinitesimal. Besides, the Imperial Govern-
ment, having no interest in the Austro-Serbian dispute,
which, as you know, is the genesis of the present European
conflict, had entertained the hope that they could continue
peaceful relations with the Dual Monarchy, and they were
given to understand that this hope was reciprocated on the
part of the latter, as is illustrated in the following instance.
On the eve of the outbreak of war against Germany, the
Government of Austria-Hungary, pointing out the presence
of her cruiser Kaiserin Elizabeth ^^^ in the Far East, which she ''"[^/•R-69.
feared might constitute the only and sole chance of creating ^' ^^^'^
hostile relations between the two countries, signified her
willingness to instruct the said cruiser to proceed to Shanghai,
a neutral port, and remain there entirely dismantled for the
duration of war between Japan and Germany, and expressed
the hope, at the same time, that the Imperial Government
would give the said cruiser suitable guarantee, so as to enable
her to sail from Kiau-chao to Shanghai in peace. Having no
occasion whatever to wage war against Austria-Hungary,
still less any necessity therefor, the Imperial Government
had the intention to let the Kaiserin Elizabeth sail to Shanghai
in peace as desired by Austria-Hungary, but just at that
moment the British men-of-war, placed under the Commander-
in-Chief of our Fleet, were already afloat for action in certain
seas. We feared, therefore, that, even though our warships

301

GERMANY AND JAPAN [September 5,

did nothing towards the Austrian cruiser, a British war vessel
might open action against her and frustrate our plan of letting
her ply her course to Shanghai. Under these circumstances,
before giving consent to the Austrian request, the Imperial
Government brought their desire to the notice of the British
Government and obtained the reply from that quarter to the
effect that, in deference to the wishes of the Imperial Govern-
ment, they were ready to accede to the request of the Austrian
Government under certain conditions. Having thus pro-
cured a satisfactory answer from our Ally, I was just on the
point of intimating our decision in regard to this matter to
the Austrian Ambassador here, when he informed me that he
was in receipt of instructions from his Government charging
him to leave Tokio and return home forthwith, and applied
"' [See R. to me for the passports. '" It was much against my liking, but
69-] in these circumstances I had no alternative but to meet his
■ request by handing him over the required passports. Simul-
taneously, I sent instructions to our Ambassador at Vienna
to address a similar request to the Government to which he
was accredited and return home. These are the circum-
stances which led up to the outbreak of war against Germany
and the rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and
Austria-Hungary.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I should like to make
reference to the courtesy shown by the Government of the
United States of America towards the Imperial Government
in connection with the present crisis. No sooner had the
diplomatic relations with Germany entered upon a very
acute and critical stage than the Imperial Government
requested the American Government that, in the event of
the outbreak of war between Japan and Germany, they
would have the goodness to place all our public establish-
ments and our countrymen in Germany under their pro-
tection. Later on, upon the rupture of diplomatic relations
with Austria-Hungary, we addressed a similar request to
that Government. On both occasions they readily acceded
to our request with willingness, and since then they have
spared no pains in looking after the welfare of our country-
men remaining in the enemy countries. I feel sure I am giving
a voice to the sentiments of the House when I express, in the
name of the Imperial Government, the deep sense of gratitude

302

1914] GERMANY AND JAPAN

for'these acts of courtesy and good will manifested by the
Government of the United States of America. It is a cause
of profound regret on my part that our Empire was forced
to employ her arms against Germany, but I am fully convinced
His August Majesty's Army and Navy will in no circum-
stance fail to achieve acts of bravery and loyalty, as they
have done on the previous occasions, and I pray with you all
that a day may soon come when peace will be restored.

303

[July 31,

KING GEORGE V. AND M. POINCARE.

LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY
KING GEORGE AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE
FRENCH REPUBLIC.

{Published officially in Great Britain on February 20, 1915.)

No. I.

'" [Men- The President of the French Republic to the Kine^^

tioned in r o ,

JvohX Cher et grand Ami, ^«''"' ^' 3i i^^Met, 1914-

P- 376).] DANS les circonstances graves que traverse I'Europe,
je crois devoir communiquer a votre Majeste les renseigne-
ments que le Gouvernement de la R^publique a regus d'AUe-
magne. Les preparatifs militaires auxquels se livre le Gou-
vernement Imperial, notamment dans le voisinage immediat
de la frontiere franfaise, prennent chaque jour une intensite
et une acceleration nouvelles. La France, resolue a faire
jusqu'au bout tout ce qui dependra d'eUe pour maintenir
la paix, s'est bornee jusqu'ici aux mesures de precaution
les plus indispensables. Mais il ne semble pas que sa prudence
et sa moderation ralentisse'nt les dispositions de I'Allemagne ;
loin de la. Nous sommes done, peut-etre, malgre la sagesse
du Gouvernement de la Republique et le calme de I'opinion,
a la veille des evenements les plus redoutables.

De toutes les informations qui nous arrivent, il resulte
que si I'Allemagne avait la certitude que le Gouvernement.
anglais n'interviendrait pas dans un conflit 011 la France serait
engagee, la guerre serait inevitable, et qu'en revanche, si
I'Allemagne avait la certitude que I'entente cordiale s'af&rme-
rait, le cas echeant, jusque sur les champs de bataille, il y
aurait les plus grandes chances pour que la paix ne. fut pas
troublee.

Sans doute nos accords militaires et navals laissent entiere
la liberte du Gouvernement de votre Majeste, et, dans les
lettres ^changees en 1912 entre Sir Edward Grey et M. Paul
304

KING GEORGE V. AND M. POINCARfi

Cambon, I'Angleterre et la France se sont simplement
engagees. Tune vis-a-vis de I'autre, a causer entre elles en cas
de tension europ6enne et a examiner ensemble s'il y avait
lieu a une action commune. Mais le caractere d'intimite
que le sentiment public a donne, dans les deux pays, a I'entente
de I'Angleterre et de la France, la coniiance ave? laquelle
nos deux Gouvernements n'ont cesse de travailler au maintien
de la paix, les sympathies que votre Majeste a toujours
tdmoignees a la France, m'autorisent a lui faire connaitre,
en toute franchise, mes impressions, qui sont celles du Gou-
vernement de la Republique et de la France entiere.

C'est, je crois, du langage et de la conduite du Gouverne-
ment anglais que dependent desormais les dernieres possi-
bilites d'une solution pacifique.

Nous avons nous-memes, des le debut de la crise, recom-
mande a nos Allies une moderation, dont ils ne se sont pas
departis. D'accord avec le Gouvernement Royal et con-
formement aux dernieres suggestions de Sir E. Grey, nous
continuerons a agir dans le merae sens.

Mais si tous les efforts de conciliation partent du meme
cote, et si I'AUemagne et I'Autriche peuvent speculer sur
I'abstention de I'Angleterre, les exigences de I'Autriche
demeureront inflexibles et un accord deviendra impossible
entre la Russie et elle. J'ai la conviction profonde qu'a
I'heure actuelle, plus I'Angleterre, la France et la Russie
donneront une forte impression d'unite dans leur action
diplomatique, plus il sera encore permis de compter sur la
conservation de la paix.

Votre Majeste voudra bien excuser une demarche qui
n'est inspiree que par le desir de voir I'equihbre europeen
definitivement raffermi.

Je prie votre Majeste de croire a mes sentiments les plus
cordiaux.

R. POINCARE.

(Translation.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.
Dear and Great Friend,

IN the grave events through which Europe is passing, I
feel bound to convey to your Majesty the information which

II— u 305

KING GEORGE V. AND M. POINCARE [July 31,

the Government of the Republic have received from Germany.
The miUtary preparations which are being undertaken by
the Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neigh-
bourhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward
every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to
continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power
to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself
solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures.
But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation
serve to check Germany's action ; indeed, quite the reverse.
We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the moderation of the
Government of the Republic and the calm of pubUc opinion,
on the eve of the most terrible events.

From all the information which reaches us, it would seem
that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that
the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in
'"[c/. B. which France might be engaged "'; if, on the other hand,
17; Y. 63.] Germany were convinced that the entente cordiale would be
affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the
field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that
peace would remain unbroken.

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave
complete Uberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in
the letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and
1^1 [See B. j^ pa^^j Cambon,"" Great Britain and France entered into
[enclos )l iiothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another
in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert
whether common action were advisable.

But the character of close friendship which public feehng
has given in both countries to the entente between Great
Britain and France, the confidence with which our two
Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance
of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your Majesty has
ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite
frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Govern-
ment of the Republic and of all France.

It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the
British Government that henceforward the last chances of a
peaceful settlement depend.

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have
enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which

306

KING GEORGE V. AND M. POINCARE

they have not swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's
Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest
suggestion, we will continue to act on the same Unes.

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side,
and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention
of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible,
and an agreement between her and Russia wiU become im-
possible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present
moment the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can
give a deep impression that they are united in their diplo-
matic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the
preservation of peace.

I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only
inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power
definitely reaffirmed.

Pray accept the expression of my most cordial senti-
ments.

R. POINCARE.

No. 2.
The King to the President of the French Republic.

Buckingham Palace, August i, 1914.

Dear and Great Friend,

I MOST highly appreciate the sentiments which moved
you to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I
am grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and
frankly.

You may be assured that the present situation in Europe
has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to
me, and I am glad to think that our two Governments have
worked so amicably together in endeavouring- to find a peace-
ful solution of the questions at issue.

It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our
united efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not
without hope that the terrible events which seem so near
may be averted.

I admire the restraint which you and your Government
are exercising in refraining from taking undue military

307

KING GEORGE V. AND M. POINCARE [August

. measures on the frontier, and not adopting an attitude which
could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one.

I am personally using my best endeavours with the
'" [See p. Emperors of Russia '" and of Germany '" towards finding some
,j, r c ^■^°-' solution by which actual military operations may at any
Lq^^io] ^^*® ^^ postponed, and time be thus given for calm dis-
cussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these
efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of
an amicable settlement.

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing
so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments ;
but you may be assured that my Government will continue
to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of
interest to our two nations with M. Cambon.

Believe me,

M. le President,

(Signed) GEORGE R.I.

{British White-paper, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1915) Cd. 7812.)

308

I9I4]

KING GEORGE V. AND THE TSAR.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY
KING GEORGE AND HIS MAJESTY THE TSAR.

(Published officially in Great Britain on August 5, 1914-)

No. I.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan {St. Petersburg.)

Foreign Office, August i, 1914.

YOU should at once apply for an audience with His
Majesty the Emperor, and convey to him the following per-
sonal message from the King : —

" My Government has received the following statement
from the German Government : —

" ' On July 29th the Russian Emperor requested the
German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia
and Austria.'" The Emperor immediately declared his ("[W. exh.
readiness to do so. ''' He informed the Russian Emperor of 21 ; Y.
this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. jW- V.
Without waiting for the result of this action Russia mobilised (siL^ j^
against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor pointed 22 • ^Y.
out to the Russian Emperor'" that hereby his attempt at app. V.
mediation would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further (III.).]
asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military opera- '"[W.,
tions against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In P- ^33 ; Y.
spite of this the German Government continued its mediation ^P^'j 7;
at Vienna. In this matter the German Government have ^ '''^
gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested to a
Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The pro-
posals made by the German Government at Vienna were
conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain,
and the German Government recommended them at Vienna
for their serious consideration. They were taken into con-
sideration at Vienna this morning.'" During the delibera- (4)j-^^ g
tions of the (? Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were con- no.]

eluded, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported

300

KING GEORGE V. AND THE TSAR [August ] u

"'[c/. w. the mobilisation of the entire Russian army and fleet.'"
<jxh. 24.] Owing to this action on the part of Russia the Austrian answer
to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under
consideration, was not given. This action on the part of
Russia is also directed against Germany — ^that is to say, the
Power whose mediation had been invoked by the Russian
Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious counter
measures to this action, which we were obhged to consider as
hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our
country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the
Russian mobilisation on our frontier. We have therefore

'"'{O. 70 ; informed Russia"" that, unless she were prepared to suspend

R- 54] within twelve hours the warlike measure against Germany

and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilise, and this would

mean war. We have asked France if she would remain

'"[Y. 117.] neutral during a German- Russian war.'"'

" I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has
produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any
possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present
threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal
appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel
must have occurred, and to leave stiU open grounds for nego-
tiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way
contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do ever5^hing
in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversa-
tions between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that
you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be
done to secure the peace of the world."

No. 2.
His Majesty the Tsar to His Majesty King George.

August I, 1914.

I WOULD gladly have accepted your proposals had not

'*'[" at 7.10 German Ambassador this afternoon'*' presented a note to

Q^^Q~ niy Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of

■ ^ '■' the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts

(5) |-j.y g 22_ to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by

97 ; R, ' Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Serbia

47] and make her a vassal"' of Austria. Effect of this would

310

KING GEORGE V. AND THE TSAR

have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of
such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including
that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and
Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for bring-
ing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that Germany
showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not
put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declaration of
war on Serbia forced me to order a partial mobilisation,'" '"P- 7o^
though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers ^^''-^

strongly advised a general mobilisation owing to quickness
with which Germany can mobilise in comparison with Russia.
I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence
of complete Austrian mobilisation,"" of the bombardment ''''[O- 47-]
of Belgrade, ''' of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, '" [Y. 113]
and of secret military preparations being made in Germany.
That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's
sudden declaration of war,'*' which was quite unexpected "^[O- 76]
by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the
Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as
mediation negotiations continued. ''' ' ^- ^PP-

In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that ' ^ ''
I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has
been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support
France and Russia. God bless and protect you.

311

[August 4,

Al"

FOREIGN OFFICE NOTICES.

I.— GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

A State of War.

HIS Majesty's Government informed the German Govern-
ment on August 4th, 1914, that, unless a satisfactory reply
to the request of His Majesty's Government for an assurance
that Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium was
II. received by midnight of that day, His Majesty's Government
would feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold
that neutrality and the observance of a treaty to which Ger-
:.tt .0]' many was as much a party as Great Britain.

The result of this communication having been that His

P^ajesty's Ambassador at Berlin had to ask for his passports,

Kjj: ./]! His Majesty's Government have accordingly formally notified

'''^' ■'- ^^p German Government that a state of war exists between

1^)^ two countries as from 11 p.m. to-day.

ti Foreign Office,

August 4th, 1914.

{London Gazette, August 5, 1914.)

II.— GREAT BRITAIN AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Notice.

DIPLOMATIC relations between France and Austria
being broken off, the French Government have requested His
Majesty's Government to communicate to the Austro-Hun-
garian Ambassador in London the following Declaration :

" Apres avoir declare la guerre a la Serbie et pris ainsi
la premiere initiative des hostilites en Europe, le Gouverne-
ment austro-hongrois s'est mis, sans aucune provocation du
Gouvernement de la Republique Frangaise, en etat de guerre
avec la France ;

'312

FOREIGN OFFICE NOTICES

1°. — ^Apres que TAlleinagne avait successivement declare
la guerre a la Russie et a la France, il est intervenu dans ce
coiSflit en declarant la guerre a la Russie qui combattait deja
aux cotes de la France.

2°. — ^D'apres de nombreuses informations dignes de foi,
I'Autriche a envoye des troupes sur la frontiere allemande,
dans des conditions qui constituent une menace directe a
regard de la France.

En presence de cet ensemble de faits, le Gouvernement
frangais se voit oblige de declarer au Gouvernement austro-
hongrois qu'il va prendre toutes les mesures qui lui permettront
de repondre a ces actes et a ces menaces."

In communicating this Declaration accordingly to the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, His Majesty's Government
have declared to His Excellency that the rupture with France
having been brought about in this way, they feel themselves
obliged to announce that a state of war exists between Great
Britain and Austria-Hungary as from midnight.

Foreign Office,

August 12th, 1914.

{London Gazette, August 13, 1914.)

313

[October 13,

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS.

{a) DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED BY GERMANY.

'"[So "THE BRUSSELS DOCUMENTS I.""'

headed in

p-^-^- {North German Gazette* October 13, 1914.)

Teolvsee THE assertion of the British Government that the viola-

p 229 ; tion of Belgian neutraUty by Germany was the cause of

Belgian England's participation in the present war, has already been

reply, proved untenable by Sir Edward Grey's own declaration.

P- 350. Certain documents discovered by the German military

° 1 authorities in the archives of the Belgian General Staff in

Brussels throw a new and somewhat peculiar light upon the

pathetic moral indignation at the German invasion of Belgium,

with which the English tried to stir up the feeling in neutral

countries against Germany.

From the contents of a portfolio bearing the inscription,

" Intervention anglaise en Belgique," it is evident that the

despatch of an English expeditionary corps to Belgium in the

event of a Franco-German war was already contemplated

as far back as the year 1906. According to a report of April

<^'[For text loth, 1906,''' addressed to the Belgian Minister of War, which

of this -^as found there, the chief of the Belgian General Staff, after

report see repeatedly conferring with Lieutenant-Colonel Bamardiston,

fFseg'^ then English Military Attache in Brussels, worked out upon

the latter 's initiative and in conjunction with him, a detailed

plan for joint operations against Germany of the Belgian

• Army and an English expeditionary force of 100,000 men.

This plan met with the approval of Major-General Grierson,

Chief of the British General Staff. Full informationfas to

the strength and organisation of the British troops, as to the

composition of the expeditionary corps, as to the places

of disembarkation and the exact time of the despatch of the

troops, &c., was communicated to the Belgian General Staff.

On the ground of this information, the Belgian General Staff

* [Norddeufsche Allgemeine Zeitung.']
3M

1914] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

thoroughly prepared, for the transport of the British troops to
the basis of their strategical operations against Germany, and
also for the housing and feeding of the troops. All the details
/of the co-operation of the latter with the Belgians were carefully
worked out. Thus a large number of interpreters and Belgian
gendarmes were to be placed at the disposal of the British
Army, and the necessary maps were to be supplied to them.
Provisions were even made for the care of the British wounded.

Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne were selected as ports
of disembarkation for the British troops. From these places
they were to be transported by Belgian trains into the fighting
zone. The fact that the disembarkation at French ports and
the transport through French territory were planned, proves
that the Anglo-Belgian arrangements were preceded by
arrangements with the French General Staff. These three
Powers drew up the exact plans for the co-operation of the
" allied armies," as the document says. This is further
substantiated by the fact that among the secret documents
there was also found a map showing the French lines of
deployment.

The report mentioned above contains some remarks of
special interest. It is said there that Lieutenant-Colonel
Barnardiston had remarked that Holland's support could not
be relied upon at the time (1906), and that he had further
given the confidential information that the British Govern-
ment intended to transfer to Antwerp the basis for provision-
ing the British Army, as soon as the North Sea had been
cleared of aU German warships. The British Military Attache
also suggested the establishment of a spy service in the
Prussian Rhine Province.

A valuable supplement to the military documents dis-
covered, was found amongst the secret papers in the shape
of a report by Baron Greindl, for many years Belgian Minister
in Berlin, addressed to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
In it Baron Greindl reveals with great acumen the real reasons
which prompted England to make her offer, and he points out
the dangerous situation in which Belgium had placed herself
by taking sides with the Entente Powers. In this very
detailed report, dated December 23rd, 1911, the full text
of which may at the Government's discretion be published
in due course, Baron Greindl points out that the plan, drawn

315

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [October 13,

up by the Belgian General Staff for the defence of Belgian
neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war and com-
municated to him (the Minister), had bearing only on the
question of what military measures should be taken in the
event of Germany violating Belgian neutrality, whereas the
hypothesis of a French attack upon Germany through Belgium
was equally within the range of possibilities. The Minister

<i'[For then proceeds as follows'^' :
transla-
tion of " VON der franzosischen Seite her droht die Gefahr
Baron nicht nur im Siiden von Luxemburg. Sie bedroht uns auf
remarks^ unserer ganzen gemeinsamen Grenze. Fiir diese Behauptung
sgg ' sind wir nicht nur auf Mutmassungen angewiesen. Wir
p. 328.] haben dafiir positive Anhaltspunkte.

" Der Gedanke einer Umfassungsbewegung von Norden
her gehort zweifellos zu den Kombinationen der Entente
cordiale. Wenn das nicht der Fall ware, so hatte der Plan,
Vlissingen zu befestigen, nicht ein solches Geschrei in Paris
und London hervorgerufen. Man hat dort den Grund gar
nicht verheimlicht, aus dem man wiinschte, dass die Schelde
ohne Verteidigung bliebe. Man verfolgte dabei den Zweck,
unbehindert eine englische Garnison nach Antwerpen iiber-
f iihren zu konnen, also den Zweck, sich bei uns eine Operations-
basis fiir eine Offensive in der Richtung auf den Niederrhein
und Westfalen zu schaffen und uns dann mit fortzureissen,
was nicht schwer gewesen ware. Denn nach Preisgabe
unseres nationalen Zufiuchtsortes hatten wir durch unsere
eigene Schuld uns jeder Moglichkeit begeben, den Forde-
rungen unserer zweifelhaften Beschiitzer Widerstand zu
leisten, nachdem wir so unklug gewesen waren, sie dort
zuzulassen. Die ebenso perfiden wie naiven Eroffnungen
des Obersten Barnardiston zur Zeit des Abschlusses der
Entente cordiale haben uns deutlich gezeigt, um was es sich
handelte. Als es sich herausstellte, dass wir uns durch die
angeblich drohende Gefahr einer Schliessung der Schelde
nicht einschiichtern liessen, wurde der Plan zwar nicht
aufgegeben, aber dahin abgeandert, dass die englische Hilfsar-
mee nicht an der belgischen Kiiste, sondern in den nachstheg-
enden franzosischen Hafen gelandet werden soUte. Hierfiir
zeugen auch die Enthiillungen des Kapitans Faber, die
ebensowenig dementiert worden sind wie die Nachrichten

316

1914] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

der Zeitungen, durch die sie bestatigt oder in einzelnen
Punkten erganzt worden sind. Diese in Calais und Diinkirchen
gelandete englische Armee wiirde nicht an unserer Grenze
entlang nach Longwy marschieren, um Deutschland zu er-
reichen. Sie wiirde sofort bei uns von Nordwesten her eindring-
en. Das wiirde ihr den Vorteil verschaffen, sofort in Aktion
treten zu konnen, die belgische Armee in einer Gegend zu
treffen, in der wir uns auf keine Festurig stiitzen konnen,
falls wir eine Schlacht riskieren wollen. Es wiirde ihr
ermoglichen, an Ressourcen aller Art reiche Provinzen zu
besetzen, auf alle Falle aber unsere Mobilmachung zu
behindern oder sie nur zuzulassen, nachdem wir uns formell
verpfiichtet batten, die Mobilmachung nur zum Vorteil
Englands und seines Bundesgenossen durchzufiihren.

" Es ist dringend geboten, im voraus einen Schlachtplan
fiir die belgische Armee auch fiir diese Eventualitat aufzus-
tellen. Das gebietet sowohl das Interesse an unserer
militarischen Verteidigung als auch die Fiihrung unserer
auswartigen Politik im Falle eines Krieges zwischen Deutsch-
land und Frankreich."

These remarks, made by an unbiassed personality, prove
conclusively that the same Great Britain who is now pretend-
ing to be the protectress of Belgian neutrality induced Belgium
to side with the Entente Powers, and that at one time England
even thought of infringing on the Netherlands' neutrahty.
Moreover it is clearly shown that the Belgian Government
itself, by lending its ear to the British proposals, has rendered
itself guilty of a grave offence against the obligations resting
upon it as a neutral power. Had the Belgian Government
acted in. full accordance with the duties of a neutral country,
it would have come to an arrangement with Germany similar
to the one made with France and England. The papers
discovered supply the documentary proof of the fact, known
to the German authorities long before the outbreak of war,
that Belgium was conniving with the Entente Powers. These
papers may serve as a justification of our military action, and
also as a confirmation of the reports received by the German
military authorities regarding the intentions of France.
May they open the eyes of the Belgian people as to whom
the catastrophe is due which has overtaken their unfortunate
country !

317

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [November 25,

('I [So "THE BRUSSELS DOCUMENTS 11.""'

headed

in {North German Gazette* November 25, 1914, Special
D.O.W.] Supplement.)

The Breach of Belgian Neutrality by England and

Belgium.

<^'[S«e The British Government has confined its answer'^' to our

P- 329-] revelations from the archives of the Belgian Ministry of War,
concerning the Anglo-Belgian military agreements in 1906,
to the statement that Major-General Grierson, who took part
in their formulation, had, died ; that Colonel Barnardiston was
away as chief of the English troops before Kiao-chau ; and
that it was possible that an academic discussion had taken
place between those two British officers and the Belgian
Military authorities, concerning the assistance which the
British Army would be able to give to Belgium in case her
neutrality were violated by one of her neighbours.
(" [See The Belgian Government has observed'^' that it could only

P- 350] be considered as natural that the English Military Attache
in Brussels should, during the Algeciras crisis, have asked
the Chief of the Belgian General Staff about the measures
which were to prevent the violation of Belgian neutrality
guaranteed by England. The Chief of the General Staff,
'"t"^",', . General Ducarme,"' had answered, that Belgium would
"^Ataian^^^ capable of warding off an attack, no matter from which
ach de side it might come. The Belgian Government adds to this the
Gotha" following remark ■.'°' "Did the conversation exceed these
for 1907, limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston explain the war plan
^%y\ which the British General Staff wished to follow in case our
J^*^ neutrahty should be violated ? We doubt it." Demanding
ments.] the unabridged publication of the material found in the
[Seep. Belgian secret archives, the Belgian Government makes
351] the solemn assertion that it was never asked directly or in-
directly to take sides with the Triple Entente in case of a
Franco-German war.

As may be seen from these declarations, the British Govern-
ment from the beginning has failed to dispute the statements

* [Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung.]
318

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

of the Imperial Government. It has Umited itself to mini-
mising them. It perhaps suggested itself to the British
Government that, owing to the overwhelming abundance of
evidence, a denial of the facts would be useless and risky.
The discovery, in the meantime, of an Anglo-Belgian military
news service, and of Belgian war maps prepared by the
British Authorities, prove anew how far the preparations for
the Anglo-Belgian war plan against Germany had proceeded.

We reproduce herewith in fascimile the text of the rough
draft discovered of the report of General Ducarme'" to the
Belgian Minister of War of April loth, 1906, which can hardly
be unknown to the Belgian Government, inasmuch as the
Belgian Minister in Berlin, Baron Greindl, expressly referred
to its contents in his report of December 23rd, 191 1.'" If,
however, the memory of the Belgian Government should be
faulty, its doubts concerning the themes treated in the con-
versations of General Ducarme'" with Lieutenant-Colonel
Barnardiston may be dissipated by the following text of the
report which was preserved in the Belgian Ministry of War, in
an envelope containing the inscription, " Conventions '*'
anglo-belges."

The report of General Ducarme'" reads, in translation, as
follows : —

[For the original French text and English translation of
General Ducame's report see pp. 331-339.

. The North German Gazette gives the document in facsimile,
and also prints in facsimile, as the inscription on the cover of
the report, the words " Conventions anglo-belges." But as
to the word " Conventions " see British of&cial comment,
vol. I., p. 23, footnote.]

It will be noted thai: the following note appears on the
margin of the document : " L'entree des Anglais en Belgique
ne se ferait qu'apres la violation de notre neutralite par
I'Allemagne." (The entry of the English into Belgium shall
not take place until after the violation of our neutrality by
Germany.) How the matter really stood appears from a note
found in the Belgian Ministry of the Interior, concerning a
conversation of a successor of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnar-
diston, the British Military Attache in Brussels, Lieutenant-
Colonel Bridges, with the Belgian Chief of the General Staff,

319

note
p. 318.]

p. 328.]

British
official
com-
ment,
vol. I.,

P- 23,
footnote.]

(1)

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [November 25,

General Jungbluth. The document, which is dated April 23rd
[In and probably dates from the year 1912,'" bears the inscription

C.p.D. " confidentielle " in the handwriting of Count van der Straaten,
officiaU Director in the Belgian Ministry of the Interior, and reads
dated "^ in translation as follows :

"Apnl j-ppj. ^jjg French original and English translation of this

1^12."] document see pp. 339-34I-]

Here it is plainly stated that the British Government had
the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, to send troops
to Belgium immediately, that is to say, to violate Belgian
neutrality and do the very thing which England, at the time
when Germany, justified by reasons of self-protection,
anticipated her, used as a pretext for declaring war on
Germany. Moreover, the British Government, with a
cynicism that is unparalleled in history, has taken advantage
of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality for the purpose
of raising sentiment against us all over the world and of
posing as the protector of small and weak States.

As regards the Belgian Government, it was its duty not
only to reject most emphatically the British insinuations,
but also to point out to the other signatories of the London
(""[See Protocol of 1839,"' ^^d especially to the German Government,
P- 487-] that England had repeatedly tempted Belgium to disregard the
duties incumbent upon her as a neutral power. The Belgian
Government, however, did not do so. That Government
considered itself justified in taking, in agreement with the
British General Staff, military precautions against the supposed
plan of a German invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the
Belgian Government has never made the slightest attempt
to take, in agreement with the German Government or the
military authorities of Germany, defensive measures against
the possibility of an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium.
Yet the documentary evidence which has been found proves
that Belgium was fully informed that such an invasion was
intended by the two Entente Powers. This shows that the
Belgian Government was determined from the outset to join
Germany's enemies and to make common cause with them.

330

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

" BRITISH ESPIONAGE IN BRUSSELS.""'
[North German Gazette* November 6, 1914.)

E. M. de I'ARMEE ANGLAISE
Je soussigne Dale Long, attache k I'E. M. requisitionne

'''[So
headed in
D.O.W.]

1914

A whole package of formulas like the one printed above
was foimd in the writing-room of the British central office for
espionage in Brussels.

Long before the war it had become known that a certain
Dale Long lived in Brussels and carried on espionage against
Germany for England. It has also been possible to bring
a great number of his agents before the court, but it was never
possible to establish definitely that Dale Long belonged to the
British General Staff. From the formulas found, however,
it appears that Dale Long was to join the British General
Staff in case of war, that he was authorised, as a member of
the British Army, to make requisitions in Belgium, and that
this authorisation was attested by the British Legation in
Brussels, as the seal indicates. The presence of a great pile
of blank formulas of this sort moreover proves in quite
unimpeachable manner that this was a measure of mobilisa-
tion which would be impossible without the consent of the
Belgian Government.

[Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeilung.'\

II— X

321

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [December 2,

, " NEW DOCUMENTS CONCERNING ENGLAND'S

headed BREACH OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.'"" ■

D.O.W.] [North German Gazette* December 2, 1914.)

EVIDENCE is accumulating that England, working in
conjunction with Belgium, had done its utmost, not only
diplomatically, but also in a military way, to prepare for war
against Germany. Our troops recently captured secret
military handbooks dealing with Belgium's roads and rivers,
which the English General Staff had published (Belgium,
Road and River Reports prepared by the General Staff, War
Of&ce) . Four volumes of this handbook are in our possession,
of which the first volume was printed as long ago as 1912,
the second in 1913, the third (in two parts) and the fourth in
1914.

They are marked : Confidential. This Book is the
property of H.B.M. Government, and is intended for the
personal information of . . . who is personally responsible
for its' safe custody. The contents are to be disclosed only
to authorised persons.

These handbooks contain the most exact descriptions of
territory conceivable, based upon military investigations.
The introductory notice reads : These reports can only give
the state of the roads at the time they were reconnoitred.
It will always be advisable to reconnoitre them immediately
before using them, to make sure that they are not blocked
owing to repairs or pipe-laying, apart from possible obstruc-
tions arranged by hostile forces or inhabitants.

Thus, for example, in volume I., pages 130 sqq., the high
road Nieuport — Dixmuide — Ypres — Menin — Tourcoing —
Tournai is dealt with as regards the nature of the road, the
country traversed, tactical considerations, observation points
and water conditions, and illustrated by special maps. The
report includes an enumeration and description of places
along the way. It contains their exact distances from each
other, as well as exhaustive details concerning the roads under
discussion, their grades, bridges, cross-roads, telephone and

* [Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung.}
322

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

telegraph stations, railway stations, including the length of
their platforms and embankments, narrow-gauge railways,
oiltanks, etc. It is always stated whether all or part of the
inhabitants speak French.

Let us, for example, give literally the tactical observations
about Dixmuide found on page 151 : —

" Dixmuide would be difficult to take, whether attacked
from the north or from the south. The best line to hold
against an attack from the south would be the railway embank-
ment W. of and up to the road, continuing along a line of
knolls to the east of the road. West of the road the field of
fire is good for 1,500 yards, east of it trees limit the view. A
suitable garrison would be Hoogmolen and Veartkant. There
is nothing else of tactical importance, nor is there anything
likely to retard the rate of marching. Observation points :
(a) the mill at Reencheeck, view all round ; {b) Koelberg
(7 J miles beyond Ypres) view to east and south. Incidentally
it may be remarked that the church towers are, as a rule,
noted as good observation points."

In a similarly thorough manner the whole course of the
Scheldt is described, with all tributary rivers, villages, landing
and fording places, breadth and depth, bridges, boats on
hand, etc.

Thus the handy volumes form a splendid guide for com-
manders. General Staff officers, and subordinate leaders of
every grade. There are appended :

(i) A list of billeting possibilities in the various communes
and villages, giving figures on billets for men, transport
facilities at hand, and all other details which a commander
requires ;

(2) A Report on Belgium, south of the line Charleroi —
Namur — ^Liege, and on Brussels from the point of view of
aviation, containing valuable information for aviators.

This lucid report, compiled most carefully and supple-
mented by a map of landing-places, bears the inscription
" secret," and was drawn up in July, 1914.

Now these handbooks drawn up from a military and
geographical point of view were not made just a short time
before or during the war. Except perhaps the printing of

323

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [December 2

them, that would not have been possible. The material on
which they are based was, as may be gathered from the notes
regarding the various parts, acquired since 1909 through
careful and separate investigations. The first volume was
then printed in 1912.

These reports therefore prove, that there has been going on
for the last five years a thorough preparation for a campaign ,

in neutral Belgium. They are nothing else than a set of secret
regulations for an English army waging war in that country.
Thus the British General Staff, for some considerable time,
prepared for this eventuality to such an extent, and foresaw
it so clearly, that it carried out the tedious work of the com-
pilation of these military handbooks.

Such a work could not have been accomplished without
the ready and most extensive support of the Belgian Govern-
ment and military officials. Such exhaustive and detailed
strategic and tactical information as that mentioned above,
or such exact data concerning all the railways and the entire
traffic, concerning the rolling stock, the locks and bridges
systems, cannot be obtained in any other way. The lists of
billeting possibilities drawn up for the British Army and
which deal with Belgium as if it were their own country, can
only have been supplied by the Belgian Government. Without
question official Belgian material was used here. It was
adapted to suit English purposes, or in many places simply
translated into English.

Such was the thoroughness with which England and
Belgium had arranged in time of peace for joint miUtary action.
Belgium was, politically and from a military point of view,
nothing but England's vassal. The indignation exhibited
before the world by England over Germany's alleged breach of
neutrality, is shown by these documents to be absolutely
groundless and unjustified. If anybody has a right to be
indignant, it is Germany.

When, on the occasion of our operations on the coast,
the English and French Press asserted contemptuously that
we were not informed as to the dangers of the submergible
territory in the so-called Polderland, it was correct in so far
as we knew Belgian territory at the beginning of the war only
through what we had been able to find in the sources available
in the bookstores.

324

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

For this reason, the EngUsh reports of their investigations
and their excellent maps were valuable booty for us. We
were able to make immediate use of this extraordinarily
valuable material for our own purposes, and to fight England
with her own weapons. - In this fact may be found the best
tribute to the painstaking work of our enemies.

" DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF MR.

GRANT-WATSON, SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH

LEGATION.""' . "'[So

headed

{North German Gazette* December 15, 1914.) n n w i

NEW and important proofs have been found of the
Anglo-Belgian complicity. Some time ago Mr. Grant- Wat-
son, f the Secretary of the British Legation, was arrested in
Brussels. He had remained at the legation quarters, after
the legation had been transferred to Antwerp and later to
Havre. The said gentleman was recently caught trying to
do away with some documents, which he had carried away
unnoticed from the legation when arrested. An examination
of the papers revealed that they were official documents,
with data of the most intimate character concerning the
Belgian mobilisation and the defence of Antwerp, dating from
the years 1913 and 1914. They include circular orders to
the higher Belgian officers in command, bearing the signature
in facsimile of the Belgian Minister of War and of the Belgian
General Staff, and also a note concerning a conference of the
" Commission de la base d'approvisionnements a Anvers,"
on May 27th, 1913. The fact that these papers were found
in the British Legation shows sufficiently that the Belgian
Government had no mihtary secrets to hide from the English
Government, and that both governments, with regard to
military matters, are in very close touch with each other.

* [Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung.]

I [Much diplomatic correspondence subsequently passed between
London and Berlin, through the hands of the United States Ambassadors,
concerning the arrest and detention of Mr. Grant- Watson, Second Secretary
of the British Legation at Brussels, and the charges brought against him
by the Germans.!

325

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [December 15

There is also a handwritten note of especial interest which
was found among the papers that the British Secretary
endeavoured to destroy. It reads as follows : —

Renseignemenis.

1°. Les ofl&ciers frangais ont regu ordre de rejoindre
des le 27. apres-midi.

2°. Le meme jour, le chef de Gare de Feignies a regu
ordre de concentrer vers Maubeuge tous les wagons fermes
disponibles, en vue du transport de troupes.

Communique par la Brigade de gendarmerie de
Frameries.

Feignies, it may be remarked, is a railway station in
France on the road from Maubeuge to Mons, about three
kilometres from the Belgian frontier. Frameries is on the
same line in Belgium, ten kilometres from the French frontier.

From this notice it must be gathered that France had
already made her first mobilisation plans on July 27th, and
that the British Legation immediately received information
thereof from Belgian sources.

The material thus discovered furnishes an additional and
valuable proof — ^if indeed any be needed — of the relations
existing between England and Belgium. It shows anew that
Belgium had sacrificed her own neutrality in favour of the
Entente, and that she was an active member of the coalition
which had been formed to fight the German Empire. For
England, on the other hand, Belgian neutrality really was
nothing but " a scrap of paper," to which she appealed when
it was in her interest, and which she disregarded when she
found it expedient to do so. It is obvious that the British
Government made use of the violation of Belgian neutrality
by Germany, only as a pretext to justify the war against us
before the world and the British people.

{b) DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED BY GREAT BRITAIN.

[The documents that follow emanated from the British
Foreign Office and were printed, in the order here preserved,
in the Blue-book entitled : " Collected Diplomatic Docu-
ments Relating to the Outbreak of the European War "

326

1914] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

(Miscellaneous, No. 10 (1915). Cd. 7860), as an Appendix
to the translation of the Belgian Grey-book [G]. They
include, as will be seen, translations into English of a number
of documents originally pubhshed in the Norddeutsche Allge-
meine Zeitung, which reappeared in the " Aktenstiicke zum
Kriegsausbruch," and in its English translation, " Docu-
ments relating to the Outbreak of the War," both of which
were published in Berlin by the German Foreign Office. It
is the Enghsh version pubhshed by the British Foreign
Office in the " Collected Diplomatic Documents " that is here
reproduced.]

DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE RELATIONS BE-
TWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND BELGIUM
PREVIOUSLY TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

No. I.

Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels*

Sir, Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.

IN speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speak-
ing unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge
that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be
the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that
this apprehension could have come from a British source.

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been
talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the
landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to
anticipate a possible despatch of German troops through
Belgium to France.

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be
the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not
believe that any British Government would be the first to do
so, nor would pubhc opinion here ever approve of it. What
we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing
question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for

* A record of this despatch was communicated by Sir F. Villiers to the
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

327

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [October 13

us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if
Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to
be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium
would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for
sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the
case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was
that their neutraUty should be respected, and as long as it
was not violated by any other Power we should certainly
not send troops ourselves into their territory.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 2.

Extract from a Despatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister
at Berlin, to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
dated December 23, 1911.

{From the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," October 13,

1914.)

»i [For the (TRANSLATION.) '"

German

version. " From the French side the danger threatens not only in

*^^ the south from Luxemburg ; it threatens us along our whole

Gennan common frontier.' For this assertion we are not dependent

com- only on surmises. We have positive facts to go upon.

ments, " The combinations of the Entente cordiale include, without

PP- 315- doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the

317] north. If that were not the case, the plan of fortifying

Flushing would not have evoked such an outcry in Paris

and London. No secret was made there about the reasons

why it was wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified.

The object was to be able to ship a British garrison without

hindrance to Antwerp, and to obtain in our country a base

of operations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower

Rhine and Westphaha, and then to carry us along with them,

which would not have been difficult. For after giving up

our national place of refuge, we should by our own fault

have deprived ourselves of any possibility of resisting the

demands of our doubtful protectors after being so foolish

328

1914] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

as to admit them to it. The equally perfidious and naif
revelations of Colonel Bamardiston at the time of the con-
clusion of the Entente cordiale showed us clearly what was
intended. When it became evident that we were not to be
intimidated by the alleged threatening danger of the closing
of the Scheldt, the plan was not indeed abandoned, but
altered in so far as the British auxiliary force was not to be
landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French har-
bours. The revelations of Captain Faber, which have been
no more denied than the information "of the newspapers
by which they were confirmed or elaborated in certain particu-
lars, are evidence of this. This British army, landed at
Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to
Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately
invade us from the north-west. This would gain for it the
advantage of going into action at once, of meeting the Belgian
army in a region where we cannot obtain support from any
fortress, in the event of our wishing to risk a battle. It
would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in
every kind of resource, but in any case to hinder our mobiUsa-
tion or to allow it only when we had formally pledged ourselves
to complete mobilisation solely for the benefit of Great
Britain and her allies.

" I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be
drawn up for this eventuality also. This is demanded as
much by the requirements of our military defence as by the
conduct of our foreign policy in the case of a war between
Germany and France."

No. 3.

Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Repre- w [On

sentatives Abroad* Oct.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, October 14, 1914. 19^4,

THE story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 314-317
1906 published in the German Press,"' and based on "The

^ „ _, . , Brussels
' JMOTE.— This telegram was sent on receipt of a summary of the docu- Docu-
ments contained in No. 4, issued by the German Government on the 13th ments
October in advance of the pubUcation of the documents themselves. I."]

329

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [October 14,

documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a
story which has been reproduced in various forms' and
denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever
existed.

As the Germans well know, General Grierson is dead, and
Colonel (now General) Barnardiston is commanding the
British forces before Tsing-tao. In 1906 General Grierson
was on the General Staff at the War Office and Colonel
Barnardiston was military attache at Brussels. In view of
the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the
neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some
academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of
Colonel Barnardiston, have taken place between General
Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what
assistance the British army might be able to afford to Belgium
should one of her neighbours violate that neutrality. Some
notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives
at Brussels.

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely,
1906, was the year following that in which Germany
had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude towards
France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the appre-
hensions existing of an attack on France through Bel-
gium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be
discussed.

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any
agreement of the nature indicated, or to any design for the
violation of Belgian neutrality, is clearly shown by the
reiterated declarations that she has made for many years
past, that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her
neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form
such violation might come.

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive
designs on the part of other Powers are made by Germany,
who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of
strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian
frontier through a barren thinly-populated tract, deliberately
constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium
which was carried out two months ago.

330

I9I4]

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

No. 4.

Documents as published in facsimile in a special Supplement
to the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung " of November
25, 1914.

Lettre d M. le Ministre de la Guerre au sujet des Entretiens

confidentiels. "'

(Confidentielle.) Bruxelles, le 10 avril, 1906.

M. LE Ministre,

J'AI I'honneur de vous rendre compte sommairement des
entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston
et qui ont fait I'objet de mes communications verbales.

La premiere visite date de la mi- Janvier. M. Barnardiston
me fit part des preoccupations de I'etat-major de son pays
relativement a la situation politique generale et aux eventu-
alites de guerre du moment. Un envoi de troupes, d'un
total de 100,000 hommes environ, etait projete pour le cas
ou la Belgique serait attaquee.

Le lieutenant-colonel m'ayant demande comment cette
action serait interpretee par nous, je lui repondis que, au
point de vue militaire, elle ne pourrait qu'etre favorable ;
mais que cette question d'intervention relevait egalement du
pouvoir politique et que, des lors, j'etais tenu d'en entretenir
le Ministre de la Guerre.

M. Barnardiston me repondit que son Ministre a Bruxelles
en parlerait a notre Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.

II continua dans ce sens : le debarquement des troupes
anglaises se ferait sur la cote de France, vers Dunkerque et
Calais, de fagon a hater le plus possible le mouvement.*
Le deijarquement par Anvers demanderait beaucoup plus de
temps, parce qu'il faudrait des transports plus considerables
et d' autre pars la securite serait moins complete,

* The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile : —

" L' entree des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'apres la violation de
notre neutrality par I'Allemagne."

331

(II [For
German
com-
ments
on this
docu-
ment,
see

pp. 314-
320.]

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [November 25

Ceci admis, il resterait a regler divers autres points,
savoir : les transports par chemin de fer, la question des
requisitions auxquelles I'armee anglaise pourrait avoir recours,
la question du commandement superieur des forces aUiees.

II s'informa si nos dispositions etaient suffisantes pour
assurer la defense du pays durant la traversee et les trans-
ports des troupes anglaises, temps qu'il evaluait a une dizaine
de jours.

Je repondis que les places de Namur et de Liege etaient
a I'abri d'un coup de main et que, en quatre jours, notre
arm6e de campagne, forte de 100,000 hommes, serait en etat
d'intervenir. Apres avoir exprime toute sa satisfaction au
sujet de mes declarations, mon interlocuteur insista sur le
fait que : (i) notire conversation etait absolument con-
fidentielle ; (2) elle ne pouvait lier son Gouvernement ;
(3) son Ministre, I'etat-major general anglais, lui et moi
etions seuls, en ce moment, dans la confidence ; (4) il ignorait
si son Souverain avait ete pressenti.

Dans un entretien subsequent, le Lieutenant-Colonel
Barnardiston m'assura qu'il n'avait jamais regu de con-
fidences d' autres attaches militaires au sujet de notre
armee. II precisa ensuite les donnees numeriques concernant
les forces anglaises ; nous pouvions compter que, en douze
ou treize jours, seraient debarques : deux corps d'arm6e,
quatre brigades de cavalerie, et deux brigades d'infanterie
montee.

II me demanda d' examiner la question du transport de
ces forces vers la partie du pays ou elles seraient utiles et,
dans ce but, il me promit la composition detaillee de I'armee
de debarquement.

22 II revint sur la question des effectifs de notre armee de
campagne en insistant pour qu'on ne fit pas de detachements
de cette armee a Namur et a Liege, puisque ces places etaient
pourvues de garnisons suf&santes.

II me demanda de fixer mon attention sur la necessite
de permettre a I'armee anglaise de beneficier des avantages
prevus par le reglement sur les prestations militaires. Enfin,
il insista sur la question du commandement supreme.
^ Je lui repondis que je ne pouvais rien dire quant k ce
dernier point, et je lui promis un examen attentif des autres
questions.

332

1914] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

Plus tard, rattacM militaire anglais confirma son esti-
mation prec6dente : douze jours seraient au moins indispen-
sables pour faire le d6barquement sur la cote de France.
II faudrait beaucoup plus (un a deux mois et demi) pour
debarquer 100,000 troupes a Anvers.

Sur mon objection qu'il 6tait inutile d'attendre I'acheve-
ment du debarquement pour commencer les transports par
chemin de fer, et qu'il valait mieux les faire au fur et a
mesure des arrivages, a la cote, le Lieutenant - Colonel
Barnardiston me promit des donnees exactes sur I'etat
journalier du debarquement.

Quant aux prestations militaires, je fis part a mon in-
terlocuteur que cette question serait facilement reglee.

A mesure que les etudes de I'etat-major anglais avangaient,
les donnees du probleme se precisaient. Le colonel m'assura
que la moitie de I'armee anglaise pourrait etre debarquee en
huit jours, et que le restant le serait a la fin du douzieme ou
treizieme jour, sauf I'infanterie montee, sur laquelle il ne
fallait compter que plus tard.

Neanmoins, je eras devoir insister a nouveau sur la
n^cessite de connaitre le rendement journalier, de fagon a
regler les transports par chemin de fer de chaque jour.

L'attache anglais m'entretint ensuite de diverses autres
questions, savoir : (i) necessite de tenir le secret des opera-
tions et d'obtenir de la presse qu'elle I'observat soigneuse-
ment ; (2) avantages qu'il y aurait a adjoindre un ofl&cier
beige a chaque etat-major anglais, un traducteur a. chaque
commandant de troupes, des gendarmes a chaque unite pour
aider les troupes de police anglaises.

Dans une autre entrevue, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardis-
ton et moi examinames les op6rations combinees dans le cas
d'une- agression de la part de I'AUemagne ayant comme
objectif Anvers et dans I'hypothese d'une traversee de notre
pays pour atteindre les Ardennes fran9aises.

Par la suite, le colonel me marqua son accord sur le plan
que je lui avals presente et m'assura de I'assentiment du
General Grierson, chef de I'etat-major anglais.

D'autres questions secondaires furent egalement reglees,
notamment en ce qui regarde les officiers intermediaires,
les traducteurs, les gendarmes, les cartes, les albums des
uniformes, les tir6s a part traduits en anglais de certains

333

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [November 25

reglements beiges, le reglement des frais de douane pour les
approvisionnements anglais, 1' hospitalisation des blesses de
I'armee alliee, &c. Rien ne fut arrete quant a Taction que
pourrait exercer sur la presse le Gouvemement ou I'autorite
militaire.

Dans les dernieres rencontres que j'ai cues avec I'attache
anglais, il me communiqua le rendement journalier des de-
barquements a Boulogne, Calais et Cherbourg. L'eloignement
de ce dernier point, impose par des considerations d'ordre
technique, occasionne un certain retard. Le premier corps
serait debarque le dixieme jour, et le second corps le quin-
zieme jour. Notre materiel des chemins de fer executerait
les transports, de sorte que I'arrivee, soit vers BruxeUes-
Louvain, soit vers Namur-Dinant, du premier corps serait
achevee le onzieme jour, et celle du deuxieme corps, le seizieme
jour.

J'ai insiste une derniere fois et aussi energiquement que
je le pouvais, sur la necessite de hater encore les transports
maritimes de fagon que les troupes anglaises fussent pres
de nous entre le onzieme et le douzieme jour ; les resultats
les plus heureux, les plus favbrables peuvent etre obtenus
' par une action convergente et simultanee des forces alliees.
Au contraire, ce sera un echec grave si cet accord ne se
produit pas. Le Colonel Barnardiston m'a assure que tout
sera fait dans ce but.

Au cours de nos entretiens, j'eus I'occasion de convaincre
I'attache militaire anglais de la volonte que nous avians
d'entraver, dans la limite du possible, les mouvements de
I'ennemi et de ne pas nous refugier, des le debut, dans Anvers.
De son cote, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston me fit part
de son peu de confiance actuellement dans I'appui ou I'inter-
vention de la HoUande. II me confia egalement que son
Gouvernement projetait de transporter la base d' approvision-
nements anglaise de la cote frangaise a Anvers, des que la mer
du nord serait nettoyee de tous les navires de guerre allemands.

Dans tous nos entretiens le colonel me communiqua regu-
lierement les renseignements confidentiels qu'il possedait sur
I'etat militaire et la situation de notre voisin de Test, &c.
En meme temps, il insista sur la necessite imperieuse pour la
Belgique de se tenir au courant de ce qui se passait dans
les pays rhenans qui nous avoisinent. Je dus lui confesser

334

1914] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

que, chez nous, le service de surveillance au dela de la frontiere,
au temps de paix, ne releve pas directement de notre etat-
major ; nous n'avons pas d' attaches militaires aupres de
nos legations. Je me gardai bien, cependant, de lui avouer
que j'ignorais si le service d' espionage, qui est present par
nos r^glements, etait ou non prepar6. Mais il est de mon
devoir de signaler ici cette situation qui nous met en etat
d'inferiorite flagrante vis-^-vis de nos voisins, nos ennemis
eventuels.

Le General-Major, Chef d'£.-M.'" '"[General

(Initialled.) Sf^^'

P- 318.]
Note. — Lorsque je rencontrai le General Grierson a Com-
piegne, pendant les manoeuvres de 1906, il m'assura que la
reorganisation de I'armee anglaise aurait pour resultat non
seulement d'assurer le debarquement de 150,000 hommes,
mais de permettre leur action dans un delai plus court que
celui dont il est question precedemment.

Fin septembre 1906.

(Initialled.)

(Translation.)

Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff] '*' to the "' [General
[Belgian] Minister of War respecting the confidential Inter- Ducame.]

views.

(Confidential.) Brussels, April 10, 1906.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to furnish herewith a summary of
the conversations which I have had with Lieutenant-Colonel
Barnardiston, which I have already reported to you verbally.'

His first visit was in the middle of January. Lieutenant-
Colonel Barnardiston told me of the pre-occupation of the
British General Staff concerning the general political situation
and the existing possibilities of war. Should Belgium be
attacked, it was proposed to send about 100,000 men.

The lieutenant-colonel having asked me how we should
interpret such a step, I answered that, from the miUtary
point of view, it could only be advantageous ; but that this

335

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [November 25,

question of intervention had also a political side, and that I
must accordingly consult the Minister of War.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston replied that his Minister
at Brussels would speak about it to our Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

He continued as follows : The disembarkation of the
British troops would take place on the French coast, in the
neighbourhood of Dunkirk and Calais, in such a manner that
the operation might be carried out in the quickest possible
way.* Landing at Antwerp would take much longer, as
larger transports would be required, and, moreover, the risk
would be greater.

This being so, several other points remained to be decided,
viz., transport by rail, the question of requisitions to which
the British Army might have recourse, the question of the
chief command of the allied forces.

He enquired whether our arrangements were adequate to
secure the defence of the country during the crossing and
transport of the British troops — a period which he estimated
at about ten days.

I answered that the fortresses of Namur and Liege were

safe against a surprise attack, and that in four days our field

army of 100,000 men would be ready to take the field. After

having expressed his. entire satisfaction at what I had said,

my visitor emphasised the following points : (i) Our con-

''i[See versation'" was absolutely confidential ; (2) it was in no way

footnote, binding on his Government ; (3) his Minister, the British

p ■ i' General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware

of the matter ; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign

had been consulted.

At a subsequent meeting Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston
assured me that he had never received any confidential
information from other military attaches about our army.
He then gave me a detailed statement of the strength of the
British forces ; we might rely on it that, in twelve or thirteen
days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades
of mounted infantry would be landed.

* The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile : —

(Translation.)
" The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the
violation of our neutrality by Germany."

336

1914] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

He asked me to study the question of the transport of
these forces to that part of the country where they would be
most useful, and with this object in view he promised me a
detailed statement of the composition of the landing force.

He reverted to the question of the effective strength of
our field army, and considered it important that no detach-
ments from that army should be sent to Namur and Liege,
as those fortresses were provided with adequate garrisons.

He drew my attention to the necessity of letting the
British Army take full advantage of the facilities afforded
under our regulations respecting military requirements.
Finally, he laid stress on the question of the chief command.

I replied that I could say nothing on the latter point, and
I promised that I would study the other questions with care.

Later, the British military attache confirmed his previous
estimate : twelve days at least were indispensable to carry
out the landing ,on the coast of France. It would take much
longer (from one to two and a half months) to land 100,000
men at Antwerp.

On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the
disembarkation was finished, before beginning the transport
by rail, and that it would be better to send on the troops by
degrees as they arrived on the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel
Bamardiston promised me precise details of the daily dis-
embarkation table.

With regard to the question of military requirements, I
informed my visitor that that question would easily be
arranged.

As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the
details of the problem were worked out with greater precision.
The colonel assured me that half the British Army could be
landed in eight days, and the remainder at the end of the
twelfth or thirteenth day, except the mounted infantry, on
which we could not count till later.

Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity
of knowing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work out
the railway arrangements for each day.

The British attache then spoke to me of various other
questions, viz. : (i) The necessity of maintaining secrecy
about the operations, and of ensuring that the Press should
observe this carefully ; (2) the advantages there would be in

II-Y ' 337

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [November 25.

attaching a Belgian officer to each British staff, an interpreter
to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit
to help the British military police.

At another interview Lie]itenant-Colonel Barnardiston aiid
I examined the question of combined operations in the event
of a German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the
hypothesis of our country being crossed in order to reach
the French Ardennes.

Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme
I had laid before him, and assured me of the assent of General
Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff.

Other questions of secondary importance were likewise
disposed of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers,
interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms,
English translations of extracts from certain Belgian regula-
tions, the regulation of customs dues chargeable on the
British supplies, hospital accommodation for the wounded
of the allied army, &c. Nothing was settled as to the possible
control of the Press by the Government or the military
authorities.

In the course of the last meetings which I had with the
British attach^ he communicated to me the daily disembarka-
lion table of the troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais
and Cherbourg. The distance of the latter place, included
owing to certain technical considerations, would cause a
certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the tenth
■day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our railways
would carry out the transport operations in such a way
that the arrival of the first corps, either towards Brussels-
Louvain or towards Namur-Dinant, would be completed on
the eleventh day and that of the second corps on the sixteenth
day.

I finally urged once again, as forcibly as was within my
power, the necessity of accelerating the transport by sea in
order that the British troops might be with us between the
eleventh and the twelfth day ; the very best and most favour-
able results would accrue from the concerted and simultaneous
action by the allied forces. On the other hand, a serious
check would ensue if such co-operation could not be achieved.
Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything would be 1

done with that end in view.
338

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity
of convincing the niihtary attache of our resolve to impede
the enemies' movements as far as lay within our power, and
not to take refuge in Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant-
Colonel Bamardiston, on his side, informed me that he had
at present little confidence in the support or intervention
of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his Government
intended to move the British base of supplies from the French
coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared
of all German warships.

At all our interviews the colonel regularly communicated
to me any confidential information he possessed respecting
the military condition and general situation of our eastern
neighbour, &c. At the same time he laid stress on the impera-
tive need for Belgium to keep herself well informed of what
was going on in the neighbouring Rhine country. I had to
admit to him that in our country the intelligence service
beyond the frontier was not, in times of peace, directly under
our General Staff. We had no military attaches at our
legations. I took care, however, not to admit to him that I
was unaware whether the secret service, prescribed in our
regulations, was organised or not. But it is my duty here
to call attention to this state of affairs, which places us in a
position of glaring inferiority to that of our neighbours, our
possible enemies.

Major-General, Chief, of General Staff. ^^^ ''' [General

(Initialled.) Ducarne.]

Note. — ^When I niet General Grierson at Goittpidgne at the
manoeuvres of 1906 he assured me that the reorganisation of
the British army would result not only in ensuring the landing
of 150,000 men, but in enabling them to take the field in a
shorter period than had been previously estimated.

End of September 1906.

(Initialled.^

(2.)
(Confidentielle.)

L'attache militaire anglais a demande k voir le General
Jungbluth. Ces messieurs se sont rencontres le 23 avril.

339

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [November 25,

Le Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges a dit au general que I'Angle-
terre disposait d'une armee pouvant etre envoyee sur le
continent, composee de six divisions d'infanterie et huit
brigades de cavalerie, soit en tout 160,000 hommes. Elle
a aussi tout ce qu'il lui faut pour defendre son territoire insu-
laire. Tout est pret.

Le Gouvernement britannique, lors des demiers evene-
ments, aurait debarque immediatement chez nous, meme si
nous n'avions pas demande de secours.

Le general a objecte qu'il faudrait pour cela notre con-
sentement.

L'attache militaire a repondu qu'il le savait, mais que
comme nous n'etions pas a meme d'empecher les AUemands
de passer chez nous, I'Angleterre aurait debarque ses troupes
en Belgique en tout etat de cause.

Quant au lieu de debarquement, l'attache militaire n'a
pas precis^ ; il a dit que la cote etait assez longue ; mais le
general sait que M. Bridges a fait, d'Ostende, des visites
journalieres k Zeebrugge pendant les fetes de Paques.

Le general a ajoute que nous etions, d'ailleurs, parfaite-
ment a meme d'empecher les AUemands de passer.

Le 24 avril, 1912.

w [For (Translation.) '"

German (Confidential.)

ments on ^^^ British military attache asked to see General Jung-
this docu- bluth. "" These gentlemen met on the 23rd April,
ment, see Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great
pp. 319- Britain had, available for despatch to the Continent, an army
3^^-l composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of
'^' [Chief of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she
Belgian needed for home defence. Everything was ready.
General jj^g British Government, at the time of the recent events,

-ts^n.] would have immediately landed troops on our territory,,
even if we had not asked for help.

The general protested that our consent would be necessary
for this.

The military attache answered that he knew that, but
that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans
passing through our territory. Great Britain would have
landed her troops in any event.
340

1914] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

As to the place of landing, the military attache was not
explicit. He said the coast was rather long ; but the general
knows that Mr. Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from
Ostend during the Easter holidays.

The general added that, after all, we were, besides, per-
fectly able to prevent the Germans from going through.

April 24, 1912.

No. 5.

Extract from a brochure entitled " On the Violation of Belgian

Neutrality," by M. J. Van den Heuvel, Belgian Minister

of State}'' '''[of.

Belgian

(Translation.) Answer,

. P-350.]

AN official communique appeared at once in the

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, of the 13th October."" The ""[Se^
whole German press hastened to echo the Norddeutsche pp-3i4-7-]
Allgemeine Zeitung. Large notices were posted on the walls
in Brussels and innumerable little yellow notices made their
appearance in the public places of other occupied towns.
The discovery was of paramount importance ; it was bound
to prove to all impartial people the guilt of the Governments
both of England and of Belgium and to show the foresight
and correctitude of Germany.

According to the communique, it appeared from documents
found in Brussels that; at the request of Great Britain, at the
beginning of the year 1906, Belgium had, in anticipation of
the violation of her neutrality by Germany, concluded with
the Powers of the Entente a convention which had for its
object the defence of her territory. Although a marginal
note on the dossier of 1906 stated expressly that " the entry
of the English into Belgium would only take place after the
violation of her neutrality by Germany,""" the suggestion was '^' [See p.
that Belgium, in settling the arrangements for this contingent 336.]

entry, had seriously misunderstood the duties of neutrals.
Germany alone was the object of her suspicion and she had
not " also foreseen the violation of Belgian neutrality by
Prance, and to provide for that event, concluded with Ger-
many a convention analogous to that concluded with France
and Great Britain."

341

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

The communique recognises that it was open to Belgium,
in the interests of self -protection, to make arrangements with
the Powers which had guaranteed her international position.
Indeed a neutralised State retains the right of making defen-
sive treaties. The fact that the inviolabiUty of such a State
is under the aegis or guarantee of certain Powers does not
deprive her of this right. But the arrangements which such a
State can make with the guaranteeing Powers to guard against
a contingent invasion are, after all, nothing but measures for
carrying out the pre-existing engagements of the guarantee.
The grievance alleged by the communique is that a con-
vention should have been made by Belgium in anticipation of
a penetration of hostile troops into Belgian territory, without
notice being given to Germany, and without the latter Power
being appealed to to make a similar convention in anticipation
of an invasion of Belgium by French or British troops.

If a convention really existed, as the communique states,
it is just to observe that a State which has prepared a plan of
invasion is in an anomalous position in addressing reproaches
to a State which limits its action to putting itself on guard
and organising necessary measures of defence. And we must
remember that the invasion of Belgium by Germany was,
according to Herr von Jagow, forced upon the German General
Staff by an event of long standing, namely, the Franco-Russian
Alliance.
^^^[See As a matter of fact the convention'" which forms the

footnote gravamen of the German charges never existed.
p° ■ V Belgium did not make any special arrangements in antici-

pation of the violation of her territory by Germany, either
with England or with France, either in 1906 or at any other
date. It is in vain that Germany has searched and will search
our archives, she will not find there any proof of her allegation.
The official communique of the 13th October published
three documents ; the second communique of the 24th
""[5ee pp. November"' added a fourth document to the dossier. None
31 -20.J qJ these documents establishes the existence of any convention
whatever.

The first document is a report made to the Minister of War

<^>[See on the loth April, igo6, by General Ducarne,"" Chief of the

note Belgian General Staff. It relates to the conversations which

P- 3^8.1 j.qq]j place at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Bamardiston.

342

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

the British mihtary attache, between himself and General
Ducarne, on the subject of the arrangements that England
might be disposed to make to assist Belgium in the event of
a German invasion. According to the German notices : —

" The Chief of the Belgian General Staff worked out a
comprehensive plan for joint operations by a British Expedi-
tionary Force of 100,000 men with the Belgian Army against
Germany in repeated conferences with Lieutenant-Colonel
Bc|.rnardiston, at the instigation of the latter. The plan was
approved by the Chief of the British General Staff, Major-
Geheral Grierson. The Belgian General Staff were supplied
with all data as to the strength and organisation of the British
forces. ... The latter thoroughly prepared for the transport.
. . . Co-operation was carefully worked out in every detail.
. . . Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne were contemplated as the
points of disembarkation for the British troops."

This document shows th3,t though the Belgian General
Staff did not take the initiative, yet it did not refuse to discuss
with the British military attach^ a plan for the help which
Britain, acting as guaranteeing Power, would be able, in case
of need, to send to Belgium to repiilse a German attack.

But what accusation against Belgium can be based on
this?

Since it is recognised that Belgium has the right to ma^ke
defensive agreements for putting into operation the guarantees
given by the guaranteeing Powers, the Belgian General Staff
would have found it difficult to refuse entirely to consider
suggestions made by the military attaches of those Powers.
Such discussions do not interfere in any way with the freedom
or responsibility of the Government, and it is they alone who
can decide whether it is expedient or opportune to enter into
a convention and, if so, what convention they should make,
having regard to the duties and interests of the country.

In 1906 the Government believed that it was proper for
them to rest content, as they had rested for more than sixty
yea.rs, with the general guarantee embodied in the Treaty of
1839,'^' and that the details of carrjdng out the guarantee »> [See
could not be fixed beforehand, that in their very nature they p. 487.1
must vary according to circumstances. Thus no convention
was entered upon. The work of the British military attache
and the Belgian officers resulted in nothing but the submission

345

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

of a report to the Minister of War by the Chief of the General
Staff.

The second document is a military map. " A map show-
ing the method of deployment of the French army was found
in the secret dossier."

The only inference to be drawn from this document —
which is not connected in any way with the report already
mentioned — is that the Belgian General Staff has always
sought, as is the duty of all General Staffs, to obtain the most
precise information possible as to the military plans of neigh-
bouring Powers.

But to pretend to argue from the mere possession of this
map that France must have been a party to the alleged con-
vention, of which Britain and Belgium are wantonly accused,
is to transcend the bounds of fancy.

The third document is a report on the international position
(1) ^see <^f Belgium sent by Baron Greindl, '" Belgian Minister Plenipo-
p. 316 ; tentiary at Berlin, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at
English Brussels on the 23rd December, 1911.

trans- Baron Greindl thought that a " French invasion was as

if ^281 probable as a German invasion."

" The combinations of the Entente Cordiale include,
without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from
the north. . . . The equally perfidious and naif revelations of
Colonel Bamardiston . . . showed us clearly what was in-
tended. . . . This British army, landed at Calais and Dun-
kirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order
to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from
the north-west. . . .

" / would strongly urge that a plan of action should he drawn
up for this eventuality also."

The inference to be drawn from this document is that the
plans of the Belgian General Staff communicated to Baron
Greindl dealt with the contingency either of an entry into
Belgium through the gap of the Meuse or of an invasion of
Luxemburg by one or other of the belligerents. Baron
Greindl thought it his duty to lay stress upon another hypothe-
sis, namely, the danger of an enveloping movement by the
north of France, which he had so often heard talked about in
Berlin. But the whole of this report rebuts the accusation
that Belgium had formed any engagements either with

344

p. 328.]

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

England or with France. Baron Greindl's attitude towards
Barnardiston's suggestions proves conclusively that he knew
that these suggestions had not resulted in any convention.

Such are the three documents pubUshed on the 13th
October hy the Nor ddeutsche AUegmeine Zeitung and placarded
everywhere with such a flourish of trumpets. They do not
contain the smallest scrap of evidence to support the German
charge. No criticism adverse to Belgium can be based upon
them. The German Government themselves understood this
so well that they ordered fresh searches to be made in the
archives.

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 24th November"' '" [Novem-
gave us the result of this second search. It is a fourth docu- ^^^ ^5.
ment, reporting a conversation which took place between ^^1^*
the British military attache, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges,
and General Jungbluth. It bears date the 23rd April,
igi2 : —

" Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the General that Great
Britain had ... an army of 160,000 men. . . . The British
Government at the time of the recent events would have
immediately landed troops in Belgium even if we had not
asked for help. The general protested that our consent would
be necessary for this. The military attache answered that he
knew that, but, that as we were not in a position to prevent
the Germans from passing through Belgium, Great Britain
would have landed her troops in any event. As to the place
of landing the military attache was not explicit. . . . The
general added that we were perfectly well able to prevent
the Germans from going through."

The inference to be drawn from this document is that,
in a private conversation between two officers of high rank,
which had no reference to any official mission, the British
officer expressed the personal opinion that in case of war
Great Britain could land " immediately " troops in Belgium
" even if we had not asked for help." The Belgian general
at once protested. He insisted that " our consent " weis
necessary, and that there was all the less reason for dispensing
with it since we " were perfectly well able " to stop the
Germans ; that is to say, to make them lose sufficient time
to deprive them of the advantage of a sudden attack,

345

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

How is it possible to draw any inference unfavourable to
Great Britain from the personal opinion of Lieutenant-
Colonel Bridges when, from what has since happened, it is
certain that the British Government did not intend to send,
and did not in fact send, troops in Belgium, except upon a
request from the Belgian Government put forward after the
violation of her territory ?

How is it possible to draw an inference unfavourable to
Belgium from this conversation ? General Jungbluth de-
fended her freedom and her neutrality. And the very fact
that the discussion took place, and the vagueness which
remained as to the places of landing, both prove that Belgium
was not bound by any convention determining the manner
in which help should be furnished by England.

Germany ought then to cease to accuse the Belgian
Government of having given themselves since 1906 into the
hands of the Powers of the Triple Entente. The first three
documents which the Germans have taken from the files of
the General Staff, like the fourth which has been brought
up to support them, far from establishing any improper
action whatever on the part of the Belgian authorities, show
clearly that they have always taken the most scrupulous
care to reconcile the precautions exacted by the necessity
of safeguarding the independence and maintaining the
honour of the country with the duties of the strictest
neutrality.

The loyal attitude of Belgium and Great Britain is clearly
shown by the action which preceded the German ultimatum.

When Belgium saw the storm-clouds gathering on the
darkened horizon she wanted to accelerate her military
re-organisation. She worked at it for years. In 1902 she
strengthened her cadres. After two years of discussion in
1905 and 1906 she decided to finish the fortifications of the-
fortress of Antwerp and to raise her defensive organisation
to a pitch commensurate with the offensive force then at
the disposal of the armies of Europe. Then came the renewal
of the artillery, then the introduction of service personelle,
finally the imposition of general liability to serve. These
stages were arrived at with considerable difficulty because-
the nation, relying on treaties and determined herself to
observe neutrality with the strictest impartiality, could not.

346

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [November 14,

discussions have taken place before this war have been
limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to
defend France if Germany attacked her through Belgium.
The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending
troops to Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at
all to the sending of troops to the Continent, and we had
never contemplated the possibility of sending troops to
Belgium to attack Germany. The Germans have stated that
British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a
French fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak
of the war, and that this is evidence of an intention to attack
Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers and no
British stores were landed on the Continent till after Ger-
many had invaded Belgium, and Belgium had appealed to
France and England for assistance. It was only after this
appeal that British troops were sent to France ; and, if the
Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these
munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the
outbreak of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality
of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the
British Government.

The extract enclosed, which is taken from an official
publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract
from an of&cial statement by the Belgian Minister of War,
prove that the Belgian Government had never connived, or
been willing to connive, at a breach of the Treaty that made
the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an international
obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger
that this Treaty might be violated, the British Government
'^'[B. 114.] made an appeal'" for an assurance from both France and
Germany, as had been done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that
neither of those countries would violate the neutrality of
Belgium if the other country respected it. The French
<"[B. 125.3 agreed,"' the Germans declined to agree."' The appeal
'" [B. 122.3 iTfi^'de by the British Government is to be found in the Parlia-
mentary White-paper published after the outbreak of the war
(see No. 114 of British Correspondence) [vol. I., p. 179]. The
reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly
by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin ; and it is
recorded in the second White-paper (see No. 160 of British
348

1914] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

Correspondence) [vol. I., pp. 207-8] that we published. The
attitude of the British Government throughout has been to
endeavour to preserve the neutrahty of Belgium, and we
never thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany
had invaded it, and Belgium had appealed for assistance
to maintain the international Treaty.

We have known for some years past that, in Holland, in
Denmark, and in Norway, the Germans have inspired the
apprehension that, if England was at war with Germany,
England would violate the neutrality of those countries and
seize some of their harbours. This allegation is as baseless
as the allegation about our intention to violate the neutrality
of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But it seems
to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs
that she herself entertains ; as it is clear now that, for some
long time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic
plans to attack France through Belgium. A statement is
enclosed, which was issued by us on October 14 last, dealing
with this point.

This memorandum and its enclosures should provide
ample material for a reply to the German statements.

Foreign Office, ^th November, 1914.

Enclosure 2.

Despatch No. 22 in the Belgian Grey-book.

{See pp. 29-31.)

Enclosure 3.

Extract from " The Times " of ^oth September, 1914.

Neutrality of Belgium.

Official Statement.

THE German press has been attempting to persuade the
public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian
neutrality France or Great Britain would have done so. It
has declared that French and British troops had marched
into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received

349

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [October 23,

from the Belgian Minister of War an official statement which
<"[c/. G. denies absolutely these allegations.'" It declares, on the
22.] one hand, that " before August 3 not a single French soldier
had set foot on Belgian territory," and again, "it is untrue
that on August 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium."
It adds : —

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian army
would oppose by force a " preventive " disembarkation of
British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did
not hesitate at the time of the Agadir crises to warn foreign
Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of
its formal intention to compel respect for the neutrality of
Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts
upon it from any and every quarter.

Enclosure 4.

Circular telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Repre-
sentatives abroad on the z^th October, 1914.

{See page 329.)

<»)[c/. THE BELGIAN ANSWER.'^*

Belgian

document, (From The Times, October 23, IQ14.)

WE have received from the Belgian Legation the following
statement, issued by the Belgian Government, replying to
the article in the North German Gazette published in The
Times of October 14th : —

The Times of October 14th reproduces a long article from

""[5ee the North German Gazette^'^ commenting on the discovery in

pp. 314 et the archives at Brussels of a map entitled " English inter-

seq.] vention in Belgium " and of a memorandum to the Belgian

Minister of War which goes to prove that in the month of

April, 1906, the Chief of the General Staff, on the suggestion

of the British Military Attache and with the approval of

350

1914] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

General Grief son.had worked out a plan of co-operation between
British fexpeditionary Forces and the Belgian Army agaiiist
Germany in the event of a Fra;nco-Getnian war. This agree-
meilt is assumed to have been preceded in all probability by
a sitttilar arrangement with the Freiich General Staff.

The North Gerrhan Gazette alsd publishes certain passages
of a report'" of the Belgian Minister at Berlin in December, "'[See
1911, relating to another plan of the Belgian General Staff, P- 328.]
in which the measures to be taketi in case of the violation of
Belgian neutrality by Germany are discussed. Baron Greindl
pointed out that this pldn dealt only with the precautions to
be taken in the event of an aggression on the part of Germany,
while, owing to its geographical situation, Belgium might
just as well be exposed to an attack by France arid England;
The North German Gazette draws from this discovery the
strange conclusion that England intended to. drag Belgium
into the war, and at one time contemplated the violation of
Dutch neutrality.

We have only one regret to express on the subject of the
disclosure of these documents, and that is that the publication
of our military documents should be mangled and arranged
in such a \vay as to give the reader the impression of duplicity
on the |)art of England and adhesion by Belgium, in violation
of her duties as a neutral State, to the policy of the Triple
Entente. We ask the North German Gatette to publish in
full the result of its search among our secret documents.
Therein will be found fresh and striking proof of the loyalty,
€Ori:ectness, and impartiality with which Belgium for eighty-
four years has discharged her international obligations.

It was stated that Colonel Bamardiston, the military
representative at Brussels of a Power guaranteeing the neu-
trality of Belgium,at the time of the Algeciras crisis, questioned
the Chief of the Belgian General Staff as to the measures
which he had taken to prevent any violation of that neutrality.
The Chief of the General Staff, at that time Lieutenant-
General Ducarne, replied that Belgium was ready to repel
any invader. Did the conversation extend beyond these
limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston, in an interview of a
private and confidential nature, disclose to General Ducarne
the plan of campaign which the British General Staff would
have desired to follow if that neutrality were violated ? We

351

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS [October 23

doubt it, but in any case we can solemnly assert, and it will
be impossible to prove the contrary, that never have the King
or his Government been invited, either directly or indirectly,
to join the Triple Entente in the event of a Franco-German
war. By their words and by their acts they have always
shown such a firm attitude that any supposition that they
could have departed from the strictest neutrality is eliminated
a priori.

As for Baron Greindl's despatch of December 23rd, 191 1,
it dealt with a plan for the defence of Luxemburg, due to the
personal initiative of the chief of the ist Section of the War
Ministry. This plan was of an absolutely private character
and had not been approved by the Minister of War. If
this plan contemplated above all an attack by Germany, there
is no cause for surprise, since the great German mihtary
writers, in particular T. Bernhardi, V. Schlivfeboch, and Von
der Goltz, spoke openly in their treatises on the coming war
of the violation of Belgian territory by the German armies.

At the outbreak of hostilities the Imperial Government,
through the mouth of the Chancellor and of the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, did not search for vain pretexts for the aggres-
sion of which Belgium has been the victim. They justified
it on the plea of military interests. Since then, in face of the
universal reprobation which this odious action has excited,
they have attempted to deceive public opinion by representing
Belgium as bound already before the war to the Triple Entente.
These intrigues will deceive nobody. They will recoil on the
head of Germany. History will record that this Power,
after binding itself by treaty to defend the neutrality of
Belgium, took the initiative in violating it, without even
finding a pretext with which to justify itself.

352

I9I4]

THE ACTION OF GERMANY.

REPORT OF A SPEECH DELIVERED BY HERR VON
BETHMANN HOLLWEG, GERMAN IMPERIAL
CHANCELLOR, ON AUGUST 4TH, 1914.

[Published in British " Collected Diplomatic Documents,"
as an Appendix to the translation of the German
White-book [W.].]

SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR BEFORE

THE GERMAN REICHSTAG, ON AUGUST 4TH, 1914.

(11 (1)

A STUPENDOUS fate is breaking over Europe. For
forty-four years, since the time we fought for and won the
German Empire and our position in the world, we have lived
in peace and have protected the peace of Europe. In the
works of peace we have become strong and powerful, and
have thus aroused the envy of others. With patience we
have faced the fact that, under the pretence that Germany
was desirous of war, enmity has been awakened against us in
the East and the West, and chains have been fashioned for
us. The wind then sown has brought forth the whirlwind
which has now broken loose. We wished to continue our
work of peace, and, like a silent vow, the feeling that animated
everyone from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier
was this : Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword fly
from its scabbard.

The day has now come when we must draw it, against our
wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavours. Russia has set
fire to the building. We are at war with Russia and France
— a war that has been forced upon us.

Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during the
pressure of these last eventful days, is before you. Allow
me to emphasise the facts that determine our attitude.

"-Z 353

[Part of
this

speech is
quoted
inG.35.
Explan-
ation,
p. 382.]

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [August 4,

From the first moment of the Austro-Serbian conflict we

'11 [S^ B. 9 declared'" that this question must be hmited to Austria-

and note.] Hungary and Serbia, and we worked with this end in view.

All Governments, especially that of Great Britain, took the

same attitude. Russia alone asserted that she had to be

heard in the settlement of this matter.

Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threatening
head.

As soon as the first definite information regarding the

mihtary preparations in Russia reached us, we declared at

St. Petersburg in a friendly but emphatic manner that

military measures against Austria would find us on the side

"" [c/. R. 12 of our ally, '^' and that military preparations against ourselves

and note; would obUge US to take counter-measures; but that mobilisa-

lob 1^^ ^^°^ would come very near to actual war.

Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire
for peace, and declared that she was making no military
preparations against us.

In the meantime. Great Britain, warmly supported by
us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg.
'"[Y. app. On July 28th the Emperor telegraphed to the Tsar"'
V- (I-)-] asking him to take into consideration the fact that it was
both the duty and the right of Austria-Hungary to defend
herself against the pan-Serb agitation, which threatened to
undermine her existence. The Emperor drew the Tsar's
attention to the solidarity of the interests of all monarchs
in face of the murder of Serajevo. He asked for the latter's
personal assistance in smoothing over the difficulties existing
between Vienna and St. Petersburg. About the same time,
and before receipt of this telegram, the Tsar asked the Em-
peror to come to his aid, and to induce- Vienna to moderate
'^' [Y. app. her demands. '*' The Emperor accepted the role of mediator. '"
V. (II.).] But scarcely had active steps on these lines begun, when
""[Y. app. Russia mobilised all her forces directed against Austria,
V. (III.).] while Austria-Hungary had mobilised only those of her corps
which were directed against Serbia. To the north she had
mobilised only two of her corps, far from the Russian frontier.
The Emperor immediately informed the Tsar that this
mobihsation of Russian forces against Austria rendered the
[Y. app. role of mediator, which he had accepted at the Tsar's request,
V. (IV.).] difficult, if not impossible.'"
354

(61

1^4] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

In spite of this we continued our task of mediation at
Vienna, and carried it to the utmost point which was com-
patible with our position as an ally.

•Meanwhile, Russia of her own accord renewed her assur-
ances that she was making no military preparations against
us.

We come now to July 31st. The decision was to be taken
at Vienna. Through our representations we had already
obtained the resumption of direct conversations between
Vienna and St. Petersburg, after they had been for some time
interrupted. But before the final decision was taken at
Vienna, the news arrived that Russia had mobilised her entire
forces, and that her mobilisation was therefore directed
against us also. The Russian Government, who knew from
our repeated statements what mobilisation on our frontiers
meant, did not notify us of this mobilisation, nor did they
even offer any explanation. It was not until the afternoon
of July 31st that the Emperor received a telegram from the
Tsar in which he guaranteed that his army would not assume
a provocative attitude towards us. '" But mobilisation on ''' [Y. app.
our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of July ^- (VI)1
30th-3ist.

While we were mediating at Vienna in compliance with
Russia's request, Russian forces were appearing all along our
extended and almost entirely open frontier, and France,
though indeed not actually mobilising, was admittedly making
military preparations. What was our position ? For the
sake of the peace of Europe we had, up till then, deUberately
refrained from calling up a single reservist. Were we now to
wait further in patience until the nations on either side of us
chose the moment for their attack ? It would have been a
crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on July
31st we called upon Russia to demobilise as the only measure
which could still preserve the peace of Europe.'" The ''"[W. exh.
Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also instructed 24 ; O.
to inform the Russian Government that in case our demand 7o]
met with a refusal, we should have to consider that a state of
war (Kriegszustand) existed.

The Imperial Ambassador has executed these instructions.
We have not yet learnt what Russia answered to our demand
for demobilisation. Telegraphic reports on this question

355

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [August 4,

have not reached us even though the wires still transmitted
much less important information.

Therefore, the time limit having long since expired, the

Emperor was obliged to mobilise our forces on the ist August

"'LW. at 5 p.m.'"

P- 135] At the same time we had to make certain what attitude

France would assume. To our direct question, whether she

''^'[W. exh. would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German War,""

25] France replied that she would do what her interests de-

''' [W. exh. manded. '" That was an evasion, if not a refusal.

27] In spite of this, the Emperor ordered that the French

frontier was to be unconditionally respected. This order,

with one single exception, was strictly obeyed. France, who

mobilised at the same time as we did, assured us that she

would respect a zone of 10 kilometres on the frontier.

What really happened ? Aviators dropped bombs, and

cavalry patrols and French infantry detachments appeared

on the territory of the Empire ! Though war had not

been declared, France thus broke the peace and actually

attacked us.

Regarding the one exception on our side which I men-
tioned, the Chief of the General Staff reports as follows :

" Only one of the French complaints about the crossing
of the frontier from our side is justified. Against express
orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, apparently led by an
officer, crossed the frontier on August 2nd. They seem to
have been shot down, only one man having returned. But
long before this isolated instance of crossing the frontier had
occurred, French aviators had penetrated' into Southern
Germany and had thrown bombs on our railway lines. French
troops had attacked our frontier guards on the Schlucht
Pass. Our troops, in accordance with their orders, have
remained strictly on the defensive." This is the report of
the General Staff.

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity {Notwehr),
'cf. G. and necessity {Not) knows no law.'" Our troops have
35] occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered
Belgian territory.

Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law. It is
true that the French Government declared at Brussels that
356

(■1)

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adver-
sary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood
ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A
French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have
been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful
protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium.
The wrong — I speak openly — ^the wrong we thereby commit
we will try to make good as soon as our mihtary aims have
been attained.

He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest
possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through
{durchhauen).

Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-
Hungary.

As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made by
Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday'" show ("[See pp.
the standpoint assumed by the British Government. We 400 &
have informed the British Government that, as long as Great 4i7-]
Britain remains neutral, our fleet wiU not attack the northern
coast of France, and that we will not violate the territorial
integrity and independence of Belgium. These assurances
I now repeat before the world, and I may add that, as long as
Great Britain remains neutral, we would also be willing, upon
reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures against
French commercial shipping.

Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words of
the Emperor : " With a clear conscience we enter the lists."
We are fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the
inheritance of a great past and for our future. The fifty years
are not yet past during which Count Moltke said we should
have to remain armed to defend the inheritance that we won
in 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our
people. But with clear confidence we go forward to meet it.
Our army is in the field, our navy is ready for battle — ^behind
them stands the entire German nation — the entire German
nation united to the last man.

^ Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means.
The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask
you to pass them quickly.

357

THE ACTION OF GERMANY . [August 21,

"DOCUMENTS ON THE POLITICAL EXCHANGE OF

'''[So VIEWS BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND."'"

headed in

For {North German Gazette* August 21, 1914. English version

Sir E. published in D.O.W.)

Grey's

reply, OFFICIAL documents relating to the political exchange of

^^^ ' «_ "^^^ws between Germany and England immediately before

4?q1^ ~ *^^ outbreak of the war, are published below. These com-

munications elucidate the fact that Germany was prepared

to spare France, provided England remained neutral and

guaranteed the neutrality of France.

Telegrams Exchanged between London and. Berlin,
30TH JULY-2ND August, 1914.!

No. I.

His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to His Majesty
King George, dated July 30, 1914.

I ARRIVED here yesterday and have communicated
what you were so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace
"''[July 26.] last Sunday"" to William, who was very thankful to receive
your message.

William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to
comply with the request of Nicholas to work for the main-
tenance of peace. He is in continual telegraphic communi-
ty" [See Y. cation with Nicholas, '^' who has to-day confirmed the news that
app. v.] he has ordered military measures which amount to mobilisa-
'^1 [Y. app. tion, and that these measures were taken five days ago. '*'
V. (V.).] -yyg have also received information that France is making
military preparations while we have not taken measures of
any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our
neighbours continue their preparations. This would then
mean a European war.

* [Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.}

t [The text of these telegrams is here taken from the British " Col-
lected Diplomatic Documents," not from the English version published
by the German Foreign Office in " Documents relating to the Outbreak
of the War," where the substance is the same but the wording differs.]

358

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this
terrible misfortune, may I propose to you to use your influence
on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral.
In my view this would be of the greatest use. I consider
that this is a certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of
maintaining the peace of Europe. I might add that Germany
and England should now more than ever give each other
mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster, which
otherwise appears inevitable.

Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sin-
cerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the
military preparations of his two neighbours may end in
competing him to follow their example for the safety of his,
own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless.
I have informed William of my telegram to you, and I hope
that you will receive my communication in the same friendly
spirit which has inspired it.

(Signed) HENRY.

No. 2.

His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry
of Prussia, dated July 30, 1914.

THANKS for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of
William's efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance
of peace. I earnestly desire that such a misfortune as a
European war — the evil of which could not be remedied^ —
may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost
possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone
further military preparations, provided that Austria declares
herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the
neighbouring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory
settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other
countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on
William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria
to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that
Germany and England are working together to prevent
what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure
Wilham that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do
all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe.

(Signed) GEORGE.

359

THE ACTION OF GERMANY

[July 30,

w[R.52.]
'''[Y. app.

V. (III.

and

VII.).]

No. 3.

His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George,
dated July 30, 1914.
MANY thanks for your friendly communication. Your
proposals coincide with my ideas and with the communication
which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which
I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the
Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas
this evening has ordered the mobilisation of his entire army
and fleet.'" He has not even awaited the result of the
mediation in which I am engaged,'*' and he has left me
completely without information. I am travelling to Berlin
to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong
Russian forces have already taken up their position.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

No. 4.

''» [De-
spatched
from
London
at

II a.m.
Further
telegrams
followed
at 1.15,
5.30, and
8.30 p.m.
See pp.
363-5-]

'^'[c/. Nos.

8,9.
below.]

His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William,
dated August i, 1914.

MANY thanks for your telegram of last night. I have
sent an urgent telegram* to Nicholas, in which I have assured
him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further
the resumption of the negotiations between the Powers
concerned.

(Signed) GEORGE.

No. 5.

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chan-
cellor, dated August i, 1914."'

SIR EDWARD GREY has just called me to the telephone
and has asked me whether I thought I could declare that in
the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian
war we would not attack the French.'*' I told him that I
believed that I could assume responsibility for this.f

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

* {See p. 309.]

t [For Sir E. Grey's statements in Parliament with regard to the mis-
understanding that arose on this matter, see pp. 436-9.]
360

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

No. 6.

His Majesty the EfHperor William to His Majesty King George,
dated August 1, 1914.

i HAVE just received the communication of your Govern-
ment offering French neutrahty under the guarantee of
Great Britain. To this offer there was added the question
whether, under these conditions, Germany would refrain
from attacking France. For technical reasons the mobilisation
which I have already ordered this afternoon on two fronts —
east and west — ^must proceed according to the arrangements
made. A counter order cannot now be given, as your tele-
gram unfortunately came too late, but if France offers me
her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English
army and navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack
on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that
France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier
are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by
telephone from crossing the French frontier.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

No. 7.

German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador at
London, dated August i, 1914.

GERMANY is ready to agree to the English proposal"' i'i[No. 5,
in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the above.]
unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between
Germany and Russia. Owing to the Russian challenge
German mobilisation occurred to-day before the English
proposals were received. In consequence our advance to the
French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee,
however, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our
troops until Monday, the 3rd August, at seven p.m., in case
England's assent is received by that time.

(Signed) BETHMANN HOLLWEG.

361

(1)

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [August i,

No. 8.

His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William,
dated August i, 1914.

IN answer to your telegram, which has just been received,

I beheve that there must be a misunderstanding"' with regard

^- % to a suggestion which was made in a friendly conversation

Grey on between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey'" when

this they were discussing how an actual conflict between the

point, German and the French army might be avoided, so long as

pp. 436-9.] there is still a possibility of an agreement being arrived at

'2' [See No. between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see

5, p. 360.1 pj-ince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to

ascertain whether there is any misunderstanding on his

side.

(Signed) GEORGE.

No. g.

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial
Chancellor, dated August 2, 1914.

(3)

(J)

THE suggestions of Sir Edward Grey, '^' based on the desire

, „ of creating the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of

^^''^ T" England, were made without any previous inquiry of France'^'

and without knowledge of the mobilisation, and have since

f?^!, been given up as quite impracticable.

Feb^'ii, (Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

1915,

p. 439.]

(5)

The pith of the declarations made by Germany lies in the

telegram of the Emperor William to the King of England.

Even if there had been a misunderstanding as to an English

[c/. Sir proposal, the offer made by His Majesty nevertheless gave

E. Grey, England an opportunity to prove honestly her love of peace

p. 439.] and to prevent war between Germany and France.'"'

362

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

"NEGOTIATIONS OF PRINCE LICHNOWSKY WITH
SIR EDWARD GREY."*

[North German Gazette,] September 6, 1914. English version
published in D.O.W.)

ACCORDING to reports to hand. Sir Edward Grey de-
clared in the House of Commons'" that the publication made wvq^
by the German Government of the German-English exchange Aug.
of telegrams before the war was incomplete. Prince Lich- 28,
nowsky, it is declared, cancelled by telegram his report on 1914-
the well-known telephone conversation immediately he was ^^^
informed that a misunderstanding existed. This telegram, P' ^3 i
it is asserted, was not published. The Times, apparently upon
information from official sources, made the same assertion,
adding the comment that the telegram had been suppressed
by the German Government in order that it might accuse
England of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace.

In answer to this we are able to state that such a telegram
is non-existent. Apart from the telegram already published, "" (a)[No. 5,
which was despatched from London at 11 a.m.. Prince Lich- p. 360.]
nowsky on August ist sent the following telegrams : —

Telegrams from the Germak Ambassador at London
TO THE German Imperial Chancellor, August i,
19144

No. I.

August I, 1. 15 p.m.

. . . SIR EDWARD GREY'S Private Secretary has
just been to see me in order to say that the Minister wishes
to make proposals to me for the neutrality of England, even
in the case that we had war with Russia and France. I see
Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will communicate at
once.

* [So headed in D.O.W.]

t [Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeifung.']

j prhe text of the translations here given is taken from the British
" Collected Diplomatic Documents," not from the German official " Docu-
ments relating to the Outbreak of the War."]

363

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [August

No. 2.

August I, 5.30 p.m.

SIR EDWARD GREY has just read to me the following
declaration which has been unanimously adopted by the
<''[c/. B. Cabinet:—'"

I23-]

" The reply of the German Government with regard to
the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret,
because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this
country. If Germany could see her way to give the same
positive reply as that which has been given by France, it
would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension
here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the
neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other
respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public
feeling in this country."

On my question whether, on condition that we would
maintain the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite
declaration with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain,
the Minister answered that that was impossible, but that
this question would play a great part in public opinion in this
country. If we violated Belgian neutrality in a war with
France there would certainly be a change in public opinion
which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain
friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest
intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It
would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility
of doing so. It was, however, difficult to draw a line up to
which we could go without intervention on this side. He
turned again and again to Belgian neutrality, and was of
opinion that this question would also play a great part.

He had also thought whether it was not possible that we
and France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed
opposite to one another without attacking. I asked him if
he would be in a position to arrange that France would assent
to an agreement of this kind. As we wanted neither to
destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory, I
could think that we would give our assent to an arrangement
of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great

364

[914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

Britain. The Minister said he would make inquiries ; he
also recognised the difficulties of holding back the military
on both sides.

No. 3.

August I, 8.30 p.m.

MY communication of this morning is cancelled by my
communication of this evening. As there is no positive
English proposal before us, any further step in the sense of
the message I sent {der mir erteilten Weisungen)^^^ is super- (i)r„ai,

fluous. the li]

of the

As will be observed, these telegrams contain no sort of ^™^^
indication that there had been a misunderstanding, and ^g".
nothing concerning the assertion made from the English side d.0.\
of a clearing up of the alleged misunderstanding. "" ,2, .^^^

SirE

Grey,

Feb.

" A BELGIAN DIPLOMAT'S VIEWS AS TO GERMANY'S "• ^
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE."* ^" "^^

{North German Gazette,] September 12, 1914.)

ON July 31st, 1914, a letter was posted bearing the follow-
ing address : —

" Madame Costermans,

107 Rue Froissard, Bruxelles, Belgique."

Since, as is known, the territory of the empire was on
the same day declared to be in a state of war, and the expedi-
tion of private letters to foreign countries therefore ceased,
the letter was returned to the post office of origin bearing an
inscription by the postal authorities, " returned because of
state of war." The letter remained there and, after the
expiration of the prescribed time, was officially opened by the

* [The English translation of this article from the North German Gazette,
under the heading and in the form here preserved, appears in the German
official " Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War," but is not in-
cluded in the British " Collected Diplomatic Documents."]

t [Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.']

365

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [September i:

Imperial head postal authorities in order to discover the name
of the sender. Inside the outer envelope there was a second
envelope, addressed : —

" Son Excellence Monsieur Davignon,

Minis tre des Affaires Etrangeres."

Inasmuch as the name of the sender did not appear on
this envelope either, it was also opened. Therein was found
an official report of the Royal Belgian Charge d' Affaires in
St. Petersburg, Mr. B. de I'Escaille, concerning the poUtical
situation there on July 30th of this year. This report, in
view of its political significance, was sent to the Foreign Office
by the Imperial postal officials.

The report reads : —

Legation de Belgique a St. Petersbourg.

795/402. Le ^ojuillet 1914.

Situation politique.

Monsieur Le Ministre,

Les journees d'hier et d'avant-hier se sont passees dans
I'attente d'evenements qui devaient suivre la declaration de
guerre de I'Autriche-Hongrie a la Serbie. Les nouvelles les
plus contradictoires ont circule sans qu'il soit possible de
demeler exactement le vrai du faux touchant les intentions
du Gouvernement Imperial. Ce qui est incontestable c'est
que I'Allemagne s'est efforcee, autant ici qu'a Vienne, de
trouver un moyen quelconque d'eviter un conflit general,
mais qu'elle a rencontre d'un cote I'obstination du Cabinet
de Vienne a ne pas faire un pas en arriere, et de 1' autre la
mefiance du Cabinet de St. Petersbourg devant les assurances
de I'Autriche-Hongrie qu'elle ne songeait qu'a punir la
Serbie et non. a s'en emparer.

M. Sazonof a declare qu'il etait impossible a la Russie
de ne pas se tenir prete et de ne pas mobiliser, mais que ces
preparatifs n'etaient pas diriges contre I'Allemagne. Ce
matin un communique officiel aux joumaux annonce que
" les reservistes ont ete appeles sous les armes dans un certain
nombre de Gouvemements.". Connaissant la discretion des

366

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

communiqu6s officiels russes, on peut hardiment pr6tendre
qu'on mobilise partout.

L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne a declare ce matin qu'il
etait a bout des essais de conciliation qu'U n'a cess6 de faire
depuis samedi et qu'il n'avait plus guere d'espoir. On vient
de me dire que I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre s'etait prononce
dans le meme sens. La Grande Bretagne a propose demiere-
ment un arbitrage, M. Sazonof a repondu : " Nous I'avons
propose nous memes a rAutrictie-Hongrie, elle I'a refuse."
A la proposition d'une Conference, I'Allemagne a repondu
par la proposition d'une entente entre cabinets. On peut
se demander vraiment si tout le monde ne desire pas la guerre,
et tache seulement d'en retarder un peu la declaration pour
gagner du temps.

L'Angleterre a commence par donner a entendre qu'elie
ne voulait pas se laisser entrainer dans un conflit. Sir George
Buchanan le disait ouvertement. Aujourd'hui on est ferme-
ment convaincu a St. Petersbourg, on en a meme I'assurance,
que I'Angleterre soutiendra la France. Cet appui est d'un
poids enorme et n'a pas peu contribue a donner la haute
main au parti de la guerre.

Le Gouvernement Russe a laisse dans ces derniers jours
libre cours a toutes les manifestations pro-Serbes et hostiles
a I'Autriche et n'a aucunement cherche a les etouifer. II
s'est encore produit des divergences de vues dans le sein du
Conseil des Ministres qui s'est reuni hier matin ; on a retarde
la publication de la mobilisation. Mais depuis s'est produit
un revirement, le parti de la guerre a pris le dessus et ce
matin a 4 heures cette mobilisation etait publiee.

L'armee qui se sent forte est pleine d'enthousiasme et
fonde de grandes esperances sur les enormes progres realises
depuis la guerre japonaise. La marine est si loin d'avoir
realise le programme de sa reconstruction et de sa reorganisa-
tion qu'elie ne peut vraiment pas entrer en ligne de compte.
C'est bien la le motif qui donnait tant d'importance a I'assur-
ance de I'appui de I'Angleterre.

Comme j'ai eu I'honneur de vous le tel^graphier aujourd'hui
(T. 10) tout espoir de solution pacifique parait ecarte. C'est
I'opinion des cercles diplomatiques,

Je me suis servi pour mon telegramme de la voie via
Stockholm par le Nordisk Kabel comme plus sftre que I'autre.

367

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [September 12,

Je confie cette depeche a un courrier prive qui la mettra a
la poste en AUemagne.

Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de
mon plus profond respect.

{Signed) B. DE L'ESCAILLE.

[Charge TESTIMONY OF THE BELGIAN MINISTER'" IN St. PETERSBURG,
d' Affaires.

See p. Belgian Legation, St. Petersburg.

366.] 795/402. Jw/y 30, 1914.

On the political situation.

To His Excellency M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Monsieur le Ministre,

YESTERDAY and the day before yesterday have passed
in the expectation of events that must follow Austria-
Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia. The most
contradictory reports have been circulating ; it was impossible
to make out what was true or not true as regards the intentions
of the Imperial Russian Government. There is, however,
no denying the fact that Germany has made serious efforts
both here and in Vlfenna to find some way of avoiding a general
conflict. On the one hand, however, it has met with the
firm decision of the Vienna Cabinet not to yield a step, and
on the other hand with the fact that the St. Petersburg
Cabinet mistrusted the assurance made by Austria-Hungary
that she only intended to punish Serbia, but not to annex her
<2'[c/. territory.*^'

B. 18.] M. Sazonof declared that it was impossible for Russia to

avoid holding herself in readiness and not to mobilise, but
(3)|-(.^ that these preparations were not directed against Germany.'"

B. 70 (i), This morning an official communication to the newspapers
93 (2).] announced that " the reserves in a certain number of districts
have been called to the colours." Anyone who knows the
reservedness of the official Russian communications can
safely maintain that a general mobilisation is taking place.

The German Ambassador declared this morning that the
efforts which since Saturday he had been making incessantly
to bring about a satisfactory arrangement had come to an
end, and that he had almost given up hope.
368

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

I have been told that the British Ambassador also expressed
himself in the same way. England recently proposed arbi-
tration.'" Sazonof answered : " We have ourselves proposed '"[«/•
it to Austria-Hungary, but she has rejected the proposal." B. 36.]
To the proposal of a conference, Germany answered by pro-
posing in turn a settlement between the Cabinets."" One i*>[c/.
might truly ask whether the whole world does not wish war B. 43.]
and only seeks to postpone for a while the formal declaration
of it, in order to gain time.

England at first let it be understood that she did not wish
to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan said so quite
openly. To-day in St. Petersburg one is fully convinced,
and even the assurance has been given, that England will
stand by the side of France. This support is of quite extra-
ordinary weight, and has in no small degree contributed to
give the war party the upper hand. The Russian Government
have in these last days given free rein to all demonstrations
friendly to Serbia and hostile to Austria, and have in no way
attempted to suppress them. In the Cabinet Council, which
took place yesterday morning, there were differences of
opinion ; the notification of a mobihsation was postponed,
but since then a change has taken place, the war party has
obtained the upper hand, and this morning at four o'clock the
mobilisation order was published. '" '" [c/.

The army, which is conscious of its strength, is fuU of R- 52.]
enthusiasm, and bases great hopes on the extraordiaary pro-
. gress which it has made since the Japanese war. The navy
is still so far from the completion of its projected reorganisa-
tion that it is scarcely to be taken into accoimt. For this very
reason, the assurance of English assistance is considered of such
great importance.

As I had the honour of wiring you to-day (T. 10), all hope
of a peaceful solution seems to have vanished ; such is the
view of the diplomatic corps.

I have made use of the route via Stockholm by the Nordisk
Cable for sending my telegram, as it is safer than the other.

I am entrusting this report to a private courier, who
will post it in Germany.

Please receive. Monsieur le Ministre, the assurance of my
greatest respect.

{Signed) B. DE L'ESCAILLE.

II — 2 A 369

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [September 13,

Our enemies are to-day declaring to the whole world,
slanderously and with a deliberate misrepresentation of the
real facts, that the Powers of the Triple Entente had up to
the last moment in view solely the maintenance of peace,
but that they were forced into war through Germany's
brusque attitude, which made any understanding impossible ;
that Germany, in her wild desire for conquest, wanted war
under all circumstances. In answer to this the foregoing
document evidences that in diplomatic circles in St. Peters-
burg, as early as July 30th, that is to say, two days before
the German mobilisation, the conviction prevailed that
Germany had been at the greatest pains, in Vienna as well as
in St. Petersburg, to localise the Austro-Serbian conflict and
to prevent the breaking out of a general world-conflagration.
It is furthermore important as evidence that the same circles
were even then convinced that England, through the assurance
that she would not remain neutral in an eventual war, but
would support France against Germany, had stiffened the
backbone of the Russian war party and thus contributed
largely to provoke the war. And, finally, this document is
also of interest because its author felt that he must report
to his Government that he considered untrustworthy the
assurances of Russia that the troops were being called to the
colours only in certain districts, and that no general mobilisa-
tion was taking place.

STATEMENT BY HERR VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG,
THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR, TO THE DANISH
PRESS BUREAU, SEPTEMBER 13, 1914.

(From The Times, September 15, 1914.)

HERR VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG has sent the
following statement to the Danish Press Bureau for pub-
lication :

"'[Sept. 4, The English Prime Minister, in his Guildhall speech,'"
see p. reserved to England the rdle of protector of the smaller and
439. «' weaker States, and spoke about the neutrality of Holland,
s«?] Belgium, and Switzerland as being exposed to danger from

370

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

the side of Germany. It is true that we have broken Belgium's
neutrality because bitter necessity compelled us to do so, but
we promised Belgium full indemnity and integrity'" if she ^'^[See
would take account of this state of necessity. If so, she would G- 20.]
not have suffered any damage, as, for example, Luxemburg.
If England, as protector of the weaker States, had wished to
spare Belgium infinite suffering she should have advised
Belgium to accept our offer. England has not " protected "
Belgium, so far as we know ; I wonder, therefore, whether it
can really be said that England is such a disinterested
protector.

We knew perfectly well that the French plan of campaign
involved a march through Belgium to attack the unprotected
Rhineland. Does anyone believe England would have inter-
fered to protect Belgian freedom against France ?

We have firmly respected the neutraUty of Holland and
Switzerland ; we have also avoided the slightest violation of
the frontier of the Dutch province of Limburg.

It is strange that Mr. Asquith only mentioned the neutral-
ity of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, but not that of the
Scandinavian countries. He might have mentioned Switzer-
land with reference to France, but Holland and Belgium are
situated close to England on the opposite side of the Channel,
and that is why England is so concerned for the neutrality of
these countries.

Why is Mr. Asquith sUent about the Scandinavian
countries ? Perhaps because he knows that it does not
enter our head to touch these countries' neutrality ; or would
England possibly not consider Denmark's neutrality as a
noli me tangere for an advance in the Baltic or for Russia's
warlike operations.

Mr. Asquith wishes people to believe that England's fight
against us is a fight of freedom against might. The world is
accustomed to this manner of expression.'*' In the name of '"'[For Mr.
freedom England, with might and with the most recklessly Asquith's
egotistic policy, has founded her mighty Colonial Empire, in ^c^^I' jo
the name of freedom she has destroyed for a century the ^^f' '
independence of the Boer Republics, in the name of freedom ^7.j

she now treats Egypt as an English colony and thereby violates
international treaties and solemn promises, in the name of
freedom one after another of the Malay States is losing its

371

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [October i6,

independence for England's benefit, in the name of freedom she
tries, by cutting German cables, to prevent the truth being
spread in the world.

The English Prime Minister is mistaken. When England
joined with Russia and Japan against Germany she, with a
blindness unique in the history of the world, betrayed civilisa-
tion and handed over to the German sword the care of freedom
for European peoples and States.

"OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO EVENTS
PRECEDING THE WAR."*

[North German Gazette,] October i6, 1914.)

IN view of the apparent endeavours of our opponents to
ascribe the responsibihty for the present war to the German
" military party " and German militarism, we publish below
a number of reports made by German diplomatic representa-
tives in foreign countries, which have for their subject the
political and politico-military relations of the Entente Powers
before the outbreak of the war. For obvious reasons the
places from which the reports have been sent, and their
exact dates, are not given. These documents speak for them-
selves.

March . . ., 1913.

The meshes of the net into which French diplomacy is
succeeding in entangling England are steadily growing
narrower. Even in the first phases of the Morocco conflict,
England, as is known, made concessions of a military nature
to France which have in the meantime developed into concrete
agreements between the General Staffs of both countries.

* [The English translation of this article from the North German GazettCy
under the heading and in the form here preserved, appears in the German
official " Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War," but is not in-
cluded in the British " Collected Diplomatic Documents."]

t [Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.]

372

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

In regard to the agreements concerning a co-operation at sea,
I learn from a generally well informed source the following : —

The English fleet will protect the North Sea, the Enghsh
Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean, in order to inake it possible
for France to concentrate her naval forces in the western
basin of the Mediterranean, in connection wherewith Malta
is placed at her disposal as a naval base. Details arrange for
the employment of French torpedo flotillas and submarines
in the channel, and of the EngUsh Mediterranean squadron,
which, on the outbreak of war, is to be placed under the
command of the French Admiral.

In the meantime the attitude of the British Government
during the Moroccan crisis in 1911, during which it showed
itself to be a tool of French politics, as uncritical as it was
submissive, and which, through the speech made by Mr. Lloyd
George, encouraged French chauvinism to new hopes, has
given the French Government an opportunity to drive another
nail into the coffin in which Entente poUtics have already
buried England's freedom of political decision.

I obtain from a special source knowledge of an exchange
of notes which took place in the autimm of the preceding year
between Sir Edward Grey and Ambassador Cambon, and
which, with the request that it be employed in strict confidence,
I have the honour to submit to you herewith. In the
exchange of notes the British and the French Governments
agree, in the case of an attack threatened by a third Power,
to enter at once into an exchange of views as to whether joint
action was indicated to repulse the attack, and, in that event,
as to how and to what extent the existing miUtary arrange-
ments should be made use of.

The form of the agreements is calculated in such a way
that the latter shall be in technical conformity with British
neutraUty. England does not formally assume in any
manner the duty of furnishing mihtary help. Under the
wording she retains a free hand to act at all times in accord-
ance with the demands of her own interests. It hardly
requires, however, any special amphfication to show that
England, through these compacts, in conjunction with the
military arrangements made, has already pledged herself
de facto beyond redemption to the French revanche idea.

373

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [October i6.

The British Government is playing a dangerous game.
Through its pohcy in the Bosnian and Moroccan questions it
has evoked crises which have twice brought the world to the
verge of a war. The encouragement which it gives to French
chauvinism directly and indirectly can one day lead to a
catastrophe in which English as well as French soldiers will
pay with their blood on French battlefields for the British
policy which aims at the isolation of Germany.

The seed sowed by King Edward is sprouting.

[Here follow the letters exchanged between Sir E. Grey
and M. Paul Cambon, November 22nd and 23rd, 1912.
For text of these see B. 105, ends, i and 2, vol. I., pp.170-2.]

II.

May . . ., 1914.
Concerning the pohtical results of the visit of the King
of England in Paris* I learn that a number of political questions
were discussed between Sir Edward Grey and M. Doumergue. '"
'^' [Minister Moreover, a suggestion came from the French side to supple-
for ment the existing politico-military understandings between

Foreign France and England by analogous understandings between
^^^^'^ England and Russia. Sir Edward Grey received the sugges-
tion sympathetically, but declared that he was not in a
position to undertake anything of binding force without con-
sulting the British Cabinet. The reception given to the
English guests by the French Government as well as by the
people of Paris is said to have made a great impression on the
Minister. It is to be feared that the English statesman,
who visited a foreign country for the first time in an official
capacity, and who, it is asserted, had never been out of
England before, will in the future be even more subject to
French influences than has already been the case.

III.

June . . ., 1914.

I have received confirmation of the report that military
arrangements between England and Russia were proposed
from the French side on the occasion of the visit of the King

* [King George and Queen Mary visited Paris, attended by Sir E. Grey,
April 21-24, 1914.]

374

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

of England in Paris. Concerning the preliminary events

I learn from a reliable source that the moving spirit was

M. Isvolsky."' It was the Ambassador's idea to make use "'[Russian

of the anticipated festive spirit of the days in Paris in order Ambassa-

to change the Triple Entente into an alliance analogous to p^g",

the Triple Alliance. If however Paris and St. Petersburg ■'

have been finally satisfied with less, their attitude appears

to have been dictated by the consideration that public opinion

in England is in great part firmly opposed to entering into

formal treaties of alliance with other Powers. In view of

this fact, there was plainly some hesitation about going to the

root of things, despite the numerous proofs of the utter lack

of resistance of English politicians to French and Russian

influences. (I may recall the support which Russia recently

received from England in the matter of the German military

mission in Turkey.) Therefore were the tactics of a slow,

pace-by-pace advance decided upon. Sir Edward Grey

warmly advocated the Franco-Russian suggestions in the

British Cabinet Council, and the Cabinet adopted his ideas. It

was decided to work, in the first place, for a naval agreement,

and to cause negotiations to take place in London between

the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attache.

The satisfaction of Russian and French diplomacy at
having again taken the English politicians by surprise, is
great. The conclusion of a formal treaty of alliance is now
considered only a matter of time. To hasten this event,
St. Petersburg would even be prepared to make certain sham
concessions to England in the Persian question. The
differences of opinion in this matter that have recently come
to hght between the two Powers have not yet been disposed
of. On the Russian side the procedure is, for the time being,
one of concihatory promises, on account of the uneasiness
which has been again manifested in England lately concerning
the future of India.

IV.

June . . ., 1914.

There is much uneasiness in St. Petersburg and London

on account of the French indiscretions concerning the Russo-

English naval convention. Sir Edward Grey is afraid there

will be interpellations in Parhament. The Naval Attache,

375

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [October i6

Captain Wolkoff, who was in St. Petersburg for a few days,
presvunably to receive instructions for the negotiations, has
returned to London. The negotiations have already begun.

June . . ., 1914-

In the House of Commons the question was put to the
Government from the Ministerial side as to whether Great
Britain and Russia had recently concluded a naval agreement,
or as to whether negotiations for the conclusion of such an
agreement had recently taken place between the two countries
or were now taking place.

In his answer Sir Edward Grey referred to similar questions
put to the Government last year. The Prime Minister,
continued Sir Edward, had at that time replied that there
existed for the event of the outbreak of a war between Euro-
pean Powers no unpublished agreements which would restrict
or hamper the free decision of the Government or of Parliament
as to whether England should take part in the war or not.
This answer was just as applicable to-day as a year ago.
Since that time no negotiation which could now make the
declaration less applicable had been concluded with any
Power ; no negotiations of the sort were in progress, and, so
far as he could judge, it was not probable that any such
would be entered into. If, however, any agreement should be
concluded which should involve a retraction or an alteration
of the above-mentioned declaration made by the Prime Minister
the year before, it was his opinion that it would have to be
submitted to Parliament, and that would doubtless be done.

The great majority of the Enghsh press refrains from
•commenting on the Minister's declaration in any way.

Only two Radical papers, the Daily News and the Man-
chester Guardian, express their opinion in short lea,ding articles.
The first named views Sir Edward Grey's words with satis-
iaction and thinks that they are definite enough to dissipate
every doubt. England is not under the control of any other
■country. She is not the vassal of Russia, nor the ally of
France, nor the enemy of Germany. The declaration, it
says, is a wholesome lesson for that section of the EngUsh
press which would create the belief that there was in

376

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

existence a Triple Entente of the same nature as the Triple
Alliance.

The Manchester Guardian, on the other hand, is not
satisfied with the Minister's declaration. It finds fault with
its obscure form and endeavours to show that it admits of
interpretations which do not altogether exclude the existence
of certain, perhaps conditional, agreements of a nature in
conformity with that which rumour lends them.

The declarations by Sir Edward Grey are in accordance
with a confidential statement made by a personage of the
> immediate entourage of the Minister, to the effect that " he
could declare most emphatically and definitely that no
agreements of miUtary or naval nature existed between
England and France, although from the French side the
desire of such compacts had been repeatedly uttered. The
British Cabinet would not grant to Russia what it had refused
to France. No naval convention had been concluded with
Russia, and none would be concluded."

VI.

June . . ., 1914.
Sir Edward Grey has plainly felt it necessary to take a
stand immediately and emphatically against the comments
of the Manchester Guardian on his answer to the interpellation
in the matter of the alleged Anglo- Russian naval understand-
ing. The Westminster Gazette publishes in a leading colrmm
a denial from the pen of Mr. Spender, who, as is weU known,
is one of Sir Edward Grey's most intimate friends ; this denial
leaves nothing to be desired in the way of definiteness. It is
remarked therein that there exists no naval agreement, and
that no negotiations are in progress between Great Britain and
Russia concerning a naval agreement, and that no one who
knew the character and methods of Sir Edward Grey would
even for a moment assume that the statement made by him
was designed to cover up the truth.

VII.

June . . ., 1914.
The fact that Sir Edward Grey's statement in the EngUsh
House of Commons concerning the Russo-English naval

377

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [October i6,

agreement has been so readily accepted by public opinion in
England, has brought about a feeling of great relief here and
in St. Petersburg. The wirepullers in this matter had already
feared that the lovely dream of the new " Triple Alliance "
had come to an end. Moreover, I can hardly believe that
the Manchester Guardian should alone have been able to see
through the trick which Sir Edward Grey employed in not
answering at all the questions put to him as to whether
negotiations with Russia concerning a naval agreement were
imminent or in progress, but rather in denying the question,
which had never been put, as to whether England had entered
into binding undertakings concerning participation in any
European war. I am, rather, incUned to believe that the
British press in this matter has again given a proof of its
weU-known discipline in the treatment of questions of foreign
policy, and has, whether upon a mot d'ordre or out of pohtical
instinct, kept quiet. To what criticisms and fault-finding by
the German people's representatives and the German press
would not the Imperial German Government be exposed, what
a cry over our foreign policy and our diplomacy would not
be raised, if a similar declaration had been made before the
Imperial Diet ! In parliamentary England everybody keeps
quiet when a Minister seeks in such a barefaced manner to
mislead his own party, the people's representatives, and the
public opinion of the whole country. What does England
not sacrifice to her Germanophobia ?

VIII.

June . . ., 1914.

From a quarter which has retained its old sympathy for
Germany I have received, with request to keep the matter
strictly secret, a note, which I most respectfully submit
herewith, concerning a conference which took place on May
26th, of this year, with the chief of the Russian Naval Staff,
and in which the foundations were laid for the negotiations
concerning the Russo-EngUsh naval agreement. My infor-
mant did not yet know to what results the negotiations have
thus far led, but he expressed very earnest concern about
the benefit which would accrue to Russian nationalism if
the agreement really came into being. As soon as the

378

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

co-operation of England were assured, the notorious Pan-Slav
agitators would not hesitate to employ the first opportunity
offered to bring about war. M. Sazonof himself, he thought,
was clearly being driven into the arms of the Russian war party.

Enclosure. ■

St. Petersburg, May i^j26th, 1914.

Considering that an agreement between Russia and
England is desired regarding the co-operation of their naval
forces in the event of warlike operations of Russia and England
with the participation of France, the conference arrived at
the following conclusions : —

The projected naval convention shall in all details regulate
the relations between the Russian and British armed forces
at sea, and therefore an understanding concerning signals and
special codes, wireless telegrams and the form of intercourse
between the Russian and British naval staffs is to be brought
about. The two naval staffs shaU furthermore regularly
make to one another reports on the navies of other powers
and on their own fleets, especially as to technical data and
newly introduced machinery and inventions.

As in the case of the Franco-Russian naval convention,
there shall take place between the Russian and British naval
staffs regular exchanges of opinions for the consideration of
questions interesting the naval boards of both states.

The Russian naval agreement with England, Uke the
Franco-Russian naval agreement, shall provide for separate
actions of the Russian and British navies, which however shall
be based on mutual understanding. In regard to the strategic
aims a distinction must be made on the one hand between
the maritime operations in the Black Sea and the North Sea,
and on the other hand the probable naval war in the Medi-
terranean. In both places it must be Russia's endeavour to
secure compensation from England in return for drawing off
a part of the German fleet against the Russian.

In the region of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles
temporary undertakings in the straits shall be kept in view
as strategic operations by Russia in case of war.

The Russian interests in the Baltic Sea demand that
England immobilise as great a part of the German fleet in

379

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [October i6,

the North Sea as possible. In this way the great superiority
of the German over the Russian fleet would be anntilled and
a Russian landing in Pomerania would perhaps be rendered
possible. In this connection the British Government could
render an important service by sending into the Baltic
harbours before the beginning of war such a number of
merchant ships as would compensate for the lack of Russian
transports.

As to the situation in the Mediterranean, it is most
highly important for Russia that the absolute superiority of
the fighting forces of the Entente over those of Austria and
Italy be assured. For if the Austro-Italian forces should
dominate this sea, attacks of the Austrian fleet in the Black
Sea would be possible, which would be a dangerous blow for
Russia. It must be surmised that the Austro-Italian forces
are superior to the French. England would therefore have
to leave the necessary number of ships in the Mediterranean
to insure the superiority of the forces of the Entente Powers
until such time as the Russian navy's development should
have proceeded sufficiently far to enable it to take over the
solution of this question itself. Russian vessels would have
to use the British harbours in the Mediterranean as naval
bases with England's permission, just as the French naval
agreement permits Russia to use the French harbours in the
Western Mediterranean as bases.

IX.

July . . ., 1914.

During my talk to-day with M. Sazonof the conversation
<''[To the turned to President Poincare's visit."' The Minister em-
Tsar, in phasised the pacific tone of the toasts exchanged. I could
J^y- not refrain from caUing M. Sazonof 's attention to the fact
I9I4-J tiiat it was not the toasts exchanged at such visits that gave
grounds for uneasiness, but rather the comments of the press
on the matter. I said such comments had not been lacking
this time, either, and that among them even the report of the
alleged conclusion of a Russo-EngHsh naval convention had
been published. M. Sazonof seized upon this sentence and
declared angrily that such a naval convention existed only
" in the mind of the Berliner Tagehlatt and in the moon."
380

1914] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

^' July . . ., 1914.

I have the honour to send you herewith the copy of a
letter which the adjutant of a Russian Grand Duke, who was
at the time sojourning here, wrote from St. Petersburg under
date of the 26th inst. to the Grand Duke, the important
contents of which letter I have already been able to report
by telegraph. The letter, of which I obtained knowledge
in a confidential way, shows, in my respectful opinion, that
Russia has been decided on war ever since the 24th of the
month.

Enclosure.

July i2j2Sth, St. Petersburg.

There have been great disorders among the workmen in
St. Petersburg ; it is remarkable that they took place at the
time of the visit of the French President to the Russian Capital,
and of the Austrian ultimatum"' to Serbia. Yesterday I '"[B. 4.]
heard from the French military agent General de la Guiche
that he had learnt that Austria was not without guilt in the
matter of the disorder among the workmen. Now, however,
everything is rapidly assuming normal conditions. And
it appears that, encouraged by the French, our Government
has stopped trembling before the Germans. It was high
time ! It is better to express oneself clearly at last than
everlastingly to hide behind the " professional lies " of the
diplomats. Austria's ultimatum is of unheard-of effrontery,
as all the papers here unite in saying. I have just read the
evening paper : — yesterday there was a sitting of the Council
of Ministers ; the Minister of War spoke very energetically
and confirmed the news that Russia was ready for war, and
the other Ministers unanimously agreed with him ; a report
to the Emperor in the same spirit was prepared, and this
report was confirmed on the same evening. There was
published to-day in the Russian Invalid a preliminary com-
munication by the Government, stating that " the Govern-
ment was greatly concerned about the events that had
occurred and the despatch of the Austrian ultimatum to
Serbia. The Government is following carefully the develop-
ment of the Austro-Serbian conflict, with regard to which m rsee O.
Russia cannot remain indifferent."'^' This communication has 10.]

381

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [January 25,

been reprinted with most favourable comments by all papers.
We are all convinced that no Rasputins will this time impede
Russia from doing her duty. Germany, who is sending
Austria on ahead, is firmly decided to fight us before we build
up our fleet, and the Balkan States have not yet recovered
from the last wars. We, too, must feel the danger and not
hide our heads, as we did during the Balkan War, when
Kokovtsof thought only of the Bourse. At that time, how-
ever, the war would have been easier, for the Balkan federa-
tion was fully armed. But we let the police scatter the street
demonstrations directed against that miserable Austria !
Now, however, such demonstrations would be joyfully greeted.
Let us hope above all that the regime of the cowards (of the
stamp of Kokovtsof) and of certain criers and mystics is
over. War is a storm. Even if catastrophes were to come,
it would still be better than to remain in this unbearably
oppressive atmosphere. I know for a certainty, from experi-
ence, that the quietest place for me is at the front, where one
sees danger in its natural proportions, and that is not so
fearful ; the worst place is the rearguard, in which the
atmosphere of cowardice prevails, improbable rumours circu-
late, and panics arise. In the future war, however, the
interior of Russia will be the rearguard.

THE SCRAP OF PAPER."*

German Chancellor's Explanation and Great Britain's Reply.
[British Foreign Office Communique.]

January 25, 1915.

THE Associated Press publishes the following account of
an interview which its correspondent has had with Herr von
Bethmann HoUweg, the German Imperial Chancellor :

" German Field Headquarters of the German Armies.

" I am surprised to learn that my phrase, ' a scrap of
paper,' which I used in my last conversation with the British

* [See B. 160 (vol, I., p. 209) ; also G. 35.]
382

t9i5] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

Ambassador'" in reference to the Belgian neutrality treaty <"[Stf«B.
should have caused such an unfavourable impression in the ^^o.]

United States. The expression was used in quite another
connection and meaning from that implied in Sir Edward
Goschen's report"' and the turn given to it in the biased
comment of our enemies is undoubtedly responsible for this
impression."

The speaker was Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, and the
conversation occurred at the Headquarters in a town of
Northern France, in a villa serving as office and dwelling for
the Chancellor, Minister von Jagow, and the members of the
diplomatic suite accompanying the Emperor in the field.
The Chancellor had apparently not realised until his attention
was caUed to it the extent to which the phrase had been used
in the discussion on the responsibility for the war. He
volunteered the explanation of his meaning, which, in sub-
stance, was that he had spoken of the treaty, not as a scrap
of paper for Germany, but as an instrument which had become
so through Belgium's forfeiture of its neutrahty, and that
England had quite other reasons for entering the war, com-
pared with which the neutrality treaty, to which she appealed,
had only the value of a scrap of paper.

The British Ambassador

" My conversation with Sir E. Goschen," said the Chan-
cellor, " occurred on the 4th August. I had just declared
in the Reichstag"" that only dire necessity, only the struggle ""[SeeG.
for existence, compelled Germany to march through Belgium, 35-1

but that Germany was ready to make compensation for the
wrong committed. When I spoke I already had certain
indications, but no absolute proof, on which to base a pubUc
accusation that Belgium had long before abandoned its
neutrahty in its relations with England. Nevertheless, I
took Germany's responsibilities towards neutral States so
seriously that I spoke frankly on the wrong committed by
Germany. What was the British attitude on the same
question ? " said the Chancellor. " The day before my con-
versation with the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Grey
had delivered his well-known speech in Parliament, '" wherein, '^i [p. 400.I
while he did not state expressly that England would take

383

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [January

part in the war, he left the matter in little doubt. One needs
only to read this speech through carefully to learn the reason
of England's intervention in the war. Amid all his beautiful
phrases about England's honour and England's obligations
we find it over and over again expressed that England's
interests — ^its own interests — called for participation in war,
for it was not in England's interests that a victorious, and
therefore stronger, Germany should emerge from the war.
This old principle of England's policy — ^to take as the sole
criterion of its actions its private interests regardless of right,
reason, or considerations of humanity — ^is expressed in that
speech of Gladstone's in 1870 on Belgian neutrality from which
<" [p. 409.] Sir Edward quoted. '"' Mr. Gladstone then declared that he was
unable to subscribe to the doctrine that the simple fact of the
existence of a guarantee is binding upon every party thereto,
irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it
may find itself at the time when the occasion for action on the
guarantee arrives, and he referred to such English statesmen
as Aberdeen and Palmerston as supporters of his views."

" England drew the sword," continued the Chancellor,
" only because she believed her own interests demanded it.
Just for Belgian neutrality she would never have entered the
war. That is what I meant when I told Sir E. Goschen, in
that last interview when we sat down to talk the matter over
privately man to man, that among the reasons which had
impelled England into war the Belgian neutraUty treaty had
for her only the value of a scrap of paper. I may have been
a bit excited and aroused," said the Chancellor. " Who
would not have been at seeing the hopes and work of the
whole period of my Chancellorship going for naught ? I
recalled to the Ambassador my efforts for years to bring
about an understanding between England and Germany,
an understanding which, I reminded him, would have made
a general European war impossible, and have absolutely
guaranteed the peace of Europe. Such understanding," the
Chancellor interjected parenthetically, " would have formed the
basis on which we could have approached the United States as
a third partner. But England had not taken up this plan, and
through its entry into the war had destroyed for ever the
hope of its fulfilment. In comparison with such momentous
consequences, was the treaty not a scrap of paper ? "

384

1915] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

The Belgian Papers

" England ought really to cease harping on this theme of
Belgian neutraUty," said the Chancellor. " Documents on
the Anglo-Belgian military agreement, which we have found
in the meantime, show plainly enough how England regarded
this neutrality. As you know, we found in the archives of
the Belgian Foreign Ofi&ce papers'" which showed that England ''' [See
in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without "The
the assent of the Belgian Government if war had then broken j^™^.
out. In other words, do exactly the same thing for which, ^aents
with all the pathos of virtuous indignation, she now reproached n./'
Germany. In some later despatch Grey, I believe, informed Bel- p. 318.]
gium that he did not believe England would take such a step
because he did not think EngUsh public opinion would justify
such action, "" and still people in the United States wonder that ^^^[See
I characterised as a scrap of paper a treaty whose observance, p. 327]
according to responsible British statesmen, should be dependent
upon the pleasure of British public opinion, a treaty which Eng-
land herself had long since undermined by military agreements
with Belgium. Remember, too, that Sir E. Grey expressly
refused to assure us of England's neutrality even in the
eventuality that Germany respected Belgian neutraUty. I
can understand therefore English displeasure at my character-
isation of the treaty of 1839"" as a scrap of paper, for this scrap ^'>[See
of paper was for England extremely valuable, as furnishing p. 487-]
an excuse before the world for embarking in the war. I hope,
therefore, that in the United States you will think clearly
enough and realise that England in this matter, too, acted
solely on the principle, ' Right or wrong, my interests.' "

The United States Note.*

The more immediate object of the interview had been to
obtain the views of the Chancellor and Herr von Jagow on
the Anglo-American negotiations regarding the neutral

* [The remainder of the interview, from this point on, relates to matters
which do not concern the present volume ; but the whole is here given
just as it appears in the Foreign Office communique.]

II— 2 B 385

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [January 25,

shipping, and after an examination of the British note the
Chancellor made the following statement :

" I shall not comment on the note of the 7th January
which, so far as the facts and questions of trade are concerned,
Sir Edward Grey, however, considered it appropriate to add
two statements intended to carry weight far beyond the
scope of this particular interchange of notes. I mean the
paragraph where he speaks of leaving open the question of
permitting the shipment of food supplies npt intended for
the enemies' armies or Government, and his slurs upon us for
abandoning the rules of civilisation and humanity. j

" It should not be forgotten that England in this war set [

out to starve over 65,000,000 of people directly by cutting
off their food, and indirectly by closing the arteries of their
commerce. In attempting this she did not refrain from
.destroying a considerable part of the trade of neutral nations.
It is now beginning to dawn upon Great Britain that she
cannot force us into submission by these methods. Sir
Edward Grey inserted the sentences in question in the docu-
ment to stand as a record of English magnanimity which
actually never existed, and so tries to mould out of this note
a precedent upon which he may some day fall back when the
British may have ceased to hold the whiphand control of
maritime avenues of supply.

Exorbitant British Demands.

" It will be well, then, to remember with what brutal
means England tried to throttle us. The nation boasting
the most powerful fleet and the strictest adherence to inter-
national agreements demands a greater control of neutral
shipping than it would be allowed to command if it had
declared an effective blockade, which, according to the
Hague ruling, it should do, but which it cannot do, being
powerless to uphold such a blockade. This is rather remark-
able for a nation which vents its moral indignation upon us
so frequently for the purpose of creating anti-German senti-
ment abroad, and so consolidating public sentiment at home ;
but it is even more extraordinary how this time Sir Edward
Grey overdraws his morality account by calling attention to
what evil things we might do in the future.

386

1915] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

" I rather admire this faciUty which frequently enables
the British Foreign Office to turn defeat ashore or on sea into
a victory in the domain of public opinion. When our vessels
successfully bombarded the towns on the east coast of England,
towns equipped with defences, arsenals, batteries, and other
military establishments, despite everything emanating to
the contrary from London, no powerful fleet appeared to
defend the coast, but all England was made to arise in indigna-
tion about our lack of civilisation. Recruiting lists bulged
with new names, and reports were spread broadcast which
shocked the world with horror at our alleged infamy."

Explosive Bullets.

. " These reports defaming us gained in intensity when our
dirigibles threw bombs over the fortified town of Great
Yarmouth, and warded off attacks from below as they passed
over British soil. Now is not this rather audacious diplomatic
journalism, in view of the fact that British vessels bombarded
the open cities of Dar-es-Salaam, Victoria, Swakopmund,
and have often bombarded towns on the Belgian coast without
previous announcement, destroying thereby private dwellings
belonging to the subjects of the Allies without regard as to
who might be living there, and that Great Britain supplies her
troops with rifles and ammunition which only outwardly
correspond with the rules of The Hague ? Bullets with the
core constructed in two parts in such a manner that in loading
the soldier can easily wrench off the points by inserting them
in a sharp-edged hole drilled in the lever attached to the rifle,
thus becoming dum-dum ammunition, were produced in large
quantities and were found. We have now in our possession
many such rifles. We have them still loaded with dum-dum
ammunition.

" Nor does Britain show so very deUcate a sentiment as
to the actions of its Allies. Great Britain claims to fight for
the hberty of peoples, but she does not interfere with Russia,
■who even now is adopting in her own provinces of Poland,
Finland, and the Baltic Provinces, and against the Jews a
police terrorism barely equalled in history. England's other
ally, France, time and again sent aviators to bombard towns
which had no fortifications whatever, and no importance

387

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [January 26,

from a military point of view, prominent among these being
Luxemburg and Freiburg in the Black Forest. Now,
thousands of German women and children and a few old men
have returned from France. Many are still there who for
months and months have suffered in French concentration
camps treatment so inhuman that it almost beggars descrip-
tion. No hostile civilian man or woman was ever put into a
concentration camp in Germany until the beginning of
November, when it was found necessary to retaliate against
the British, and later the French, as these nations continued
to refuse to let German civilians go free. No British, French,
or Russian woman living in the Empire was ever put in a
concentration camp in Germany.

" With such a score counting against England and the
Allies, let nobody in the future ever be deceived by mag-
nanimous appeals to civilisation and humanity, although
they be so ingeniously inserted in diplomatic notes dealing
with the throttling of neutral traffic."

II.

January 26, 1915.

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs authorises the
pubhcation of the following observations upon the report of
an interview recently granted by the German Chancellor to
an American correspondent :

It is not surprising that the German Chancellor should
show anxiety to explain away his now historic phrase about
a treaty being a mere " scrap of paper." The phrase has
made a deep impression because the progress of the world
largely depends upon the sanctity of agreements between
individuals and between nations, and the pohcy disclosed in
Herr von Bethmann HoUweg's phrase tends to debase the
legal and moral currency of civilisation.

What the German Chancellor said was that Great Britain,
in requiring Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium,
" was going to make war just for a word, just for a scrap
of paper " ; that is, that Great Britain was making a
mountain out of a molehill. He now asks the American
public to believe that he meant the exact opposite of what
he said ; that it was Great Britain who really regarded

388

THE ACTION OF GERMANY

the neutrality of Belgium as a mere trifle, and Germany who
" took her responsibilities towards neutral States seriously."
The arguments by which Herr von Bethmann HoUweg seeks
to establish the two sides of this case are in flat contradiction
of plain facts.

First, the German Chancellor alleges that " England in
1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without
the assent of the Belgian Government." This allegation is
absolutely false. It is based upon certain documents found
in Brussels which record conversations between British and
Belgian officers in 1906 and again in 191 1."' The fact that '"[See
there is no note of these conversations at the British War PP- 314-
Of&ce or Foreign Office shows that they were of a purely ^ao.J

informal character, and no military agreement of any sort
was at either time made between the two Governments.
Before any conversations took place between British and
Belgian officers, it was expressly laid down on the British
side that the discussion of military possibilities was to be
addressed to the manner in which, in case of need, British
assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium
for the defence of her neutrality, and on the Belgian side a
marginal note upon the record explains that " the entry
of the English into Belgium would only take place after
the violation of our neutrality by Germany." As regards the
conversation of 1911, the Belgian officer said to the British,
"You could only land in our country with our consent,"
and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a
categorical assurance"" that no British Government would '"'[See
violate the neutraUty of Belgium, and that " so long as it was p. 327-!
not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send
troops ourselves into their territory."

The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be
illustrated in this connection. He represents Sir Edward
Grey as saying, " He did not believe England would take
such a step, because he did not think English public opinion
would justify such action." What Sir Edward Grey actually
wrote was : " I said that I was sure that this Government
would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium,
and I did not believe that any British Government would
be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever
approve of it."

389

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [January 26,

If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were
conversations on military subjects between British and
Belgian officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known
to him, namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate
network of strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the
Belgian frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract :
railways deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden
attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last.
This fact alone was enough to justify any communications
between Belgium and other Powers on the footing that
there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality unless it
were previously violated by another Power. On no other
footing did Belgium ever have any such communications.
In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of
Belgium having thereby " abandoned " and " forfeited " her
neutrality, and he implies that he would not have spoken of
the German invasion as a " wrong " had he then known of
the conversations of 1906 and 1911. It would seem to follow,
that according to Herr von Bethmann HoUweg's code, a
wrong becomes a right if the party which is to be the subject
of the wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations
to resist it. Those who are content with older and more
generally accepted standards are likely to agree rather with
what Cardinal Mercier said in his Pastoral letter : " Belgium
was bound in honour to defend her own independence. She
kept her oath. The other Powers were bound to respect and
protect her neutrality. Germany violated her oath ; England
kept hers." These are the facts.

In support of the second part of the German Chancellor's
thesis, namely, that Germany " took her responsibilities
towards neutral States seriously," he alleges nothing except
that " he spoke frankly on the wrong committed by Germany "
in invading Belgium. That a man knows the right, while
doing the wrong, is not usually accepted as proof of his serious
conscientiousness .

The real nature of Germany's view of her " responsibilities
towards neutral States " may, however, be learnt, on
authority which cannot be disputed, by reference to the
English White Paper. If those responsibilities were in
truth taken seriously, why, ^hen Germany was asked to
"'[B. 114.] respect the neutrahty of Belgium'" if it were respected by

390

1915] THE ACTION OF GERMANY

France, did Germany refuse ? "' France, when asked the "» [B. 122.]
corresponding question at the same time, agreed."' This '"[B. 125.]
would have guaranteed Germany from all danger of attack
through Belgium. The reason of Germany's refusal was
given by Herr von Bethmann HoUweg's colleague. It may
be paraphrased in the well-known gloss upon Shakespeare :

" Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just ;
But four times he that gets his blow in fust."

" They had to advance into France," said Herr von Jagow,
" by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well
ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some
decisive blow as early as possible."''' "'[B. 160.]

Germany's real attitude towards Belgium was thus frankly
given by the German Foreign Secretary to the British
Ambassador, and the German Chancellor, in his speech to the
Reichstag, claimed the right to commit a wrong in virtue of
the military necessity of " hacking a way through." The
treaty which forbade the wrong was by comparison a mere
scrap of paper. The truth was spoken in the first statements
by the two German Ministers. All the apologies and argu-
ments which have since been forthcoming are afterthoughts
to excuse and explain away a flagrant wrong. Moreover,
all attacks upon Great Britain mi regard to this matter, and
all talk about " responsibilities towards neutral States,"
come badly from the man who on the 29th July asked Great
Britain to enter into a bargain to condone the violation of the
neutrality of Belgium. ''" '*'[B. 85.]

The German Chancellor spoke to the American corre-
spondent of his " efforts for years to bring about an under-
standing between England and Germany," an understanding,
he added, which would have " absolutely guaranteed the
peace of Europe." He omitted to mention what Mr. Asquith
made pubhc in his speech at Cardiff,'" that Germany re- ""[5ee
quired, as the price of an understanding, an unconditional P- 462.]
pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government
were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggres-
sion against Germany ; they were not prepared to pledge their
neutrality in case of aggression by Germany. '" An Anglo-Ger- '°'[B. 101.3
man understanding on the latter terms would not have meant
an absolute guarantee for the peace of Europe ; but it would

391

(2)

THE ACTION OF GERMANY [Jan. 26, 1915]

have meant an absolutely free hand for Germany, so far as
England was concerned, for Germany to break the peace of
Europe.

The Chancellor says that in his conversation with the
British Ambassador in August last he " may have been a bit
excited at seeing the hopes and work of the whole period of
his chancellorship going for nought." Considering that at
the date of tlie conversation (4th August) Germany had
"•[Y. 147.] already made war on France"' the natural conclusion is that
the shipwreck of the Chancellor's hopes consisted, not in the
fact of a European war, but in the fact that England had not
agreed to stand out of it.

The sincerity of the German Chancellor's professions to
the American correspondent may be brought to the very
simple test, the application of which is the more apposite
because it serves to recall one of the leading facts which pro-
duced the present war. Herr von Bethmann HoUweg re-
[B. 36, fused the proposal, which England put forward"" and in
43-] which France, Italy, and Russia concurred, for a Conference
at which the dispute would have been settled on fair and
honourable terms without war. If he really wished to work
with England for peace, why did he not accept that proposal ?
He must have known after the Balkan Conference in London
that England could be trusted to play fair. Herr von Jagow
had given testimony in the Reichstag to England's good
faith in those negotiations. The proposal for a second Con-
ference between the Powers was made by Sir Edward Grey
with the same straightforward desire for peace as in 1912
and 1913. The German Chancellor rejected this means of
averting war. He who does not will the means must not
complain if the conclusion is drawn that he did not will the
end.

The second part of the interview with the American
correspondent consists of a discourse upon the ethics of war.
The things which Germany has done in Belgium and France
have been placed on record before the world by those who
have suffered from them and who know them at first hand.
After this, it does not lie with the German Chancellor to read
to other belligerents a lecture upon the conduct of war.

392

[Dec. 6, 1914]

ITALY AND AUSTRIAN INTENTIONS
AGAINST SERBIA.

[Documents published in the British " Collected Diplomatic
Documents " as an Appendix to the translation of the
Serbian Blue-book [S.].]

DESPATCH FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT
ROME CONTAINING A REPORT OF A SPEECH
DELIVERED ON THE 5TH DECEMBER, 1914,
BY SIGNOR GIOLITTI, FORMERLY PRIME
MINISTER OF ITALY.

No. I.

Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward
Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, December 6, 1914.

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date
reporting the vote of confidence in the Government recorded
in the Italian Chamber, I have the honour to inform you
that in his speech which closed the discussion, Signor Giolitti
stated, in illustration and justification of the attitude of
Italy in separating herself from her allies and remaining
neutral, that on the 9th August, 1913, being himself absent
from Rome, he had received a telegram from the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, the late Marquis di San Giuliano, to the
following effect :— "' '" [cf. B.

" Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her ^^^■•'

intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such

S9S

ITALY, AUSTRIA, AND SERBIA [December 5,

action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus
foederis of the Triple AUiance, which, on the contrary, I
beheve to be inappUcable. I am endeavouring to arrange
for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action
on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state
clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be
taken, as defensive, and that therefore we do not consider
that the casus foederis arises."

Signor Giolitti's answer was as follows : — " If Austria
intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a casus foederis cannot
be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own
account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as
no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a
declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the
most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the
part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous
adventure."

This, he said, was done, and the action of Italy in no
respect disturbed her relations with her allies. He explained
this point in order to make it clear in the eyes of Europe that
Italy had acted with entire loyalty, as she would do to the
end.

It is interesting to notice that it was on the following day„
the loth August, that the peace of Bucharest, against which
Austria was disposed to promulgate reserves, was signed.

No. 2.

Speech of Signor Giolitti before the Italian Chamber of Deputies^
on the $th December, 1914.

(Translated from the Official Report of the Pro-
> ceedings of the Chamber.)

SIGNOR GIOLITTI : The President of the Council, when
speaking of the declaration of neutrality made by Italy on
the outbreak of war, recalled the fact that this decision was
the subject of heated debates and divided counsels, but that
later, both in Italy and abroad, the view gradually prevailed
that we were only exercising a right secured to us.

394

I9I4J ITALY, AUSTRIA, AND SERBIA

Therefore, inasmuch as I hold it necessary that Italy's,
loyal observance of international treaties shall be considered,
as being above any possibility of dispute — [Hear, hear) — I
feel it my duty to recall a precedent, which proves that the
interpretation placed by the Government on the Treaty of
the Triple Alliance is the correct interpretation, and was.
admitted as correct in identical circumstances by the Allied
Powers.

During the Balkan War, on the gth August, 1913, about a_
year before the present war broke out, during my absence
from Rome, I received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San
Giuliano, the following telegram : —

" Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her
intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such
action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus.
foederis of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I
believe to be inapplicable. {Sensation.)

" I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort
with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria,,
but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not
consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and.
that, therefore, we do not consider that the casus foederis.
arises.

" Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve."

I replied : —

" If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a.
casus foederis cannot be established. It is a step which she-
is taking on her own account, since there is no question of.
defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her..
It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made
to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for
action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this,
most perilous adventure." [Hear, hear.)

This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld,
and recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed
our relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration,
of neutrality made by the present Government conforms,
therefore in all respects to the precedents of Italian policy,,
and conforms also to an interpretation of the Treaty of
Alliance which has been already accepted by the Allies.

393

ITALY, AUSTRIA, AND SERBIA [December 5,

I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the
eyes of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained
completely loyal to the observance of her pledges. {Loud
applause.)

I should like now to make a very short statement in
-explanation of my vote on this question. I approve the
^Government's programme of an armed and vigilant neutrality
for the guardianship of the vital interests of Italy. The
Honourable President of the Council said truly that the vast
upheaval becomes greater every day, and that it is given to
none to foresee the end. The immense military and financial
resources which the belligerent Powers have at their disposal
exclude the possibility of an early termination of the confhct.
As long as the necessity does not arise for us to come down
into the arena to preserve our own vital interests, we ought all
loyally to observe neutrality, since it is only by such loyal
observance that we can preserve intact that great source of
strength which is freedom of action. {Loud applause.)

In this conflict, which is without precedent in history, the
political life of Italy may be at stake. The greatest prudence
is therefore incumbent on all ; and it is incumbent above Eill,
not only on the Government and on Parliament, but also on
that great force, the Press — {Hear, hear) — to keep a single
eye to the great interests of Italy and to remember only that
they are Italians. {Loud applause.)

In conclusion, I hope from the bottom of my heart that the
rmen who at this supreme moment have the responsibility of
Government may deserve the full gratitude of the country.
{Loud cheers and applause, during which many Deputies went
up to the speaker and congratulated him.)

^96

I9I4]

BRITISH SPEECHES.
I.— IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

[Of these speeches in the House of Commons, the twa
statements made by Sir Edward Grey on August 3rd and
the three statements by Mr. Asquith — on August 4th,
August 5th and August 6th — ^were printed as Part II. of the
British Blue-book " Great Britain and the European Crisis "
[B.]. The other speeches and statements, here added, are
taken from " Hansard."]

(i) Sir Edward Grey (July 27, 1914) . . page 397

(2) Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Bonar Law (August 3, 1914) 400

(3) Sir Edward Grey, further statement (August 3, 1914) 417

(4) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914) 418

(5) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1914) . . . . . . 420

(6) Mr. Asquith and Mr. Bonar Law (August 6, 1914) . . 421

(7) Sir Edward Grey, answers to questions (August 27

and 28, 1914, and February 11, 1915) . . . . 436

(I) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS, MONDAY, JULY 27, 1914.*

AUSTRIA AND SERBIA.

Mr. Bonar Law. — I rise to ask the Foreign Secretary a
question of which I have given him notice : whether he
would communicate any information to the House as to the
situation which exists between Austria and Serbia ?

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs {Sir E. Grey). —
The House will, of course, be aware through the public Press

* [This statement by Sir E. Grey is not printed in the British Blue-book,
but there are several references to it : see B. 62, 83, and 161 (vol. I., p. 217).]

397

BRITISH SPEECHES [July 27,

of what the nature of the situation in Europe is at this
moment, I think that it is due to the House that I should
give in short narrative form the position which His Majesty's
Government have so far taken up.

'"[July 24.] Last Friday"' morning I received from the Austro-
Hungarian Ambassador the text of the communication
made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers,
which has appeared in the Press, and which included textually
the demand made by the Austro-Hungarian Government

'"'DB. 4-] upon Serbia."'

'"[See B. In the afternoon I saw other Ambassadors,'" and expressed

5, 10, II.] the view that, as long as the dispute was one between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia alone, I felt that we had no title to
interfere, but that, if the relations between Austria-Hungary
and Russia became threatening, the question would then be
one of the peace of Europe : a matter that concerned us all.
I did not then know what view the Russian Government
had taken of the situation, and without knowing how things
were likely to develop I could not make any immediate

'*i[c/. B. proposition; but I said"' that, if relations between Austria-
"•] Hungary and Russia did become threatening, the only chance
of peace appeared to me to be that the four Powers — Germany,
France, Italy, and Great Britain, who were not directly
interested in the Serbian question — should work together
both in St. Petersburg and Vienna simultaneously to get
both Austria-Hungary and Russia to suspend military oper-
ations while the four Powers endeavoured to arrange a settle-
ment.

After I had heard that Austria-Hungary had broken off
diplomatic relations with Serbia, I made by telegraph yester-
day afternoon the following proposal, as a practical method
of applying the views that I had already expressed : —

"'EB. 36.] I instructed"" His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris,

Berlin, and Rome to ask the Governments to which they
were accredited whether they would be willing to arrange
that the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors in London
should meet me in a Conference to be held in London immedi-
ately to endeavour to find a means of arranging the present
difficulties. At the same time, I instructed His Majesty's
Ambassadors to ask those Governments to authorise their
398

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

representatives in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade to
inform the Governments there of the proposed Conference,
and to ask them to suspend all active miUtary operations
pending the result of the Conference.

To that I have not yet received complete replies, and it
is, of course, a proposal in which the co-operation of all four
Powers is essential. In a crisis so grave as this, the efforts
of one Power alone to preserve the peace must be quite
ineffective.

The time allowed in this matter has been so short that
I have had to take the risk of making a proposal without the
usual preliminary steps of trying to ascertain whether it
would be well received. But, where matters are so grave
and the time so short, the risk of proposing something that
is unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot
but feel, however, assuming that the text of the Serbian
reply"' as published this morning in the Press is accurate, "'[B-39-]
as I believe it to be, that it should at least provide a basis on
which a friendly and impartial group of Powers, including
Powers who are equally in the confidence of Austria-Hungary
and of Russia, should be able to arrange a settlement that
would be generally acceptable.

It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the
situation that the moment the dispute ceases to be one between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia and becomes one in which
another Great Power is involved, it can but end in the greatest
catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe
at one blow"" : no one can say what would be the limit of ""f'^A B.
the issues that might be raised by such a conflict, the con- ^6.]

sequences of it, direct and indirect would be incalculable.'^' "'[c/- B.

9> 48.J

Mr. Harry Lawson. — May I ask the right hon. Gentleman

whether it is true that this morning the German Emperor
accepted the principle of mediation which he has proposed ?

Sir E. Grey. — I understand that the German Government
are favourable to the idea of mediation in principle'*' as'"['^^*B.
between Austria-Hungary and Russia, but that as to the 46 and
particular proposal of applying that principle by means of a °°
Conference which I have described to the House, the reply
of the German Government has not yet been received.

399

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 3,

(2) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS. MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1914.

'^'Quly 27, LAST week"' I stated that we were working for peace not

seep. only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe.

397-] To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult

to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs,

but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved.

Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon

'"' [O.76.] each other.'"'

Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's
Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before
I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard
to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under
what obligations the Government is, or the House caii be
said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of
all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked
with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power,
to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that
point. We have always done it. During these last years,
as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would
have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Through-
out the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for
peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe
was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis.
It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in
adjusting their points of view. It took much time and
labour and discussion before they could settle their differ-
ences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main
object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather
than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure
the peace of Europe ; because there has been little time, and
there has been a disposition — at any rate in some quarters
on which I will not dwell — to force things rapidly to an issue,
at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know,
the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the
Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do
riot want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say
where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most

400

BRITISH SPEECHES

in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or
endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach
this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of
British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free
from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish papers'" as soon as we can regarding (^'[B.
what took place last week when we were working for peace ; i-i59-3J
and when those papers are published I have no doubt that
to every human being they wiU make it clear how strenuous
and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were,
and that they wiU enable people to form their own judgment
as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations,
I have assured the House — and the Prime Minister has
assured the House more than once — that if any crisis such
as this arose we should come before the House of Commons
and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide
what the British attitude should be, that we would have no
secret engagement which we should spring upon the House,
and tell the House that because we had entered into that
engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the
country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There has [sic] been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the
Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple Entente,
for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an alliance
— it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember
that in igo8 there was a crisis — also a Balkan crisis — origin-
ating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened
to come to London, because his visit was planned before the
crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a
Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public
opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give
anything more than diplomatic support. More was never
asked from us, more was never given, and more was never
promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given
no promise of anything more than diplomatic support — up
till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support.
Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the
House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906.

II— 2 C 401

BRITISH SPEECHES [August

That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came
at a time of very great dif&culty to His Majesty's Govern-
ment when a general election was in progress, and Ministers
were scattered over the country, and I — spending three days
a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign
Office — was asked the question, whether, if that crisis de-
veloped into war between France and Germany, we would
give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing
to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive
the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the
occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced
upon France then on the question of Morocco — a question
which had just been the subject of agreement between
this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular
on both sides — that if out of that agreement war was forced
on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this
country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no. promise, but I expressed that opinion during
the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to
the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador, at
the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats ; but
I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by
the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and
I think very reasonably, " If you think it possible that the
public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis
arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support
which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able
to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time
comes, unless some conversations have already taken place
between naval and military experts." There was force in
that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to
take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing
which passed between military or naval experts should bind
either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to
make a decision as to whether or not they would give that
support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general
election was in prospect ; I had to take the responsibility
of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be sum-
moned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry
CampbeU-Bannerman, the Prime Minister ; I consulted, I

402

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State
for War ; and the present Prime Minister, who was then
Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could
do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding
that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the
crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military
and naval experts took place was later on — I think much
later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to
be of importance — ^but later on it was brought to the know-
ledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came — another Morocco crisis — and
throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been
taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion
and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we
ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which
was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that
these conversations which took place were not binding upon
the freedom of either Government ; and on the 22nd of
November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the
letter"' which I will now read to the House, and I received '^ C^- ^°5
from him a letter in similar terms"" in reply. The letter mm X05
which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known (2) ; c/.M.
to the public now as the record that, whatever took place Viviani's
between military and naval experts, they were not binding speech,
engagements upon the Governments : — J' . ^59

" My dear Ambassador, Sf^""

" From time to time in recent years the French and
British naval and military experts have consulted
together. It has always been understood that
such consultation does not restrict the freedom of
either Government to decide at any future time
whether or not to assist the other by armed force.
We have agreed that consultation between experts
is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engage-
ment that commits either Government to action
in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may
never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the
French and British fleets respectively at the
present moment is not based upon an engagement
to co-operate in war.

403

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 3

" You have, however, pointed out that, if either Govern-
ment had grave reason to expect an unprovoked
attack by a third Power, it might become essential
to know whether it could in that event depend
upon the armed assistance of the other.

" I agree that, if either Government had grave reason
to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power,
or something that threatened the general peace,
it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both Governments should act together
to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and,
if so, what measures they would be prepared to
take in common."

Lord Charles Beresford. — What is the date of that ? '

Sir E. Grey. — The 22nd November, 1912. That is the
starting point for the Government with regard to the present
crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister
and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified,
and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what
our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether
we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free,
and, a fortiori, the House of Commons remains perfectly
free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view
of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to
the House of Commons that I should give that full information
to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the
letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything
which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations
with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom
of the Government to decide what attitude they should take
now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to
decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this : The
situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it
was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it
was primarily a dispute which concerned France — a dispute
which concerned France and France primarily — a dispute,
as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement
subsisting between us and France, and published to the
whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic

404

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but
diplomatic support ; we were, at any rate, pledged by a
definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically
in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not
originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated
as regards anything with which we had a special agreement
with France ; it has not originated with anything which
primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute
between Austria and Serbia. I can say this with the most
absolute confidence — ^no Government and no country has
less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria
and Serbia than the Government and the country of France.
They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour
under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair
to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot
apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the
Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms
of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and com-
pletely cleared the ground with regard to the question of
obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. ''' '''[JFor M.
For many years we have had a long-standing friendship Viviani
with France. I remember well the feeling in the House — on this
and my own feeling — ^for I spoke on the subject, I think, j^g ° '
when the late Government made their agreement with France — y. 159
the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that (vol. I.,
these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the P- 429)-]
past, had cleared these differences away ; I remember saying,
I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had
been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had
made that possible. But how far that friendship entails
obligation— it has been a friendship between the nations
and ratified by the nations — ^how far that entails an obligation,
let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings,
and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I
construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon
anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they
should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and
collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view,
and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

40s

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 3,

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the
northern and western coasts of France are absolutely un-
defended. The French fleet being concentrated in the
Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it
used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between
the two countries has given them a sense of security that
there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French
fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been
concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and
friendship which has existed between the two countries.
My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war
which France had not sought, and in which she had not been
the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bom-
barded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we
could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within
sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispas-
sionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling
of this country. There are times when one feels that if
these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling
which would spread with irresistible force throughout the
land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment,
and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on
that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently
going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment,
what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean ?
If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what
we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts abso-
lutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming
down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war
of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may
be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean.
We are in the presence of a European conflagration ; can
anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of
it ? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude
of neutrality, sajdng, " No, we cannot undertake and engage
to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the
French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean ; and let
us assume that the consequences — which are already tre-
mendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries

406

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

which are at peace — in fact, equally whether countries are
at peace or at war — let us assume that out of that come
consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden
moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should
go to war ; and let us assume — ^which is quite possible —
that Italy, who is now neutral — because, as I understand,
she considers that this war is an aggressive war,'" and the '"CB. 152.]
Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance, her obligation did
not arise — ^let us assume that consequences which are not
. yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her
own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neu-
trality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British
interests ourselves to fight — what then will be the position
in the Mediterranean ? It might be that at some critical
moment those consequences v/ould be forced upon us because
our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this
country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks
there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which
may not be vital to this country. What will be our position
then ? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which
is equal to dealing alone with a combination "of other fleets
in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when
we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and
we might have exposed this country" from our negative attitude
at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that
from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly
that France was entitled to know — and to know at once —
whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected
northern and western coasts she could depend upon British
support. In that emergency, and in these compelling cir-
cumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Am-
bassador the following statement"" : — ""[B. 148;

Y. 137.

" I am authorised to give an assurance that if the ^^^^ *°°*^
German fleet comes into the Channel or through the latter,
the North Sea to undertake hostile operations and cf. y'.
against the French coasts or shipping, the British 126, 143.]
fleet will give all the protection in its power.
This assurance is, of course, subject to the
policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the

407

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 3,

support of Parliament, and must not be taken as
binding His Majesty's Government to take any
action until the above contingency of action by
the German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on
our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on
our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should
that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from
hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this
in any very formal way ; but I understand that the German
Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves
to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the
northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly
before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an
engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious con-
sideration— becoming more serious every hour — there is the
question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length

what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing

"'[See factor is the treaty of 1839,'^' but this is a treaty with a

p. 487. c/. history — a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there

g^^*y was war between France and Germany, the question of

p. 488 1 ^^^ neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were

said. Amongst other things. Prince Bismarck gave an

assurance to Belgium that-^confirming his verbal assurance,

he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous

in reference to the treaty in existence — that the. German

Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality

of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality

would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That

is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany

of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude ? The people who laid
down the attitude of the British Government were Lord
Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the
House of Commons. Lord Granville on August 8, 1870,
used these words. He said : —

" We might have explained to the country and to
foreign nations, that we could not think this
country was bound either morally or inter-

408

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

nationally, or that its interests were concerned
in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium ;
though this course might have had some con-
veniences, though it might have been easy to
adhere to it, though it might have saved us
from some immediate danger, it is a course
which Her Majesty's Government thought it
impossible to adopt in the name of the country
with any due regard to the country's honour
or to the country's interests."

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later : —

" There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It
is not necessary, nor would time permit riie, to
enter into the complicated question of the nature
of the obligations of that treaty ; but I am not
able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who
have held in this House what plainly amounts
to an assertion, that the simple fact of the exis-
tence of a guarantee is binding on every party
to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular
position in which it may find itself at the time
when the occasion for acting on the guarantee
arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy
to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such
as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never
to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may
venture to say so, that impracticable view of
the guarantee. The circumstance that there is
already an existing guarantee in force is, of
necessity, an important fact, and a weighty
element in the case, to which we are bound to
give full and ample consideration. There is also
this further consideration, the force of which we
must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common
interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement
of any Power whatever."

The treaty is an old treaty — 1839 — and that was the
view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which
are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which

409

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 3,

benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who
guarantee the neutraUty of Belgium. The honour and
interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we
cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of
our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations,
than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on
this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew
that this question must be a most important element in our
policy — a most important subject for the House of Commons.
I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris

''|[B. 114.] and Berlin"' to say that it was essential for us to know
whether the French and German Governments respectively
were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the
neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from

•"'[B. 125, the French Government this reply"" : —

" The French Government are resolved to respect the
neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in
the event of some other Power violating that
neutrality that France might find herself under
the necessity, in order to assure the defence
of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance
has been given several times. The President
of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the
Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels
has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

i"[B, 122.] From the German Government the reply'" was : —

" The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could
not possibly give an answer before consulting
the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor."

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important

to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would

not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign

Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that

he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any

reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war,

1*1 [cf. B. to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain

122.] extent, part of their plan of campaign.'*' I telegraphed at

410

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government,'" "'[B. 115.I
and I got the following reply'" from Sir Francis Villiers : — (^ip. 128.]
" Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will
observe and uphold her neutrality, which she
intends to maintain to the utmost of her power.
In so informing me. Minister for Foreign Affairs
said that, in the event of the violation of the
neutrality of their territory, they believed that
they were in a position to defend themselves
against intrusion. The relations between Belgium
and her neighbours were excellent, and there
was no reason to suspect their intentions ; but
he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared
against emergencies."

It now appears from the news I have received to-day —
which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure
how far it has reached me in an accurate form — that an
ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany,"' the '''[B. 153;
object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with G. 20.]
Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage
of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one
has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment,
I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in
a position to give the House full, complete and absolute
information upon the point. We were sounded'*' in the i*'[B. 85.]
course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given
that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that
would content us. We replied"" that we could not bargain i»|[B.ioi.]
away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian
neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that
the following telegram'" had been received from the King f«i[B. 133;
of the Belgians by our King — King George : — G, 25.]

" Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's
friendship and that of your predecessors, and the
friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the
proof of friendship she has just given us again, I
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic inter-
vention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard
the integrity of Belgium."

411

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 3,

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our
part. What can diplomatic intervention do now ? We
have great and vital interests in the independence — and
integrity is the least part — of Belgium. If Belgium is com-
pelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of
course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she
admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could
only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region
of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they
should be left alone and independent. The one thing they
fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that
their independence should be interfered with. If in this
war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those
countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants
violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it,
at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the
independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to
what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It
will be found in " Hansard," volume 203, p. 1787. I have
not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context,
but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could
make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone
said : —

" We have an interest in the independence of Belgium
which is wider than that which we may have
in the literal operation of the guarantee. It
is found in the answer to the question whether,
under the circumstances of the case, this country,
endowed as it is with influence and power, would
quietly stand by and witness the perpetration
of the direst crime that ever stained the pages
of history, and thus become participators in the
sin."

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything

1^' [See B. in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium,"' asking her to

153 i text, compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have

G. 20.] been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if

that holds. If her independence goes, the independence

of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of

412

BRITISH SPEECHES

view of British interests to consider what may be at stake.
If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten
to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes
subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself
— consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am
sure that France has the power to defend herself with all
the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown
so often — stUl, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell
under the same dominating influence, and then Holland,
and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words
come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common
interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any
Power ?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside,
husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the
course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect
to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point
of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those
obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian
treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might
have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of
the respect that we should have lost. And I do not believe,
whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is
going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior
strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe
able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to
protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer
but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war,
whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign
trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed,
but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental
nations engaged in war— all their populations, all their
energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle —
they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carry-
ing on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war
or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that
at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained
aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to
use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the
course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe

413

BRITISH SPEECHES [August

opposite to us — if that had been the result of the war —
falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am
quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have
lost us all -respect. I can only say that I have put the ques-
tion of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not
yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as
they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there
is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent
the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are

<''[c/. Y. undisputed.'"

126.] I have read to the House the only engagements that we

have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force.
I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no
engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary
armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet

'^' [cf. B. has taken place ; '" mobilisation of the army is taking place ;*
47. 48 ; Y. ]3^^ ^g have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that .
^vol ¥^ — ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ °^ ^ European conflagration such as this, un-
p. 427).]' precedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and
other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupa-
tion, with all the unknown factors — we must take very
carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending
an expeditionary force out of the country until we know
how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation
is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland— and I
would like this to be clearly understood abroad — does not
make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we
have now to take into account. I have told the House how
far we have at present gone in commitments and the condi-
tions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House
and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the
neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy is there before the House ? There is
but one way in which the Government could make certain
at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that
would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation
of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have
made the commitment to France that I have read to the

* [Mobilisation Orders were issued by the British Admiralty on Sunday,
August 2nd ; the Army Reservists were called up on Tuesday, August 4th.]
414

BRITISH SPEECHES

House which prevents us doing that. We have got the
consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any
unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions abso-
lutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink
from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power.
If we did take that line by saying, " We will have nothing
whatever to do with this matter " under no conditions — the
Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Medi-
terranean, with damage to British interests, and what may
happen to France from our failure to support France — if we
were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as
nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I be-
lieve, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation
before the world, and should not escape the most serious and
grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government,
and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I
do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after
the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the
House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared,
and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use
all the strength we have at any moment — we know not how
soon — to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know,
if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have an-
nounced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final
decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we
know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced
upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned,
we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right
hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt
whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces
were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never
was there a. time when confidence was more justified in the
power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect
our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering
and misery entaUed, from which no country in Europe will
escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will
save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy
ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount
of harm that must be done by the economic condition that
is caused on the Continent.

415

BRITISH SPEECHES [August

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Govern-
ment in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to
do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons.
We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have,
and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared
to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably
it may develop, we wUl face it. We worked for peace up to
the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard,
how persistently and how earnestly we strove for peace last
week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned.
We are now face to face with a situation and all the conse-
quences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we
shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding
to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures
may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action
taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the
situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realise
the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between
Austria and Serbia, and not the complications of this matter
which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and
Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do
not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany
is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a
'" [c/.Y. 159 good deal has been happening on the French frontier. "' We
(vol. I., do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris,
p. 425).] -pj^g situation has developed so rapidly that technically,
as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to
describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring
out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct,
and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now
put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not
improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our
stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country
realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magni-
tude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which
I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be
supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons,
but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and
the endurance of the whole country.

416

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

Mr. Bonar Law's Comments.

Mr. Bonar Law. — ^The right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Grey)
has made an appeal for support, and it is necessary I should
say a word or two. They shall be very few. I wish to say,
in the first place, that I do not believe there is a single Member
of this House who doubts that, not only the right hon. Gentle-
man himself, but the Government which he represents, have
done everything in their power up to the last moment to
preserve peace, and I think we may be sure that, if any other
course is taken, it is because it is forced upon them, and that
they have absolutely no alternative. One thing only, further,
I would like to say. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the
bright spot in the picture*" which only a day or two ago was "'[.Seg
a black spot on the poUtical horizon. Everything he has said P- 414]
I am sure is true. I should like to say, further, that if the
contingencies, which he has not put into words, but which
are all in our minds as possible, arise, then we have already
had indications that there is another bright spot, and that
every one of His Majesty's Dominions beyond the Seas will be
behind us in whatever action it is necessary to take. This
only I shall add ; The Government already know, but I
give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which
I am Leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think
it necessary to take for the honour and security of this country,
they can rely on the unhesitating support of the Opposition.

(3) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD
GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3,
1914-

Germany and Belgium.

I want to give the House some information which I have
received, and which was not in my possession when I made
my statement this afternoon. It is information I have re-
ceived from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the
following effect : —

" Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note
proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering

II— 2 D 417

">[cA

153 ;

141

and

note

; G.

23-1

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 4,

free passage on Belgian territory, and promising
maintenance of independence of the kingdom
and possessions at the conclusion of peace, and
threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium
as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours"'
was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have
answered that an attack on their neutrality would
be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations,
and that to accept the German proposal would
be to sacrifice the honour of a nation. Conscious
of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel
aggression by all possible means."

Of course, I can only say that the Government are pre-
pared to take into grave consideration the information which
it has received. I make no further comment upon it.

(4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914.

Mr. Bonar Law. — I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether
he has any statement that he can now make to the House ?

V'* The Prime Minister {Mr. Asquiih). — In conformity with
the statement of policy made here by my right hon. friend
the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this
[B. 153.] morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin."' It
was to this effect : —

" The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His
Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on
behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government
are also informed that the German Government
has delivered to the Belgian Government a note
proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage
through Belgian territory, and promising to main-
tain the independence and integrity of the kingdom
and its possessions at the conclusion of peace,
threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium
as an .enemy. An answer was requested within
twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium
has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation
418

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

of the law of nations. His Majesty's Govern-
ment are bound to protest against this violation
of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common
with themselves, and must request an assurance
that the demand made upon Belgium may not
be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will
be respected by Germany. You should ask for
an immediate reply."

We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels
the following telegram"' : — w[B. 154;

"German Minister has this morning addressed note ^- ^7-1
to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating
that, as Belgian Government have declined the
well-intended proposals submitted to them by
the Imperial Government, the latter wUl, deeply
to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if
necessary by force of arms, the measures con-
sidered indispensable in view of the French
menaces."

Simultaneously — almost immediately afterwards — ^we re-
ceived from the Belgian Legation here in London the following
telegram ''' :— '''^- J59

" General staff announces that territory has been
violated at Gemmenich (near Aix-la-ChapeUe)."

Subsequent information tended to show that the German
force has penetrated still further into Belgian territory.'" '^'t^- ^57-1
We also received this morning from the German Ambassador
here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secre-
tary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is
in these terms : —

" Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the
part of the British Government with regard to
our intentions by repeating most positively formal
assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict
with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence
whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of
this declaration is borne out by fact that we
solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to

419

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 5,

respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we
could not profitably annex Belgic territory without
making at the same time territorial acquisitions
at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir
E. Grey that German army could not be exposed
to French attack across Belgium, which was
planned according to absolutely unimpeachable
information. Germany had consequently to dis-
regard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a
question of life or death to prevent French ad-
vance."

I have to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government :
We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory com-
'^'p3. I59-] munication. We have, in reply'" to it, repeated the request
'"'[B. 114.] we made last week "" to the German Government, that they
should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neu-
trality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week.
We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory
answer to the telegram of this morning — which I have read
to the House — should be given before midnight.

(5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 5, 1914.

Mr. Bonar Law. — May I ask the Prime Minister if he has
any information he can give us to-day ?

The Prime Minister {Mr. Asquith). — Our Ambassador at
Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening, and
since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between
'" [B. 160 Germany and ourselves. '^'

i7°;^^ -i' We have received from our Minister at Brussels the
following telegram : —

" I have just received from Minister for Foreign
Affairs "

— that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs —

" a note'*' of which the following is a literal
translation : —

" ' Belgian Government regret to have to inform His
Majesty's Government that this morning armed

420

p. 211).]

<^'[G.

40.

cf.G.

22,

23;

152.]

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian terri-
tory in violation of engagements assumed by
treaty.

" ' Belgian Government are further '" resolved to resist ''' For

by all means in their power. "further"

" ' Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and yfgrmlv"

Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence Ngy^g.

of her territory. ment) ; see

" ' There would be"" concerted and common action G. 40.]
with the object of resisting the forcible measures

employed by Germany against Belgium, and at '"[Trans-

the same time of guarding the maintenance for Ifg^Q^j^j

future of the independence and integrity of j^g .. ^ii y

Belgium. amait) in

" ' Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she G. 40.]
will assume defence of her fortified places.' "

We have also received to-day from the French Ambassa-
dor here the following telegram received by the French
Government from the French Minister at Brussels : —

" The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of
War has asked the French military attache to
prepare at once for the co-operation and contact
of French troops with the Belgian army pending
the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing
Powers now being made. Orders have therefore
been given to Belgian provincial Governors not
to regard movements of French troops as a
violation of the frontier."

This is all the information I am at the moment able to
give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving
notice that to-morrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move
a vote of credit of ioo,ooo,oooZ.

(6) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 6, 1914.

Motion made, and Question proposed, " That a sum, not
exceeding £100,000,000 be granted to His Majesty, beyond
the ordinary grants of Parliament, towards defrajdng ex-
penses that may be incurred during the year ending March

421

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 6.

31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the
security of the country, for the conduct of Naval and Military
operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the
continuance of trade, industry, and business communications,
whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk,
or otherwise for the relief of distress, and generally for all
expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war."

The Prime Minister {Mr. Asquith). — In asking the House
to agree to the resolution which Mr. Speaker has just read
from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it
is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which
was covered by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary
''' [Aug. 3 ; two or three nights ago. '" He stated — and I do not think
see speech, any of the statements he made are capable of answer and
p. 400.] certainly have not yet been answered — the grounds upon
which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret,
His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this
country in a state of war with what, for many years and
indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power. But,
''''[B Sir, the papers"" which have since been presented to Parlia-

1-159.] ment, and which are now in the hands of hon. Members,
will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how
persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to
have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend
to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace.
Everyone knows, in the great crisis which occurred last year
in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the
acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps takenjby
my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict was limited,
and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace
was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have,
unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House
and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will
accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be
paid to any statesman : that, never derogating for an instant
or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country,
he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and
preserve the greatest interest of all countries — universal peace.
These papers which are now in the hands of hon. Members
show something more than that. They show what were the
422

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality.

I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our

feUow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications,

will read, learn and mark the communications'" which <''|B, 85,

passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London lo^-]

in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy

our neutrality are contained in the communication made

by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the

29th July, No. 85 of the published Paper."' I think I must <« [6,85.]

refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of

things as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward Goschen

goes on : —

" He then proceeded to make the following strong bid
for British neutrality. He said that it was clear,
so far as he was able to judge the main principle
which governed British policy, that Great Britain
would never stand by and allow France to be
crushed in any conflict there might be. That,
however, was not the object at which Germany
aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain
were certain, every assurance would be given to
the British Government that the Imperial Govern-
ment "

Let the House observe these words —

" aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense
of France should they prove victorious in any
war that might ensue."

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent
question : —

" I questioned His Excellency about the French
colonies "

What are the French colonies ? They mean every part of
the dominions and possessions of France outside the geo-
graphical area of Europe —

" and he said that he was unable to give a similar
undertaking in that respect."

423

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 6,

Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always
"been the crucial, and almost the governing consideration,
namely the position of the small States : —

" As regards Holland, however. His Excellency said
that so long as Germany's adversaries respected
the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands,
Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Govern-
ment an assurance that she would do likewise."

Then we come to Belgium : —

" It depended upon the action of France what oper-
ations Germany might be forced to enter upon in
Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian
neutrality would be respected if she had not sided
against Germany."

Let the House observe the distinction between those two
cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence
and integrity but also neutrality ; but in regard to Belgium,
there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an
assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity
of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency
added : —

" Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his
policy had been to bring about an understanding
with England. He trusted that these assur-
ances "

the assurances I have read out to the House —

" might form the basis of that understanding
which he so much desired."

What does that amount to ? Let me just ask the House.
I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly
not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany,
but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the
British Government in this matter. What did that proposal
amount to ? In the first place, it meant this : That behind
the back of France — they were not made a party to these
communications — we should have given, if we had assented
to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of
a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions
424

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards
Belgium ? When she addressed, as she has addressed in
these last few days, her moving appeal to us'" to fulfil our 'i'[pp.43o-
solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we 421-]

have given ? What reply should we have given to that
Belgian appeal ? We should have been obliged to say that,
without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power
threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word.
The House has read, and the country has read, of course,
in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal'" addressed ""[5ee
by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can P- -*" :
read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are G^as!]
fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the
position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle,
if we had assented to this infamous proposal ? Yes, and what
are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the
dishonour of our obligations ? What are we to get in return ?
A promise — ^nothing more ; a promise as to what Germany
would do in certain eventualities ; a promise, be it observed
— I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record
— ^given by a Power which was at that very moment announc-
ing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to
do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised,
we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with
dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of
this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I
think the country wiU be glad, to turn to the reply which
my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the
House two of the more salient passages. This document.
No. loi of my Paper,'" puts on record a week ago the attitude '^'P- ^oi.]
of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British
people. My right hon. friend says : —

" His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment
entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they
should bind themselves to neutrality on such
terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to
stand by while French Colonies are taken if France
is beaten, so long as Germany does not take
French territory as distinct from the Colonies.

From the material point of view "

425

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 6,

My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate
language : —

" such a proposal is unacceptable, for France,
without further territory in Europe being taken
from her, could be so crushed as to lose her posi-
tion as a Great Power, and become subordinate
to German policy."

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded : —

" Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace
for us to make this bargain with Germany at
the expense of France, a disgrace from which the
good name of this country would never recover.
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain
away whatever obligation or interest we have
as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could
not entertain that bargain either."

He then says : —

" We must preserve our full freedom to act as circum-
stances may seem to us to require."

And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will
appreciate : —

" You should . . . add most earnestly that the one
way of maintaining the good relations between
England and Germany is that they should continue
to work together to preserve the peace of Europe.
. . . For that object this Government will work
in that way with all sincerity and good will.

If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the
present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour
will be to promote some arrangement to which
Germany could be a party, by which she could
be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy
would be pursued against her or her allies by
France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separ-
ately. I have desired this and worked for it "

The statement was never more true —

" as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis,
and, Germany having a corresponding object, our

426

BRITISH SPEECHES

relations sensibly improved. The idea has hither-
to been too Utopian to form the subject of definite
proposals, but if this present crisis, so much
more acute than any that Europe has gone
through for generations, be safely passed, I am
hopeful that the relief and reaction which will
follow may make possible some more definite
rapprochement between the Powers than has been
possible hitherto."

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate
and convincing language the attitude of this Government.
Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious
sincerity and earnestness which underlies it ; can anyone
honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite
of great provocation — and I regard the proposals made to
us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without
consideration and almost without answer — can anyone doubt
that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman,
who had already earned the title — and no one ever more
deserved it — of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the
very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but
unhappily frustrated purpose ? I am entitled to say, and
I do so on behalf of this country — I speak not for a party,
I speak for the country as a whole — that we made every
effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But
this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting
for ? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the
Government, the terrible incalculable suffering, economic,
social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war
between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There
is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying
days — more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen
for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not
a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that
time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled
suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about,
not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in
this country and in the other countries of the world, but ta
posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation.
Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes,^

427

BRITISH SPEECHES [August

and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to
describe. Unhappily, if — in spite of all our efforts to keep
the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness
of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war — ^we
have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the
interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well
assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the
country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just
cause.

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two
sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international
obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into
between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life,
would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law
but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly
have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate
the principle which, in these days when force, material force,
sometimes seems to be the dominant influence' and factor
in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate
the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed,
in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will
of a strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any
nation ever entered into a great controversy — and this is
one of the greatest history will ever know — with a clearer
conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not
for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own
selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles,
the maintenance of which is vital to the civUisation of the
world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and
justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge
this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us
now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United
Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre,
shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object
may be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this
Committee — to make the very unusual demand upon it —
to give the Government a Vote of Credit of £100,000,000.
I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it,
into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and
Supplementary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements
which arise in that connection. There is a much higher

428

BRITISH SPEECHES

point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify,,
upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose ,ta
adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would
be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee.
There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the
Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past, Vote&
of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military
operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Com-
mittee to give us its confidence in the extension of the
traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this money, which
we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied
not only for strictly naval and military operations, but ta
assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade,
industry, business, and communications — whether by means
of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise — for the
relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out
of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee
will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the
Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters.
It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury
will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will
be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would
be a great pity — in fact, a great disaster — if, in a crisis of this,
magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision — ^provision
far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions
that prevailed in the old days — for all the various ramifica-
tions and developments of expenditure which the existence
of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must
entail on any one of them.

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State
for War — a position which I held until this morning* — for a
Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps
the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on
that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of
Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I
need not go back but which are fresh in the minds of every-
one, in the hope and with the object that the condition of
things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily
be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established.
I believe that is the case ; in fact, I know it to be. There is.
* [Lord Kitchener was Mr. Asquith's successor at the War Office.]

42»

BRITISH SPEECHES [August

no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit
and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished
than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to
continue the work of that office, and I would have done so
under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army,
it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should
divide his attention between that Department and another,
still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to
look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately
responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give,
as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs
of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a
very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person
of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism
that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped
into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not
a politician. His association with the Government as a
Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken
as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions.
He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great
public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the
discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever
fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties
and all opinions.

I am asking, on his behalf for the Army, power to increase
the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number
already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the
Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged
to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and
the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India
is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that
every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously
and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of
their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help
they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the
Mother Country must set the example, while she responds
with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from
the outlying members of her family.

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for con-
troversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I
have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in the

430

BRITISH SPEECHES

general description of the provision we think it necessary to
make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my
purpose — ^it is not the purpose of any patriotic man — ^to
inflame feehng, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international
animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We
have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil,
and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country
will enable us to do it.

Mr. Bonar Law's Comments.

Mr. Bonar Law. — ^No Minister has ever fulfilled a duty
more responsible or in regard to which the responsibility
was more acutely felt than that which has just been fulfilled
by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Asquith). This is not a
time for speech making, and I should have been quite ready
to leave the statement which he has given to the Committee
as the expression of the view, not of a party but of a nation.
But as this, I think, will be the only opportunity which will
be given for expressing the views of a large section of this
Committee, I feel that I am bound to make clear to the
Committee and to the country what is the attitude of His
Majesty's Opposition on this question. There are two
things which I desire to impress upon the Committee. The
first is that we have dreaded war and have longed for peace
as strongly as any Member of this Committee ; and the second
is that in our belief we are in a state of war against our wiU,
and that we, as a nation, have done everything in our power
to prevent such a condition of things arising. When this
crisis first arose I confess I was one of those who had the hope
that even then, though a European conflagration took place,
we might be able to stay out of it. I held that hope strongly,
but in a short time I became convinced of this, that into this
war we should inevitably be drawn, and that it really was a
question, and a question only, whether we should enter it
honourably or be dragged into it with dishonour. I remember
that on the first occasion after the retirement of my right hon.
Friend,* when I had to speak on foreign affairs, I made this

• [Mr. A. J. Balfour resigned the leadership of the Unionist party on
November 9, 1911, and Mr. Bonar Law was chosen to succeed him as
Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, on November 14,
1911.]

431

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 6,

statement, which perhaps is wrong, though I do not think so
even yet. I said that if ever war arose between Great Britain
and Germany it would not be due to inevitable causes, for I
did not believe in inevitable war. I said it would be due to
human folly. It is due to human folly, and to human wicked-
ness, but neither the folly nor the wickedness is here. What
other course was open to us ? It is quite true, as the Foreign
<''rAuff. Secretary explained to the House the other day,"' that we
3rd, see were under no formal obligation to take part in such a
pp. 400 struggle, but every Member in this House knows that the
et sfi?.] Entente meant this in the minds of this Government and of
every other Government, that if any of the three Powers
were attacked aggressively the others would be expected to
step in to give their aid. The question, therefore, to my
mind was this : Was this war in any way provoked by those
who will now be our allies ? No one who has read the White
Paper can hesitate to answer that question. I am not going
to go into it even as fully as the Prime Minister has done, but
I would remind the House of this, that in this White Paper is
contained the statement made by the German Ambassador,
I think, at Vienna, that Russia was not in a condition and
<='[B. 32.] could not go to war, and in the same letter"" are found these
words :

" As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about
in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter."

Every one for years has known that the key to peace or
war lay in Berlin. Every one knew it, and at this crisis there
is no one who can doubt that BerUn, if it had chosen, could
have prevented this terrible conflict. I am afraid that the
miscalculation which was made about Brussels was made
also about us. The despatch which the right hon. Gentle-
<='[B. 85.] man referred to'^' is a despatch of a nature that I, at least,
believe would not have been addressed to Great Britain if it
had been believed that our hands were free, and that we held
the position which we had always held before. That, at least,
is my belief. Now what does this mean ? We are fighting,
as the Prime Minister said, for the honour, and with the honour
is bound up always the interest, of our country. But we are
fighting also for the whole basis of the civilisation for which
we stand, and for which Europe stands. I do not wish, any

432

914] BRITISH SPEECHES

more than the Prime Minister, to inflame passion, and I only
ask the House to consider this one aspect.

Look at the way Belgium is being treated to-day. There
is a report — ^if it is not true now, it may be true to-morrow —
that the city of Liege is attacked by German troops, and that
civilians, as in the days of the middle ages, are fighting for
their hearths and homes against trained troops. How has
that been brought about ? In a state of war, war must be
waged, but remember that this plan is not of to-day or of
yesterday. It has been long matured. The Germans knew
^ that they would have others to face, and they were ready to
take the course which they took the other day of sajdng to
Belgium,'^' "Destroy your independence and allow our '"[G. 20.]
troops to go through, or we will come down upon you with
a might which it is impossible for you to resist." If we had
allowed that to be done, our position as one of the great nations
of the world, and our honour as one of the nations of the
world, would, in my opinion, have been gone. This is no
small struggle. It is the greatest, perhaps, that this country
has ever been engaged in, and the issue is uncertain. It is
Napoleonism once again. Thank heaven, so far as we know,
there is no Napoleon.

I am not goings to say anything more about the causes of
the war, for I do not desire to encourage controversy on this
subject. But, if I may be allowed to say so, I should like
to say this, that I read yesterday with'real pleasure an article
in a paper which does not generally commend itself to me, the
Manchester Guardian. In that article it still held that the
war ought not to have been entered into, but it took this view,
that that was a question for history, and that now we were
in it, there was only one question for us, and that was to bring
it to a successful issue. I have felt S5niipathy, far more than
at any other time, for the Prime Minister and for the Foreign
Secretary. I can imagine nothing more terrible than that the
Foreign Secretary should have a feehng that perhaps he has
brought this country into an unnecessary war. No feeling
can be worse. I can say this, and whether we are right or
wrong, the whole House agrees with it I am sure, that that
is a burden which the right hon. Gentleman can carry with a
good conscience, and that every one of us can put up unhesitat-
ingly this prayer, may God defend the right.

II-2 E 433

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 6,

I should like, if I may, to go to another topic — this is the
only opportunity I shall have, and I think it is worth saying —
and to ask the House to consider the conditions under which
this war is going to be carried on. I was pleased to hear the
Prime Minister say the other day in answer to a speech by the
hon. Member (Mr. Arthur Henderson), and he has developed
it in describing the terms of this Vote of Credit, that he
realised, as we all must realise, that in a country situated like
ours the development of industry and the supply of food at
home is just as much an operation of war as is the conduct of
our armed forces. I do not wish to minimise our difficulties,
but I am quite sure, as sure as I can be of anything, that there
is no danger of a scarcity of food, and that the only danger
is the fear of scarcity of food. Everyone who has been in
business knows that what causes panic prices is not actual
scarcity at the time, but the fear of scarcity coming, and this
is a case where every one of us must do what he can to impress
upon the^people of this country that there is, as I beheve, no
danger. Here I should like, if I may, to give one warning
note. Remember, at least I believe it, this war, unexpected
by us, is not unexpected by our enemy. I shall be greatly
surprised if we do not find that at first on our trade routes
there is a destruction of our property which might raise a
panic. That is inevitable, I think, at the outset. Let us
be prepared for it, and let us realise that it has no bearing
whatever on the ultimate course of the war. There is some-
thing else which I think, if I am right, it is important to say.
We had a discussion yesterday about credit. That is the
basis of successful war, as it is of every branch of industry
at this moment. I think the Government have taken the
right course. I have followed it closely, and I know that
they have been supported by those who best understand
the situation. I think the danger is minimised as much
as it can be. But, after all, the question of credit really
depends on what we believe is going to be the effect of
this war upon our trade and our industry. I hope the
House will not think I am too optimistic, but I do think
there is a danger of our taking too gloomy a view of
what the effects may be, and by taking that gloomy view,
helping to bring about the very state of affairs that we wish
to avoid.

434

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

Again, I wish to guard myself against seeming to be too
hopeful. But let us look at the facts as if we were examining
a chess problem. If we keep the command of the sea, what
is going to happen ? It aU depends on that. I admit that
if that goes the position is gloomy indeed, but of that I have
no fear. If we keep the command of the sea, what is going
to happen ? Five-sixths of our production is employed in
the Home trade. What goes abroad is very important, for,
of course, if the population which suppUed the sixth were
thrown out of work, that would react upon the Home trade.
But, after all, the total amount of our exports to all the
European countries which are now at war is only a small
part of our total exports. There is here no question of fiscal
policy. We are far beyond that. It is a fact. Our total
exports to all the countries which are now at war do not, in
my belief — I have not looked into the figures — exceed our
exports to India and Australia taken alone.

We shall have free trade, if the sea routes are maintained,
with the Colonies and with the whole of the American Contin-
ent, and, unfortunately for them, both our allies and our
enemies will not be competing with us in those markets. Look
at it as a problem, and I think we have a right to beheve,
not that trade will be good, but that it will be much more
nearly normal than is generally believed. I hope the House
will not think that a useless thing to say. There is one thing
more which I would desire to say. This is the affair of the
nation. Everyone would desire to help. There is a great
deal of work to be done which cannot be done by the Govern-
ment. I was glad that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime
Minister has already asked the co-operation of my right hon.
Friend the Member for West Birmingham"* and my right 'o [Mr.
hon. Friend the Member for the Strand."" They gave it Austen
gladly. But I am sure that I speak not only for this bench. Chamber-
but for the whole of our party, when I say that the Govern- ^^"-^
ment has only got to requisition any one of us and we will '"'P^r.
serve it and our country to the best of our abihty. Walter

435

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 27

(7) SIR EDWARD GREY, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
German Proposals for Neutrality.

August 27, 1914.

Mr. Keir Hardie asked the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made
by the German Ambassador (White Paper, p. 66, item No.
'1' [».«., 123),'" together with his invitation to the Foreign Secretary
B. 123.] to put forward proposals of his own which would be acceptable
as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and considered
by the Cabinet ; and, if not, why proposals involving such
far-reaching possibilities were thus rejected ?

Sir E. Grey. — ^These were personal suggestions made
by the Ambassador on August ist, and without authority,
to alter the conditions of neutrality proposed to us by the
'^'[B. 85.] German Chancellor in No. 85"' in the White Paper (Miscellan-
eous No. 6, 1914).

The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the next
morning — ^that is Sunday, August 2nd — ^the conditions on
which we could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion
that respect for the neutrahty of Belgium must be one of these
conditions. The German Chancellor had already been told
(s)rg jQj ] on July 30th that we could not bargain that away.'"

On Monday, August 3rd, I made a statement in the House
(4) |-5gg accordingly. '^' I had seen the German Ambassador again at
p. 400.] his own request on Monday, and he urged me most strongly,
though he said he did not know the plans of the German
military authorities, not to make the neutrality of Belgium
one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was a
day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the
morning, and I had no time to record the conversation, and it
does not therefore appear in the White Paper, but it was
impossible to withdraw that condition without becoming a
consenting party to the violation of the Treaty, and sub-
sequently to a German attack on Belgium.

After I spoke in the House we made to the German Govern-
<^'[B. i53.]ment the communication described in- No. 153''' in the
White Paper about the neutrality of Belgium.
436

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply to that com-
munication had not been received when the White Paper was
printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete
the White Paper. '"' '"_[B. 160

I have been asked why I did not refer to No. 123"" in the ^ ^^^r^\
White Paper when I spoke in the House on August 3rd. If ^°^^i^? ^
I had referred to suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality, ^^^ ^
I must have referred to No. 85/^' the proposals made not ^ ' '^^^'J
personally by the Ambassador but officially by the German ^^- ^5-J
Chancellor, which were so condemned by the Prime Minister
subsequently, and this would have made the case against
the German Government much stronger than I did make it
in my speech. I deliberately refrained from doing that then.

Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the
German Ambassador, as distinct from communications made
on behalf of his Government : He worked for peace ;' but
real authority at Berlin did not rest with him and others
like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace
failed.

Mr. Keir Hardie. — May I ask whether any attempt was
made to open up negotiations with the German Government
on the basis of the suggestions here set forth by the German
Ambassador ?

Sir E. Grey. — ^The German Ambassador did not make
any basis of suggestions ; it was the German Chancellor who
made the basis of suggestions. The German Ambassador,
speaking on his own personal initiative and without authority,
asked whether we would formulate conditions on which we
would be neutral. We did go into that question, and the
conditions were stated to the House and made known to the
German Ambassador.

Mr. Keir Hardie. — May I ask whether the German author-
ities at BerUn repudiated these suggestions of their Ambassa-
dor in London, and whether any effort at all was made to
find out how far the German Government would have agreed
to the suggestions put forward by their own Ambassador ?

Mr. T. M. Healy. — Before the right hon. Gentleman
answers that question may I ask him if Socialists in the
E.eichstag are asking any questions like this ?

437

BRITISH SPEECHES [August 28,

Sir E. Grey. — The German Ambassador — [Hon.
Members : " Do not answer ! "] — I should Uke not to have any
misunderstanding — did not make to us suggestions different
from those which his Government made. The suggestions
'''[B. 83.] that his Government made were those in No. 85"' in the
White Paper. The German Ambassador never suggested to
us that Germany would be able to agree to the condition of
the neutrality of Belgium. On the contrary, he did suggest
to me that we should not put that condition forward because
he was afraid his Government would not be able to accept it.

August 28, 1914.

[cf. Ques- Lord Robert Cecil asked the Secretary of State for Foreign

tions and Affairs whether his attention has been called to the pubUca-

pp 436- ^^°^ "y ^^^ German Government of certain proposals which

427.] are alleged to have been made to secure French and EngHsh

[See pp. neutrality during the War ;'" and whether the pubUcation is

358-62.] complete and accurate ?

Sir E. Grey*. — I have seen an incomplete publication.
The circumstances were as follows : It was reported to me
one day that the German Ambassador had suggested that
Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia
and Austria, and also engage not to attack France, if we
would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France.
I said at once that if the German Government thought such
an arrangement possible I was sure we could secure it. It
appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was
that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany
went to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal,
and, as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible
with the terms of the Franco-Russian AUiance, it was not in
my power to promise to secure it. Subsequently, the Am-
bassador sent for my private secretary, and told him that,
as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he had sent
a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced
by the first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first
telegram has been published. This second telegram does not
seem to have been published.

* [The German reply to this statement by Sir E. Grey will be found on
PP- 363-5 above.]
438

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

February 11, 1915.

Mr. Jowett asked whether the telegram relative to a
guarantee by Great Britain of the neutrality of France, referred
to in Appendix II. (6) of Miscellaneous, No. 15, 1914,'" was "'[».«.,
communicated to M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, before tfansla-
August 3rd, to the French Government before August 4th, p°eu°ij
and to the British Cabinet before August 3rd ? Yellow-

Sir E. Grey. — I would refer the hon. Member to the reply book
which I gave to the noble Lord the Member for Hitchin'^' tY.].]
on August 28th last, from which it is clear that there was '"'[Lord
a complete misunderstanding as to the nature of the -sug- Robert
gestion made by the German Ambassador and that there was Cecil, s«e
therefore nothing on the subject to communicate to the French ^' '^^ '■'
Government or the Cabinet on the dates named. If the
German proposal had been, as at first" supposed, that Germany
would remain neutral if France remained neutral, I should,
of course, have submitted it to the French Government. -
But the German proposal was ascertained to be that France
should remain neutral when Germany went to war with
Russia. In other words, that France should be faithless to
her alliance with Russia. I could not suggest that to the
French and they would have rightly resented any suggestion
of the kind.'" ^ '^'[^A

II.— PUBLIC SPEECHES.

p. 362.]

MR. ASQUITH AT THE GUILDHALL, LONDON,
SEPTEMBER 4, 1914.*

My Lord Mayor and Citizens of London :

IT is three and a half years since I last had the honour
of addressing in this hall a gathering of the citizens. We
were then meeting, under the presidency of one of your
predecessors, men of all creeds and parties, to celebrate and

* "A Call to Arms." Authorised Edition revised by Mr. Asquith.
(London : Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.)

[The German Chancellor replied to this speech in a statement to the
Danish Press Bureau, for which see pp. 370-372.]

439

BRITISH SPEECHES [September 4,

approve the joint declaration of the two great English^
speaking States that for the future any differences between
them should be settled, if not by agreement, at least by
judicial inquiry and arbitration, and never in any circum-
stances by war. Those of us who hailed that great eirenicon
between the United States and ourselves as a landmark on
the road of progress were not sanguine enough to think, or
even to hope, that the era of war was drawing to a close.
But still less were we prepared to anticipate the terrible
spectacle which now confronts us — a contest, which for the
number and importance of the Powers engaged, the scale of
their armaments and armies, the width of the theatre of con-
flict, the outpouring of blood and loss of life, the incalculable
toll of suffering levied upon non-combatants, the material
and moral loss accumulating day by day to the higher inter-
ests of civilised mankind — a contest which in every one of
these aspects is without precedent in the annals of the world.
We were very confident three years ago in the rightness of
our position when we welcomed the new securities for peace.
We are equally confident in it to-day, when reluctantly, and
against our will, but with clear judgment and a clean con-
science, we find ourselves involved with the whole strength
of this Empire in this bloody arbitration between might
and right. The issue has passed out of the domain of argu-
ment into another field. ' But let me ask you, and through
you the world outside, what would have been our condition
as a nation to-day, if through timidity, or through a perverted
calculation of self-interest, or through a paralysis of the
sense of honour and duty, we had been base enough to be
false to our word, and faithless to our friends ? Our eyes
would have been turned at this moment with those of the
whole civilised world to Belgium, a small State which has
lived for more than seventy years under a several and collective
guarantee, to which we, in common with Prussia and Austria,
were parties. We should have seen, at the instance and by
the action of two of those guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality
violated, her independence strangled, her territory made use
of as affording the easiest and most convenient road to a
war of unprovoked aggression against France. We, the
British people, should at this moment have been standing
by, with folded arms and with such countenance as we could
440

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

command, while this small and unprotected State, in defence
of her vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening
and overwhelming force. We should have been admiring as
detached spectators the siege of Liege, the steady and manful
resistance of a small army, the occupation of Brussels with
all its splendid traditions and memories, the gradual forcing
back of the patriotic defenders of their fatherland to the
ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by them,
buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil popu-
lation, and, finally, the greatest crime committed against
civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years War, the
sack of Louvain, with its buildings, its pictures, its unique
library, its unrivalled associations, a shameless holocaust of
irreparable treasures, lit up by blind barbarian vengeance.
What account could we, the Government and the people
of this country, have been able to render to the tribunal of
our national conscience and sense of honour, if, in defiance
of our plighted and solemn obligations, we had endured,
and had not done our best to prevent, yes, to avenge, these
intolerable wrongs ? For my part, I say that sooner than
be a silent witness, which means in effect a willing accom-
plice, to this tragic triumph of force over law, and of brutality
over freedom, I would see this country of ours blotted out of
the pages of history.

That is only a phase, a lurid and illuminating phase, in
the contest into which we have been called by the mandate
of duty and of honour to bear our part. The cjmical viola-
tion of the neutrahty of Belgium was not the whole, but a
step, a first step, in a deliberate pohcy of which, if not the
immediate, the ultimate and not far distant aim was to crush
the independence and the autonomy of the Free States of
Europe. First Belgium, then Holland and Switzerland,
countries, like our own, imbued and sustained with the spirit
of liberty, were, one after another, to be bent to the yoke.
And these ambitions were fed and fostered by a body of
new doctrine, a new philosophy, preached by professors and
learned men. The free and full self-development which to
these small States, to ourselves, to our great and growing
Dominions over the seas, to our kinsmen across the Atlantic, is
the well-spring and life-breath of national existence, that free
self-development is the one capital offence in the code of

441

BRITISH SPEECHES [September...

those who have made force their supreme divinity, and upon
its altars they are prepared to sacrifice, both the gathered
fruits and the potential germs of the unfettered human
spirit. I use this language advisedly.

This is not merely a material, it is also a spiritual conflict.
Upon its issue everything that contains the promise of hope,
that leads to emancipation and a fuller Uberty for the millions
who make up the mass of mankind, will be found sooner or
later to depend.

Let me now turn for a moment to the actual situation in
Europe. How do we stand ? For the last ten years by what
I believe to be happy and well-considered diplomatic arrange-
ments we have established friendly and increasingly intimate
relations with the two Powers, France and Russia, with whom
in days gone by we have had in various parts of the world
occasion for constant friction, and now and again for possible
conflict. These new and better relations, based in the first
instance upon business principles of give and take, matured
into a settled temper of confidence and goodwill. They were
never in any sense or at any time, as I have frequently stated
in this hall, directed against other Powers.

No man in the history of the world has ever laboured
more strenuously or more successfully than my right hon.
friend Sir Edward Grey for that which is the supreme interest
of the modem world — a general and abiding peace. It is, I
venture to think, a very superficial criticism which suggests
that under his guidance the policy of this country has ignored,
still less that it has counteracted and hampered, the Concert
of Europe. It is little more than a year ago when, imder
the stress and strain of the Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors
of the Great Powers met here day after day and week after
week, curtailing the area of possible differences, reconciling
warring ambitions and aims, and preserviag against almost
incalculable odds the general harmony, and it was in the
same spirit and with the same purpose when a few weeks

<''[B. 4.] ago Austria delivered her ultimatum to Serbia'^' that the
Foreign Secretary — ^for it was he — ^put forward the proposal
for a mediating conference between the four Powers not

""[B. 36.] directly concerned — Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves.""
If that proposal had been accepted the actual controversy
would have been settled with honour to everybody, and the
442

BRITISH SPEECHES

whole of this terrible welter would have been avoided.* And
with whom does the responsibility rest for its refusal and for
all the illimitable sufferings which now confront the world ?
One Power, and one Power only, and that Power is Germany.
There is the foundation and origin of this world-wide catas-
trophe. We persevered to the end, and no one who has not
been confronted, as we were, with the responsibility — which
unless you had been face to face with it you could not possibly
measure, the responsibility of determining the issues of
peace and war — ^no one who has not been in that position can
realise the strength, energy, and persistence with which we
laboured for peace. We persevered by every expedient that
diplomacy could suggest — straining almost to the breaking
point our most cherished friendships and obligations — even
to the last moment making effort upon effort, and indulging
hope against hope. Then, and only then, when we were
at last compelled to realise that the choice lay between
honour and dishonour, between treachery and good faith —
when we at last reached the dividing line which makes or
mars a nation worthy of the name, it was then only that we
declared for war.

Is there any one in this hall, or in this United Kingdom,
or in the vast Empire of which we here stand in the capital
and centre, who .blames us or repents our decision ? If not,
as I believe there is not, we must steel ourselves to the task,
and, in the spirit which animated our forefathers in their
struggle against the dominion of Napoleon, we must, and we
shall, persevere to the end.

It would be a criminal mistake to underestimate either
the magnitude, the fighting quality, or the staying power of
the forces which are arrayed against us ; but it would be-
equally foolish, and equally indefensible, to belittle our own
resources whether for resistance or for attack. Belgium has
shown us by memorable and glorious example what can be
done by a relatively small State when its citizens are animated,
and fired by the spirit of patriotism.

In France and Russia we have as allies two of the greatest
Powers in the world, engaged with us in a common cause, who-
do not mean to separate themselves from us any more than
we mean to separate ourselves from them. We have upon
the seas the strongest and most magnificent Fleet the world

443,

BRITISH SPEECHES [September 4.

has ever seen. The Expeditionary Force which left our
shores less than a month ago has never been surpassed, as its
glorious achievements in the field have already made clear,
not only in material equipment, but in the physical and moral
.quality of its constituent parts.

As regards the Navy, I am sure my right honourable
friend Mr. ChurchiU, whom we are glad to see here, will tell
you there is happily little more to be done. I do not flatter
it when I say that its superiority is equally marked in every
department and sphere of its activity. We rely on it with the
most absolute confidence, not only to guard our shores against
the possibiUty of invasion, not only to seal up the gigantic
battleships of the enemy in the inglorious seclusion of their
own ports, whence from time to time he furtively steals forth
to sow the sea with murderous snares, which are more full of
menace to neutral ships than to the British Fleet. Our Navy
does all this, and while it is thirsting, I do not doubt, for that
trial of strength in a fair and open fight which has so far
been prudently denied it, it does a great deal more. It
has hunted the German Mercantile Marine from the high
seas. It has kept open our own stores of food supply, and
largely curtailed those of the enemy, and when the few
German cruisers which still infest the more distant ocean
routes have been disposed of — as they will be very soon —
it will achieve for British and neutral commerce, passing
backwards and forwards, from and to every port of our
Empire, a security as complete as it has ever enjoyed in the
days of unbroken peace. Let us honour the memory of the
gallant seamen who, in the pursuit of one or another of these
varied and responsible duties, have already laid down their
lives for their country.

In regard to the Army, there is a call for a new, a con-
tinuous, a determined, and a united effort. For, as the war
goes on, we shall have not merely to replace the wastage caused
by casualties, not merely to maintain our military power at its
original level, but we must, if we are to play a worthy part,
enlarge its scale, increase its numbers, and multiply many
times its effectiveness as a fighting instrument. The object of
the appeal which I have made to you, my Lord Mayor, and
to the other Chief Magistrates of our capital cities, is to
impress upon them the imperious urgency of this supreme duty.

444

BRITISH SPEECHES

Our self-governing Dominions throughout the Empire,
without any soUcitation on our part, demonstrated with a
spontaneousness and unanimity unparalleled in history their
determination to affirm their brotherhood with us, and ta
make our cause their own.

From Canada, from Australia, from New Zealand, from
South Africa, and from Newfoundland, the children of the
Empire assert, not as an obhgation, but as a privilege, their
right, and their willingness to contribute money, material,
a;nd, what is better than all, the strength and sinews, the
fortunes, and lives of their best manhood.

India, too, with not less alacrity, has claimed her share
in the common task. Every class and creed, British and
native, princes and people, Hindoos and Mohammedans, vie
with one another in a noble and emulous rivalry. Two
divisions of our magnificent Indian Army are already on their
way. We welcome with appreciation and affection their
proffered aid, and, in an Empire which knows no distinctioa
of race or class, where all alike, as subjects of the King
Emperor, are joint and equal custodians of our common
interest and fortunes, we here hail with profound and heart-
felt gratitude their association side by side and shoulder to
shoulder with our home and Dominion troops, under the flag
which is a symbol to all of a unity that the world in arms
cannot dissever or dissolve.

With these inspiring appeals and examples from our
fellow-subjects all over the world, what are we doing, and
what ought we to do at home ? Mobilisation was ordered
on August 4th. Immediately afterwards Lord Kitchener
issued his call for 100,000 recruits for the Regular Army,
which has been followed by a second call for another 100,000. "' '^' iSee first,
The response up to to-day gives us between 250,000 and Military
300,000 men, and I am glad to say that London has done its '^
share. The total number of Londoners accepted is not less
than 42,000. I need hardly say that the appeal involves
no disparagement or discouragement of the Territorial Force.
The number of units in that force who have volunteered for
foreign service is most satisfactory, and grows every day.
We look to them with confidence to increase their numbers,
to perfect their organisation in training, and to play the
efficient part which has always been assigned to them,

445

BRITISH SPEECHES [September 4,

both offensive and defensive, in the military system of the
Empire,

But to go back to the expansion of the Regular Army,
we want more men, men of the best fighting quality, and if
for the moment the number who offer and are accepted
should prove to be in excess of those who can at once be
adequately trained and equipped, do not let them doubt
that appropriate provision will be made for incorporation
of all willing and able men in the fighting forces of the King.
We want first of all men, and we shall endeavour to secure
that men desiring to serve together shall, wherever possible,
be allotted to the same regiment or corps. The raising of
battalions by counties or by municipalities with this object
wiU be in every way encouraged, but we want not less urgently
a larger supply of ex-non-commissioned ofiicers, the pick of
the men who have served their country in the past, and
whom, therefore, in most cases, we shall be asking to give up
regular employment in order that they may return to the
work for the State which they alone are competent to do.

The appeal which we make is addressed quite as much to
their employers as to the men themselves. They ought
surely to be assured of reinstatement in their positions at the
end of the war. Finally, there are numbers of commissioned
officers now in retirement with large experience of handling
troops, who have served their country in the past. Let
them come forward, too, and show their willingness, if need
be, to train bodies of men, for whom for the moment no regular
cadres or units can be found. I have little more to say.

As to the actual progress of the war I will not say any-
thing except that, in my judgment, in whatever direction
we look there is abundant ground for pride and for comfort.

I say nothing more, because I think we should bear in
mind, all of us, that we are at present watching the fluctuation ,
of fortune only in the early stages of what is going to be a
protracted struggle. We must learn to take long views and
to cultivate above all other qualities — those of patience,
endurance, and steadfastness.

Meanwhile, let us go, each one of us, to his or her appro-
priate part in the great common task.

Never had a people more or richer sources of encourage-
ment and inspiration. Let us realise, first of all, that we are

446

BRITISH SPEECHES

fighting as a United Empire, in a cause worthy of the highest
traditions of our race. Let us keep in mind the patient and
indomitable seamen who never relax for a moment, night or
day, their stern vigil on the lonely sea. Let us keep in mind
our gallant troops, who to-day, after a fortnight's continuous
fighting under conditions which would try the mettle of the
best army that ever took the field, maintain not only an
undefeated but an unbroken front.

Finally, let us recall the memories of the great men and the
great deeds of the past, commemorated some of them in the
monuments which we see around us on these waUs, not for-
getting the dying message of the younger Pitt — ^his last
public utterance, made at the table of your predecessor,
my Lord Mayor, in this very hall, " England has saved herself
by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her
example." The England of those days gave a noble answer
to his appeal and did not sheathe the sword until after nearly
twenty years of fighting the freedom of Europe was secured.
Let us go and do likewise.

MR. ASQUITH IN EDINBURGH, SEPTEMBER i8, 1914.*

A FORTNIGHT ago to-day, in the Guildhall of the City
of London,"' I endeavoured to present to the nation and to w[See
the world the reasons which have compelled us, the people p-43§-]
of all others who have the greatest interest in the maintenance
of peace, to engage in the hazards and the horrors of war.
I do not wish to repeat to-night in any detail what I then
said. The war has arisen immediately and ostensibly, as
everyone knows, out of a dispute between Austria and Serbia,
in which we in this country had no direct concern. The
diplomatic history of those critical weeks — the last fortnight
in July and the first few days of August — is now accessible
to all the world. It has been supplemented during the
last few days by the admirable and exhaustive despatch'" of '*'[B- 161.]
our late Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen — a
despatch which I trust everybody will read, and no one who
reads it can doubt that largely through the efforts of my

* "The War of Civilisation." Authorised Edition revised by Mr.
Asquith. (London : Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.)

447

BRITISH SPEECHES [September i8,

right hon. friend and colleague, Sir Edward Grey, the con-
ditions of a peaceful settlement of the actual controversy-
were already within sight when on July 31st Germany, by
P'[0. 70.] her own deliberate act, made war a certainty.'"

The facts are incontrovertible. They are not sought to
be controverted, except, indeed, by the invention and circula-
tion of such wanton falsehoods as that France was contem-
plating and even commencing the violation of Belgian territory
""[G. 20, as a first step on her road to Germany.'" The result is that
22 ; Y. we are at war, and we are at war — as I have already shown
147. 148.] elsewhere, and as I repeat here to-night — for three reasons.
In the first place, to vindicate the sanctity of treaty obliga-
tions and of what is properly called the public law of Europe ;
in the second place, to assert and to enforce the independence
of free States, relatively small and weak, against encroachment
and violence by the strong ; and in the third place, to with-
stand, as we believe in the best interests not only of our own
Empire, but of civilisation at large, the arrogant claim of
a single Power to dominate the development of the destinies
of Europe.

Since I last spoke some faint attempts have been made in

Germany to dispute the accuracy and the sincerity of this

statement of our attitude and aim. It has been suggested,

'''[See p. for instance,'^' that our professed zeal for treaty rights and

370. for the interests of small States is a new-bom and stimulated

Ch™-^'^ passion. What, . we are asked, has Great Britain cared in

cellor the past for treaties or for the smaller nationalities except

to when she had some ulterior and selfish purpose of her own

Danish to serve ? I am quite ready to meet that challenge, and to

Press meet it in the only way in which it could be met, by reference

Bureau.] ^^ history ; and out of many illustrations which I might take

I will content myself with two, widely removed in point of

time, but both, as it happens, very apposite to the present

case. I will go back first to the war carried on at first against

the revolutionary Government of France and then against

Napoleon, which broke out in 1793 and which lasted for more

than 20 years. We had then at the head of the Government

in this country one of the most peace-loving Ministers who

has ever presided over our fortunes, Mr. Pitt. For three

years, from 1789 to 1792, he resolutely refused to interfere

in any way with the revolutionary proceedings in France

448

BRITISH SPEECHES

or in the wars that sprang out of them, and as late, I think,
as February in 1792, in a memorable speech in the House of
Commons, which shows amongst other things the shortness
of human foresight, he declared that there never was a time
when we in this country could more reasonably expect 15
years of peace. And what was it^that, within a few months
of that declaration, led this pacific Minister to war ? It was
the invasion of the treaty rights, guaranteed by ourselves, of a
small European State — the then States General of Holland.

For nearly 200 years the Great Powers of Europe had
guaranteed to Holland the exclusive navigation. of the River
Scheldt. The French revolutionary Government invaded
what is now Belgium, and as a first act of hostility to Holland
declared the navigation of the Scheldt to be open. Our
interest in that matter then, as now, was relatively small and
insignificant. But what was Mr. Pitt's reply? I quote you
the exact words he used in the House of Commons ; they
are so applicable to the circumstances of the present moment.
This is in 1793 : —

" England wiU never consent that another country should
arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure the political
system of Europe established by solemn treaties and guaran-
teed by the consent of the Powers."

He went on to say that " If this House — the House of
Commons — means substantial good faith to its engagements,
if it retains a just sense of the solemn faith of treaties, it must
show a determination to support them." And it was in
consequence of that stubborn and unyielding determination
to maintain treaties, to defend small States, to resist the
aggressive domination of a single Power that we were involved
in a war which we had done everything to avoid and which
was carried on upon a scale both as to area and as to duration
up to then unexampledjn the history of mankind.

That is one precedent. Let me give you one more. I
come down to 1870, when this very treaty to which we are
parties no less than Germany, and which guarantees the
integrity and independence of Belgium, was threatened. Mr.
Gladstone was then Prime Minister of this country, and he
was, if possible, a stronger and more ardent advocate of
peace even than Mr. Pitt himself.- Mr. Gladstone, pacific as

II — 2 F 449

BRITISH SPEECHES [September i8,

he was, felt so strongly the sanctity of our obUgations that —
though here again we had no direct interest of any kind at
stake — ^he made agreements with France and Prussia to
co-operate with either of the belligerents if the other violated
"'[See pp. Belgian territory.'" I should like to read a passage from a
488-9.] speech 10 years later, delivered in 1880 by Mr. Gladstone
himself in this city of Edinburgh, in which he reviewed that
transaction and explained his reasons for it.

After narrating the facts which I have summarised, he
said this : " If we had gone to war " — which he was prepared
to do — " we should have gone to war for freedom. We should
have gone to war for public right, we should have gone to war
to save human happiness from being invaded by a t5nrannous
and lawless Power. That," Mr. Gladstone said, " is what
I call a good cause, gentlemen. And though I detest war, and
there are no epithets too strong if you will supply me with
them that I will not endeavour to heap upon its head ; in
such a war as that, while the breath in my body is continued
to me, I am ready to engage."

So much for our own action in the past in regard to treaties
and small States. But, faint as is this denial of this part of
our case, it becomes fainter still, it dissolves into the thinnest
of thin air, when it has to deal with our contention that we
and our Allies are withstanding a Power whose aim is nothing
less than the domination of Europe. It is, indeed, the avowed
belief of the leaders of German thought, I will not say of the
German people, but of those who for many years past have
controlled German pohcy, that such a domination, carrying
with it the supremacy of what they call German culture and
the German spirit, is the best thing that could happen to the
world.

Let me, then, ask for a moment what is this German
culture ? What is this German spirit of which the Emperor's
armies are at present the missionaries in Belgium and in
France ? Mankind owes much to Germany, a very great
debt for the contributions she has made to philosophy, to
science, and to the arts, but that which is specifically German
in the movement of the world in the last 30 years has been,
on the intellectual side, the development of the doctrine of
the supreme and ultimate prerogative in human affairs of
material force, and on the practical side the taking of the

45°

19143 BRITISH SPEECHES

foremost place in the fabrication and the multiplication of the
machinery of destruction. To the men who have adopted
this gospel, who believe that power is the be aU and end all
of a State, naturally a treaty is nothing more than a piece
of parchment, and all the old world talk about the rights of
the weak and the obligations of the strong is only so much
threadbare and nauseating cant.

One very remarkable feature of this new school of doctrine,
whatever be its intellectual or its ethical merits, is that it has
turned out, as an actual code for life, to be a very purbhnd
philosophy.

For German culture and the German spirit did not save
the Emperor and his people from delusions and miscalcula-
tions as dangerous as they were absurd in regard to the
British Empire. We were believed by these cultivated
observers to be the decadent descendants of a people who,
by a combination of luck and of fraud had managed to obtain
dominion over a vast quantity of the surface and the popula-
tions of the globe. This fortuitous aggregation which goes
by the name of the British Empire was supposed to be so
insecurely founded, and so loosely knit together, that, at the
first touch of serious menace from without, it would fall to
pieces and tumble to the ground. Our great Dominions were
getting heartily tired of the Imperial connection. India,
it was notorious to every German traveller, was on the verge
of open revolt, and here at home, we, the people of this United
Kingdom, were riven by dissension so deep and so fierce that
our energies, whether for resistance or for attack, would be
completely paralysed. What a fantastic dream ! And what
a rude awakening ! And in this vast and grotesque, and yet
tragic, miscalculation is to be found one of the roots, perhaps
the matin root, of the present war.

But let us go one step more. It has been said " By their
fruits ye shall know them," and history will record that, when
the die was cast and the struggle began, it was the disciples
of that same creed who revived methods of warfare which
have for centuries past been condemned by the common
sense, as well as by the humanity, of the great mass of the
civilised world.

Louvain, Malines, Termonde. These are names which
win henceforth be branded on the brow of German culture.

451

BRITISH SPEECHES [September i8

The ruthless sacking of the ancient and famous towns of Bel-
gium is fitly supplemented by the story that reaches us only
to-day from our own Headquarters in France, of the
proclamation issued less than a week ago by the German
authorities, who were for a moment, and, happily, for little
more than a moment, in occupation of the venerable city of
Reims. Let me read, for it should be put on record, the
concluding paragraph of the proclamation :

" With a view to securing adequately the safety of the
troops, and to instil calm into the population of Reims, the
persons named below [8i in number, and including all the
leading citizens of the town] have been seized as hostages by
the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. These hos-
tages will be hanged at the slightest attempt at disorder.
Also the town will be totally or partially burned and the
inhabitants will be hanged for any infraction of the above.

" By order of German authorities."

Do not let it be forgotten that it is from a Power whose
intellectual leaders are imbued with the ideal that I have
described, and whose generals in the field sanction and even
direct those practices — it is from that Power that the claim
proceeds to impose its culture, its spirit — ^which means its
domination — ^upon the rest of Europe. That is a claim, I say
to you, to all my fellow-countr57men, to every citizen and
subject of the British Empire whose ears and eyes my words
can reach — that is a claim that everything that is great in
our past and everything that promises hope or progress in
our future summons us to resist to the end. The task — do
not let us deceive ourselves — ^the task will not be a light one.
Its full accomplishment — and nothing short of full accom-
plishment is worthy of our traditions or will satisfy our
resolve — ^will certainly take months, it may even take years.
I have come here to-night, not to ask you to count the cost,
for no price can be too high to pay when honour and freedom
are at stake, but to put before you, as I have tried to do, the
magnitude of the issue and the supreme necessity that lies
upon us as a nation, nay, as a brotherhood and family of
nations, to rise to its height and acquit ourselves of our duty.

The war has now lasted more than six weeks. Our supre-
macy at sea has not been seriously questioned. Full supplies

452

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

of food and of raw materials are making their way to our
shores from every quarter of the globe. Our industries, with
one or two exceptions, maintain their activities. Unemploy-
ment is so far not seriously in excess of the average. The
monetary situation has improved, and every effort that the
zeal and the skill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the
co-operation and expert advice of the bankers and business
men of the country, can devise — every effort is being made to
achieve what is most essential — the complete re-establishment
of thetforeign exchanges. Meanwhile, the merchant shipping
of the enemy has been hunted from the seas, and our seamen
are still, patiently or impatiently, waiting a chance to try
conclusions with the opposing Fleet. Great and incalculable is
the debt which we have owed during these weeks, and which
in increasing measure we shall continue to owe, to our Navy.
The Navy needs no help, and as the months roU on — thanks
to a far-sighted policy in the past — its proportionate strength
will grow.

If we turn to our Army we can say with equal justice and
pride that, during these weeks, it has revived the most glorious
records of its past. Sir John French and his gallant officers
and men live in our hearts as they will live in the memories
of those who come afterwards. But splendid achievements
such as these — equally splendid in retirement and in advance
— cannot be won without a heavy expenditure of life and
limb, of equipment, and supplies. Even now, at this very
early stage, I suppose there is hardly a person here who is
not suffering from anxiety and suspense. Some of us are
plunged in sorrow for the loss of those we love, cut off, some
of them, in the. springtime of their young Uves. We will not
mourn for them overmuch.

" One crowded hour of glorious life
Is worth an age without a name."

But these gaps have to be filled. The wastage of modem
war is relentless and almost inconceivable. We have — I
mean His Majesty's Government have — since the war began
dispatched to the front already considerably over 200,000
men, and the amplest provision has been made for keeping
them supplied with all that was necessary in food, in stores,
and in equipment. They will very soon be reinforced by

453

BRITISH SPEECHES . [September i8.

Regular troops from India, from Egypt, and the Mediterra-
nean, and in due time by the contingents which our Dominions
are furnishing with such magnificent patriotism and HberaUty.
We have with us here our own gallant Territorials, becoming
every day a fitter and a finer force, eager and anxious to
respond to any call, either at home or abroad, that may be
made upon them.

But that is not enough. We must do still more. Already
in little more than a month we have half a million recruits
for the four new Armies which, as Lord Kitchener told the
country yesterday, he means to have ready to bring into the
field. Enlisting, as we were last week, in a single day as many
men as we have been accustomed to enlist in the course of a
whole year, it is not, I think, surprising that the machinery
has been over-strained, and there have been many cases of
temporary inconvenience and hardship and discomfort. With
time and patience and good organisation these things will be
set right, and the new scale of allowances which was announced
in Parliament yesterday will do much to mitigate the lot of
wives and children and dependents who are left behind. We
want more men, and perhaps most of all help for training
them. Every one in the whole of this kingdom who has in
days gone by, as officer or as non-commissioned officer, served
his country never had a greater or a more fruitful opportunity
of service than is presented to him to-day.

We appeal to the manhood of the three kingdoms. To
such an appeal I know well, coming from your senior repre-
sentative in the House of Commons, that Scotland will not
turn a deaf ear. Scotland is doing well, and indeed more than
well, and no part of Scotland, I believe, in proportion better
than Edinburgh. I cannot say with what pleasure I heard
the figures given out by the Lord Provost, and those which
have been supphed to me by the gallant general who has the
Scottish Command, which show, indeed, as we expected, that
Scotland is more than holding her own.

In that connection let me repeat what I said two weeks
ago in London. We ; think it of the highest importance
that, as far as possible^and subject to the accidents of war,
people belonging to the same place, breathing the same
atmosphere, having the same associations, should be kept
together.

454

1914] BRITISH SPEECHES

I have only one word more to say. What is it that we
can offer to our recruits ? They come to us spontaneously,
under no kind of compulsion, of their own free will, to meet a
national and an Imperial need ; we present to them no
material inducement in the shape either of bounty or bribe,
and they have to face the prospect of a spell of hard training
from which most of the comforts and all the luxuries that many
of them have been accustomed to are rigorously banished.
But then, when they are fully equipped for their patriotic
task, they wiU have the opportunity of striking a blow, it
may be even of laying down their lives, not to serve the cause
of ambition or aggression, but to maintain the honour and the
good faith of our country, to shield the independence of free
States, to protect against brute force the principles of civilisa-
tion and the liberties of Europe.

MR. ASQUITH IN DUBLIN, SEPTEMBER 25, 1914.*

(Extract.)

IT is no part of my mission to-night — ^it is indeed at this
time of day wholly unnecessary — ^to justify, still less to excuse,
the part that the Government of the United Kingdom has
taken in this supreme crisis in our national affairs. There
have been wars in the past in regard to which there has been
among us diversity of opinion, uneasiness as to the wisdom of
our diplomacy, anxiety as to the expediency of our policy,
doubts as to the essential righteousness of our cause. That
is not the case to-day. Even in the memorable struggle
which we waged a hundred years ago against the domination
of Napoleon there was always a minority, respectable not
merely in number, but in the sincerity and in the eminence
of its adherents, which broke the front of our national unity.
Again I say that is not the case to-day. We feel as a nation —
or rather, I ought to say, speaking here and looking round
upon our vast Empire in every quarter of the globe, as a
family of nations — without distinction of creed or party, of
race or climate, of class or section, that we are united in

* "A United Empire." Authorised Edition revised by Mr. Asquith.
(London : Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.)

455

BRITISH SPEECHES [September 25,

defending principles and in maintaining interests which
are vital, not only to the British Empire, but to all that is
worth having in our common civilisation and all that is worth
hoping for in the future progress of mankind.

What better or higher cause, whether we succeed or fail,
and we are going not to fail but to succeed, what higher cause
can arouse and enlist the best energies of a free people than
to be engaged at one and the same time in the vindication
of international good faith, the protection of the weak against
the violence of the strong, and in the assertion of the best
ideals of all the free communities in all the ages of time and
in every part of the world against the encroachments of those
who believe, and who preach, and who practise the religion
of force ?

It is not — I am sure you will agree with me — it is not neces-
sary to demonstrate once more that of this war Germany is the
real and the responsible author. The proofs are patent,
manifold, and overwhelming. Indeed, on the part of Ger-
many herself we get upon this point, if denial at all, a denial
only of the faintest and the most formal kind. For a gener-
ation past she has been preparing the ground, equipping
herself both by land and sea, fortifying herself with alliances,
what is perhaps even more important, teaching her youth
to seek and to pursue as the first and the most important
of all human things the supremacy of German power and
the German spirit, and all that time biding her opportunity.
Many of the great wars of history have been almost acciden-
tally brought on. There was nothing in the quarrel, such
as it was, between Austria and Serbia that could not, and
would not, have been settled by pacific means. But in
the judgment of those who guide and control German policy
the hour had come to strike the blow that had been long
and deliberately prepared. In their hands lay the choice
between peace and war, and their election was for war. In
so deciding, as everybody now knows, Germany made two
profound miscalculations, both of them natural enough in
men who had come to believe that in international matters
everything can be explained and measured in terms of material
force.

What were those mistakes ? The first was that Belgium,
a small and prosperous country, entirely disinterested in

456

BRITISH SPEECHES

European quarrels, guaranteed by the joint and several
compacts of the Great Powers, would not resent, and cer-
tainly would not resist, the use of her territory as a high
road for an invading German force into France. How could
they imagine that this little covmtry, rather than allow her
neutrality to be violated and her independence insulted and
menaced, was prepared that her fields should be drenched
with the blood of her soldiers, her towns and villages de-
vastated by marauders, her splendid heritage of monuments
and of treasures buUt up for her by the piety, art, and learn-
ing of the past ruthlessly laid in ruins? The passionate
attachment of a numerically smcill popvilation to the bit of
territory, which looks so little upon the map, the pride of
unconquerable devotion of a free people to their own free
State — ^these were things which apparently had never been
dreamed of in the philosophy of Potsdam.

Rarely in history has there been a greater material dis-
parity between the invaders and the invaded. But the
moral disparity was at least equally great, for the indomitable
resistance of the Belgians did more than change the whole
face of the campaign. It proved to the world that ideas
which cannot be weighed or measured by any material cal-
culus can stiU inspire and dominate mankind. That is the
reason why the whole sympathy of the civilised world at
this moment is going out to these smaU States — Belgium,
Serbia, and Montenegro — ^that have played so worthy a
part in this historic struggle.

But Germany was guUty of another and a stiU more
capital blunder in relation to ourselves. I am not referring
for the moment to the grotesque misunderstanding upon
which I dwelt a week ago at Edinburgh'" — their carefuUy ^^>iSee
fostered belief that we here were so rent with civil distrac- p. 451]
tion, so paralysed by lukewarmness or disaffection in our
Dominions and Dependencies, that if it came to fighting
we might be brushed aside as an impotent and even a
negligible factor. The German misconception went even
deeper than that. They asked themselves what interest,
direct or material, had the United Kingdom in this conflict.
Could any nation, least of all the cold, calculating, phleg-
matic, egotistic British nation, embark upon a costly and
bloody contest from which it had nothing in the hope of profit

457

BRITISH SPEECHES [September 25

to expect ? They forgot that we, hke the Belgians, had
something at stake which cannot be translated into what
one of our poets has called " the lore of nicely calculated less
or more."

What was it we had at stake ? First and foremost, the
fulfilment to the small and relatively weak country of our
plighted word, and behind and beyond that the maintenance
of the whole system of international good will, which is the
moral bond of the civilised world. Here again they were
wrong in thinking that the reign of ideas, old-world ideas
like those of duty and good faith, had been superseded by
the ascendancy of force. War is at all times a hideous thing ;
at the best an evil to be chosen in preference to worse evils,
and at the worst little better than the letting loose of hell
upon earth. The Prophet of old spoke of the " confused
noise of battle and the garments rolled in blood," but in
these modem days, with the gigantic scale of the opposing
armies and the scientific developments of the instruments
of destruction, war has become an infinitely more devastating
thing than it ever was before. The hope that the general
recognition of a humaner code would soften or abate some
of its worst brutalities has been rudely dispelled by the events
of the last few weeks. The German invasion of Belgium and
France contributes indeed some of the blackest pages to its
sombre annals. Rarely has a non-combatant population
suffered more severely, and rarely, if ever, have the monu-
ments of piety and of learning and of those sentiments of
religious and national association of which they are the
permanent embodiment, even in the worst times of the most
ruthless warriors been so shamefully and cynically desecrated ;
and behind the actual theatre of conflict, with its smoke and
its carnage, there are the sufferings of those who are left
behind, the waste of wealth, the economic dislocation, the
heritage — the long heritage — of enmities and misunder-
standing which war brings in its train.

Why do I dwell upon these things ? It is to say this —
that great indeed is the responsibility of those who allow
their country — as we have done — to be drawn into such a
welter. But there is one thing much worse than to take
such a responsibility, and that is upon a fitting occasion to
shirk it. Our record in the matter is clear. We strove up

458

BRITISH SPEECHES

ta the last moment for peace, and only when we were satis-
fied that the price of peace was the betrayal of other countries
and the dishonour and degradation of our own did we take
up the sword.

I should like, beyond this inquiry into causes and motives,
to ask your attention and that of my fellow-countrymen to
the end which, in this war, we ought to keep in view. Forty-
four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone
used these words. He said : " The greatest triumph of our
time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as
the governing idea of European politics." Nearly 50 years
have passed. Little progress, it seems, has as yet been made
towards that good and beneficent change, but it seems to me to
be now at this moment as good a definition as we can have of
our European policy. The idea of public right — what does
it mean when translated into concrete terms ? It means,
first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite
repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the
relation of States and of the future moulding of the European
world. It means next that room must be found and kept
for the independent existence and the free development of
the smaller nationahties each with a corporate consciousness
of its own. Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian
countries, Greece, and the Balkan States — they must be
recognised as having exactly as good a title as their more
powerful neighbours — ^more powerful in strength and in
wealth — ^to a place in the sun. And it means finally, or it
ought to mean, perhaps, by a slow and gradual process, the
substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambition,
for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise, of a
real European partnership based on the recognition of equal
right and established and enforced by a common will. A
year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It
is probably one that may not, or will not, be realised either
to-day or to-morrow, but if and when this war is decided in
favour of the Allies it will at once come within the range and
before long within the grasp of European statesmanship.

459

BRITISH SPEECHES [October 2,

MR. ASQUITH IN CARDIFF, OCTOBER z, 1914.*

(Extract.)

... I am not here to-night to argue out propositions
which British citizens in every part of the world to-day regard
as beyond the reach of controversy. I do not suppose that
in the history of mankind there has ever been in such a vast
and diverse community agreement so unanimous in purpose
and so concentrated, a corporate conscience so clear and so
convinced, co-operation so spontaneous, so ardent, and so
resolute. Just consider what it means, here in this United
Kingdom — ^England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales — to hear
one plain, harmonious, great united voice over the seas from
our great Dominions. Canada, Australia, South Africa,
New Zealand, our Crown Colonies swell the chorus.

In India — where whatever we won by the sword we hold
and we retain by the more splendid title of just and disinterested
rule, by the authority, not of a despot, but of a trustee —
the response to our common appeal has moved all our feeUngs
to their profoundest depths, and has been such as to shiver
and to shatter the vain and ignorant imaginings of our ene-
mies. That is a remarkable and indeed a unique spectacle.

What is it that stirred the imagination, aroused the
conscience, enlisted the manhood, welded into one compact
and irresistible force the energies and the will of the greatest
Imperial structure that the world has ever known ? That
is a question which, for a moment, at any rate, it is weU
worth asking and answering. Let me say, then, first nega-
tively, that we are not impelled, any of us, by some of the
motives which have occasioned the bloody struggles of the
past. In this case, so far as we are concerned, ambition and
aggression play no part. What do we want ? What do we
aim at ? What have we to gain ?

We are a great, world-wide, peace-loving partnership.
By the wisdom and the courage of our forefathers, by great
deeds of heroism and adventure by land and sea, by the

* " Why We are at War." Authorised Edition revised by Mr. Asquith.
^London : Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.)

460

BRITISH SPEECHES

insight and corporate sagacity, the tried and tested experience
of many generations, we have built up a dominion which is
buttressed by the two pillars of Liberty and Law. We are
not vain enough or foolish enough to think that in the course
of a long process there have not been blunders, or worse
than blunders, and that to-day our Dominion does not fall
short of what in our ideals it might and it ought and, we
believe, it is destined to be. But such as we have received
it, and such as we hope to have it, with it we are content.

' We do not covet any people's territory. We have no
desire to impose our rule upon alien populations. The
British Empire is enough for us. All that we wished for,
all that we wish for now, is to be allowed peaceably to con-
solidate our own resources, to raise within the Empire the
level of common opportunity, to draw closer the bond of
affection and confidence between its parts, and to make it
everywhere the worthy home of the best traditions of British
liberty. Does it not follow from that that nowhere in the world
is there a people who have stronger motives to avoid war
and to seek and ensue peace ? Why, then, are the British
people throughout the length and breadth of our Empire
everywhere turning their ploughshares into swords ? -Why
are the best of our able-bodied men leaving the fields and the
factory and the counting-house for the recruiting office and
the training camp ?

If, as I have said, we have no desire to add to our Imperial
burdens, either in area or in responsibility, it is equally true
that in entering this war we had no iU will to gratify nor
wrongs of our own to avenge. In regard to Germany in
particular, our policy — ^repeatedly stated in Parliament,
resolutely pursued year after year both in London and in
Berlin — our policy has been to remove one by one the out-
standing causes of possible friction and so to establish a
firm basis for cordial relations in the days to come.

We have said from the first — I have said it over and over
again, and so has Sir Edward Grey — ^we have said from the
first that our friendships with certain Powers, with France,
with Russia, and with Japan, were not to be construed as
impl3dng cold feelings and still less hostile purposes against
any other Power. But at the same time we have always
made it clear, to quote words used by Sir Edward Grey as

461

BRITISH SPEECHES [October 2,

far back as November, 1911 — I quote his exact words —
" One does not make new friendships worth having by de-
serting old ones. New friendships by all means let us have,
but not at the expense of the ones we have." That has
been, and I trust will always be, the attitude of those whom

<"ESee first the Kaiser in his now notorious proclamation'" describes as
Military ^j^g treacherous English.

' We laid down — and I wish to call not only your attention

but the attention of the whole world to this, when so many
false legends are now being invented and circulated — ^in the
following year — ^in the year 1912 we laid down in terms
carefully approved by the Cabinet, and which I will textually
quote, what our relations with Germany ought in our view
to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German
Government — " Britain declares that she will neither make,
nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggres-
sion upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any
treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is
now a party, nor will §he become a party to anything that

'<"'[c/.SirE. has such an object."'^ There is nothing ambiguous or
Grey, p. equivocal about that.

465] But that was not enough for German statesmanship.

They wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge
ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany
being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time when
Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive
and her defensive resources, especially upon the sea. They
asked us, to put it quite plainly, for a free hand, so far as we
were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to over-
bear, to dominate the European world.

To such a demand but one answer was possible, and that
was the answer we gave. None the less we have continued
■during the whole of the last two years, and never more ener-
getically and more successfully than during the Balkan
crisis of last year, to work not only for the peace of Europe
but for the creation of a better international atmosphere
and a more cordial co-operation between all the Powers.
Prom both points of view, that of our domestic interests as
a kingdom and an Empire, and that of our settled attitude
and policy in the counsels of Europe, a war such as this,
which injures the one and frustrates the other, was and
462

BRITISH SPEECHES

could only be regarded as among the worst of catastrophes —
among the worst of catastrophes, but not the worst.

Four weeks ago, speaking at the Guildhall, in the City
of London, when the war was still in its early days, I
asked my fellow-countrymen"' with what countenance, with '"|Se« pp.
what conscience, had we basely chosen to stand aloof, we 44o-il
could have watched from day to day the terrible unrolling
of events — ^public faith shamelessly broken, the freedom of
a small people trodden in the dust, the wanton invasion
of Belgium and then of France, by hordes who leave behind
them at every stage of their progress a dismal trail of savagery,
of devastation, and of desecration worthy of the blackest
annals in the history of barbarism. That was four weeks
ago. The war has now lasted for 60 days, and every one
of those days has added to the picture its share of sombre
and repulsive traits. We now see clearly written down in
letters of carnage and spoliation the real aims and methods
of this long-prepared and well-organised scheme against the
liberties of Europe.

I say nothing of other countries. I pass no judgment
upon them. But if we here in Great Britain Imd abstained
and remained neutral, forsworn our word, deserted our
friends, faltered and compromised with the plain dictates
of our duty — ^nay, if we had not shown ourselves ready to
strike with all our forces at the common enemy of civilisation
and freedom, there would have been nothing left for our
country but to veil her face in shame and to be ready in her
turn — ^for her time would have come — ^to share the doom
which she would have richly deserved, and after centuries
of glorious life to go down to her grave " unwept, unhonoured,
and unsung."

Let us gladly acknowledge what becomes clearer and
clearer every day, that the world is just as ready as it ever
was, and no part of it readier than the British Empire, to
understand and to respond to moral issues. The new
school of German thought has been teaching for a generation
past that in the affairs of nations there is no code of ethics.
According to their doctrine force and nothing but force is
the test and the measure of right. As the events which are
going on before our eyes have made it plain, they have suc-
ceeded only too well in indoctrinating with their creed — I

463

BRITISH SPEECHES [March zz

will not say the people of Germany — ^like Burke, I will not
attempt to draw up an indictment against a nation — I will
not say the people of Germany, but those who control and
execute German policy.

But it is one of those products of German genius which,
whether or not it was intended exclusively for home con-
sumption, has not, I am happy to say, found a market
abroad, and certainly not within the boundaries of the British
Empire. We still believe here, old-fashioned people as we
are, in the sanctity of treaties, that the weak have rights and
that the strong have duties, that small nationalities have
every bit as good a title as large ones to life and independence,
and that freedom for its own sake is as well worth fighting
for to-day as it ever was in the past. And we look for-
ward at the end of this war to a Europe in which these
great and simple and venerable truths will be recognised
and safeguarded for ever against the recrudescence of the
era of blood and iron. Stated in a few words that is the
reason for our united front, the reason that has brought
oiK gallant Indian warriors to Marseilles, that is extracting
from our most distant Dominions the best of their man-
hood, and which in the course of two months has transformed
the United Kingdom into a vast recruiting ground.

SIR EDWARD GREY AT BECHSTEIN HALL, LONDON,

MARCH 22, 1915.

{Authenticated, Report)

WHILE we are taken up by the particular methods by
which the war is to be prosecuted to a successful conclusion,
do not let us lose sight, even for a moment, of the character
and origin of this war and of the main issue for which we are
fighting.

Hundreds of millions of money have been spent, hundreds
of thousands of lives have been lost, and millions have been
wounded or maimed, in Europe during the last few months.
All this might have been avoided by the simple method of a
Conference or joint discussion between the European Powers
concerned, which might have been held m London or in The

464

BRITISH SPEECHES

Hague or wherever or in whatever form Germany would have
consented to have it. It would have been far easier to have
settled by a Conference the dispute between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia, which Germany made the occasion for this war,
than it was to get successfully through the Balkan crisis of
two years ago, Germany knew, from her experience of the
Conference in London which settled the Balkan crisis, that
she could count upon our goodwill for peace in any Concert
or Conference of the Powers. We had sought no diplomatic
triumph in the Balkan Conference. We had not given our-
selves to any intrigue. We had pursued impartially and
honourably the end of peace. We were ready, last July,
to do the same again. '" In recent years, we had given Germany w [See B.
every assurance that no aggression upon her would receive 36.]

any support from us. We had withheld from her but one
thing : an unconditional promise to stand aside, however
aggressive Germany herself might be to her neighbours."" ""[5ee
Last July, France was ready to accept a Conference, Italy P- 462.]
was ready to accept a Conference, Russia was ready to accept
a Conference ; and we know now that, after the British
proposal for a Conference was made, the Emperor of Russia
himself proposed to the German Emperor that the dispute
should be referred to The Hague.'" Germany refused every (')[See the
suggestion made to her for settling the dispute in this way, Tsar's
and on her rests now, and must rest for all time, the appalling telegram,
responsibility for having plunged Europe into this war, and ^°\. \''
for involving herself and the greater part of a whole Continent ^' •'
in the consequences of it.

We know now that the German Government had pre-
pared for war as only people who plan can prepare. This
is the fourth time within living memory that Prussia has
made war in Europe. In the Schleswig-Holstein war, in
the war against Austria in 1866, in the war against France
in 1870, as we now know from all the documents that have
been revealed, it was Prussia who planned and prepared
these wars. The same thing has occurred again, and we are
determined that it shall be the last time that war shall be
made in this way.

As to our own part : We had assured Belgium that never
would we violate her neutrality so long as it was respected "'[See
by others.'^' I had given this pledge to Belgium long before p. 327.]

II— 2 G 465

BRITISH SPEECHES [March 22,

the war. On the eve of the war, we asked France and Ger-

'''[B. 114.] many to give the same pledge.'" France at once did so,""

'"'[B. 125.] but Germany dechned to give it.'^* When, after that,

''' [B. 122.] Germany invaded Belgium, we were bound to oppose Germany

with all our strength ; and, if we had not done so at the first

moment, is there anyone who now believes that, when Germany

attacked the Belgians, shot combatants and non-combatants,

and ravaged the country in a way that violated all rules of

war of recent times, and all rules of humanity of all times,

is there any one who thinks it possible that we could have

sat still and looked on, without eternal disgrace ?

Now, what are the issues for which we are fighting ? In
due time, the terms of peace will be put forward by our
Allies in common with us, in accordance with the Alliances
that now exist between us and are public to the world. But
one essential condition must be the restoration of Belgium
to her independent national life and the free possession of
her territory ; and reparation to her, as far as reparation
is possible, for the cruel wrong done to her.

That is part of the great issue for which we with our Allies
are contending, and which is this : We wish the nations of .
Europe to be free to live their independent lives, working
out their own forms of government for themselves and their
own national development, whether they be great States
or small States, in full liberty. That is our ideal. The Ger-
man ideal — ^we have had it poured out by German Professors
and publicists since the war began — is that of the Germans
as a superior people ; to whom all things are lawful in the
securing of their own power ; against whom resistance of
every sort is unlawful and to be savagely put down ; a people
establishing a domination over the nations of the Continent ;
imposing a peace that is not to be a liberty for other nations,
but subservience to Germany. I would rather perish or leave
this Continent altogether than live in it under such conditions.
After this war, we and the other nations of Europe must
be free to live, not menaced by talk of supreme War Lords
and shining armour and the sword continually rattled in the
scabbard, and Heaven continually invoked as an accomplice
to German arms, and not having our policy dictated and our
national destinies and activities controlled by the military
caste of Prussia. We claim for ourselves, and our Allies claim
466

BRITISH SPEECHES

for themselves and together we will secure for Europe, the
right of independent sovereignty for the different nations ;
the right to pursue national existence, not in the shadow of
Prussian hegemony or supremacy but in the light of equal
liberty.

All honour for ever be given from us, whom age or cir-
cumstances have kept at home, to those who voluntarily
have come forward to risk their lives, and give their lives,
on the field of battle on land or sea. They have their reward
in enduring fame and honour. And aU honour be from us
to the brave Armies and Navies of our Allies, who have
exhibited such splendid courage and noble patriotism. The
admiration they have aroused and the comradeship in arms
will be an ennobling and endearing memory between us,
cementing friendship and perpetuating National Goodwill.

And for all of us who are serving the State at home in
whatever capacity, whether ofiicials, employers or wage-
earners, doing our utmost to carry on the National life in this
time of stress, there is the knowledge that there can be no
nobler opportunity than that of serving one's country when
its very existence is at stake, and when its cause is just and
right ; that never was there a time in our history when the
crisis was so great and imperative as it is now, or the cause
more just and right.

467

[August i,

FOREIGN ADDRESSES, PROCLAMATIONS
AND MESSAGES.

[Addresses, etc., of a military character will be found in the
first Military Volume.]

FRANCE.

Proclamation by the President of the Republic.

To THE French Nation :

[Pages IN spite of all the efforts of diplomacy, the situation in

d'His- Europe has in the last few days become considerably worse.
ioire.] jj^g outlook has become darker. At this moment most
nations have mobilised their forces, and even those countries
whose neutrality is guaranteed have taken the same precau-
tionary measure. Those Powers whose constitutional laws
are different from ours have, without actually mobilising,
commenced, and are proceeding with, preparations which are
equivalent to actual mobilisation, and in anticipation of it.

France, which has always plainly asserted her pacific
intentions, which has, in these tragic days, given to Europe
counsels of moderation and a living example of wise prudence,
and which has redoubled her efforts to maintain the peace of
the world, has prepared herself for all eventualities, and has
now taken the first indispensable steps for safeguarding her
territory ; but our legislation does not permit these prepara-
tions to be completed without a decree of mobilisation.

The Government, mindful of its responsibilities, and know-
ing that it would fail in its sacred duty if it left matters in
their present state, has just ordered the necessary decrees to
be issued. Mobilisation is not war ; on the contrary, it
appears to be the best means, in the present circumstances,
of securing peace with honour. Strong in its ardent wish
to arrive at a peaceful solution of the crisis, the Government
will continue its diplomatic efforts, sheltered by these pre-
cautionary measures, and still hopes that these efforts will be

46S

FOREIGN ADDRESSES

crowned with success. It counts on the self-restraint of our
noble nation not to be carried away by unwarrantable excite-
ment. It counts on the patriotism of every Frenchman, and
knows that there is not one who is not ready to do his duty.
At this moment there are no more parties, there is only the
same France as of old, France peaceful and resolute, the
Fatherland of right and justice, absolutely unanimous in its
calmness, vigilance and dignity.

The President of the French Republic,

RAYMOND POINCARfi.
The President of the Council,

RENE VIVIANI..

[Signed also by all the Ministers and Under-Secretaries of
State.]

Paris, August ist.

Appeal by the President of the Council to the Women of France.

IN spite of the efforts of France, Russia and England [Pages
to maintain peace, Germany has plunged us into war. At ^'His-
their country's call, your fathers, your brothers and your ^<'*''*-J
husbands have risen, and will to-morrow have taken up the
challenge.

The departure on active service of all who are capable
of bearing arms interrupts the work in the fields. The harvest
is not yet gathered in, and the time of the vintage is approach-
ing. In the name of the Government of the Republic, and
in the name of the entire nation at its back, I appeal to your
fortitude and to that of your children, whose age alone and
not lack of courage keeps from the fight. I ask you to
continue the cultivation of the fields, to complete the gathering
of this year's crops, and to prepare for those of next year.
You can render no greater service to your country than this,
and I appeal to you for her sake. You have to secure your
own subsistence and the provisioning of the population of
the towns, and above all the provisioning of those who are
defending on the frontier civilisation and justice, as well
as the independence of the country.

Up then, French women, young children, sons and
daughters of the Fatherland ! Take the place on the field
of toil of those who have gone to the field of battle. Prepare

469

FOREIGN ADDRESSES [August 2

to show them, later on, the ground cultivated, the crops
gathered in, and the fields sown ! In these grave hours
no labour is menial, all is noble that serves the country.
Up ! then ; to action and to work ! to-morrow there will be
glory for everyone !

Vive la R^publique ! Vive la France !

The President of the Council of Ministers,

RENfi VIVIANL

RUSSIA.

V Imperial Manifesto.

[Official.] BY God's Grace, We, Nicholas IL, Emperor and Autocrat

of All the Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland,
etc., etc., etc.,

Declare to all Our loyal subjects :

In pursuance of her historical covenants, Russia, one in
faith and blood with the Slav peoples, has never regarded
their fate with indifference. The fraternal sentiments of
the Russian people towards the Slavs have recently been
aroused with entire unanimity and special force when
Austria-Hungary presented to Serbia demands notoriously
inacceptable for a sovereign State.

Treating with contempt the concihatory and peace-loving
reply of the Serbian Government, and rejecting the well-
intentioned mediation of Russia, Austria hurriedly had
recourse to armed attack, and began a bombardment of
defenceless Belgrade.

Compelled by force of conditions thus created to adopt
indispensable measures of precaution. We commanded the
Army and Navy to be placed upon a war footing, but, careful
of the blood and property of Our subjects. We exerted every
effort for a pacific outcome to the negotiations which had
begun.

Amid friendly negotiations Austria's ally, Germany,
despite Our hopes of prolonged good neighbourly relations
and disregarding Our assurances that the measures adopted
had absolutely no hostile intention towards herself, began to

470

1914] FOREIGN ADDRESSES

urge their immediate abrogation and, on meeting with a
refusal of this demand, suddenly declared war on Russia.

It now behoves us no longer merely to intervene on behalf
of a country akin to Us and unjustly insulted, but to guard
the honour, dignity, and integrity of Russia and her position
among the Great Powers. We firmly believe that in the
defence of Russian Soil all Our loyal subjects will harmoni-
ously and devotedly come forward.

In the threatening hour of trial let all internal dissensions
be forgotten ! May the union of the Tsar with His people
be still more closely strengthened, and may Russia, rising as
one man, repel the insolent attack of the foe !

With profound faith in the justice of Our cause and humble
reliance on Almighty Providence, We prayerfully invoke
God's blessing on Holy Russia and Our valiant troops.

Given at St. Petersburg on the Twentieth day of July
(August 2) in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Nine
Hundred and Fourteen and the Twentieth year of Our Reign.

Signed by His Imperial Majesty's own Hand

NICHOLAS.

Message from the Municipal Council of Petrograd to the
Municipal Councils of Paris and London, August 8, 1914.

WE are with you, and our feelings towards you are [Pages
unchanged. We were your friends in peace, and remain d'His-
your friends in war. We will all rise for the protection of *°*^^-^
our common interests, and to fight against the common
enemy, hostile to the world and to the fraternal unity of
nations. We appreciate your friendship ; accept our cordial
greetings.

The Tsar at the Kremlin.

August 18.
THE Emperor and Empress to-day received in the Hall [^mes,
of St. George, the Great Palace of the Kremlin, deputations ^^•
of the nobihty, the City of Moscow, the Zemstvo, and the j°' ■,
merchants, who presented loyal addresses to their Majesties.

471

FOREIGN ADDRESSES [August 25.

In a general reply, his Majesty said : —

" At this stormy, warlike hour, which, suddenly and
against my wishes, has fallen upon my peaceful people, I seek,
according to the custom of my ancestors, to strengthen the
forces of my soul in the sanctuaries of Moscow.

" Within the walls of the old Kremlin I greet in you,
inhabitants of Moscow, my beloved ancient capital, all my
people, who everywhere, in the villages of their birth, in the
Duma, and in the Council of the Empire, unanimously replied
to my appeal and rose with vigour throughout the country,
forgetting all private differences, to defend the land of their
birth and the Slav race.

" In a powerful common impulse all nationalities, all tribes
of our vast Empire, have united. Russia, like myself, will
never forget these historic days.

" This union of thought and sentiment in all my people
affords me deep consolation and a calm assurance for the
future. From here, from the heart of the Russian land, I
send a warm greeting to my gallant troops and to our brave
Allies who are making common cause with us to safeguard
the down-trodden principles of peace and truth. May God
be with us."

Message from Imperial Duma of Russia.

House of Commons, August 25, 1914.

[Hansard.] MR. SPEAKER : I have to inform the House that since
the House adjourned, I have received a telegram from the
President of the Imperial Duma of Russia, M. Michel de
Rodzianko, which I should like to read to the House :

August 10, 1914.

" The Duma of the Empire, assembled in extraordinary
Session, in view of the exceptional events passing in the
civilised world, begs the House of Commons of Great Britain
to accept their warm and sincere greeting in the name of the
sentiments of profound friendship which unite our two great
nations. The whole of Russia has welcomed with enthusiasm
the resolution of the British people to give their powerful
support to the friendly nations in the historic struggle which
is developing at this moment. May God bless the arms of the '
friendly nations of the Triple Entente. Long live His Majesty

472

FOREIGN ADDRESSES

King George and his valiant Fleet and Army ! Long live the
British Pariiament ! Long live Great Britain ! "

In reply I sent the following telegram :

" I hasten to thank you warmly for the telegram in which
you have been good enough to convey to me the sentiments
of friendship which the Duma of the Empire has expressed
towards the House of Commons.

" As soon as the House meets again, towards the end of
this month, I shall not fail to inform it of this graceful mani-
festation of the cordial relations which so happily exist between
our two countries."

BELGIUM.

King Albert's Speech to the Belgian Chambers, Brussels,

August 4, 1914.
Gentlemen :

NEVER since 1830 has a graver hour struck for Belgium : [Neutralite
the integrity of our territory is threatened. j^ Y-

The very strength of our right, the sympathy which ^«m»«i
Belgium, proud of her free institutions and her moral con-
quests, has continued to enjoy among the other nations, the
fact that our independent existence is essential to the balance
of power in Europe, induce us still to hope that the events
which are dreaded will not occur.

But if our hopes are vain, if we are called upon to resist
the invasion of our soil and to defend our threatened hearths,
this duty, however hard it may be, will find us armed and
ready for the greatest sacrifices.

Henceforth, prepared for any emergency, our brave youths
are on their feet, firmly resolved, with the tenacity and self-
possession traditional among Belgians, to defend the country
in its danger.

I offer them, in the name of the nation, a fraternal greeting.
Everywhere, throughout Flanders and the land of the Wal-
loons, in town and country alike, one single feeling unites our
hearts — ^patriotism ; one vision alone fills our thoughts —
our menaced independence ; one duty alone presents itself to
our wills — stubborn resistance.

473

FOREIGN ADDRESSES [August

In these grave circumstances two virtues are requisite,
a courage that is calm and steadfast, and complete unity
among all Belgians.

Both of these have already been conspicuously displayed
before the eyes of an enthusiastic nation.

The faultless mobilisation of our army, the multitude of
voluntary enlistments, the devotion of the civilian popula-
tion, the self-sacrifice of families, have shown in the most
unmistakable manner the fortifying courage which animates
the Belgian people.

The moment has come for action.

I have called you together. Gentlemen, in order to give
the legislative Chambers an opportunity to associate them-
selves with the enthusiasm of the people in a common feeling
of sacrifice.

You will know how to take with urgency all those measures,
both for war and for public order, which the situation demands.

When I look at this assembly, stirred with emotion, in
which there is now only one party, that of the country, where
at this moment all hearts beat in unison, my thoughts are
carried back to the Congress of 1830, and I ask you. Gentle-
men, Are you resolutely determined to maintain inviolate
the sacred patrimony of our ancestors ?

No one in this country will fail in his duty.

The Army, strong and disciplined, is equal to its task ;
my Government and I myself have full confidence in its
leaders and in its rank and file.

In close touch with, and supported by the people, the
Government knows its responsibilities and will fulfil them to-
the end, with the deliberate conviction that the efforts of alU
united in the most fervent and most generous patriotism,
will secure the highest welfare of the country.

If the foreigner violates our territory, in contempt of the
neutrality whose claims we have always scrupulously observed,,
he will find all Belgians grouped around their Sovereign, who will
never betray his constitutional oath, and around the Govern-
ment which enjoys the full confidence of the entire nation.

I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends
itself wins the respect of all. That country does not perish..

God will be with us in this just cause.

Long live independent Belgium !

474

FOREIGN ADDRESSES

Sympathy with Belgium.

Address to His Majesty.

House of Commons, August 27, 1914.

THE PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith) : I beg to [Hansard.^
move, " That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty
praying Him to convey to His Majesty the King of the Bel-
gians the sympathy and admiration with which this House
regards the heroic resistance offered by his army and people
to the wanton invasion of his territory, and an assurance of
the determination of this country to support in every way the
efforts of Belgium to vindicate her own independence and the
public law of Europe."

Sir, very few words are needed to commend to the House
the Address, the terms of which will shortly be read from the
Chair. The War which is now shaking to its foundations the
whole European system originated in a quarrel in which this
country had no direct concern. We strove with all our might,
as everyone now knows, to prevent its outbreak, and when
that was no longer possible, to limit its area. It is aU impor-
tant, and I think it is relevant to this Motion, that it should
be clearly understood when it was, and why it was, that we
intervened. It was only when we were confronted with the
choice between keeping and breaking solemn obligations —
between the discharge of a binding trust and of shameless
subservience to naked force — ^that we threw away the scab-
bard. We do not repent our decision. The issue was one
which no great and self-respecting nation — certainly none
bred and nurtured like ourselves, in this ancient home of
liberty — could, without undjdng shame, have declined. We
were bound by our obligations, plain and paramount, to
assert and maintain the threatened independence of a small
and neutral State. Belgium had no interests of her own to
serve, save and except the one supreme and ever-widening
interest of every State, great or little, which is worthy of the
name, the preservation of her integrity and of her national
life.

History tells us that the duty of asserting and maintaining
that great principle — which is, after all, the well-spring of

475

FOREIGN ADDRESSES [September 17

civilisation and of progress — has fallen once and again at the
most critical moment in the past to States relatively small in
area and in population, but great in courage and in resolve
— to Athens and Sparta, to the Swiss Cantons, and, not least
gloriously, three centuries ago, to the Netherlands. Never,
Sir, I venture to assert, has the duty been more clearly and
bravely acknowledged, and never has it been more strenuously
and heroically discharged, than during the last weeks by the
Belgian King and the Belgian people. They have faced,
-without flinching and against almost incalculable odds, the
horrors of irruption, of devastation, of spoliation, and of
outrage. They have stubbornly withstood and successfully
arrested the inrush, wave after wave, of a gigantic and an
overwhelming force. The defence of Liege will always be
the theme of one of the most inspiring chapters in the annals
of liberty. The Belgians have won for themselves the immor-
tal glory which belongs to a people who prefer freedom to
-ease, to security, even to life itself. We are proud of their
alhance and their friendship. We salute them with respect
and with honour. We are with them heart and soul, because,
by their side and in their company, we are defending at the
same time two great causes — the independence of small
States and the sanctity of international covenants. We
assure them — as I ask the House in this Address to do — we
assure them to-day, in the name of this United Kingdom and
of the whole Empire, that they may count to the end on our
whole-hearted and unfailing support.

[An Address identical in wording was passed on the same
4ay in the House of Lords, on the motion of Lord Crewe.]

Reply from King Albert.

House of Commons, September 17, 1914.

THE PRIME MINISTER : I have to state to the House
-that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has received
from His Majesty's Minister at the Court of Belgium a despatch,
dated the 17th inst., stating that he has had the honour of
being received in audience by His Majesty the King of the
Belgians, and that, in obedience to the King's Command,

476

FOREIGN ADDRESSES

he presented to His Majesty a copy of the Address adopted
by the House of Commons on the 27th ultimo. He had
received a reply thereto in these terms : —

" His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, desires His
Majesty's Minister to convey, his heartfelt thanks to the
Prime Minister and the Marquis of Crewe, and, through them,
to the Members of both Houses of Parliament. His Majesty
deeply appreciates the language employed in the Address as
a further and striking proof of the S5niipathy and support
of the whole British nation, to which he attaches the utmost
value."

[A similar statement was made on the same day in the
House of Lords by Lord Crewe.]

SERBIA.

Message from the Skupshtina to the French Chamber of
Deputies. {Communicated August 4, 1914.)

Nish.

IN the name of the national Skupshtina assembled at [Pages
Nish ; and by virtue of a unanimous resolution, I have the d' Hisioire.']
honour to transmit to you the warmest greetings of the Serbian
Skupshtina, and ask you to communicate them to the Chamber
of Deputies. The Serbian people has always had the liveliest
synipathy and the very highest respect for the great French
nation. At this historic moment, the whole of Serbia derives
fresh strength from finding itself on the same side as France
in the defence of right and justice.

The President,
NICOLITCH.

GERMANY.
I. — The Emperor William. [AUfrom

cj. 7 1 T T- Kriegsaus-

bpeech by the Emperor on July 31, 1914, from the Balcony bruch.']

of the Royal Palace.

A MOMENTOUS hour has struck for Germany. Envious
rivals everywhere drive us to legitimate defence. The sword

477

FOREIGN ADDRESSES [August i,

has been forced into our hand. I hope that, if my endeavours
up to the very last moment should not succeed in bringing
the adversaries to reason and in preserving peace, we may
wield the sword, with God's help, so that we may sheath it
again with honour. War would demand enormous sacrifices
from the German people, but we would show the enemy
what it means to attack Germany. And so I commend you
to God. Go now into the churches, kneel before God and
implore His help for our brave army.

Speech of the Emperor on the Day of Mobilisation, August i,
1914, from the Balcony of the Royal Palace.

I THANK you from the bottom of my heart for the
expression of your affection and your loyalty. In the struggle
which now lies before us I recognise no longer any parties
\pt- P- amongst my people. '" There are none but Germans amongst
'^ '^ us, and whatever parties may have turned against me in the
course of past controversies, I forgive them all whole-heartedly.
Now the only course is for us to stand together as brothers
and then God will help the German sword to victory.

Speech from the Throne, Delivered on August 4, 1914, in
the White Hall of the Royal Palace at Berlin.

Gentlemen,

IN a fateful hour I have gathered round me the chosen
representatives of the German people. For nearly half a
century we have been able to persevere in the path of peace.
Attempts to impute warlike designs to Germany and to cramp
her position in the world have often placed a heavy strain
upon the patience of our people. In unerring sincerity my
Government has pursued, even in circumstances of great
provocation, the development of all moral, intellectual and
economic forces as its highest goal. The world has been a
witness how indefatigably in the stress and storm of recent
years we have striven in the first rank to spare the peoples of
Europe a war between the Great Powers.

The gravest dangers conjured up by the events in the
Balkan Peninsula appeared to have been overcome. Then,
with the murder of my friend, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand,

478

FOREIGN ADDRESSES

the abyss opened up. My exalted Ally, the Emperor and
King, Francis Joseph, was compelled to have recourse to
arms, to defend the safety of his realm against dangerous
intrigues from a neighbouring state. In the pursuit of its
legitimate interests the Allied Monarchy found the Russian
Empire standing in its path. It is not only our duty as an
Ally that calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. There
devolves upon us equally the formidable task of defending,
together with the ancient culture common to both realms, our
own position against the storm of hostile forces.

With a heavy heart have I been compelled to mobilise
my army against a neighbour with whom it has fought
shoulder to shoulder on so many battle-fields. With sincere
sorrow have I seen a friendship broken which Germany had
faithfully preserved. The Imperial Russian Government,
yielding to the pressure of an insatiable nationalism, has
cast in its lot with a State which has brought on the disaster
of this war by favouring criminal conspiracies. That France
should also have placed herself at the side of our adversaries
cannot surprise us. Too often have our endeavours to arrive
at more friendly relations with the French Republic been
defeated by long-standing aspirations and long-standing
resentments.

Gentlemen, what human insight and power can do to
arm a nation for the supreme decisions, that has been done
with your patriotic help. The hostility which, for a long
time past, has been spreading in the East and in the West has
now broken out into open flames. The present situation
has not arisen out of trivial conflicts of interest or diplomatic
combinations, it is the result of an active ill will for long years
past towards the power and prosperity of the German Empire.

No lust of conquest drives us. We are animated by
the unconquerable will to preserve for ourselves and all
generations to come the place to which God has called us.

From the documents which have been laid before you
you will see how my Government and, above all, my Chan-
cellor, strove to the very last moment to avert extremities.
In compulsory self-defence we drew the sword, with a clean
hand and a clean conscience.

To the peoples and races of the German Empire my
cry goes forth to defend with their combined weight, and in

479

FOREIGN ADDRESSES [August 4,

brotherly association with our Allies, that which we have
wrought in peaceful endeavour. Staunch and true, after the
manner of our fathers, earnest and chivalrous, humble before
God, and joyfully brave before the enemy, we put our trust
in the Eternal and Omnipotent Power to strengthen our
defence and to lead it to a fortunate issue.

To you, gentlemen, the whole German nation, mustered
around its princes and leaders, looks up to-daj^. May you
come to unanimous and prompt decisions, that is my inner-
most wish.

His Majesty added : —

" You have read. Gentlemen, what I said to my people
•'' [See from the balcony of the Palace. '" I repeat it to you here —
p. 478.] J ifnow no longer any parties, I know only Germans (pro-
longed and enthusiastic cheers) ; and in witness that you are
determined, without difference of party, without difference
of race, without difference of creed, to stand fast with me,
through thick and thin, through trials and through death,
I invite the leaders of the parties to come forward and to
give me their hands as the pledge thereof."

The leaders of the parties came forward in answer to this
invitation amidst a storm of cheers. Thereupon the Chan-
cellor stepped forward and declared the Reichstag open.

All Highest Decree of Amnesty.

WE, Wilhelm, by the Grace of God, King of Prussia, etc.,
in view of the self-sacrificing love of the Fatherland which
the whole nation is displaying in the war which has been
forced upon us, do unto all persons who, up to the present
day, have

(i) For Use majesti against their own ruler or against a
federal Prince (paragraphs 94-101 of the Criminal Code) ; for
hostile action against friendly states in the sense of para-
graphs 103-104 of the Criminal Code ; for offences and mis-
demeanours in the exercise of civic rights (paragraphs 105-109
of the Criminal Code) ; for resistence to the authority of the
State (paragraphs 110-122 of the Criminal Code) ; for offences
and misdemeanours against pubUc order in the sense of
paragraphs 123-138 of the Criminal Code; for insults in

480

FOREIGN ADDRESSES

cases provided for by paragraphs 196-197 of the Criminal
Code ; for offences in the sense of paragraph 153 of the
Industrial Regulations ; for punishable actions committed
through the Press or punishable under the Press Law of
May 7th, 1874. {Imperial Law Gazette, page 65), or under
the Law of Public Meetings of April 19th, igo8 {Imperial
Law Gazette, page 151)

Been condemned to a fine, to arrest, to confinement within
a fortress up to two years, inclusive, or to imprisonment up
to two years ; or

(2) For theft or embezzlement (paragraphs 242-248 of
the Criminal Code, paragraph 138 of the Military Code) for
fraud in the sense of paragraph 264a of the Criminal Code ;
for criminal appropriation in the sense of paragraphs 288-289
of the Criminal Code ; for malversation in the sense of para-
graph 370 of the Criminal Code ; or for an action punishable
under the Law relating to poaching of April 15th, 1878,
(Collection of Laws, page 222)

Have been condemned to a fine, or to arrest or to imprison-
ment up to three months inclusive

Grant remission of such penalties as shall have not yet
been carried out, together with aU costs in arrears and
the enjoyment of all civic rights which they may have for-
feited.

If penalties have also been inflicted on account of one and
the same act under a provision which does not fall within
the scope of this decree, remission of such penalty is also
granted if it can be established under the Law with which
this decree is concerned. In the case of punishment resulting
from conviction for another punishable offence full remission
is granted of the punishment inflicted for the offence within
the scope of the present decree.

If for the same act a fine had been inflicted as well as loss
of liberty, a fine is only to be remitted if the punishment
involving loss of liberty comes within this decree.

In the case of sentences pronounced by a tribunal exer-
cising jurisdiction in common with other Federal States this
decree finds application in so far as we possess the right of
amnesty in the particular case under agreements made with
the Governments concerned.

11— 2 H 481

FOREIGN ADDRESSES [August

Our Minister of State is to provide for the prompt
publication and execution of this decree.

Berlin Castle,

August 4, 1914. WILHELM R,

The Emperor's Appeal to the German People.

SINCE the foundation of the Empire it has been for
forty-three years my strenuous endeavour, and that of my
predecessors, to preserve the peace of the world and to pro-
mote by peaceful means our vigorous development. But our
adversaries were jealous of the success of our work.

All open and latent hostility on the east and on the west
and beyond the sea we have borne till now in the conscious-
ness of our responsibility and power. Now, however, an
attempt is being made to humiliate us. We are expected to
look on with folded arms whilst our enemies are arming
themselves for a treacherous attack. They will not suffer
that we maintain resolute fidelity to our ally who is fighting
for his position as a Great Power, and with whose humiliation
our power and honour would equally be lost.

So the sword must decide. In the midst of perfect peace
the enemy takes us by surprise. Therefore to arms ! Any
dallying, any temporising would be to betray the Fatherland.

What is at stake is whether the Empire which our fathers
founded anew shall or shall not subsist, whether German
power and German life shall or shall not subsist. We shall
resist to the last breath of man and horse, and shall fight out
the struggle even against a world of enemies. Never has
Germany been subdued when it was united. Forward with
God, who will be with us as He was with our ancestors !

Berlin,

August 6. WILHELM.

The Emperor to the Oberbiirgermeister of Berlin.

THE progress of military operations compels me to
remove my Headquarters from Berlin. My heart prompts
me, in bidding farewell to the citizens of Berlin to return my
deepest thanks for all the manifestations and proofs of love
and affection which these great and fateful days have brought
to me in such abundant measure. I rely fully on the help of

482

FOREIGN ADDRESSES

God, on the gallantry of the army and the navy, and on the
unconquerable resolution of the united German nation in
the hour of danger. Victory will not fail our righteous cause.

Berlin, the Palace,

August i6, 1914. WILHELM I.R.

II. — ^The Empress.

To THE Women of Germany.

OBEYING the summons of the Emperor our people [Kriegsaus-
is preparing for an unprecedented struggle, which it did not hrmh.]
provoke and which it is carrying on only in self-defence.

Whoever can bear arms will joyfully fly to the Colours
to defend the Fatherland with his blood.

The struggle will be gigantic and the wounds to be
healed innumerable. Therefore I call upon you, women
and girls of Germany, and upon all to whom it is not given
to fight for our beloved home, for help. Let every one now
do what lies in her power to lighten the struggle for our
husbands, sons, and brothers. I know that in ^1 ranks of
our people without exception the will exists to discharge
this high duty, but may the Lord God strengthen us in our
holy work of love, which summons us women to devote all
our strength to the Fatherland in its decisive struggle.

The organisations primarily concerned to whom our
support is above all things needful have already sent out
notices as to the mustering of volunteers and the collection
of gifts of all kinds.

Berlin,

August 6. AUGUSTE VICTORIA.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Message addressed by the Emperor Francis Joseph to the Prime

Minister of Austria.

[Wiener

Dear Count Sturgkh, — Zeitung,

PROFOUNDLY afflicted, I stand under the impression J-^^^^'
of the nefarious deed* which has cut off my dearly loved juiy 5,

* [The assassination of the Archduke Francfs Ferdinand on June 28, ^9M-]
1914.]

483

FOREIGN ADDRESSES [July

nephew in the midst of an activity which was devoted to
the earnest fulfilment of his duty, at the side of his noble-
hearted Consort, who in the hour of danger remained loyally
at his side — a deed which has plunged me and my House
into the deepest grief and mourning.

If in this cruel sorrow there can be a consolation for me,
it is to be found in the numberless proofs of warm affection
and sincere sympathy which have reached me from all classes
of the population during the last few days. The hand of a
criminal has taken from me a dear relative and faithful
helper, has robbed his children, scarcely out of the tenderest
age and still in need of protection, of all that was dear to
them on earth, and has heaped inexpressible sorrow on their
innocent heads.

But the fanaticism of a small band of misguided men
cannot shake the sacred ties that bind me to my peoples ;
it cannot reach the feelings of deep love for me and my House
to which expression has been given in all parts of the
Monarchy in so touching a manner. Through sixty-five years
I have shared with my peoples joy and sorrow, remembering
even in the hours of deepest gloom my high duties and my
responsibility for the destinies of the millions for whom I
am answerable to the Almighty. This fresh painful trial
which God's inscrutable decree has imposed upon me and
mine will only strengthen me in the resolve to follow to my
last breath the way I know to be right for the welfare of
my peoples. If some day, as my most priceless legacy, I
can leave to my successor the pledge of their love, this will
be the fairest reward of my paternal care.

I desire you to make known to all who in these sad days
have gathered round my Throne in proven loyalty and
devotion my heartfelt thanks.

, FRANZ JOSEPH, m.p.
Sturgkh, m.p.

Vienna,

July 4, 1914.

[An identical message was addressed on the same day
to the Prime Minister of Hungary, Count Tisza.]
484

FOREIGN ADDRESSES

Manifesto of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

To MY Peoples !

IT was my most ardent wish to devote the T&csiz\mng[Kriegsaus-
span of years to be granted to me by the grace of God, to ^»<^^-^
works of peace, and to the preservation of my peoples from
the heavy sacrifices and burdens of war. It has been other-
wise decided in the counsels of Providence. The intrigues
of an enemy filled with hate compel me, after long years
of peace, to draw the sword in defence of the honour of my
Monarchy, "for the protection of its credit and its power,
and for the security of its possessions. With an ingratitude
quickly forgetful, the kingdom of Serbia, which, from the
beginning of its independence as a State to the present day,
has been helped and supported by my predecessors and myself,
has, already for years past, trodden the path of open hostility
towards Austria-Hungary. When, after three decades of
peaceful work, fruitful in blessings, in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
I extended my sovereign rights to those lands, that exercise
of my authority called forth in the kingdom of Serbia, whose
rights were in no way affected, outbreaks of unbridled passion
and bitterest hatred. My Government, making use at that
time of the noble privilege of the stronger, showed extreme
indulgence and leniency towards Serbia in demanding only
that it should replace its army on a peace footing, and
undertake, in future, to walk in the ways of peace and friend-
ship. Animated by the same spirit of moderation, my
Government confined itself, when Serbia was engaged two
years ago in war with the Ottoman Empire, to the protection
of the most vital interests of the Monarchy. To this attitude
of the Monarchy in the first place, Serbia owed it that she
was able to achieve her war-like purpose. The hope that
the Serbian Kingdom would appreciate the forbearance and
love of peace of my Government and redeem its promises
has not been fulfilled. Ever higher flames its hatred of me
and of my house. Ever more undisguised the endeavour to
detach inalienable territories by violence from Austria-
Hungary. A criminal agitation is spreading beyond the
frontier to undermine in the South-East of the Monarchy the
foundations of established order, to shake the loyalty towards

485

FOREIGN ADDRESSES [July 28, 1914]

ruler and Fatherland of a people to whom I devoted in fatherly
solicitude my full care and affection, and to lead the growing
generation astray by inciting it to criminal deeds of folly
and high treason. A series of murderous enterprises, a
conspiracy systematically prepared and carried out, of which
the appalling success struck me and my loyal peoples to the
heart, has displayed to the sight of all the bloody trail of those
secret machinations which have been initiated and directed
from Serbia. A halt must be called to these intolerable
activities, an end must be put to the continuous provocations
of Serbia. The honour and dignity of my Monarchy must be
preserved inviolate, and its political, economic, and military
development must be secured against constant convulsions.
In vain has my Government made yet a last attempt to attain
that goal by peaceful measures and to induce Serbia, by an
earnest warning, to enter upon a new path. Serbia has
rejected the moderate and rightful demands of my Govern-
ment, and has declined to recognise those duties the ful-
filment of which in the life of nations and of States constitutes
the natural and necessary foundation for peace. I must,
therefore, proceed to obtain by force of arms the indispensable
guarantees which shall assure to my States internal tran-
quillity and enduring peace. In this grave hour I am conscious
of the whole consequences of my decision, and of my responsi-
bility before the Almighty. I have considered and weighed
everything. With a quiet conscience I tread the path to
which my duty points. I rely upon my peoples, who in all
times of storm have ever gathered round my throne in unity
and loyalty, and been prepared to make the heaviest sacri-
fices for the honour, greatness and power of the Fatherland.
I rely upon the gallant armies of Austria-Hungary, ever filled
with devoted enthusiasm, and I rely upon the Almighty that
he may grant victory to my arms.

FRANZ JOSEPH, m.p.
Sturgkh, m.p.

Bad Ischl,

July 28, 1914.

486

JApril 19, 1839]

TREATIES.

NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM.

Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France,
Prussia, and Russia, on the one part, and Belgium,
ON the other.

Signed at London, April 19, 1839.

(Extract.)

Article i.

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of
Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the
King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, declare, that
the Articles hereunto annexed, and forming the tenour of the
Treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the King of
the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands,
Grand Duke of Luxemburg, are considered as having the same
force and validity as if they were textualiy inserted in the
present Act, and that they are thus placed under the guarantee
of their said Majesties.

Annex to the above-mentioned Treaty.

(Extract.)

Article 7.

BELGIUM, within the limits specified in Articles L, II.,
and IV.,* shall form an independent and perpetually neutral
State {un Etat indSpendant et perpHuellement neutre). It
shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other
States.

* [These articles lay down the geographical boundaries of Belgium.]

487

TREATIES [August g,

Treaty between Her Majesty and the King of Prussia,
relative to the independence and neutrality
OF Belgium.

Signed at London, August 9, 1870.

(Ratifications exchanged at London, August 26, 1870.)

Article i.

HIS Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that,
notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German
Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed deter-
mination to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the
same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty the Queen
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her
part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies
of France should violate that neutrality, She will be prepared
to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence of
the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon,
employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to
insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with
His Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence
and neutrality of Belgium-

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage
herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general
operations of the war now carried on between the North
German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of
Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the
Netherlands of April 19th, 1839.

Article 2.

His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the
event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate
with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces
for the purpose aforesaid ; and, the case arising, to concert
with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately
or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of
Belgium.

488

1870] TREATIES

Article 3.

This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting
Parties during the continuance of the present war between the
North German Confederation and France, and for twelve
months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded
between those Parties ; and on the expiration of that time
the independence and neutraUty of Belgium will, so far as the
High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue
to rest as heretofore on the first Article of the Quintuple
Treaty of April 19th, 1839.

Article 4.

The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications
shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof, &c.

Done at London, the ninth day of August, in the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy.

(L.S.) GRANVILLE.
(L.S.) BERNSTORFF.

[A precisely similar Treaty was concluded between Great
Britain and France on August 11, 1870.]

NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG.

Treaty between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria,
THE King of the Belgians, the Emperor of the
French, the King of Italy, the King of the Nether-
lands, THE King of Prussia, and the Emperor of
Russia, relative to the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
burg.

Signed at London, May 11, 1867.

(Extracts.)

Article 2.

THE Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits
determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th

489

TREATIES [May ii, 1867]

of April, 1839 under the guarantee of the Courts of Great
Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall hence-
forth form a perpetually neutral State.

It shall be bound to observe the same neutraUty towards
aU other States.

The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the
principle of neutraUty stipulated by the present Article.

That principle is and remains placed under the sanction
of the collective guarantee of the Powers signing parties to
the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which
is itself a neutral State.

Article 3.

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg being neutralised,
according to the terms of the preceding Article, the mainten-
ance or establishment of fortresses upon its territory becomes
without necessity as well as without object.

In consequence, it is agreed by common consent that the
city of Luxemburg, considered in time past, in a military
point of view, as a Federal fortress, shall cease to be a fortified
city.

His Majesty the King Grand Duke reserves to himself to
maintain in that city the number of troops necessary to
provide in it for the maintenance of good order.

Article 5.

His Majesty the King Grand Duke, in virtue of the rights
of sovereignty which he exercises over the city and fortress
of Luxemburg, engages, on his part, to take the necessary
measures for converting the said fortress into an open city by
means of a demolition which His Majesty shall deem sufficient
to fulfil the intentions of the High Contracting Parties
expressed in Article 3 of the present Treaty. The works
requisite for that purpose shall be commenced immediately
after the withdrawal of the garrison. They shall be carried
out with all the attention required for the interests of the
inhabitants of the city.

His Majesty the King Grand Duke promises, moreover,
that the fortifications of the city of Luxemburg shall not be
restored in future, and that no military establishment shall
be there maintained or created.

490

[October 7, 1879] TREATIES

AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE OF 1879.
{Made public, February 3, 1888.)

(Translation.)

IN consideration that their Majesties the German
Emperor, King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria,
King of Hungary, must deem it their duty as monarchs in
all circumstances to care for the safety of their Empires and
the tranquillity of their peoples ;

In consideration that both Monarchs — as was the case
during their former Alliance — ^will be able more easUy and
efficiently to fulfil this duty if their Empires stand firmly
together ;

In consideration, finally, that close co-operation between
Germany and Austria-Hungary can threaten no one, but
is rather calculated to consolidate the peace of Europe as
created by the Berlin Treaty, their Majesties the German
Emperor and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary,
have resolved to enter into a bond of peace and reciprocal
defence under a solemn reciprocal promise that they will
never give to their purely defensive agreement an aggressive
tendency in any direction.

To this end their Majesties have appointed as Pleni-
potentiaries : His Majesty the German Emperor, his Extra-
ordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador Lieutenant-General
Prince Henry VII Reuss, His Majesty the Emperor of
Austria, King of Hungary, his Privy Councillor and Minister
of the Imperial House and for Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant
Field-Marshal Count Julius Andrassy of Csik-Szent-Kiraly
and Kraszna-Horka, who have met in Vienna to-day and,
after exchanging their plenipotentiary powers, which have
been found good and sufficient, have come to the following
agreement :

Clause i. — ^Should, contrary to the hope and against
the sincere wish of the two high contracting parties, one
of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the two high
contracting parties are bound to stand by each other with

491

TREATIES [October 7, 1879]

the whole armed forces of their Empires and, in consequence
thereof, only to conclude peace jointly and in agreement.

Clause 2. — Should one of the high contracting parties
be attacked by another Power, the other high contracting
party hereby binds itself, not only not to stand by the
aggressor of its high ally, but to observe at least an attitude
of benevolent neutrality towards its high co-contractor.

If, however, in such a case, the attacking power should
be supported by Russia, either in the form of active co-
operation or by military measures menacing to the party
attacked, the obligation defined in Clause i, of reciprocal
help with the entire armed strength, comes immediately
into force in this case also, and the war will then also be
waged jointly by the two high contracting parties until the
joint conclusion of peace.

Clause 3. — In accordance with its pacific character,
and in order to preclude all misinterpretation, this Treaty
shall be kept secret by both of the high contracting parties
and shall not be communicated to any third Power except
with the consent of both parties and after special agreement.

Both of the high contracting parties cherish the hope, in
view of the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander
during the meeting at Alexandrovo, that the armaments of
Russia will not in reality prove dangerous to them, and
believe for this reason that there is at present no cause to
make any communication. Should, however, this hope prove,
contrary to expectation, to be erroneous, the two high con-
tracting Powers would recognise it to be a duty of loyalty to
inform the Emperor Alexander, at least in a confidential
manner, that they would be obliged to regard an attack
upon one of them as directed against both.

Signed and sealed in Vienna on October 7, 1879.

PRINCE REUSS.
ANDRASSY.

493

[February 9, 1909] TREATIES

FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO.

FRANCO - GERMAN DECLARATION RESPECTING
MOROCCO, SIGNED FEBRUARY g, 1909.

(Translation.)

THE Government of the French RepubUc and the Im-
perial German Government, being equally anxious to facilitate
the execution of the Algeciras Act, have agreed to define
the meaning which they attach to the articles of that Act
with a view to avoid in the future all sources of misimder-
standing between them.

Therefore,

The Government of the French Republic, firmly attached
to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the
Shereefian Empire, being resolved to safeguard the principle
of economic equality, and, consequently, not to obstruct
German commercial and industrial interests in that country ;

And the Imperial German Government, pursuing only
economic interests in Morocco, recognising on the other
hand that the special political interests of France in that
country are closely bound up with the consolidation of order
and internal peace, and being resolved not to impede those
interests ;

Declare that they do not pursue nor encourage any mea-
sure of a nature to create in their favour or in that of any
Power an economic privilege, and that they will endeavour
to associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may
obtain a concession.

JULES CAMBON.

KIDERLEN-WAECHTER.

493

TREATIES [November 4,

FRANCO - GERMAN CONVENTION RESPECTING
MOROCCO, SIGNED NOVEMBER 4, 1911.

(Translation.)

IN consequence of the troubles which have arisen in
Morocco, and which have shown the necessity of carrying
on, in that country, in the interests of all, the work of pacifi-
cation and progress provided for by the Algeciras Act, the
Government of the French Republic and the Imperial Ger-
man Government have deemed it necessary to define more
precisely and to complete the Franco-German Agreement
■J'' {Seep, of the 9th February, 1909.'"

493] Therefore, M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary
of the French Republic accredited to His Majesty the German
Emperor, and M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs of the German Empire, having com-
municated to one another their full powers, found in good
and due form, have agreed upon the following articles :

Article i.

The Imperial German Government declare that, having
only economic interests in Morocco, they will not obstruct
such action as may be taken by France with a view to assist
the Moorish Government in the introduction of any adminis-
trative, judicial, economic, financial and military reforms
of which they may stand in need for the good government
of the Empire, as also of any new regulations and modifi-
cations in existing regulations which these reforms may
entail. Consequently, the German Government adhere to
the measures of reorganisation, of control, and of financial
guarantee, which the French Government, after obtaining
the consent of the Moorish Government, may consider it
necessary to take with this object in view, with the reserva-
tion that French action will ensure economic equality between
the nations in Morocco.

In the event of France being led to strengthen and to
extend her control and her protection, the Imperial German
Government, recognising France's full liberty of action,

494

TREATIES

will raise no objection, subject to the reservation that the
commercial Uberty guaranteed by former treaties is respected.
It is agreed that the rights and proceedings of the Morocco
State Bank, as defined in the Algeciras Act, shall not be in
any way impeded.

Article 2.

With this view it is agreed that the Imperial Govern-
ment will raise no objection to France, after obtaining the
consent of the Moorish Government, proceeding with such
military occupation of Moorish territory as she may consider
necessary for the maintenance of order and the security of
commercial transactions, and to her exercising all rights of
police on land and in Moorish waters.

Article 3.

From now henceforward, if His Majesty the Sultan of
Morocco should entrust to the diplomatic and consular agents
of France the representation and protection of Moorish
subjects abroad, the Imperial Government declare that
they will raise no objection.

If, on the other hand, His Majesty the Sultan handed
over to the French representative at the Moorish Court the
duty of acting as intermediary with the other foreign repre-
sentatives, the German Government would raise no objection.

Article 4.

The French Government declare that, firmly attached
to the principle of commercial liberty in Morocco, they will
not permit any inequality either as regards the establish-
ment of customs duties, taxes, or other contributions, or as
regards the establishment of tariffs for transport by rail,
river, or other means, and especially as regards aU questions
of transit.

The French Government wUl also use their influence
with the Moorish Government with ^ view to prevent any
differential treatment of subjects of the different Powers ;
they will more particularly oppose any measure, the pro-
mulgation, for instance, of administrative decrees dealing

495

TREATIES [November 4,

with weights and measures, gauging, stamping, &c., which
might place the merchandise of a Power in a position of
inferiority.

The French Government engage to use their influence
with the State Bank with a view to the posts of delegate
which are in the gift of the bank, on the Commission of
Customs Valuation and on the Standing Customs Committee
being conferred in turn on the members of the management
of the bank at Tangier.

Article 5.

The French Government will see that no export duty is
levied in Morocco on iron ore exported from Moorish ports.
Mines of iron ore will be subject to no special tax on their
output or methods of working. They shall, apart from the
general taxes, pay only a fixed charge, calculated by the
hectare and yearly, and a charge in proportion to the gross
output. These charges, which shall be fixed in accordance
with articles 35 and 49 of the draft mining regulations at-
tached to the protocol of the 7th June, 1910, of the Paris
conference, shall be paid equally by all mining undertakings.

The French Government will see that the mining taxes
are collected regularly, and that on no pretext whatever the
whole or a part of these taxes shall be remitted.

Article 6.

The Government of the French Republic engage to see
that the contracts for works and materials, which may be
necessary in connection with any future concessions for
roads, railways, harbours, telegraphs, &c., are allotted by
the Moorish Government in accordance with the rules of
adjudication.

They engage further to see that the conditions for ten-
dering, more especially as regards the supply of materials
and the limit of time within which tenders must be submitted,
do not place the subjects of any Power in a position of in-
feriority.

The working of the great undertakings mentioned above
shall be reserved to the Moorish State or entrusted, by a
concession, to third parties, who may be asked to furnish

496

TREATIES

the funds necessary for the purpose. The French Govern-
ment will see that as regards the working of railways and
other means of transport, as also the application of the
regulations which govern such working, no differential treat-
ment is accorded to the subjects of the different Powers
who use such means of transport.

The Government of the Republic will use their influence
with the State Bank with a view to the post of delegate on
the General Commission of Tenders and Contracts being
conferred in turn on the members of the management of the
bank at Tangier.

Similarly, the French Government will use their influence
with the Moorish Government in order that, so long as article
66 of the Algeciras Act remains in force, one of the three
posts of Shereefian delegate on the Special Committee of
Public Works is conferred on a subject of one of the Powers
represented in Morocco. '

Article 7.

The French Government will use their influence with the
Moorish Government in order that the owners of mines and
other industrial or agricultural undertakings, without dis-
tinction of nationality, and in accordance with the regula-
tions which may be issued on the model of French legislation
on the same subject, may be authorised to build light rail-
ways connecting their centres of production with the lines
of general public utility and with the ports.

Article 8.

Each year a report on the working of the railways in
Morocco shall be presented drawn up in the same form and
under the same conditions as the reports which are laid
before the meetings of shareholders in French railway com-
panies.

The Government of the Republic shall entrust to one of
the directors of the State Bank the duty of drawing up this
report which, together with the materials on which it is
based, shall be submitted to the Censors, and then published,
with, if necessary, such observations as the latter may wish
to append thereto, founded on their own information.
II — 2 I 497

TREATIES [November 4,

Article 9.

In order to avoid, as far as possible, diplomatic repre-
sentations, the French Government will urge the Moorish
Government to refer to an arbitrator, nominated ad hoc in
each case by agreement between the French consul and the
consul of the Power interested, or, failing them, by the two
Governments, such complaints brought by foreign subjects
against the Moorish authorities or agents acting in the capacity
of Moorish authorities as shall not have been found capable
of adjustment through the intermediary of the French consul
and the consul of the Power interested.

This mode of procedure shall remain in force until such
time as a judicial system, founded on the general principles
embodied in the legislation of the Powers interested, shall
have been introduced, which shall ultimately, by agreement
between those Powers, replace the consular courts.

Article 10.

The French Government will see that foreign subjects
continue to enjoy the right of fishing in Moorish waters and
harbours.

Article ii.

The French Government will urge the Moorish Govern-
ment to open to foreign commerce new ports from time to
time in accordance with the growing requirements of trade.

Article 12.

In order to meet a request of the Moorish Government,
the two Governments undertake to urge, in agreement v/ith
the other Powers and on the basis of the Madrid Convention,
the revision of the lists and the reconsideration of the position
of foreign-protected subjects and mokhalats (" associes agri-
coles "), which are dealt with in articles 8 and 16 of that
convention.

They hkewise agree to urge upon the signatory Powers
any modifications of the Madrid Convention which may be
made necessary, when the time comes, by the change in the

498

TREATIES

status of foreign-protected persons and mokhalats (" associes

agricoles ").

Article 13.

Any clause of an agreement, convention, treaty, or regu-
lation which may conflict with the foregoing stipulations is
and remains, abrogated.

Article 14.

The present agreement shall be communicated to the
other signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act, and the two
Governments engage to give their mutual support with a
view to obtain the adhesion of those Powers.

Article 15.

The present convention shall be ratified, and the rati-
fications exchanged at Paris as soon as possible.

Done in duplicate at Berlin, the 4th November, 1911.

JULES CAMBON.
KIDERLEN.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Jules Camhon, Ambassador of the French
Republic at Berlin.

(Translation.)

Berlin, November 4, 1911.
My dear Ambassador,

IN order to make quite clear the agreement of the 4th
November, 191 1, respecting Morocco, and to define its mean-
ing, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in
the event of the French Government deeming it necessary to
assume a protectorate over Morocco, the Imperial Government
would place no obstacle in the way.

The adherence of the German Government, accorded in
a general manner to the French Government in the first
article of the said convention, applies of course to all questions

499

TREATIES [November 4,

as are provided for in the Algeciras Act, which require
regulating.

You were good enough to inform me, on the other hand,
that, should Germany wish to acquire from Spain Spanish
Guinea, Corisco Island, and the Elobey Islands, France
would be prepared to waive in Germany's favour the exercise
of her preferential rights which she holds by virtue of the
treaty of the 27th June, 190Q, between France and Spain.
I have pleasure in taking note of this assurance, and in
adding that Germany will not intervene in any special agree-
ments which France and Spain may think fit to conclude with
each other on the subject of Morocco, it being understood
that Morocco comprises all that part of Northern Africa
which is situated between Algeria, French West Africa, and
the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro.

The German Government, while they abstain from asking
that the share to be granted to German industry in the con-
struction of railways shall be fixed in advance, rely on the
readiness of the French Government always to welcome
the association of interests between nationals of both
countries in schemes for which they may respectively obtain a
concession.

They rely likewise on the construction of no other Moorish
railway being put up to public tender before the railway from
Tangier to Fez, in which all the nations are interested, is put
up to public tender, and on the French Government proposing
to the Moorish Government the opening of the port of Agadir
to international commerce.

Finally, when the system of railways of general interest
is planned, the German Government request the French
Government to see that the Moorish administration show a
genuine regard for the economic interests of Morocco, and
that, more particularly, the alignment of the lines of public
interest is such as to facilitate, so far as may be possible,
connections between the mining districts and the lines of
public interest or the ports which form their natural outlet.

Your Excellency was good enough to assure me that
as soon as the judicial system referred to in article 9 of the
above-mentioned convention shall have been introduced, and
the consular courts replaced, the French Government will
ensure that German nationals are placed under the new

500

TREATIES

jurisdiction in exactly the same conditions as French nationals.
I have pleasure in taking note of this assurance, and at the
same time in informing your Excellency that, when this judicial
system is put into force, in agreement with the Powers, the
German Government will consent to the abolition of their
consular courts at the same time as those of the other Powers.
I would add that, in my view, the expression " changes in
the status of protected persons," which is used in article 12
of the convention of the 4th November, 1911, respecting
Morocco, implies the abrogation, if it be thought necessary,
of that part of the Madrid Convention which deals with
protected persons and mokhalats (" associes agricoles").

Finally, being desirous of giving to the said convention
the character of an act destined not only to remove every
cause of conflict between our two countries, but also to
strengthen their good relations, we unite in declaring that any
disputes which may arise between the contracting parties
on the subject of the interpretation and the application of
the stipulations of the convention of the 4th November, and
which shall not have been settled diplomatically, shall be
submitted to a court of arbitration constituted in accordance
with the terms of The Hague Convention of the i8th October,
1907. Terms of Reference shall be drawn up, and the pro-
cedure shall follow the rules laid down in the same convention
so far as^ provision to the contrary has not been made by an
agreement between the parties at the time of going to
arbitration.

DE KIDERLEN.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at
Berlin, to M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.

(Translation.)

Berlin, November 4, 191 1.

My dear Secretary of State,

I HAVE the honour to take note of the declaration which
your Excellency has been good enough to make to me that,
in the event of the French Government deeming it necessary

5°i

TREATIES , [November 4

to assume a protectorate over Morocco, the Imperial Govern-
ment would place no obstacle in the way, and that the
adherence of the German Government, accorded in a general
manner to the French Government in the first article of the
agreement of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco,
applies as a matter of course to all questions which require
regulating provided for in the Algeciras Act.

On the other hand, I have the honour to confirm the state-
ment that, should the German Government wish to acquire
from Spain Spanish Guinea, Corisco Island, and the Elobey
Islands, France is prepared to waive in Germany's favour the
exercise of her preferential rights which she holds by virtue
of the treaty of the 27th June, 1900, between France and
Spain. I am glad, on my part, to receive the assurance that
Germany will not intervene in any special agreements which
France and Spain may think fit to conclude with each other
on the subject of Morocco, it being understood that Morocco
comprises all that part of northern Africa which is situated
between Algeria, French West Africa, and the Spanish Colony
of Rio de Oro.

I have pleasure also in informing you that, while the German
Government abstain from asking that the share to be granted
to German industry in the construction of railways shall be
fixed in advance, the French Government will welcome the
association of interests between nationals of both countries
in schemes for which they may respectively obtain a con-
cession.

You may also rest assured that the construction of no
other Moorish railway will be put up to pubhc tender before
the railway from Tangier to Fez, in which all nations are
interested, is put up to public tender, and that the French
Government will propose to the Moorish Government the
opening of the port of Agadir to international commerce.

Finally, when the system of railways of public interest is
planned, the French Government will see that the Moorish
administration show a genuine regard for the economic
interests of Morocco, and that, more particularly, the align-
ment of the lines of public interest is such as to facilitate, so
far as may be possible, connections between the mining
districts and the lines of public interest or the ports which
form their natural outlet. Your Excellency may likewise

502

TREATIES

rest assured that as soon as the judicial system referred to
in article 9 of the convention of the 4th November, 1911,.
respecting Morocco is introduced, and the consular courts
replaced, the French Government will ensure that German
nationals are placed under the new jurisdiction in exactly
the same conditions as French nationals.

I have, on the other hand, pleasure in taking note of the
statement that when this judicial system is put into force,
in agreement with the Powers, the German Government will
consent to the abohtion of their consular courts at the same
time as those of the other Powers. I take note also of the
statement that, in your Excellency's view, the expression
" changes in the status of protected persons," which is used
in article 12 of the above-mentioned convention, implies the
abrogation, if it be thought necessary, of that part of the
Madrid Convention which deals with protected persons and
mokhalats (" associes agricoles ").

Finally, being desirous of giving to the convention of the
4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco, the character of
an act destined not only to remove every cause of conflict
between our two countries, but also to strengthen their good
relations, we are agreed in declaring that any disputes which
may arise between the contracting parties on the subject of
the interpretation and the application of the stipulations of
the said convention, and which shall not have been settled
diplomatically, shall be s\ibmitted to a court of arbitration
constituted in accordance with the terms of The Hague
Convention of the i8th October, 1907.

Terms of Reference shall be drawn up and the procedure
shall follow the rules laid down in the same convention, so
far as provision to the contrary has not been made, by
an agreement between the parties at the time of going to
arbitration.

JULES CAMBON.

503

TREATIES [July 13,

ANGLO- JAPANESE AGREEMENT.

{Signed at London, July 13, 1911.)

Preamble.

THE Government of Great Britain and the Government
of Japan, having in view the important changes which have
taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-
Japanese Agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing
that a revision of that Agreement responding to such changes
would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed
upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement
above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object
as the said Agreement, namely :

{a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general
peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India ;

(&) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers
in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the
Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for
the commerce and industry of all nations in China ;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High
Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of
India, and the defence of their special interests in the said
regions :—

Article i.

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great
Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to
in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two
Governments will communicate with one another fully and
frankly, and will consider in common the measures which
should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

Article 2.

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action,
wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either

504

TREATIES

High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence
of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the
preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party
will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct
the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement
with it.

Article 3.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them
will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrange-
ments with another Power to the prejudice of the objects
described in the preamble of this Agreement.

Article 4.

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty
of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that
nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting
Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom
such treaty of arbitration is in force.

Article 5.

The conditions tmder which armed assistance shall be
afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances
mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by
which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged
by the Naval and Military authorities of the High Contracting
Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully
and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

Article 6.

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately
after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten
years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should
have notified twelve months before the expiration of the

505

TREATIES [September 5,

said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain
binding until the expiration of one year from the day on
which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have
denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration
arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alUance
shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised by
their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement,
and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 13th day of July, 1911.

E. GREY,

His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

TAKAAKI KATO,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary of His Majesty the Emperor
of Japan at the Court of St. James.

<^' [c/. Y.
160,
where
the date
Sept.
4th is
incor-
rectly
assigned
to the
signature
of the
Declara-
tion.]

DECLARATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, ENGAGING NOT TO
CONCLUDE PEACE SEPARATELY DURING THE
PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR.'"

{Signed at London, September 5, 1914.)

THE Undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their
respective Governments, hereby declare as follows : —

The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually
engage not to conclude peace separately during the present
war.

The three Governments agree that when terms of peace
come to be discussed no one of the allies will demand con-
ditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of
the other allies.

In faith whereof the Undersigned have signed this Declara-
tion and have affixed thereto their seals.

506

1914] TREATIES

Done at London in triplicate,'" this 5th day of September, '"[Japan
XQXA became a

(L.S.) E. GREY, P^f y,*?

His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State claration

for Foreign Affairs. - on Oct 19,

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary of the French RepubUc.

(L.S.) BENCKENDORFF,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary of His Majesty the Emperor
of Russia.

LES Soussignes, dument autorises par leurs Gouverne-
ments respectifs, font la declaration suivante :

Les Gouvernements britannique, frangais et russe s'en-
gagent mutueUement a ne pas conclure de paix separee au
cours de la presente guerre.

Les trois Gouvernements conviennent que lorsqu'U y aura
lieu de discuter les termes de la paix aucune des Puissances
alliees ne pourra poser des conditions de paix sans accord
prealable avec chacun des autres allies.

En foi de quoi les Soussignes ont signe la presente Declara-
tion et y ont appose leurs cachets.

Fait a Londres, en triple original, le 5 septembre, 1914.

(L.S.) E. GREY,

Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Sa
Majesty britannique.

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON,

Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Pleni-
potentiaire de la Republique frangaise.

(L.S.) BENCKENDORFF,

Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Pleni-
potentiaire de Sa Majeste I'Empereur
de Russie.

5P7

1915-]

TREATIES

[October i8,

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS SIGNED AT THE

<"' [For text
of other
Hague Con-
ventions,
see Naval
& Military
vols.]

HAGUE, OCTOBER i8, 1907.

(1)

CONVENTION No. 3.

Relative to the Opening of Hostilities.
Article i. The Contracting Powers recognise that
hostilities between them must not commence without a
previous and exphcit warning, in the form of either a declara-
tion of war, giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional
declaration of war.

2. The existence of a state of war must be notified to the
neutral Powers without delay, and shall not be held to affect
them until after the receipt of a notification, which may,
however, be given by telegraph. Nevertheless, neutral
Powers may not rely on the absence of notification if it be
established beyond doubt that they were in fact aware of the
existence of a state of war.

3. Article i of the present Convention shall take effect
in case of war between two or more of the Contracting Powers.

Article 2 applies as between a belligerent Power which is
a party to the Convention and neutral Powers which are also
parties to the Convention.

(The remaining Articles relate to ratification, procedure,
etc.)

[Convention No. 3 was signed and ratified by, among other
Powers, Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France,
Russia, and Belgium.]

CONVENTION No. 5.

Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
AND Persons in War on Land.

Chapter I.
The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers.

Article i. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys,
whether of munitions of war or of supphes, across the territory
of a neutral Power.

508

1907] TREATIES

3. Belligerents are likewise forbidden to : —

{a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless
telegraphy station or any apparatus for the purpose of
communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea ;

(6) Use any installation of this kind established by
them for purely military purposes on the territory of a
neutral Power before the war, and not previously opened
for the service of public messages.

4. Corps of combatants must not be formed, nor recruiting
agencies opened, on the territory of a neutral Power, to assist
the belligerents.

5. A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred
to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory.

It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of neutrality
nnless such acts have been committed on its own territory.

6. The responsibiUty of a neutral Power is not involved
by the mere fact that persons cross the frontier individually
in order to offer their services to one of the belligerents.

7. A neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or
transit, for either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, or,
in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet.

8. A neutral Power is not bound to forbid or restrict the
use on behalf of belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables,
or of wireless telegraphy apparatus, belonging to it or to
Companies or to private individuals.

9. A neutral Power must apply impartially to the belliger-
ents every restriction or prohibition which it may enact
in regard to the matters referred to in Articles 7 and 8.

The neutral Power shall see that the above obligation is
observed by Companies or private owners of telegraph or
telephone cables or wireless telegraphy apparatus.

10. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force,
attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a
hostile act,

[Convention No. 5 was signed and ratified by, among other
Powers, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Belgium and
Luxemburg.]

509

INDEX

Agadir, see under Morocco.
Agence Havas, I. 320, 383 ; II. 18.
Agiazn, see under Austria-Hungary.
Albert, King of the Belgians :
Addresses to, from House of Commons
and House of Lords, and reply,

II- 475-7-

Appeal to King George V. for support,
August 3, I. 204 ; II. 33 ; read in
the House, I. 401 ; II. 411.

Conversation with Emperor of Ger-
many, November, 1913, I. 284-5.

Speech to the Belgian Chambers,
August 4, II. 473-4.
Alesander, down Prince of Serbia :

Appeal to the Tsar for help, July 24,
I. 459-61 ; reply by Tsar, July 27,
I. 475-5 ; thanks for, July 28,
I. 483 ; reply, I. 483-4.

Delegation of full royal authority to,
June 24, I. 459, footnote.

Manifesto published on declaration of
war by Austria, July 29, I. 484.

Speech from the throne, at opening of
the Skupshtina, I. 484-5.

Threatening letters received from Aus-
tria-Hungary, II. 94.
Algeciras, Conference of, German mem-
orandum, March 19th, 1913, re

need for increased armaments as

shown by, I. 269-70.
Aljinovid, Luka, proceedings against, for

treasonable agitation, II. 209.
AUizd, M., French Minister at Munich :

Communications to M. Pichon and
M. Bienvenu-Martin, I. 275-6, 297,

357-
Instructed to ask for passports and

leave Munich, August 3, I. 404.
Alsace-Lorraine, German military pre-
parations, July 30th, I. 166, 172.

d'Annoville, M., French Charge d'Af-
faires at Luxemburg, communication
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, July 26,

I- 331-2-
Antwerp, see under Belgium.
d'Apchier-Ie-Maugin, M., French Consul-
General at Budapest, communication
to M. Viviani, July 11, I. 288-9.
Asanith, Rt. Hon. Herbert H., M.P.,
Prime Minister :
Address to King of the Belgians

moved by, August 27, II. 475.
Speeches ;

Cardiff, October 2, II. 391, 460-4.
Dublin, September 25, II. 455-9.
Edinburgh, September 18, II. 447-

455-
Guildhall, September 4, II. 439-47 ;

Dr. von Bethmann HoUweg's

statement to Danish Press Bureau

in reply, II. 370-2.
House of Commons, August 4,

II. 38-9, 418-20 ; August 5,

II. 420-1 ; August 6, II. 421-31 ;

comments by Mr. Bonar Law,

II- 431-5-
Atanasijevid, Mika, II. 228.
Auguste Victoria, Empress of Germany,
appeal to the women of Germany,
August 6, II. 483.
Australia, assistance from, Mr. Asquith,

II. 445, 460.
Austria-Hungary :
A Nap, II. 93-

Administration of Bosnia and Herze-
govina under Treaty of Berlin, 1878,
I. 27-8.
Agram :

Attempts against of&cials and trials,
I. 308 ; II. 99, 208, 2o8-g, 214-5.
Anti-Serb riots, I. 28.

INDEX

Austria-Hungary — cont.
Ambassadors, Ministers, etc., of,
IN Foreign Countries :

Belgrade, see Giesl von Gieslingen,
Baron.

Berlin, see Sz6gy6ny, Count.

Brussels, see Clary and Aldringen,
Count.

Constantinople, Consul-General, see
Jehlitschka, Herr.

London, see Mensdorff, Count.

Nish, Consular Agent, see Hoflehner,
Herr.

Paris, see Sz6csen, Count.

St. Petersburg, see Sz4p4ry, Count.

St. Petersburg, Charge d' Affaires, see
Czernin, Count.

Tokio, see Miiller, Freiherr von.

Uskub, Consul-General, see Jehlit-
schka, M.
Ambassadors, Ministers, etc., of
Foreign Countries in :

Belgian, see Dudzeele, Count Errem-
bault de.

British Ambassador, see Bunsen,
Sir M. de.

British Consul, Vienna, see Phill-
potts, Mr.

French, see Dumaine, M.

German, see Tschirschky, Herr
von.

Italian, see d'Avarna, Duke.

Japanese Ambassador :
Communication to Count Berch-

told, August 20, II. 290-1.
Passports being furnished, August
24, II. 293.

Russian, see Schebeko, M.

Russian Charg6 d' Affaires, see Kuda-
chef. Prince.

Russian Consul (acting), Prague, see
Kazansky, M.

Serbian Minister, see Yovanovitch,
M. Yov. M.

United States, see Penfield, F. C.
Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, see

under Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Ayheiter Zeitung, II. 96, 115, 118.
Army :

Assistance expected from Mussul-
man population in Serbia by
Austrian Ambassador at Con-
stantinople, July 29, I. 150.

Employment of troops against
France, see under France.

51Z

Anstria-Hnngary — cont.
Army — cont.

Troops sent to German frontier.

Sir E. Grey, II. 290.
Attitude of :

see also and Serbia below.
considered very Disquieting by M.

Isvolsky, July 29, I. 362.
no Effort made at peaceful settle-
ment, I. 215.
M. B. de I'Escaille on, July 30,

II. 368.
continued Excitement, II. 93.
Fear that no intervention will suc-
ceed, 199.
Government believed to believe

themselves obliged to commence

military action, M. Dumaine, July

26, I. 327.
Herr von Jagow on, I. 306, 359.
Nicholas II. on, August 2, II.

470.
M. Pashitch on, II. 103-4.
Provocative action following Russian

attempts at conciliation, I. 379.
Review of, 6-9.
M. Sazonof's criticism, August, I.

197.
Summary, M. Bienvenu-Martin, July

29, I. 354, 480-1.
Support by German Press, I. 307,

461.
Az Eszt, II. 92.
Ballplatz, attitude of, M. Yov. M.

Yovanovitch, II. 116-7.
AND Belgium :

Austrian declaration of war, August

28, II. 67-8, 292 ; Belgian reply,

August 29, II. 68-70.
Austrian subjects and interests

entrusted to protection of U.S.A.

Minister, II. 68, 292.
alleged Bad treatment of subjects

in Belgium, II. 67, 68 ; denial,

II. 69, 70.
stranded British subjects in, recom-
mended by Sir M. de Bunsen to
Count Berchtold's consideration,
August 13, I. 221.
Council of Ministers, July 13, II.

97-
Croatia :

Provincial Council, attack on mem-
bers of Serb party in, I. 28.
State of siege proclaimed, I. 477.

INDEX

Anstria-Hnngary — cont.

FiuME :

Russian Consul-General, see Salviati,

M.
State of siege proclaimed, I. 477.

and France, see under France.

Fremdenhlatt, I. 215, 220 ; II. 115.

Friedjung trial, I. 308 ; II. 99.

and Germany, see under Germany.

Gold.withdrawal from circulation under
secret instructions, II. 115.

and Great Britain :

Anxiety to know attitude of Great

Britain, I. 199.
Declaration of war, I. 220-1.
Neutrality of Great Britain antici-
pated in, I. 125.

Hague conventions 3 and 5 signed and
ratified by, II. 508, 509.

and Italy, see under Italy.

and Japan, rupture of diplomatic
relations and recall of representa-
tives, August 24, II. 293 ; Baron
Kate on circumstances of, Septem-
ber 5, II. 301-2.

Japanese subjects and interests placed
under protection of U.S.A., and
gratitude expressed to, II. 302-3.

KORRESPONDENZ BUREAU :

Attitude 01, condemned in diplomatic
circles, M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch,

July 15, II. 901-9.
Excitement of public opinion by,

II. 92, 94-5.
Misrepresentations of Serbian Press

by, M. N. Pashitch, July 14, II.

94-5-
Provocative attitude of, II. 10 1.

Literary Bureau of Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, exciting of public opinion
against Serbia by, M. Yov.M. Yovano-
vitch, July 14, II. 96-7.

Manifesto of the Emperor, July 28,
II. 485-6.

Mediation by the Powers, see that
title.

Message from the Emperor to the
Prime Ministers, July 4, II. 483-4.

Military action, importance of Austria
not precipitating, urged on German
Ambassador by Sir E. Grey, I. 96,

97.
I Milit&rische Rundschau quoted, I. 289.
Minister of Finance, see Bilinski, Herr.
Minister for War, see Krobatin, M.
11— 2 K

Anstria-Hnngary — cont.
Mobilisation :

Anticipated, July 28, I. 348,

in Bohemia and Galician frontier, I.

357-8, 358-

Defensive military measures under-
taken in Galicia owing to Russian
mobilisation on frontier, II. 283.

of Eight army corps, not excessive
against 400,000 Serbians, Sir E.
Grey, July 31, I. 176.

Explanation by Count Berchtold to
M. Schebeko, I. 369.

Explanation by Court SzApdry to
M. Sazonof, II. 277-8.

Extent of, July 29, I. 479-80.

Forced by Serbian mobilisation.
Count Berchtold, II. 269.

General :

Declaration of, I. 189, 216, 381,

478.
Rumoured, I. 358.

not necessarily a Hostile act. Count
Forgach, July 31, I. 181.

Ordered, July 26, I. 468.

Particulars, July 28, I. 357-8.

Preparations, II. 115-6.

Reservists called up, I. 477.

a Result of Russian mobilisation and
not a threat. Count Berchtold, I.
163.

Russian general mobilisation or-
dered as result of, and not a sign
of aggressive intentions, I. 160,
192-3. 382-3.

Serious results. Sir E. Grey on pos-
sibility of, and grave danger of
general war, I. 467.

against Serbia not Russia, II. 158.
Moderating Advice to :

Impossibility of, owing to near ex-
piry of time Umit, in opinion of
M. Sazonof and M. Pal^ologue,
July 25, I. 99.

Suggested by M. Bienvenu-Martin.
July 25, I. 98.
Negotiations with, review of, by Sir

M. de Bunsen, I. 214-21.
Neuf Freie Presse, I. 215, 220, 289 ;

II. 97-
Note to Serbia :

Acceptance :
neither Anticipated nor desired in
Austria, I. 34, 102. 120, .121,
215, 289-^0, 290-1, 303, 320.

S13

INDEX

Anstria-Hungary — coni.
Note to Serbia — conf.
Acceptance — coni.
in Entirety, views of the Marquis
di San Giuliano as to, July 27,

I- 135. 341-
Impossibility of entire acceptance :
Prince Alexander, July 24, I.

459-60.
British, French and Russian
representatives at Vienna, II.
118.
M. Paul Cambon, July 24, I.

94, 310.
Herr von Jagow, July 25, I.

loi, 125.
M. Pashitch, July 24, II. 107-8.
Dr. Patchou, July 23, I. 457 ;

II. 107.
Serbian Government, I. 92.
M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, II.
118-9.
Possibility of, if certain explana-
tions given, July 25, I. 138-9.
Revolution in Serbia in case of,

possibility, I. 98-9, 305, 307.
Unconditional, opinion of Italian
Secretary-General that Austria
will only be restrained by,
July 25, I. 102.
Analysis of, M. Bienvenu-Martin,

July 24, I. 300.
Apprehension expressed by Sir E.
Grey as to consequences, I. 32,
73-4. 95. 105. 128 ; II. 192.
Attitude of Count Berchtold, July 24,

I. 91-2.
Attitude of French, British and Rus-
sian representatives re, II. 118-9.
Bavarian President of Council's
knowledge re, and opinion, July
23, I. 297.
Count Berchtold willing to explain
to M. Sazonof various points in,
July 30, II. 279.
believed by British Ambassador to
be drawn up so as to make war
inevitable, I. 34.
M. Boschkovitchon, July 22,1. 295-6.
British attitude towards, I. 31-3,

95.313-
Commentary on, by Count Berchtold,
July 22, to Governments of Ger-
many, Italy, France, England,
Russia and Turkey, II. 188-90.

S«4

Austria-Hungary — conf.
Note to Serbia — cont.

Communication of, to French Minis-
ter by Herr von Schoen, I. 303-5,
461-2.

Communication of, to M. Sazonof,
July 24, I. 458.

Communication re, to Serbian Lega-
tions abroad, by Dr. Laza Patchou,
July 23, II. 107.

Conversation between Sir E. Grey
and Prince Lichnowsky, I. 295.

Conversation between Sir E. Grey
and Count Mensdorii, July 24,
I. 88-9 ; II. 192-3.

Conversation between Count Szdcsen
and M. Bienvenu-Martin, July 24,
I. 300-1 ; II. 193-4-

Criticism by M. Bienvenu-Martin,
July 24, I. 299.

Criticism by Sir E. Grey, July 24,

I. 88-9 ; II. 192-3.

private Criticism of, by Herr von

Jagow and disclaimer of previous

knowledge of, July 25, I. 33,

101.
Criticism by M. Sazonof, I. 89-90,

123, 468 ; II. 195-6, 251-2.
certain Demands would necessitate

alteration of law, M. Sazonof, I.

468.
Desire of M. Sazonof that H.M.

Government would express strong

reprobation of Austro-Hungarian

action, July 24, I. 91.
Discussion of, between Count Szd-

pdry and M. Sazonof, July 24,

II. 195-6.

Disorders among workmen in St.
Petersburg at time of, II. 381.

Effect in Russia, I. 476.

Explanation of, as a demarche with
a time limit, not an ultimatum
and military operations not threat-
ened, I. 98, 312, 315, 323, 464-
5 ; II. 198 ; not received by
French Government, July 25, I.
98.

French attitude, I. 33.

German approval, I. 306, 330-1,
465, 466.

German attitude, I. 33, 109.

pretended German confidence in
friendly settlement, M. de Manne-
ville, July 4, I. 287.

INDEX

Anstria-Hnngary — cont.
Note to Serbia — cont.

German disclaimer of previous know-
ledge of terms, I. 105, 292, 293,
307. 308, 312. 316. 330. 349. 465.
466 ; truth of, doubted, I. 309, 311,

356.

German summary of, II. 125-6.

Information requested by M. Berthe-
lot as to whether note an ulti-
matum, but no direct reply given,

I. 462.

Italy and, see under Italy.
Kudachef, Prince, attitude re, July

24, I. 91-
Moderation of demands :

British influence for, hoped for,

M. Pashitch, July 24, II. 108.

Proposal by M. Sazonof re, July

26, I. 326.
Request of Serbian Prime Minister
that H.M. Government would
use influence to obtain, July 24,
I. 92.
Peaceful result alleged by Baron

Macchio to be possible, I. 296.
Presentation of, July 23, I. 457.
Regarded as challenge to Russia,

II. 120-1.

Representatives of foreign countries
(except Germany) kept in ignor-
ance as to nature of, etc., before-
hand, I. 214-5 ; II. 117-8.
Russian attitude, I. 33, 294, 297.
Russian request for information as
to data on which demands based,
I. 106.
Serbian attitude, I. 294, 296 ; II. 16.
Serbian reply :

Admitted by Count Mensdorfi to
appear satisfactory on paper,
July 27, I. 127.
Advice by Cabinets of London,
Paris, and St. Petersburg, I. 29,
33. 96, 96-7. 302. 312-3 ; II-
194.
Approval by M. Sazonof, July 27,

I. 472.
Austrian attitude :

Opinion of German Government
re, in advice given to Austria,
I. 145.
Reply considered unsatisfactory
in Vienna and energetic action
to be taken, I. 108, 474.

Anstria-Hungary — cont.
Note to Serbia — cont.
Serbian reply — cont.

Austrian attitude — cont.

Statement by Count Mensdorff
and reply by Sir E. Grey, July
27, I. 126-8.
Views of the Marquis di San
Giuliano, July 27, I. 135.

Austrian of&cial explanation pub-
lished of grounds on which
reply considered inadequate and
criticism of, by Italian Minister
for Foreign Afiairs, I. 139.

Austrian comments on, and justi-
fication of coercive measures,
Government memorandum, July
27, 28, I. 344-6.

Communication of, to M. Sazonof
by M. de Strandtman, July 25,
I. 463, received July 27 (de-
, layed in transmission).

Concessions only apparent and
intended to deceive Europe,
Herr von Tschirschky, Count
Berchtold, I. 34, 109 ; II.
269.

Conciliatory influences must have
been exercised at Belgrade by
Russia, Sir E. Grey, July 27,
I. 125, 477.

Consideration of, and moderating
influence at Vienna urged on
German Ambassador by Sir E.
Grey, I. 125, 477.

Criticism of, by Count Berchtold,
July 28, I. 160.

Criticism by M. Sazonof, II. 269-
70.

Discussion on basis of :

Advocated, Sir E. Grey, July 27,

II- 399-

Austrian refusal to accept,

I. 137, 150, 217, 352-3 ;

II. 269-70, 272, 274-5.
Austrian wilUngness :

and Proposal by M. Sazonof
that pourparlers should take
place in London, I. 384-5,
386.

Question as to genuineness
of, or object of throwing
responsibility on Russia,
M. Jules Cambon, Aug. 1, 1.
386.

SIS

INDEX

Austria-Hungary — cont.
Note to Serbia — cont.
Serbian reply — cont.
Discussion on basis of — cont.

German Government should
urge. Sir E. Grey, July 27,
I. 123.
German suggestions, II. 130.
Germany appealed to by Sir E.
Grey to induce Austria to
accept, II. 274.
Impossibility, I. 145, 153,

163.
Opinion of Herr von Jagow,

July 29, I. 359-
Russian suggestion and Austrian

refusal, II. 269-70.
Urged by German Government,
I. 140.
Forecast of, by M. Yov. M. Yo-

vanovitch, I. 303.
German attitude, I. 34, no, 138,

145 ; II. 126.
Intentional delay of telegram from
Belgrade to M. Isvolsky an-
nouncing, I. 473.
Opinion of M. de Margerie, that
good impression should be pro-
duced by, July 26, I. 469.
Public delight in Vienna, etc., at
rejection of, and popularity of
war, I. 215-6.
not yet Read by Herr von Jagow,

July 26, I. 343.
Refusal to accept Serbia's sub-
mission or to accept conversa-
tion with the Powers, and
consequent seriousness of situa-
tion, I. 333.
should Satisfy Austria if not
desirous of war, British Charge
d'Affaires, Serbia, II. 16—

17-
Suggestion by Prince Lichnowsky

re nature of, I. 96.

brief Summary of projected reply,
July 25, 102-3.

Summary communicated to repre-
sentatives of Allied Govern-
ments at Belgrade, July 25, II.
108-9.

Summary, delay in receipt of, in
France, I. 327.

Summary of, by M. Boppe, July
25. I- 319-
516

Austria-Hungary — cont.
Note to Serbia — cont.
Serbian reply — cont.

Summary communicated to Ger-
man Ambassador in London,
and hope expressed that German
Government will influence
Austrian Government to give
favourable reception to, July

25, I. 34, 106-7.

Count SzApary's attitude, July

26, I. 134.

Text, I. 112-116; translation, I.
116-120.

Text of, with Austrian comments,
II. 140-8, 254-66.

Text, Herr von Schoen ignorant of,
and criticism of, as in papers,
July 26, I. 331.

Text transmitted to M. Davignon,
July 25, II. 16.

Text not published by Wolff Bureau
or in local Berlin papers, July
28, I. 478.

Time of delivery, II. no, 126, 245,
250, 269, 270, 275.
Summary of demands. Consular re-
port, July 20, I. 290.
Text, I, 74-85 ; II. 136-140.
Text communicated to M. Davignon,

July 24, II. 13.
Time limit :

Apprehension expressed by Sir
E. Grey at insertion of, I. 32,
73-4, 88-9 ; II. 192.

Expiry, diplomatic relations to be
broken off, and military pre-
parations commenced, not mili-
tary operations, I. 104.

Extension :

British efforts to obtain, I. 33,

96, 97. 315. 324. 464-
French efforts to obtain, I. 315,

464.
German Ambassador at Vienna
instructed to pass on sugges-
tion for, but success doubted,
July 25, I. 33, loo-i, 316,

463-4-
German attitude re request for,

I- 323-
Instructions to Italian Ambas-
sador to support request re-
ceived too late, I. 121.

INDEX

Anstria-Hungary — cont.
Note to Serbia — cont.
Time limit — cont.
Extension — cont.

Instructions not received by
French Ambassador until time
of expiry, July 25, I. 321, 324.
Opinion of Sir G. Buchanan that
influence should be brought
to beajr with view to, July 24,
I. 90.
Refusal by Austria and reason,
I. 322, 463 ; II. 177, 243,

243-4-
Request by Russian Charg6
d' Affaires and evasion by
Government, July 25, 1. 318-9,
462-3.
Russian Ambassador at Vienna
not to press for, July 26,
I. 121.
Russian efforts to obtain, I. 33,
35. 97' 105-6, 314, 314-5.
315. 316, 317, 318, 318-9,
458 ; II. 120, 243.
Suggestion not considered prac-
ticable by M. Pal6ologue,
I. 90.
Hour fixed for reply, I. 85, 300,

310.
Short time limit, need for. Count

Berchtold, July 23, II. 191.
Shortness of :

Criticised, M. J. Cambon* July

24, I. 307-
Exercise of moderating influence
made difficult by, M. Pal^o-
logue, July 24, I. 308.
Sir E. Grey helpless as regards
influencing of Russia owing to,
July 24, I. 32-3, 95.
Transmission of, to Dr. Laza Patchou,

July 23, II. 106.
Warning to Count Sz6csen of pain-
ful impression that will be aroused
by, July 24, I. 301.
"Willingness of Serbian Government
to entertain, if only judicial co-
operation in punishment and pre-
vention of poUtical crimes asked
for, Serbian representaJtive at
BerUn, July 20, I. 291 .
Official circles' ostensibly peaceful state-
ments, no reliance to be placed on,
M. Boschkovitch, July Jf, II. 100.

Austria-Hungary — cont.
Position in, M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch,

July 15, II. 97-8-
Press :

Analysis of articles in, on Serajevo
outrage, M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch,
July 6, II. 91-3-
Attitude of, M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch, II. 115.
Attitude of, condemned in diplo-
matic circles, M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch, July 15, II. 98-9-
False reports spread by, in order
to excite public opinion, - against
Serbia, nature of, and denial,
M. N. Pashitch, II. 95-6, 101-2,
104.
French intervention not anticipated,

I. 289.
alleged Italian approval of note
and assurance of support, denial
by Marquis di San Giuliano,
July 27, I. 341.
Language used pointing to war

with Serbia, I. 215.
Non-pubUcation of news of partial

Russian mobilisation, I. 369.
Provocative attitude of, criticism

by M. Sazonof, II. loi.
anti-Serbian campaign and mis-
representations, I. 291 ; II. 83,
87, 88, 103.
anti-Serbian campaign :

Conversation between Baron
Macchio and M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch fe, II. 89-90.
Denial of charges and steps to
be taken to stop, M. N. Pashitch,
July I, II. 86-7.
Instigators of, II. 88.
Prime Minister, see Stiirgkh, Count.
Reichpost, II. 88.

Representatives of foreign Powers in,
misleading information given to,
»-e forthcoming Austrian action, II.
116-8.
Responsibility of :

Sir E. Goschen on, I. 142, 3S0.
M. Ren6 Viviani on, August i,
I. 391.
and Russia, see under Russia.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

see Berchtold, Count.
Seizure of Salonica Railway intended
by, I. 102.

S17

INDEX

Austria-Hungary — cont.
and Serajevo outrage, alternative
courses that Austria may take,
M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, II. 93-4,

99-
AND Serbia :

Accusations against Serbia will not
obtain credence, M. Sazonof, II.
91.
Aggressive intentions of Govern-
ment, but moderating of, I. 293-4,
296.
Anti-Serbian feeling after Serajevo

murders, I. 28.
Assurance of good conduct to Aus-
tria :
Alleged Failure to keep, I. 73, 75,
82, 93, 304 ; II. 149, 175-6,
188-9.
Obligations given not to Austria
but to the Powers, I. 99, 133 ;
II. 197.
Attack on Serbia :

probable Abandonment of Bel-
grade, withdrawal to interior
and appeal to Powers for help,
I. 99.
Impossibility of averting war,

I. 143, 196-7.
Invasion of Serbia, European war
would follow, statement by
Sir E. Grey, July' 27, I. 337.
Russia cannot remain indifferent,

I. 121, 308.
Russian order for mobilisation
against Austria would follow,

I. 143.

Austria aware of possibility of

collision with Russia, Count Berch-

told, II. 245.
anti-Austrian propaganda, see under

Serbia.
Austrian attitude and action re :

Apprehension re, M. Pashitch,
July 19, II. 103-4, 104-5-

Austrian explanation and justi-
fication of, II. 127, 175.

Count Berchtold on, II. 152, 189-
90, 198-9, 245-8, 270, 281.

Communication from Dr. von
Bethmann HoUweg to Govern-
ment of Germany, July 28,

II. 150-2.

Country enthusiastic for war, I.
121 ; II. 106, 118.
5»8

Anstria-Hnngary — cont.
AND Serbia — cont.

Austrian attitude and action re — cont.

Criticism by diplomatic circles,

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, July

15, II. 98-9.

Determination on miUtary action,

I. loi, 108, 217, 319, 327, 345,
348, 360-1, 488.

Explanation to Sir E. Grey,
Count Mensdorfi, I. 126-8, 158 ;.

II. 267.

Explanation by Count Szdpdry,

II. 251-2.
Emperor Francis Joseph on, July

28, II. 485-6.
German attitude and support, I.

92-3, 303-4. 343. 438-9; n.

120, 125, 151-2, 194, 197, 246.
growing Hostility to Serbia owing
to tone of Serbian Press, II.

91.
Humiliation of Serbia will probably
be sought, M. Boschkovitch,
July 17, II. loo-i.
Note from Dr. von Bethmann
HoUweg communicated to Gov-
ernments of France, England
and Russia, July 23, I. 92-3,
303-5, 461-2 ; II. 148-9.
Russian attitude, July 30, 1. 162-3.
British attitude, explanation by

Sir E. Grey, July 28, II. 271-3.
British interests only indirectly con-
cerned, but concerned with ques-
tion of peace of Europe, I. 88,
88-9, 90, 95, 104-5, 466; II.
398.
Conviction of Government of neces-
sity for scoring definite success,
against Serbia, gravity of situation
owing to, in opinion of the Marquis
di San Giuliano, July 23, I. iii.
Declaration of war, July 28, I. 35 ;
II. 17, 111-2, 127.
Announcement of, to M. Sazonof,

July 28, II. 112.

Communication of, by M. Pashitch

to Legations abroad, July 28,

II. 112.

Sir E. Grey informed of, by Sir

M. de Bunsen, July 28^ I. 144.

Manifesto published by Prince

Alexander on, July 29, I. 484.
Text of, I. 129.

INDEX

Anstria-Hnngary — cont.
AND Serbia — cont.

Diplomatic relations, rupture of,

I. 324, 327 ; II. 245 :
Announcement of, July 25, II. 109,

no, IIO-l.
Announcement by Count Berch-
told to Ambassadors abroad,
July 26, II. 250-1.
Communication by Austro-Hun-
garian Legation at Brussels
to M. Davignon, July 26, II. 16.
Diplomatic steps to be taken at
Belgrade when Serajevo enquiry
completed, M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch, II. 98.
a European affair :

M. Sazonof, July 24, II. 197.
Dr. Spalaikovitch, II. 108.
Forecast of Austrian action, M. Yov.
M. Yovanovitch, July 15, II. 99-
100. '
Good relations :

Desire for, Herr Jehlitschka, II.

85-
Serbian desire for, II. 84-5, 85,
105.

Guarantees for future relations neces-
sary, I. 152, 159 ; II. 176, 192.

Hostilities opened by Serbia on
Hungarian frontier, July 27, II.
270, 272.

Independence of Serbia, no assurance
given by Herr von Schoen, I. 136.

Intention to act in conformity with
Hague Conventions and Declara-
tion of London if same procedure
adopted by Serbia, July 28, I.
129.

Interference would not be accepted
by Austria, Count Pourtalds,
July 24, II. 197.

Involving of Russia, depression
caused by prospect of, II. 121.

Irrevocable steps possible unless
mediation immediately under-
taken, I. 162.

Italian public opinion re, II. loi.

Herr von Jagow's attitude, July 22,
I. 72.

Localisation of conflict :

Anticipated in Austria-Hungary,

II. 119-20.

Anticipated at Constantinople, I.
336-7-

Austria-Hungary — cont.
AND Serbia — cont.

Localisation of conflict — cont.

Anticipated by Germany and
refusal by Herr von Jagow to
believe in possibility of exten-
sion to Europe, July 25, I. 317.

Assistance of Great Britain in,
counted on by Austrian Govern-
ment, July 27, I. 127.

Austrian insistence on, II. 177.

probably Counted on by Austria,
I. 476.

Desired by Count Berchtold, July
24, II. 119.

Desired by Count Berchtold and
diplomats, but possibility 'of
European conflict considered by
military circles. Consular report,
July 20, I. 291.

Desired by Germany and French
support relied on, II. 276.

French attitude, II. 194.

French and English action in
direction of, promised, but
failure of, II. 127.

German desire and efforts for,

I- 33. 72. 92. 304-5. 307. 312,
332, 462, 465 ; II. 108, 127,
129-30, 154, 156, 194 ; Dr.
von Bethmann HoUweg on,
August 4, I. 354.

Sir E. Grey requested by Prince
Lichnowsky to use influence
in St. Petersburg for, July 27,
I. 125, 477.

Gravity of position in event of
failure of, urged on Prince
Lichnowsky by Sir E. Grey,
I. 125.

Impossibility, as Russia not pre-
pared to give way, I. 134.

Insistence by Germany on ques-
tion being a local one, I. 354,
480.

considered Possible by Herr von
Jagow, July 25, I. loi.
Mediation by the Powers, see that

title.
Military preparations being made

by Austria, M. Yov. M. Yovano-
vitch, July 20, II. 106.
Note, see that title above.
Obscurity of intentions of Austrian

Government, up to July 23, I. 29.

519

INDEX

Aastiia-Hungary — cont.
AND Serbia — cont.

Occupation of the Sanjak, possi-
bility of, Mr. Beaumont, July 29,
I. 150 ; denial, I. 194-5, 3^4'
391-

Official quiet, hostility to Serbia
considered by M. Boschkovitch to
be concealed by, July 22, I. 295.

Operations against Serbia, mediation
by H.M. Government with view
to suspension, importance of, July
28, I. 141.

Peaceful settlement, possibility of
but for action taken by Germany,
in opinion of Sir M. de Bunsen,
I. 218-9.

Possibility of Russia being involved
and general war realised by
Germany, II. 125.

Proposal to place matter before
Hague Conference, Emperor
Nicholas, July 29, I. 443.

Publication of case against Serbia
before taking action, assumed,
July 20, I. 30, 71.

Readiness to discuss grounds of
grievances against Serbia, accord-
ing to Count Sz6csen, July 31, I.
490.

Review of events by M. Sazonof,
August 2, I. 493-6.

Russia to restrain Serbia as long as
possible, July 27, 1914, I. 134.

Russia unable to remain indifierent,
I. 462; II. 119, 120-1, 127,
152, 196, 277, 280-1, 381.

Russian attitude, German criticism
of, II, 151.

Search for instigators of murder on
Serbian territory, warning by M.
Sazonof that Russian Government
would not tolerate, July 6, I.
287-8.

Secrecy as to intentions of Austrian
Government, II. 97, 106, 116.

Serbia to be accused of tolerating
revolutionary elements, M. Yov.
M. Yovanovitch, July 15, II. 98.

if Serbia gave way after expiry of
time limit under pressure of
miUtiry preparations, Austrian
expenses would have to be made
good. Count Berchtold, II. 198,
243-
320

Austria-Hungary — cont.
AND Serbia — cont.
Serbian attitude :

Count Berchtold, July 26, II.

250.
Freiherr von Giesl, July 21, II.

185-7-
M. Pashitch, II. 103.
anti-Serbian policy not approved
by German Foreign Office, M.
Yov. M. Yovanovitch, July 15, II.

99-
anti-Serbian propaganda by lower

Catholic circles, Vienna Press and

military circles, M. Yov. M.

Yovanovitch, July i, II. 87.
Skirmish on the Danube, I. 134.
Summary of stages in, M. Ren6

Viviani, August 4, I. 421-5.
Suspension of military operations
after occupation of Belgrade
and adjoining territories :

French support of suggestion
requested, I. 170.

Possibility of mediation and
general suspension of further
military preparations, July 30,
I. 169 ; II. 359-
Territorial acquisitions and violation
of integrity :

Assurances against any intention
of, I. loi, 127, 136, 138, 145,
157. 158. 164. 194-5. 328, 335,
354-5. 368, 384. 391. 470. 473.
488; II. 127, 128, 151, 152,
154. 155. 177. 180, 199, 277.

Binding engagement to Europe
against, and against desire to
destroy independence, Russia
might be induced to remain
quiet in opinion of Duke
d'Avarna, but declaration not
probable, I. 149.

Denial by M. Isvolsky that Rus-
sia had received declaration
in silence, I. 491.

Formal declaration not accepted
by Russia as satisfactory, II.
284.

Russia would have no right to
intervene. Count Berchtold,
July 28, I. 217.
Territorial integrity and rights as

sovereign State must be respected,

M. Sazonof, July 27, I. 133.

tJ^DEX

Austria-Hungary— cowi.

AND Serbia — cont.

no Territorial acquisitions aimed at
so long as war reiiiains localised,
Count Berchtold, July 27, II.
252. ''

Threatening letters received by-
Crown Prince Alexander, II. 94.
Vassalage to Austria :

Possibility of, even if left nomin-
ally indei)endeiit, Sir E. Grey,
July 29, I. 158.
Russia would not tolerate, M.
Sazonof, July 29, I. 164 ; II.
277.
Waj, impossibility of avoiding, I.

137, 149, 163; II. 119, 187-8.
Willingness to meet reasonable
demands of Austria, but not to
abandon certain political ideals, I.
107.
Serbian papers prohibited from enter-
ing, II. 95.
Seriousness of situation unless Germany

able to restrain, July 25, I. 100.
Slavonia, state of siege proclaimed, I.

477-
Southern Slav inhabitants. Government
action probably precipitated by im-
minence of general insurrection
among, in opinion of Duke d'Avarna,
I. 361.
Subjects in Serbia, see under Serbia.
Telegraph office, intentional delay of

diplomatic telegrams in, I. 473.
Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign
Affairs, see Forgach, Count, and
Macchio, Baron.
Vienna :
Bourse :
Depression on, July 14, II. 97.
Recovered, July 15, II. 98.
Unsettled condition, II. 115.
British Embassy, testimony to staff

of, by Sir M. de Bunsen, I. 222.
Jlussian Embassy, attempted hostUe

manifestations against, I. 215.
Serbian Legation :

Hoisting of flag at half-mast,
July 2, and Austrian protests,
II. 88.
Hostile demonstrations before,

June 30, July 2, II. 87, 88.
Police supervision from June 30,
II. 114.

Austria-Hungary — cont.
'ViETsiiA—cont.
Serbian Leg|atidn— com/.

Telegraphic communication with
Serbia, interfered with, II.

"4-5-
Threatened by mobs after Serajevo
murders, I. 28.
Die Zeit, 11. 96, 115, 118.
d'Avarna, Duke, Italian Ambassador
at Vienna, ignorance beforehand of
forthCoining Austrian note, I. 214-5.
Balkan Crises, British efforts for peace,
and success. Sir E. Grey, August 3,
II. 400,
Balkan War, German memorandum,
March 19, 1913, re need for increased
armaments as shown by, I. 270.
Balkans, Bussian Policy :
Austrian criticism, II. 179-80.
German view of, II. 124-5.
Baltic Sea, note of Conference on Russo-
EngUsh naval agreement re operations
in, II. 378-80.
Barnardiston, Lieut.-Colonel :
Alleged drawing up of plan by, 1906,
with chief of the Belgian General
Staff, for joint operations against
Germany, II. 314, 315, 319, 329;
British reply, II. 318, 330; com-
ments by M. J. Van den Heuvel,
II. 342-3 ; official Belgian reply, II.
350-2.
Report on conversation with chief of
the Belgian General Staff, April,
1906, II. 331-9.
Barrfere, M., French Ambassador at
Rome :
Communications ,:
from M. Bienvenu-Martin and M.
Ren6 Viviani, I. 292-3, 296-7,
302, 302-5, 310-1, 322-4, 327-8!
344-5. 348-9. 354-6, 361, 362, 377
-9, 380, 384-5, 388-9, 395-6,
404.
to M. Bienvenu-Martin and M. Rend
Viviani, 318, 324-5, 341, 354,
363-4, 387-8.
Conversations :

M. Salandra, July 26, I. 324.
Marquis di San Giuhano, I. 293,
328, 341, 363-4, 387-8.
Basle, see under Switzerland.
Bassompierre, U. de, II. 24.

521

INDEX

Bavaria :

Infantry regiments, Metz, recall of
non-commissioned officers and men
on leave, July 28, I. 357.

Opinion re new armaments, 1913, I.
275-6.

Optimism in Press and pessimism in
official circles, I. 297.

President of Council, knowledge of
contents of Austrian note, and
opinion re, July 23, I. 297.
Beaumont, Mr., British Charg6 d'Affaires
at Constantinople :

Conversation with Austrian Ambas-
sador, I. 1 50-1.

Telegram to Sir E. Grey, July 29, I.
150-1.
Belgian Colonies, French protection

extends to, M. Poincar6, II. 55.
Belgian Congo :

Governor, instructed to maintain
strictly defensive attitude, II. 54,

54-5-
Lukuga, port of, German attack on,
August 22, II. 66.
Belginm :
Anglo - Belgian relations, documents
published by the Foreign Office,
II. 326-50.
Antwerp :

British fleet to ensure free passage
of the Scheldt for provisioning of,
II. 47.
Grain cargoes addressed to Germany
detained at :
Correspondence between M. Davig-
non and Herr von Below
Saleske, July 31, August i, 3,
II. 71-3.
Explanation of circumstances, M.
Davignon, August 17, II. 70-1.
Army, placing of, on strengthened

peace footing, July 29, II. 17.
Attitude of, speech by King Albert,

August 4, II. 473-4.
Austrian subjects and interests en-
trusted to U.S.A. Minister, II. 68,
292.
Austrian and Hungarian nationals,
alleged bad treatment of, August
28, II. 67, 68 ; denial, August 29,
II. 69, 70.
Austro-Hungarian declaration of war
against, II. 67-8, 292 ; Belgian
reply, August 29, II. 68-70.
522

Belgium — cont.
British secret military handbooks on
roads and rivers, article in North
German Gazette, December 2, II.
322-5.
Brussels :

British espionage in, extract from
the North German Gazette, Nov-
ember 6, II. 321.
German Legation, custody entrusted
to care of United States Minister,
August 4, II. 37.
Congo Conventional Basin, proposed
neutralisation, August 7, II. 54,

54-5-
French offer of five army corps to,

and reply, August 3, I. 203.
German interests, U.S.A. to take

charge of, II. 62.
Germany and :

Annexation of territory, assurance
against, by Herr von Jagow,
August 4, I. 206.
Anxiety as to German attitude, I.

356.
Attitude, 1913, in event of European

war, I. 272.
German mistake as to Belgian atti-
tude, Mr. Asquith, September 25,

II- 456-7-

Hostile acts alleged by German
Government, July 31, I. 186;
reply and explanation, August 17,
II. 70-1.

Interests in Germany, custody under-
taken by Spain and Ambassador
instructed, II. 37, 46 ; thanks
communicated, II. 47.

Ultimatum, August 2, I. 399 ; M,

Jules Cambon instructed to protest

against, in writing, August 3, I.

404.

Great Britain's attitude. Dr. von

Bethmann HoUweg's statement to

the Danish Press Bureau, II. 370-2.
LifeGE :

Defence of, Mr. Asquith on, II. 476.

Fall of, II. 56, 59.

Summoned to surrender but Ger-
mans repulsed, August 4, I. 206.
Luxemburg Charge d'Affaires, not to

be requested to leave, II. 62.
Minister for the Colonies, see Renkin, M.
Minister for Foreign Affairs, see Davig-
non, M.

INDEX

Belgiam — coni.
Minister of State, see Van den Heuvel,

M. J.
Mobilisation :

Explanation of measures. Baron

van der Elst, July 31, II. 20.
Explanation of speed at which
decision made, M. Davignon, July
31, II. 19.
Ordered for August i, II. 18.
Moniteur Beige, II. 71-2.
Neutrality :

Anglo-Belgian scheme, 1906, for
despatch of expeditionary corps
to Belgium in event of Franco-
German war and French con-
nivance, German charges of,
II. 314-26.
Belgian official statement in reply,
II. 350-2 ; German comments,
II. 318-^.
Dr. von Bethmann HoUweg on,
II. 385 ; reply by Sir E. Grey,
II. 388-92.
British reply, October 14, II.
329-30 ; German comments, II.
318-9.
Foreign Office reply, November 9,

II- 347-9-
Investigation into, and refutation,

I. 20-3.

Reply to, by M. J. Van den Heuvel,

II. 341-7.

Appeal to Great Britain, France and
Russia for co-operation, I. 405 ;
II. 43, 44-5, 421 ; willingness of
Governments to co-operate, II. 47,
48.

Appeal to French to co-operate with
troops, II. 421.

Appeal by King for British diplo-
matic intervention to safeguard,
August 3, I. 204 ; II. 33 ; read
in the House, I. 401 ; II.
411.

Assumption by Sir E. Grey that
Belgium will do utmost to main-
tain, and assistance to be given,
I. 180, 205 ; II. 40.

British attitude, I. 167, 183, 202,
390. 397. 401 ; German Chancel-
lor's criticism, August 4, I. 209-
10.

British attitude in 1870, II. 384,
408-9, 449-50,

Belgium — cont.
Neutralitx — cont.

British offer of help cancelled for time
being in consequence of ultimatum
to Germany, II. 43, 44-5.
British plans for violation of. Com-
munication from Sir E. Grey tff
Sir F. Villiers, April 7, 1913, re
report of, II. 327-8.
British ultimatum to Germany,
August 4, I. 207, 405 ; II. 39,
42-3, 285.
alleged British and French plans for
violation, official reply, II. 349-5°-
Course of events as regards relations
of Belgium with guaranteeing
Powers, II. 40-2.
Declaration by Government of in-
tention to defend, and steps being
taken, I. 37, 189, 356, 399, 405 ;
II. 19, 22, 29, 31, 41, 43-4, 45,
45-6, 410-1, 421.
Determination to maintain, instruc-
tions for eventual presentation
of note to guaranteeing Powers
and terms of note, July 24, II.
13-5 ; note to hs presented,
August I, II. 23.
French declaration to observe, I. 37,
188, 383, 387 ; II. 18, 22, 41. 410.
French offer of support if requested,

II. 32, 42.
French violation :

Alleged intention of, I. 206 ; II.

24-5, 26, 27.
M. Jules Cambon instructed to
protest against allegation of
projected invasion, in writing,
August 3, I. 404.
by Military aviators :
Alleged, I. 402, 426.
Denial, I. 403, 427.
Protest by Herr von Jagow, and
reply by M. Cambon, I. 406-7.
alleged Preparations for operations
in districts of Givet and Namur,
August 2, I. 399.
German attitude :

Mr. Asquith on, August 6, II.

424-5-

Belgian belief that attitude would
be same as that of French, II. 18.

Belgian desire for formal declara-
tion, but no instructions received
by Herr von Below, II. 24.

INDEX

Belgium — cont.
Neutrality — cont.

German attitude — cont.

Herr von Below on, July 31,

II. 20-1.
Herr von Heeringen on, 1913,

II. 21.
Inquiry by Sir E. Goschen and
refusal of Herr von Jagow to
reply, II. 22.
Herr von Jagow on, 1913, II. 20-1,
21.
German attitude in 1870, II. 408.
German charge against Great Britain
of having long intended to violate,
investigation and refutation, I.
20-1.
German promise of, refusal by Sir
E. Grey to promise neutrality of
Great Britain in return for, I. 167,
- 187, 401 ; II. 436.
German proposal fe friendly neu-
trality and free passage, August 2,
and Belgian reply, August 3,
I. 204, 426 ; II. 25, 26-7, 27-8,
29-31, 41-2, 411, 417-8:
Carrying out of proposals by force
threatened, August 4, I. 205,
207 ; II. 34.
Communicated to representatives

abroad, August 3, II. 31-2.
Renewal of proposal, II. 56-9 :
Communication of, and of pro-
posed reply to British, Rus-
sian and French representa-
tives, August 10, II. 60.
Meaning of word " Auseinander-
setzung " to be ascertained
from German Government,
August 10, II. 60 ; explana-
tion, II. 63.
Receipt acknowledged by Bel-
gian Government, August 10,
II. 59.
proposed Reply approved by
British and French Govern-
ments, August II, II. 63.
Reply, August 12, II. 64; com-
municated to M. Loudon, and
to be forwarded to German
Minister, II. 65.
Russian thanks for communica-
tion re, and congratulations
on Belgian attitude, August
13, II. 64.

524

Belgium — cont.
Neutrality — cont.

German refusal to promise, and

reason, I. 36, 152, 186, 207-9,

387; II. 390-1, 410.
German violation :

Announced by German Minister
at The Hague, and explanation,
August 3, I. 398.

Announcement by Belgian Gov-
ernment to British, French and
Russian Ministers, August 4,
II. 43, 420-1.

Mr. Asquith on, September 25,
II. 458.

Assurance to be asked from Gov-
ernment against. Sir E. Grey,
August 4, I. 204.

Belgian Government informed of
necessity for, August 4, 1. 405-6.

Belgian protest and intention to
defend, announcement to coun-
tries having diplomatic relations
with Belgium, August 5, II.

45-6.

Belgium expected by British Gov-
ernment to resist, II. 34-5.

Dr. von Bethmann HoUweg on,

I. 209; II. 38, 356-7, 371.
British obligation in event of.

Sir E. Grey, August 3, II. 414.
Communicated by Sir F. ViUiers,

August 4, I. 206.
Communication to the Press by

Prince. Lichnowsky ye, I. 401.
possible Consequences, Sir E. Grey,

August 3, II. 412-3.
Effect on public opinion in Great

Britain, statement by Sir E.

Grey, July 31, I. 186-7.
Explanations, I. 206, 207-8, 398 ;

II- 39, 56- 57-
at Gemmenich, announcement, I.

207, 404 ; II. 36.
Great Britain prepared to join

Russia and France to assist

Belgium, I. 205 ; II. 35.
Sir E. Grey on, March 22, 1915,

II. 466.

no Intention of. Dr. von Beth-
mann HoUweg, 191 1, II. 20.

Public declaration against, refusal
by Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg,
1911, II. 20.

Threatened, I. 36-7.

INDEX

Belgium — cont.
Neutrality — cont.

German violation — cont.

War with Germany would result.
Sir E. Grey, II. 33.
Germany not to violate territorial
integrity and independence of,
while Great Britain remains neu-
tral. Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg,
August 4, II. 357.
Guarantee of the Powers, appeal not
to be made to, at present, August
3, I. 203, 400 ; II. 32, 42.
Inquiries by Sir E. Grey whether
France and Germany will en-
gage to respect, July 31, I. 37,
179 ; II. 19, 22, 410 :
Information to Belgium of, July

31, I- 179-

German reply awaited, II. 22, 41.
Safeguarding of, by international

treaties, 1839, I. 36.
" Scrap of paper," explanation by

Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, II.

382-5 ; reply by Sir E. Grey,

II. 388-92.
Treaty between Great Britain, Aus-
tria, France, Prussia and Russia,

and Belgium, 1839, extracts, II.

487.
Treaty between Her Majesty and

the King of Prussia, 1870, II.

488-g.
Refusal to allow German troops free

passage, I. 399.
Representatives of, in Foreign

Countries :
Belgrade, see Welle, M. Michotte de.
Berlin, see Beyens, Baron.
Berlin, 191 1, see Greindl, Baron.
Paris, see Guillaume, BaJPn.
Luxemburg, see Jehay, Count van

den Steen de.
Holland, see Fallon, Baron.
London, see Lalaing, Count de.
Madrid, see Grenier, Baron.
Russia, see under Russia.
Vienna, see Dudzeele, Count Errem-

bault de.
Representatives of Foreign Coun-
tries in :
Austro-Hungarian Minister, see Clary

and Aldringen, Count.
British, see VilUers, Hon. Sir Francis

Hyde.

Belgium — cont.
Representatives of Foreign Coun-
tries IN — cont.
French, see Klobukowski, M.
German, see Below Saleske, Herr

von.
Netherlands Minister, see Weede,

Jonkheer de.
Russian, communication from M.

Davignon, II. 43, 60.
U.S.A. Minister, see Whitlock, Brand.
Staatscourant, 48.

U.S.A. Minister, Brussels, refusal to
convey certain information to M.
Davignon, II. 56, 57.
Vice-Gk>vernor of the Katanga, see

Tombeur, M.
" Wandelaar " and " Wielingen," Ught-
ships :
Retention considered desirable by
Belgian Government, August 5,

n. 53-

Withdrawal of, asked for by Dutch
Government if war buoying of the
Scheldt carried out, II. 35, 36.
Belgrade, see under Serbia.
Below Saleske, Heir von, German
Minister in Belgium :
Communications :

from M. Davignon, II. 37, 72-3.
to M. Davignon, II. 34, 37, 71-2.
Conversations :

M. Davignon, II. 24.
Baron van der Elst, July 31, II.
20-1 ; August 3, II. 28-9.
Departure from Brussels, August 4,

n. 37-
Note presented by, to M. Davignon
re alleged French intention to invade
Belgium, and German ^proposal of
friendly neutrality and free passage,
August 2, II. 24-8.
Passports sent to, August 4, II. 37.
Benckendorfl, Count, Russian Ambassador
at London :
Communications :

from M. Sazonof, 132-3, 141, 160-1,
458, 465, 471-2, 472, 478, 479,
485-6, 488,^489.
to M. Sazonof, 464-5, 466-7, 471,
477- 481, 487. 490.
Conversations :

M. Paul Cambon, I. 309-10, 310.
Sir E. Grey, July 25, I. 464-5,
466-7, 467 ; July 30, I. 487.

5?S

INDEX

:Benckendorff, Count — cont.

non-Support of Serbia by Russian
Government would be difficult in
opinion of, I. 310.
Pessimistic view as to relations between
St. Petersburg and Berlin, I. 309.
:Berchtold, Count, Austro - Hungarian
Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Ambassadors of France, Russia, Italy
and Great Britain kept in dark as
to' Austrian note, I. 214-5.
Attitude of, I. 71.
Communications :

Count MensdorS, I. 74-88.

to M. N. Pashitch, 1. 111-2.

to Representatives abroad, see under

particular names.
to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, II.
iio-i.
Conversations :

Sir M. de Bunsen, July 28, I. 137,
137-8, 216-7 ; Aug. 13, I. 221-2.
M. Sch6b6ko, July 28, I. 159-60 ;
July 30, I. 163, 369-70.
Employment of Austrian troops against

France, denied by, I. 219-20.
goes to Ischl, II. 97.
Negotiations with M. Sch6b6ko, review

of, I. 218.
Satisfied with Serbian attitude, Herr
Jehlitschka, II. 85.
Berlin, see under Germany.
Berne, see under Switzerland.
Berthelot, M., Acting Political Director,
France, Conversations :
Herr von Schoen, July 24, I. 462 ;

July 26, I. 329-31, 334.
Count Sz6csen, July 24, I. 301.
M. Vesnitch, July 24, I. 302.
:Bertie, Sir Francis Leveson, British Am-
bassador at Paris :
Communications :

from Sir E. Grey, I. 94-5, 98, 106-7,
I". 153-4. 169, 179, 180, 182-3,
201-2, 203-4.
to Sir E. Grey, 1.98-9, 122, 130, 135-6,
166, 180-1, 187-9, 192-3, 194-8.
Conversations :
M. Bienvenu-Martin, July 28, I. 135-

6, 136.
M. de Margerie, Aug. i, I. 188-9.
M. Poincar6, July 30, I. 166 ; Aug.

I, I. 192-3.
M. Ren6 Viviani, July 31, I. 187-8 ;

Aug. I, I. 387.
526

Bethmann HoUweg, Dr. von, German
Imperial Chancellor :

Communications :

to M. Eyschen, Aug. 2, I. 190.
to Governments of Germany, July
28, II. 150-2.

Conversations with foreign representa-
tives at Berlin, see under particular
names.

Desire for peace, July 29, I. 145.

Explanation of words " scrap of
paper," II. 382-5 ; reply by Sir E.
Grey, II. 388-92.

German attitude re neutrality of Bel-
gium, 1911, II. 20.

Influence exerted in favour of direct
conversations between Austria and
Russia, I. 142, 151, 155.

Interview with American correspond-
ent, II. 382-8 ; comments by Sir E.
Grey, II. 388--92.

final Interview with Sir E. Goschen,
Aug. 4, I. 209-10.

Moderating influence at Vienna no
longer possible owing to Russian
mobilisation, I. 142.

Speech before the German Reichstag,
Aug. 4, II. 353-7-

Statement to the Danish Press Bureau,
Sept. 13, II. 370-2 ; Mr. Asquith's
reply to, II. 448-50-

Statement in the Reichstag, Aug. 4,
re violation of Luxemburg and Bel-
gium, II. 38.

Telegrams between Prince Lichnowsky
and, re neutrality of France, I.
435-6.

Working in interest of mediation in
Vienna and St. Petersburg, I. 151,

155. 178-
Beyens, Baron, Belgian Minister at

Berlin :
Communications :

from M. Davignon, II. 13-5, 17, 18,
18-9, 20, 22, 23, 24, 31-2, 32.

to M. Davignon, II. 16-7, 22-38, 46.
German pretended ignorance re

Austrian note disbelieved by, I. 311.
to Leave Berlin with staff, Aug. 6,

II. 46.
Passports to be asked for, Aug. 4, II.

37-
Passports received, II. 46.
premeditated Warlike intentions of

Germany, according to, I. 311.

INDEX

Bienvenn-Martin, M., Acting Minister for
Foreign ASairs, France :
Communications :

from M. Ren6 Viviani, I. 298-9,

346-7-
to M. Ren6 Viviani, I. 299, 300-1,
322-4, 327-8, 332-4, 347-8-
Conversations with representatives of
various Powers, see under particular
names.
Impossibility of Great Britain declaring
solidarity with Russia appreciated
by. July 28, I. 136.
Moderating advice at Vienna sug-
gested by, July 25, I. 98.
Bilinski, Herr, Austro-Hungarian Minister
of Finance, appeal made to, by
Emperor, for calmness, II. 93.
Slack Sea, note of conference on Russo-
English naval agreement re operations
in, II. 378-80.
Bompard, M., French Ambassador at
Constantinople :
Communications :
from M. Bienvenu-Martin and M.
Ren6 Viviani, I. 354-6, 361, 362,
380, 388-9, 395-6, 404-
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, I. 336-7.
Boppe, M., French Minister at Belgrade :
Communications :

from M. Bienvenu-Martin and M.
Ren6 Viviani, I. 302, 302-5, 310-1,
354-6, 361, 362, 404.
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, I. 319,
365-6-
to be Instructed to request suspension
of military operations, I. 340.
Boschkovitch, M., Serbian Minister in
London :
Communications :

from M. N. Pashitch, II. 107-8.
to M. N. Pashitch, II. 86, loo-i.
Conversations :

M. Paul Cambon, July 22, I. 295.
Sir A. Nicolson, July 25, 1. 107-8.
Bosnia and Herzegovina :
Administration by Austria under

Treaty of Berlin, 1878, I. 27-8.
Annexation by Austria, 1908 :
British attitude, I. 28, II. 401.
Russian attitude, I. 28.
Serbian attitude, I. 28.
Serbian declaration abandoning pro-
tests against, March 31, 1909,
I. 28, 74-5, 81 ; II. 136.

Bosnia and Herzegovina — cont.
Anti-Austrian Propaganda :

Declaration demanded from Serbian
Government condemning, I. 31,
76, 82-3.
German charge, II. 124.
and alleged Tolerance by Serbian
Government, I. 75, 81-2.
Great Serbian chauvinism during
Bosnian crisis referred to in Ger-
man note of July 24, I. 92, 304.
Insurrection against Turkish Govern-
ment, culminating in war between
Turkey and Russia, 1877-8, I.
27.
Outrages on Serbs in, European sym-
pathy will be increased by, M.
Sazonof, II. 91.
Serb nationalist movement in, I. 27-8.
Bosnian Question, British policy, Ger-
man comments, II. 374.
Bosphorus, note of conference on Russo-
English naval agreement re operations
near, II. 378-9.
Bridges, Lient. - Colonel, conversation
with General Jungbluth, April, 1912,
re plan for sending British troops to
Belgium in event of Franco-German
war, II. 339-41 I German comments,
II. 319-20 ; comments by M. J.
Van den Heuvel, II. 345-6.
British Central African Protectorate,
attacked by German troops from
German East Africa, II. 66.
Broniewski (or Bronewsky), M., Russian
Charg6 d' Affaires, Germany :
Communications :
from M. Sazonof, I. 479.
to M. Sazonof, I. 461, 463-4, 471,
474-5- 478, 479-80.
Conversations with Herr von
Jagow, July 21, I. 292 ; July 25,
I- 316-7, 317, 463 ; July 27, I. 474 ;
July 29, I. 479-80.
Brussels, see under Belgium.
Brzakovid, D. V., secretary of the Sokol

Association, Kragujevatz, II. 224.
Bach, Herr von, German Minister in
Luxemburg, communications to M.
Eyschen, I. 190, 415-6; II. 61.
Buchanan, Sir George W., British Am-
bassador at St. Petersburg :
Communications :

from Sir E. Grey, I. 98, 104, 125-6,
141, 169, 176-7. 193-4- * 1

527

INDEX

Buchanan, Sir George W. — cont.
Communications — cont.

to Sir E. Grey, I. 89-gi, 99-100,
123-4, 124, 133-4. 143. 145. 147-
8, 164, 179, 184-5, 196-8.
Conversations :

Count Pourtalds, July 29, I. 148.
M. Sazonof, July 24, I. 89-91 ;
July 25, I. 99-100 ; July 26,
I- 338-9; July 27, I. 123-4, 131.

133-4. 350; July 29, I. 147-8;

July 30, I. 164 ; July 31, I. 184-5.
Moderating counsels continually given
to M. Sazonof, I. 143.
Budapest, see under Hungary.
Bulgaria, declaration of neutrality by
Bulgarian Minister, Serbia, to M. Pas-
hitch, July 29, I. 480.
Bnnsen, Sir Maurice W. de, British Am-
bassador at Vienna :
Attitude re Austrian note, II. 118-9.
Communications :

from Sir E. Grey, I. 72-4, 88-9,

105-6, 126-8, 194-5.
to Sir E. Grey, I. 91-2, 102, 108,
108-9, 120-1, 129, 134-5, 137-8.
144, 149, 161-2, 162-3, 181-2,
189, 196-9.
Conversations :

Count Berchtold, July 28, I. 137,
137-8, 216-7 ; II- 271-3 ; August
13, I. 221-2.
M. Dumaine, I. 121.
Count Forgach, July 31, I. 181-2.
M. Sch6beko, July 30, I. 121, 162-3 >

August I, I. 198-9.
Herr von Tschirschky, I. 108-9.
Demand for passport, I. 221.
Departure from Vienna and journey,

account of, I. 222.
Instructed to support Russian col-
league, I. 105-6, 315, 464.
Instructions received re steps to be
taken by representatives of four
Powers, July 26, I. 327.
final Interview with Count Berchtold,

August 13, I. 221-2.
Review of negotiations with Austrian
Government, I. 2x4-21.
{labrinovic, Nedeljko :

Connection with Serajevo outrage, II.

182, 210-1.
Proceedings of Serajevo Court against,
and conclusions of, I. 80-1, 87-8 ;
II. 139-40, 233-6.
528

Sabrinovic, Nedeljko — cont.
Serbian Press on, II. 237, 238.
General Yankovitch stated by, to have
instigated Serajevo murder, accord-
ing to A Nap, II. 93.
Cambon, M. Jules, French Ambassador
at Berlin :
Communications :

from M. Bienvenu-Martin and M.
Rene Viviani, I. 296, 302, 302-5,
310-1, 311-3, 344-5. 348-9, 354-6,
361, 362, 377-9, 380, 384-5, 386,
388-9, 395-6, 397-8, 404-
to M. Bienvenu-Martin and M. Rend
Viviani, I. 291-2, 306-8, 311,
315-7, 320, 338, 342-4, 351-2,
358-60, 370-1, 373. 374-5, 381,
386, 387, 393, 400.
to M. Stephen Pichon, May 6, 1913, 1.-
273-5 ; November 22, 1913, I.
284-5.
Conversations :

M. Boschkovitch, July 22, I. 295.
with Herr von Jagow, May 6, 1913,
re Balkan crisis, I. 273 ; July 21,
I. 293 ; July 24, I. 306-8 ; July
26, I. 342-4; July 27, I. 338,
474-5 ; July 28, I. 351 ; July 29,
I. 146, 358-9 ; July 30, I. 374-5 ;:
July 31, 1. 381 ; August 3, 1. 406-7.
Correspondence with M. de Kiderlen-
Waechter re Morocco Convention,
November 4, 1911, II. 499-503.
Despatch to M. Jonnart re new Ger-
man military law, March 17, 191 3,
I. 259-60.
Instructed toaskforpassports, andleave

Berlin with staff, August 3, 1. 404.
Instructed to support and concert
with British colleague, July 27-
28, I. 130, 131, 340.
Report on final interviews in BerUn, and
departure and journey, I. 406-412.
Cambon, M. Paul, French Ambassador
in London :
Authorised to take part in proposed

Conference, July 28, I. 130, 131.
Communications :

from M. Bienvenu-Martin and M.
Ren6 Viviani, I. 292-3, 296-7,
302, 302-5, 311-3, 322-4, 327-8,
344-5, 348-9, 354-6, 361, 362,
364, 366-7, 371-3, 377-9. 380,
384-5, 386, 388-9, 390-2, 395-6.
397, 402.

INDEX

Cambon, M. Fanl — cont.
Communications — cont.
to M. Bienvenu-Martin and M. Ren6
Viviani, I. 294-5, 309-10, 349-51.
364. 373-4. 375-6, 390, 396-7.
401-2, 405.
Conversations :

Count Benckendorflf, I. 309-10, 310.
Sir E. Grey :

July 21, I. 295 ; July 24, I. 94-5.
309-10 ; July 29, I. 153-5,
365 ; July 30, I. 170 ; July 31,
I. 182-3, 375-6; August 1, I.
3Q0 ; August 2, I. 201-2.
Correspondence with Sir E. Grey, 1912,
re attitude in event of peace of Europe
being threatened, I. 170-2, 428-9 ;
II. 403-4 ; German diplomatic re-
port re, March, 1913, II. 373-4-
Gravity of situation, July 24, I.
.309.
Canada, assistance from, Mr. Asquith on,

II. 445, 460.
Catlotti, Marchese, Italian Minister at
St. Petersburg, conversation with
Italian Ambassador, July 25, I.
325.
Chelius, General von, German honor-
ary aide-de-camp to the Tsar, message
to the Emperor, July 25, re military
preparations, II. 153.
CheTalley, M., French Minister at Chris-
tiania :
Communications :

from M. Bienvenu-Martin, I. 404 :
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, July 26, I.

331-
China :

Demand for German warships to leave
waters in neighbourhood of, II.
291, 296, 300.

Japanese operations in. Count Okuma
on object of, August 19, II. 296.

Kaiserin Elizabeth, Japanese and Brit-
ish wiUing to allow, to proceed to
Shanghai to be dismantled, II. 301-
2.

Kiau-Chao :
German military preparations, II.

297, 299.
Japanese demand for handing over
of leased territory by Germany,
II. 291, 296, 300.

Tsingtau, Austrian ship Elisabeth to
take part in fighting at, II. 293.

II— 2 L

fiiganovic, Milan :

Austrian demand for arrest of, I, 77,
84 ; II. 139, Serbian reply and
Austrian comments, II. 146-7, 264,
265.

an Austrian subject, II. 146, 264.

in Belgrade for three days after murder
and allowed to leave, Count Berch-
told, II. 191.

Conclusions of Serajevo criminal en-
quiry against, I. 80-1, 87-8 ; II.

139-40-
Connection with Serajevo outrage, II.

210-1, 233-4.
Impossibility of arresting, I. 115, 119 ;
II. 264.
Ciganovitch, Mihaylo, comitadji, II. 92.
Clary and Aldiingen, Count, Austro-
Hungarian Minister in Belgium :
Communications :

from Count Berchtold, II. 292.
to M. Davignon, II. 67-8.
Departure from Belgium with staff, II.
68, 292.
Conference of the Powers, see under

Mediation by the Powers.
Congo Conventional Basin, Neutralisa-
tion :
Belgian proposal, August 7, II. 54,

54-5-
Britain unable to agree to, August 17,

II. 66.
France not desirous for, II. 65, 66.
French Government inclined to pro-
claim, August 9, II. 56.
Reservation of French reply, August

8, II. 55-
Spain asked by French Government

to make suggestion at Berlin, II. 56 ;

no answer from Spain before knowing

views of Great Britain, II. 65.
Crackanthorpe, D., British Charge

d' Affaires at Belgrade :
Communications :

from Sir E. Grey, I. 96-7, 107-8.

to Sir E. Grey, I. 92, 102-3, 103,

139. 151-
Conversation with M. Pashitch, July

24, II. 107-8.
Departure from Belgrade, July 25,

I- 103.
Opinion that Serbian reply should
satisfy Austria if not desirous of war,
II. 16-17.
Croatia, see under Austria-Hungary.

529

INDEX

dnbrilovid, Vaso, proceedings of Sara-
jevo Court, against, II. 233-6 ; confes-
sion, 242.
von Cnvai, Royal Commissioner, Agram,
attempt against, by Luka Jukid, June,
1912, II. 203, 214-5, 208.
Czernin, Count, Austro-Hungarian Charge
d'Affaires, St. Petersburg, interview
with M^^Sazonof, I. 287-8.
Da2i6, Zivojin, one founder of the
Narodna Odbrana, and work of, II.
200, 203, 205, 210, 233.
Dar-es-Salaam, German port, attacked

by British troops, II. 66.
Dardanelles, note of Conference on
Russo-Engiish naval agreement re
operations near, II. 378-g.
Davidovid, Ljuba, ex-minister, one
founder of the Narodna Odbrana, II.
200.
Cavignon, M., Belgian Minister for
Foreign Affairs :
Announcement to, of German violation

of Luxemburg, August 2, II. 23.
Communications :

from Count Clary, II. 67-8.

with Representatives abroad, see

under particular names.
from M. Sazonof, August 13, II. 64.
Interview with M. Klobukowski, I.

356.
Report from M. B. de I'Escaille, July
30, of position in Russia, II. 366-9 ;
German comments on, II. 365-6,

37°-
de la Guiche, General, French mihtary
fe agent, Petrograd, II. 381.
de I'Escaille, M. B., Belgian Charge
d'Affaires, St. Petersburg, report, July
30, to M-. Davignon of position in
Russia, II. 366-9 ; German comments
on, II. 365-6, 370.
Denmark :

French representative, communication

from M. Viviani, August 3, I. 404.
German attitude re, 1913, in event of

European war, I. 272.
Press Bureau, statement to, by Dr.
von Bethmann Hollweg, September
13, II. 370-2 ; Mr. Asquith's reply
to, September 18, II. 448-50.
Dimitrijevid, T., anti-Austrian pamphlet

by, II. 208.
Djinovid, Mitar, member of the Narodna
Odbrana, II. 226.

530

Dojcid, Stephen, attempt against Royal
Commissioner, Baron Skerlecz, at
Agram, August, 1913, II. 208.
Dominions, support of, anticipated, Mr.

Bonar Law, August 3, 417.
Donnersmarck, Prince Henckel von,
quoted re new German military pro-
posals, etc., 191^, I. 265-6.
Doumergue, M., French Minister for
Foreign Affairs :
Communication from M. MoUard,

August 5, I. 412-3.
Conversations :

with Sir E. Grey, April, 1914, II.

374-
with Count Szecsen, II. 286, 288.
Ducarne, General, Chief of the Belgian
General Staff :

Alleged drawing up of plan by Lieut. -
Colonel Barnardiston with, 1906,
for joint operations against Germany,
II. 314, 315, 319, 329 ; British reply,
II. 318, 330 ; comments by M. J.
Van den Heuvel, II. 342-3 ; official
Belgian reply, II. 350-2.

Report, April 10, 1906, on conversa-
tions with Lieut. -Colonel Barnardis-
ton re despatch of British expedi-
tionary force to Belgium, II. 331-9.
Dudzeele, Count Errembault de, Belgian

Minister at Vienna :

Communications :

from M. Davignon, II. 13-5, 17, 18,

23, 24, 31-2, 32.
toM. Davignon, II. 13, 17.

Passports being forwarded to, II. 68.

Passports received, II. 292.
Dumaine, M., French Ambassador at
Vienna :

Attitude of, re Austrian note, II. 118-

9-
Authorised to ask for passports and

to leave Vienna, August 10, II. 288,

289.
Communications :

from M. Bienvenu-Martin and M.
Ren6 Viviani, I. 292-3, 302, 303-5,
310-1, 311-3. 314-5. 322-4, 327-8.
344-5. 348-9. 349, 354-^. 361, 362,
377-9, 380, 384, 388-9, 395-6.
404.

to M. Bienvenu-Martin and M. Ren6
Viviani, I. 286, 289-90, 293-4,
318-9, 321, 326-7. 352-3, 357-8,
360-1, 369-70, 381.

INDEX

Snmaine, M. — cont.
Conversations :

Baron Macchio, I. 214, 296 ; II.

116-7, 117-8.
M. Sch6b6ko and Herr von
Tschirschky, July 29, I. 162.
Departure from Vienna, August 12,

I. 219-20.
Instructed to ask Count Berchtold for
extension of time limit, July 25, I.
315, 464 ; instructions not received
till too late, I. 321.
to be Instructed to request suspension

of military operations, I. 340.
Instructions to, to keep in touch with
EngUsh colleague, July 28, I.
349-
Moderating counsel to be given by, to
Count Berchtold, I. 293, 298-9.
Dnncan, Consul-Qeneral Sir Frederick,

Vienna, I. 22.
Edward VII., King of England, I. 430.
Dggeling, Major von, German military
attach^, St. Petersliurg, conversations
and reports re Russian military pre-
parations, II. 153, 155, 157-8, 249,

253-
Egypt, German policy in, March, 1913,
with view to European war, I. 271—2.
Elisabeth, Austrian cruiser, see Kaiserin

Elizabeth.
England, see Great Britain.
English Colonies, German poHcy in,
March, 1913, with view to European
war, I. 271-2.
Erid, Vase, II. 227.

Etienne, M., French Minister of War,
communication to M. Jonnart, April 2,
1913, I. 269.
Eyschen, M., Minister of State and
President of the Government of
Luxemburg :
Communications :

from Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg,

August 2, I. 190.
to M. Davignon, August 2, II. 23.
to Sir E. Grey, I. 190, 201.
to M. Mollard, I. 414-6.
to Count van den Steen de Jehay,
August 8, II. 61-2.
Conversations with M. Mollard, I.

376-7. 392-3, 412-4.
Letter from Herr von Buch re de-
parture of Belgian representative,
August 8, II. 61.

Eyschen, M. — cont.
Reply to declaration of French Govern-
ment re neutraUty of Luxemburg,
August 4, I. 414-5.
Faber, Captain, II. 329.
Fallon, Baron, Belgian Minister in
Holland :
Communications :

from M. Davignon, II. 15, 17, 18,

23. 31-2, 53, 54, 59, 60, 64, 68-70.

to M. Davignon, II. 35-6, 47, 53-4,

56, 57. 63, 65.

Conversation with M. Loudon, August

3. II. 35.
renewed German proposals to Belgium,
passed on by, explanation of action,

11- 56. 57-
Faramond, M. de, French Naval At-

tach6 at Berlin, report to M. Baudin,

March 15, 1913, I. 264-9.
Farges, M., French Consul-General at

Basle, communication to M. Bienvenu-

Martin, July 27, I. 332.
Finland, Gulf of, German preparations

against Russia in, proof possessed by

Russian Government, M. Sazonof, July

30, I. 164.
Fiume, see under Austria-Hungary.
Fleuriau, M. de, French Charg6 d' Af-
faires, London, communications :

from M. Bienvenu-Martin, I. 325,

339-40-
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, I. 313-4, 315,
336, 337. 338-9, 340-1-
Flotow, Herr von, German Ambassador
at Rome :
Communication from Dr. von Beth-
mann Hollweg, July 31, II. 158.
Conversations :

Sir R. Rodd, July 29, I. 167.
Marquis di San Giuliano, July 31,

I. 388.
Baron van der Elst, re neutrality of
Belgium, referred to, II. 20-1.
Forgach, Count, Austrian Under-Secre-
tary of State :
Attitude of, I. 218.

Character of Austrian note confided

to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 23, I. 214.

Conversation with Sir M. de Bunsen,

July 31, I. 181-2.
Drawing up of note to Serbia, entrusted
to, II. 117.
Fovi6, BoSo, member of the Narodna
Odbrana, II. 242.

531

INDEX

France :

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,

see Bienvenu-Martin, M.
Ambassadors, Ministers, etc., of

Foreign Countries in :
Austro-Hungarian, see Siecsen,

Count.
Belgian, see Guillaume, Baron.
British, see Bertie, Sir Francis L.
German, see Schoen, Baron von.
Russian, see Isvolsky, M.
Russian Charge d'Affaires, see

Sevastopoulo, M.
Ambassadors, Ministers, etc., of,

IN Foreign Countries :
Basle, Consul-General, see Farges,

M.
Belgium, see Klobukowski, M.
Belgrade, see Boppe, M.
Berlin, see Cambon, M. Jules.
BerUn Charge d'Affaires, see Manne-

ville, M. de.
Budapest, Consul - General, see

d'Apchier-le-Maugin, M.
Christiania, see Chevalley, M.
Frankfort, Consul - General, see

Ronssin, M.
the Hague, see Pellet, M. Marcelin.
London, see Cambon, M. Paul.
London, Charge d'Affaires, see

Fleuriau, M. de.
Luxemburg, see MoUard, M.
Luxemburg, Charge d'Affaires, see

d'Annoville, M.
Madrid, see Geoffray, M. L.
Munich, see AUiz^, M.
St. Petersburg, see Paleologue, M.
Stockholm, see Thi6baut, M.
Turkey, see Bompard, M.
Vienna, see Dumaine, M.
Army :

Five army corps offered to Belgian

Government, and reply, August 3,

I. 203.
Mobilisation, see thai title below.
Ten kilom. left between German

frontier and, I. 172, 193, 194, 198,

372, 396.
Attitude of, proclamation by the

President, August i, II. 468-9.
AND Austria :

Conciliatory moves at Paris, I.

384-
Declaration of war by France,
August 12, II. 289-90, 312-3.

532

France — cont.
and Austria — cont.

Employment of Austrian troops
against, I. 220-1 ; denials by
Count Berchtold, I. 21^-20.

French assertion that Army Corps
sent to Germany, and rupture
owing to, I. 220-1 ; II. 288 ;
Austrian denial, II. 289.

French inquiry whether Innsbruck
Army Corps brought to French
frontier, August 8, II. 286 ; re-
port unfounded, Count Berchtold,
August 9, II. 287-8.

Intervention not anticipated by
Austrian Press, I. 289.

Rupture of diplomatic relations,

I. 220-1 ; II. 288.

and Belgium, see under Belgium.
Chamber of Deputies, message from

the Skupshtina, II. 477.
Coasts and shipping, protection to be

given by British Fleet, I. 201-z,

390, 396, 397, 400, 430 ; II. 408 ;

reasons for giving assurance. Sir E.

Grey, August 3, II. 406-8.
AND Congo Conventional Basin
Neutralisation :

not Desirous for, II. 65, 66.

Inclination to proclaim, August 9,

II. 56.

Reservation of reply, II. 55.

Spain asked to make suggestion at

Berlin, II. 56 ; no answer from

Spain before knowing views of

Great Britain, II. 65.

Declaration not to conclude a separate

peace or put forward conditions of

peace without previous agreement

with Allies, September 5, I. 433 ;

II. 506-7.
Declaration by Great Britain of

solidarity with, see under Great

Britain.
Delle, customs station fired on by

German soldiers, I. 395, 398.
Director of Political Department, see

Margerie, M. de.
Echo de Paris, I. 31 1-2, 329, 466.
German diplomatic officials, departure,

August 3, I. 403.
German fleet not to attack northern

coast while Great Britain remains

neutral. Dr. von Bethmann Holl-

weg, August 4, II. 357.

INDEX

Prance — cont.
AND Germany :

Assurance against territoriSil ac-
quisitions in return for British
neutrality :
Mr. Asquith on, August 6, II.

423-7-
Offered July 29, but no assurance

as regards colonies, I. 152-3.
Refusal of proposal, July 30-31,
I. 167, 176, 187. .

Attack on France without pretext
anticipated by M. J. Cambon
at first military steps taken by
Russia, I. 323.
Attitude to be adopted by France in
event of Russo-German war, de-
mand as to, July 31, I. 181, 381,
382, 385 ; 11. 134, 135, i6r-2,
283 ; reply, II. 135, 163 ; Herr
von Schoen informed that Govern-
ment fail to understand reason for,
August I, I. 188-9.
Declaration of war by Germany,

August 3, I. 402-3, 426-7.
D-marches by Herr von Schoen,

summary of, I. 332-3.
Deterinination for war against

France, I. 384.
alleged French hostile acts by mili-
tary aviators, I. 402, 426 ; denial,
I. 403, 427 ; protest by Herr von
Jagow and reply by M. Cambon,
I. 406-7.
alleged French violation of territory :
Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg,

August 4, II. 356.
Herr von Below Saleske, August

3, II. 28-9. .
Denial by French Government,
August 3, I. 402.
French neutrality in German-Russian
war :
Assurance would not be given,

M. Cambon, July 29, I. 154-5.
Exchange of telegrams between'
Great Britain and Germany,
August I, II. 360-5.
German attempts to throw re-
sponsibiUty for war on, I. 473.
German representations in, believed
to aim at intimidating France
and securing intervention at St.
Petersburg and alienating Russia
and France, I. 470, 473.

France — cont.
AND Germany — coni.

German violation of territory :
Advance of German patrols to

Joncherey and Baron, August 2,

and French soldier killed, I. 398.
Mr. Asquith on, September- 25,

II. 458.
Bombs dropped on Lun6viUe by

German miUtary aviator, August

3, I. 426.
at Ciry and near Longwy and

Delle, August 2, I. 395-6.

419, 425.
by German patrols, July 29, 1.

372-3- ^ . -^ .u

German report of one mciaent,

II- 356.

Protest by M. Jules Cambon and
reply by Herr von Jagow,
August 3, I. 406-7.
Protest to German Government,
August 2, I. 397-8.

Note from German Government,
July 24, I. 303-5 ; denial of any
" threat " being intended, I. 311-2,
466.

Notification of state of war between,
I. 416—8 ; copy communicated to
M. Davignon, August 5, II. 46.

Opening of hostilities by France
August 2, German assertion, II.
135.

PubUc opinion in Germany, 1913.
with regard to war with France,
report to M. Stephen Pichon,
July 30, 1913, I. 276-83.

War between, opinions of Emperor
ye possibility, November, 191 3.
I- 284-5.
Government :

Explanation of Austrian Govern-
ment that note not an ultimatum
not received by, July 25, I. 98.

Notification of intention to act in

accordance with International

Conventions, August 4, I. 417 ;

translation, I. 418.

and Great Britain, see under Great

Britain.
Hague conventions 3 and 5 signed

and ratified by, II. 508, 509.
Inactivity of, anticipated by German

Ambassador at Vienna, July 26, I.

109. 35-

S33

INDEX

France — cont.
and Luxemburg, see under Luxemburg.
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, see Dou-
mergue, M. ; Pichon, M. Stephen,
and Viviani, M. Ren6.
Mobilisation and Military Pre-
parations :
Conversation between Herr von
Schoen and M. Rene Viviani, July
29, 1. 367.
Date of first plans, according to
documents said to have been
found in possession of Mr. Grant-
Watson, II. 326.
for Defensive purposes only, August

I, I. 194.
Difficulty of Germany's position in
view of, Herr von Jagow, July 30,

I. 165.

alleged Failure of German efforts

owing to, II. 130.
Information received in Germany,

July 27, II. 129.
Herr von Jagow troubled by reports

of, July 29, I. 146.
News received in Germany, July 29, of

rapid preparations, II. 130.
Ordered, August i , owing to German

measures, I. 38, 193, 194, 391-2,

491 ; II. 135-
Particulars re, and comparison with

those of Germany, July 30, I.

372-3-
Proclamation by the President,

August I, I. 392 ; text, II. 468-9.
Report by German Minister at

Berne, July 27, II. 154.
Reported by Count Sz6csen, July 29,

II. 276.

Reservists not yet called back,
July 30, I, 173.

Baron Schoen to point out that
Germany may be compelled to
take similar measures, and danger
of, II. 276.
and Morocco, see under Morocco.
Neutrality of, under British
guarantee in event of German-
Russian War :

British proposal, misunderstanding
re, II. 362.

German offer to give up idea of
attack on France, August i, but
mobilisation measures must con-
tinue, II. 361.

534

France — cont.
Neutrality of, under British;
guarantee in event of German-
Russian War — cont.

German reply, I. 435-6 ; II. 361.

Prince Lichnowsky questioned by
Sir E. Grey as to German action
in event of French neutrality, and
reply, August i, II. 360.

Suggestion by Prince Lichnowsky
re, and Sir E. Grey on misunder-
standing, August 28, 1914, Feb. 11,
1915 ; 11. 438-9.

Suppression of telegram re, in Ger-
man Government publication, II.
438 ; German reply to British
charge re, II. 363.
Pacific attitude of, I. 165, 166, 193, 391.
Paris :

H.M. George V.'s visit to, April, 1914^
German diplomatic reports on
political results of, II. 374-5.

German Embassy, preparations for
departure, July 31, August i, I.
188, 189.

Municipal Council, message from the-

Municipal Council of Petrograd^

II. 471.

Political Director, see Margerie, M. de.

President of the Republic, see Poincar6^

M. Raymond.
Press :

Accusation against, by Herr von
Schoen, July 28, I. 349.

Note communicated to, terms of^

I- 335-
Note to, suggestion by Herr von

Schoen, July 26, I. 329, 334.
proposed Re-estabUshment of three-
years' service 1913, German feeUng.
re, 1. 259-60, 260-1.
Reims, German proclamation re takings

of hostages, II. 452.
and Russia :

Determination of France to fulfil

all obligations, I. 33, 89, 367.
Determination of Government ta

act in concert with Russia, and

public support of, July 29, I. 482 ;

gratitude of Russian Gk)vernment,.

July 29, I. 484.
Intervention at St. Petersburg urged

by Germany, and reply I. 328,,

331. 335. 355. 470. 473, 480-1 ;

11. 154-

INDEX

France — cont.
AND Russia — cont.
Moderating influence continually
exerted at St. Petersburg, I. 391.
Russia ready to face risks of war
if secure of support of, I. 100.
AND Serbia :

Advice to Serbia as to reply to

Austrian note, I. 302 ; II. 194.
Advice given to Serbia as advocated
by H.M. Government, July 25,
I- 33. 98.
Attitude towards Austrian ultima-
tum, I. 33.
Calmness urged by French Govern-
ment, II,- 87, 90.
Public opinion quieted down, II.

90.
Serbia's request for English media-
tion supported, July 26, I. 325.
Serbian Minister, see Vesnitch, M.
Suarce, horses requisitioned by German

cavalry, I. 398.
Women of, appeal to, by M. Ren6
Viviani, II. 469-70.
Frankfort, see under Germany.
Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria :
murder of, I. 27 :
Account of plot, Austrian dossier, II.

210-1.
Analysis of articles in Vienna Press on,
M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, July 6,
II. 91-3.
Assassins, Austrian subjects, and pre-
vious attitude of Austrian and
Serbian authorities towards, I. 30,
108 ; II. 86.
Attempts by Serbian Government to
obliterate traces. Count Berchtold,
July 23, II. 191.
Attitude of Serbian Government, M.

Yov. M. Yovanovitch, II. 84.
Attributing of, to work of Serbian
revolutionaries by English Press, II.
86.
Austrian allegation of, as conspiracy

engineered in Serbia, II. 83.
Causes leading to outrage, explanation
by Dr. M. R. Vesnitch to M. Viviani,
July I, II. 90.
Connected with Serbia, in German

Press, II. 84.
Course of events since, communica-
tion by M. Pashitch to Serbian
Ministers abroad, July 19, II. 101-5.

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria :

mnrder of — cont.
Enquiry :

Austrian demand re, I. 29, 30, 77,
84; reply I. 114-5, iiQ-

Evidence requested from Austro-
Hungarian Government, I. 115-6,
119.

Extract from proceedings against
Gavrilo Princip and others, II.
232-6, 242.

Results I. 29-30, 80-1, 87-8 ; II.
139-40.

alleged to Show that outrage pre-
pared at Belgrade, II. 83.
European attitude towards, I. 27.
Great Serbian agitators accused, not

Kingdom, Government, or whole

nation, M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch,

II. 89-90.
Judicial investigation against
participants and Austrian par-
ticipation :

Austrian demand for, I. 31, 77, 84 ;
II. 139.

Serbian reply and Austrian com-
ments, I. 115, 119; II. 146, 262,
263-4.
Narodna Odbrana Local Committee

at Nish on, II. 241-2.
News sent to France by M. Dumaine,

June 28, I. 286.
alleged Plots against the Archduke,

by Serbian associations, 1913, II. 209.
Rejoicing over :

Belgrade, Herr von Storck, June 29,
II. 182.

Nish, Herr Hoflehner, July 6, II.
184-5.

Uskub and Pristina, M. Jehlitschka,
July I, II. 183-4.
Resentment in Austrian military circles

and possibility of war, M. Dumaine,

June 28, I. 286.
Responsibility of Serbian Govern-
ment, ETC. :

AUeged I. 27, 75, 82 ; II. 124, 137,
148-9.

Austro-Hungarian Press campaign,
II. 101-2 ; denial of charges and
steps to be taken to stop, July,
M. M. Pashitch, II. 86-7.

Denial, I. 113, 117.

German views re, I. 93, 303-4.

M. Jehlitschka, July i, II. 183-4.

535

INDEX

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria :

murder ot—cont.
Responsibility of Serbian Govern-
ment, ETC. — cont.

Reply to Austrian note and Austrian
comments, II. 142, 256-7.

Count Szdpary, July 24, II. 195.
Serbian attitude re possible Austrian

demands, II. 105.
Serbian Press on, II. 237-41.
no Steps taken by Serbian Government

to start enquiry, Count Berchtold,

July 23, II. 191.
no Steps taken by Serbian police,

June 30, to follow up clues, II. 183.
Franz Joseph, Emperor of Austria :
Letters sent to Prime Ministers of

Austria and Hungary and Minister of

Finance.appealingf or calmness, II. 93.
Manifesto, July 28, II. 485-6.
Message from Sir M. de Bunsen, I.

221-2.
Message to the Prime Ministers of Aus-
tria and Hungary, July 4, II. 483-4.
to Return from Ischl to Vienna, July

30. I- 358-
French Colonies, German policy in,
March 1913, with view to European
war, I. 271.
French Congo, see Congo Conventional

Basin.
Fuchs, General von, departure of M.
Mollard from Luxemburg insisted on by
I. 415-6.
Funakoshi, Baron, Japanese Charge
d' Affaires, Berlin :
Ultimatum presented to German

Government by, II. 295-6.
Passports furnished August 23, and to
depart with staff, August 24, II. 293.
Tunder, Dr., director in chief of the
Reichpost, anti-Serbian speech made by,
July2, n. 88.
Ctabrinovitch, see Cabrinovid, Nedeljko.
"Geoffray, M. L., French Ambassador at
Madrid, communications from M. Ren6
Viviani, I. 388-9, 395-6, 404.
tGeorge V., King of England :

Appeal to, from King of the Belgians,
August 3, I. 204 ; II. 33 ; read in
the House, I. 401 ; II. 411.
Autograph letter from French Presi-
dent handed to, July 31, I. 376.
letters exchanged between M. Poin-
care and, July 31, August, II. 304-8.

J36

George, V. — cont.

Speech at the prorogation of Parlia-
ment, September 18, I. i.

Telegram from H.R.H. Prince Henry
of Prussia and reply, July 30, II.

358-9-
Telegrams between the Emperor
William and, July 30, August i,
I. 435-6 ; II- 360, 361-2.
Telegrams exchanged between the

Tzar and, August i, II. 309-11.
Visit to Paris, April 19, German diplo-
matic reports on political results
of, II. 374-5-
Georgevitch, M. M., Serbian Charge
d' Affaires at Constantinople :
Communication to M. N. Pashitch,

II- 85.
Conversation with Herr Jehlitschka,
June 30, II. 85.
Gerard, 3. W., American Ambassador at
Berlin, testimony by Sir E. Goschen,
to assistance rendered by, and by staff,
I- 213-4.
German East Africa, attack on British
Central African Protectorate by troops
from, II. 66.
Germany :
Ambassadors, Ministers, Etc;, of
Foreign Countries in :
American, see Gerard, J. W.
Austrian, see Szogyeny, Count

Hohenlohe.
Belgian, 1911, see Greindl, Baron.
Belgian Minister, see Beyens, Baron.
British, see Goschen, Sir Edward.
British Charge d' Affaires, see Rum-
bold, Sir Horace.
French, see Cambon, M. Jules.
French Charge d'Affaires, see Man-

neville, M. de.
French Consul-General at Frankfort,

see Ronssin, M.
French Minister at Munich, see

AUize, M.
Japanese Charg6 d'Affaires, see Funa-
koshi, Baron.
Russian, see Swerbeiev, M.
Russian Charge d'Affaires, see

Broniewsky, M.
Serbian Charg6 d'Affaires, see Yov-

anovitch. Dr. M.
Spanish Ambassador, charge of
French interests and care of
archives to be left to, I. 404.

INDEX

^Geimany — cont.

Ambassadors, Ministers, etc., or,

IN Foreign Countries :

Belgium, see Below Saleske, Herr von.

Berne, telegram to Dr. von

Bethmann HoUweg, July 27, II.

154-
Japan, see under Japan.
London, see Lichnowsky, Prince.
Luxemburg, see Buch, Herr von.
Paris, see Schoen, Baron von.
Petrograd, see Pourtalds, Count.
Rome, see Flotow, Herr von.
Secretary of Legation, Serbia, see

Storck, Herr Ritter von.
Vienna, see Tschirschky, Herr von.
Amnesty, decree of, August 4, II.

480-2.
Appeal to people of, by the Emperor,

August 6, II. 482.
Army :

on French frontier and incursions

made across, August i, I. 193, 194.
Massing on frontier, I. 372-3.
Mobilisation, see that title below.
Violation of French territory, see

under France.
Assurance to, against aggressive or
hostile policy against, or against
Allies, by France, Russia or England,
desire for, by Sir E. Grey if peace
of Europe preserved, July 30, I. 168.
Attitude of :

Mr. Asquith on, September 4, II.

441-2.
Belgian anxiety as to, I. 356.
M. Berthelot on, July 26, 1. 330.
Dr. von Bethmann HoUweg on,

August 4, II. 353-7.
M. Bienvenu-Martin's summary, July

29. I- 354-5. 480-1.
Desire to humiliate Russia, disin-
tegrate Triple Entente, and to

make war if necessary, I. 380.
possible Desire to provoke European

war, II. 120.
Desire expressed to co-operate for

maintenance of peace, July 27,

I. 122, 136.
no Desire for general war, I. loi.
Desire for war, I. 199, 306, 384.
Efforts for peace, II. 131-2, 478, 479.
Failure of attempts at agreement

owing to, M. Ren6 Viviani, July

31, I. 380.

Germany— cowi.

Attitude of — cont.

more Hopeful atmosphere prevailing.

Baron Beyens, July 27, II. 17.
Nicholas II. on, August 2, II. 470-1.
Peaceful intentions and desire for

peaceful settlement assurance, I.

122, 142, 142-3, 328, 329, 331, 335,

333. 342. 343-4. 348. 482.
Peaceful settlement between Austria

and Serbia prevented by, in

opinion of Sir M. de Bunsen, I.

218-9.
Pessimistic impression of M. Bron-

iewsky, July 25, I. 317.
Public opinion, 1913, with regard to

war, and report to M. Stephen

Pichon, July 30, 1913, I. 276-83.
Review of, I. 17-9.
M. Sazonof on, I. 100, 133, 197,

199, 495-6.
M. Rene Viviani on, August 4, I.

422-7.
Warlike intentions of, according to

Belgian Minister at BerUn, I. 311.
William II. on, August 4, II. 478-

80 ; August 6, II. 482.
AND Austria :

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