Fix potential quint32 wrap in KDB 1 importer - #13682
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parseGroupTreeState() retrieves the number of record tree states from a 32-bit integer. It then calculates the number of bytes to read as num * 5, which is checked against the actual buffer length. The multiplication occurs as quint32, which wraps at 2^32. An attacker could craft a 32-bit value that wraps to match the observed buffer length. The following loop, however, uses num directly and may thus loop millions of times, reading beyond the end of the buffer. No bytes are written and the minimum number that wraps is 2^32 / 5, which is well beyond any reasonable buffer size. Hence this is exploitable only as a denial of service. Given that this requires a crafted KDB file, there are easier ways to make the contents of a file unreadable.
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🟡 Changes recommended
Add regression coverage for the malformed count that triggered the wraparound.
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Pull request overview
This pull request hardens KeePass 1 group-tree-state parsing against 32-bit multiplication overflow.
Changes:
- Performs record-size arithmetic using
quint64. - Rejects malformed metastream lengths before iteration.
File summaries
| File | Summary |
|---|---|
src/format/KeePass1Reader.cpp |
Uses 64-bit arithmetic for record-size validation. |
Review details
- Files reviewed: 1/1 changed files
- Comments generated: 1
- Review effort level: Lite
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phoerious
changed the title
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## develop #13682 +/- ##
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Coverage 63.14% 63.14%
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Files 388 388
Lines 41119 41120 +1
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+ Hits 25963 25964 +1
Misses 15156 15156 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Harness. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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droidmonkey
approved these changes
Sep 16, 2026
phoerious
changed the title
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parseGroupTreeState()retrieves the number of record tree states from a 32-bit integer. It then calculates the number of bytes to read asnum * 5, which is checked against the actual buffer length. The multiplication occurs as quint32, which wraps at 2^32. An attacker could craft a 32-bit value that wraps to match the observed buffer length. The following loop, however, usesnumdirectly and may thus loop millions of times, reading beyond the end of the buffer.No bytes are written and the minimum number that wraps is 2^32 / 5, which is well beyond any reasonable buffer size. Hence this is exploitable only as a denial of service. Given that this requires a crafted KDB file, there are easier ways to make the contents of a file unreadable.
Type of change