Skip to content

SVG sanitizer does not strip external resource references in <style>, <image>, and <feImage> elements #1708

Description

@geo-chen

reported via email on 13 June 2026:

I found an incomplete case in imgproxy's SVG sanitizer that allows attacker-controlled external resource loading to survive sanitization.

When IMGPROXY_SANITIZE_SVG=true (the default), imgproxy removes <script> tags, <iframe> tags, and on* event-handler attributes from SVG files before serving them. However, the sanitizer does not remove or neutralize:

  1. Content inside <style> tags -- CSS @import url([https://attacker-server/)](https://attacker-server/)) and background: url(...) directives pass through unchanged.
  2. <image href="[https://attacker-server/..](https://attacker-server/)."> SVG image elements.
  3. <feImage href="[https://attacker-server/..](https://attacker-server/)."> inside SVG <filter> blocks.

When imgproxy serves the sanitized SVG with Content-Type: image/svg+xml and Content-Disposition: inline (the default), a browser opening the URL will perform GET requests to those external origins. The CSP header script-src 'none' that imgproxy already sets does not restrict CSS or image loading, so these requests are not blocked.

I confirmed this by running imgproxy v4.0.4 with default settings, fetching a test SVG containing the above elements, and observing that the response body contains the attacker URLs unchanged. The full test steps and observed output are shown below.

To reproduce:

  1. Run: docker run -d -p 8080:8080 -e IMGPROXY_SANITIZE_SVG=true darthsim/imgproxy:latest
  2. Prepare an SVG with <image href="https://attacker.example.com/"> and serve it locally.
  3. Request http://localhost:8080/insecure/<base64-encoded-url>.svg.
  4. The response body contains the <image> element with the attacker URL intact.

Suggested fix: Extend the sanitizeElement function in processing/svg/svg.go to either (a) strip <style> elements entirely, or sanitize their content to remove url() references and @import directives; (b) strip <image> elements or allow only data: URIs; and (c) strip <feImage> elements. Additionally, consider adding default-src 'none' or img-src 'none'; style-src 'none' to the existing CSP header as a defense-in-depth measure.

Metadata

Metadata

Assignees

No one assigned

    Labels

    No labels
    No labels

    Type

    No type

    Projects

    No projects

    Milestone

    No milestone

    Relationships

    None yet

    Development

    No branches or pull requests

    Issue actions