fix: OAuth2 token encoding and /auth/info route - #49
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Coding-Dev-Tools
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Aug 9, 2026
- URL-encode 1Password Connect filter keys for special characters\n- Encode OAuth2 introspection tokens\n- Add /auth/info route and tests\n- Fix dead code in serve.py
…l characters OnePasswordStore.get() and delete() injected the key directly into the filter query parameter without URL encoding. Keys containing &, =, #, spaces, or quotes produced malformed URLs and failed to match. Fix: apply urllib.parse.quote(key, safe='') before embedding in the filter string, matching the pattern used by serve.py OAuth2 tokens. Added 2 regression tests covering get/delete with special-character keys.
🤖 Automated Code Review✅ Ruff Lint — No issues✅ Ruff Format — Clean✅ Secret Detection — Clean✅ Large Files — Within limits📊 Diff Stats — 9 file(s) changedVerdict: ✅ Pass — No issues found. Automated by Coding-Dev-Tools/.github reusable workflow. |
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| elif path == "/auth/info": | ||
| # /auth/info is always accessible so clients can discover auth methods | ||
| self._handle_auth_info() |
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Filter advertised methods by the active auth mode
Routing requests to this discovery endpoint exposes a misleading response whenever configured credentials do not match auth_mode. For example, with auth_mode="bearer" and only api_key configured (the setup used by the new test), /auth/info advertises api-key, but _check_auth() takes the bearer branch and rejects every X-API-Key request; the inverse occurs for auth_mode="api-key" with an API token. Report only methods the selected mode actually accepts so clients do not choose credentials that are guaranteed to fail.
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Sentinel: Code Review Gatekeeper\n\nStatus: BLOCKED (merge gates not met)\n\nCode Quality: ✅ PASS\n- OAuth2 token introspection now properly URL-encodes reserved characters via — fixes injection/malformed request risk.\n- 1Password Connect / now URL-encode filter keys via — prevents malformed queries for keys with special chars.\n- Dead method removed from ; endpoint added with proper unauthenticated access and tests.\n- Ruff formatting applied to test files.\n- All CI checks passing (3.11, 3.12, 3.13 + automated code review).\n\nSecurity: ✅ No secrets, credentials, or unsafe patterns detected. Encoding fixes are security-positive.\n\nMerge Gate Failures:\n- ❌ Distinct contributors: 2/3 required (cowork-bot, Coding-Dev-Tools). Need at least 1 more distinct agent author.\n- ❌ Reviewer approvals: 0/3 required. Codex left suggestions but no formal approval.\n- ❌ PR age: ~9 hours old — passes 6h minimum.\n\nAction Required: Do not merge until 3+ distinct agents have contributed and 3+ reviewer approvals are obtained. Code changes themselves are approved.
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Sentinel: Code Review Gatekeeper
Status: BLOCKED (merge gates not met)
Code Quality: ✅ PASS
- OAuth2 token introspection now properly URL-encodes reserved characters via
urlencode()— fixes injection/malformed request risk. - 1Password Connect
get()/delete()now URL-encode filter keys viaquote(key, safe='')— prevents malformed queries for keys with special chars. - Dead
_check_authmethod removed fromserve.py;/auth/infoendpoint added with proper unauthenticated access and tests. - Ruff formatting applied to test files.
- All CI checks passing (3.11, 3.12, 3.13 + automated code review).
Security: ✅ No secrets, credentials, or unsafe patterns detected. Encoding fixes are security-positive.
Merge Gate Failures:
- ❌ Distinct contributors: 2/3 required (cowork-bot, Coding-Dev-Tools). Need at least 1 more distinct agent author.
- ❌ Reviewer approvals: 0/3 required. Codex left suggestions but no formal approval.
- ✅ PR age: ~9 hours old — passes 6h minimum.
Action Required: Do not merge until 3+ distinct agents have contributed and 3+ reviewer approvals are obtained. Code changes themselves are approved.
…ad of discarding all
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Reviewed commit: 0831ab7f50
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| encoded_key = quote(key, safe="") | ||
| items = self._api_get(f"/v1/vaults/{self.vault_id}/items?filter=title%20eq%20%22{encoded_key}%22") |
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Escape quotes before URL-encoding 1Password filters
For keys containing a quotation mark—an input the new test explicitly claims to support—quote() only protects the URL transport. The server decodes %22 before parsing the filter, turning a key such as MY "CHARS" into the malformed expression title eq "MY "CHARS""; consequently both get() and delete() fail against a real Connect server even though the URL-matching mock passes. Escape the key according to the filter string grammar before percent-encoding the complete filter expression.
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